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ABSTRACT 
The focus of this study is the Southern African Development Community (SADC) preventive diplomacy 
interventions in Lesotho in 1994, 1998 and 2007. The core aim of the study was to evaluate the efficacy of 
the SADC security mechanism (the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS) in conflict prevention, 
management and resolution on the basis of the Lesotho experience. 
 
Data for this qualitative case study was collected through interviews and document analysis. The twenty 
four participants for the study were drawn from the SADC OPDS unit, Lesotho political parties, Civil Society 
Organisations (CSOs), Academics from the University of Botswana (UB) and the National University of 
Lesotho (NUL), retired Botswana Defence officers who participated in the Lesotho missions and office of 
the post-2007election dispute dialogue facilitator in Lesotho. Documents on the SADC Treaties, Protocols, 
Communiqués and interventions in other set ups were used to highlight its operational policies, mandate, 
structures, successes and challenges. Lesotho was chosen as a case study because SADC employed both 
non-coercive (SADC Troika and Eminent Person mediation, 1994 and 2007 respectively) and coercive 
measures (the 1998 military intervention). 
 
The findings of the study revealed that SADC as a regional body had its own successes and challenges. 
Different perceptions on the SADC interventions in Lesotho emerged mainly between the participants from 
the ruling party and the opposition parties.  While the former commended SADC for successfully mitigating 
the calamitous effects of 1994, 1998 and 2007 post-electoral violence, the opposition parties viewed the 
regional organisations as engaged in illegal interference in the domestic affairs of the country to defend the 
incumbent governing party. It also emerged from the study that the SADC security mechanism has 
numerous structural and operational flaws. There were several unanswered questions revolving around the 
legality and mandate of some of the missions. For instance, no concrete evidence emerged as to whether 
the 1998 military intervention was authorised by the SADC. 
 
The study also revealed that SADC has learnt valuable lessons from the Lesotho missions. Some of the 
reforms which the SADC has introduced in the OPDS such as the establishment of the SADC Stand by 
Force, Early Warning structures, the Mediation Unit, and a panel of expert mediators emanated mainly from 
the Lesotho experiences. 
 
The study recommends that SADC needs to harmonise the efforts of its OPDS structures such as the 
Mediation Unit; the Troika; the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC); the Inter-State 
Politics and Diplomacy Committee (ISPDC) and the Summit of Heads of States and Governments for rapid, 
coherent and well coordinated interventions in future regional preventive missions. 
 
It is also recommended that SADC should focus on identifying and mitigating underlying causal factors 
such as underdevelopment; poverty; deprivation of freedoms, marginalisation and other forms of social 
stratifications and oppression in its preventive diplomacy missions if durable peace is to be achieved in 
Lesotho and any other future cases.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
Overview of the Study 
1.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the background to the study, the problem statement, objectives of the study, research 
questions, significance of the study, theoretical framework, research methodology, scope of the study, limitations and 
a summary outline of each chapter. 
 
1.2 Background to the Study 
This study is an analysis of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) intervention missions in the 
Kingdom of Lesotho in 1994, 1998 and 2007. In order to have a full grasp of the persistent conflicts in Lesotho and 
the resultant SADC interventions, it is imperative to give a picture of how the world, especially post-Cold War Sub-
Saharan Africa, became a centre stage for protracted intra-state conflicts necessitating regional responses and 
solutions by different regional organisationsand solutions. The SADC missions in the Kingdom of Lesotho should be 
located and understood within this global conflict environment. 
 
Throughout history, the world has grappled with conflicts and wars in their different manifestations, intensity, scope 
and consequences. All continents of the world have experienced conflicts in one way or the other. Isard (1992: 1) 
highlights the inevitability of conflicts in human society in his statement that ―[t]he history of human kind and the rise 
and fall of civilisations is unquestionably a story of conflict. Conflict is inherent in human activities. It is 
omnipresent....‖ This is evidenced by conflicts in spite of the existence of international, regional and civil society 
organisations for the maintenance of international peace and security. The sources of conflict in most cases are 
multidimensional and multifaceted, encompassing historical, external and internal social, economic and political 
factors such as the colonial legacy of ill-defined borders, ethnic, religious and cultural marginalisation or domination, 
struggle for limited resources, struggle for power, underdevelopment, crippling indebtedness, globalisation, skewed 
distribution of resources, corruption, undemocratic governance, administrative failures and collapsed states, military 
dictatorships, weak systems and institutions of governance, flawed electoral systems and electoral fraud, erosion of 
the state power and crises of legitimacy in governance. 
 
The post-Cold War era experienced more destructive regionalised intra-state conflicts which threatened global peace 
and stability when numerous conflicts culminating in immense human casualties and material destruction consumed 
different parts of the world. In this regard, Joseph (1999: 9) comments, ―[t]he anticipation of enhanced possibilities for 
international peace, security and co-operation at the end of the Cold War has given way to confusion and 
disillusionment as a result of the intensifying conflicts in parts of Africa, Asia and Europe.‖ Despite the demise of the 
Cold War politics which constrained their interventions, the United Nations Security Council, regional organisations 
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and the international community appear to be paralysed in that they have failed to act decisively in the face of the 
numerous conflicts, as is evident in the conflicts in Bosnia, Kosovo, Somalia, Burundi, Sudan, Rwanda, Angola, 
Uganda, The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Lesotho, Ivory Coast and the Central African Republic to 
mention a few. Lamenting the plight of this conflict-ridden world Annan (2000a: 173) stated that ―[i]f I were a doctor 
examining the health of the world today, I would be greatly alarmed at the state of my patient The international 
community, vibrant in its resolve to achieve a strong, stable and a healthy political environment as the post-Cold War 
began, was drained and weakened by one bout after another of conflict during the last decade... It has had to 
weather the massive displacement of people, extensive loss of life, and irreparable damage which are conflict‘s 
concomitants." 
 
1.3 Conflicts in Africa 
The Sub-Saharan region is the most conflict-ridden area in the world. The post-Cold War period has seen the 
continent becoming the home for the highest number of devastating, deep-seated and intractable intra-state conflicts 
(Azar and Moon 1988, Onyeani 1990, Buzan 1991, Chabal 1992, Annan 1998, 2000a, 2005, Adedeji 1999, Adebayo 
and Gelin-Adam 1999, Rugumamu 2002, Field 2004, Cilliers 2004, Commission on Human Security 2005, Dindelo 
2006, Swart 2008). The consensus among different scholars on conflict is that ―Africa is in crisis‖ (Chabal 1994: 3). 
The ―[i]nsecurity and instability in much of Africa has become a single complex interrelated problem that is an intrinsic 
part of the debate about the nature or capability of the African state‖ (Cilliers 2004: 21). 
 
In the last decade conflicts have been raging in Lesotho, Sudan, Ivory Coast, Uganda, the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo, Chad, and Somalia; border disputes were looming between Nigeria and Cameroon over the Bakassi 
Peninsula (the contested territory, has since been handed to Cameroon in 2006), Ethiopia and Eritrea, Botswana and 
Namibia over Sedudu Islands, (the dispute was resolved by the International Court of Justice at the Hague), 
secessionist conflicts looming in Nigeria the Niger Delta), Senegal (Casamance), Ethiopia, and Namibia (Caprivi 
Strip) and latent conflicts due to autocratic regimes in Zimbabwe and Swaziland. North Africa experienced political 
upheavals in the opening months of 2011 culminating in the collapse of long-time autocratic regimes in Tunisia, 
Libya, and Egypt. Sorbo (1999: 199) highlights the image of Africa as a continent in which many states are 
―candidates for state collapse or civil war and (in which) there are a host of other countries where present low level 
ethnic and political conflicts remain unresolved.‖ 
 
The SADC region did not escape this scourge that bedevilled most regions of Africa. Southern Africa experienced 
devastating anti-colonial wars in Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa. After attaining their 
independence in 1975, Angola and Mozambique were ravaged by more than two decades of civil war. Both the wars 
were fuelled by the Cold War ideological rivalry between the East and the West and it was very difficult to find a 
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lasting solution. Lesotho, which is the case study in this thesis, has also faced incessant post- election conflicts since 
attaining independence in 1966. The 1970 elections were won by the opposition Basotholand Congress Party (BCP), 
and the incumbent Basotho National Party (BNP) hijacked the democratic dispensation by launching a coup, banning 
the opposition parties and forcing their leaders into exile. The dictatorial regime of Leabua Jonathan polluted the 
political climate in the region until it was halted by a military coup sponsored by apartheid South Africa. This was 
mainly because the Leabua Jonathan government did not comply with the apartheid regime‘s directives such as 
expelling the liberation activists from Lesotho and signing non-aggression pacts with South Africa (Matlosa, 1993, 
1995). The landlocked Kingdom of Losotho went through a process of democratisation with multi-party elections in 
1993 and 1998 won by the BCP and the Lesotho Coongress for Democracy (LCD) respectively. The election 
triggered violent confrontations with the losing parties contesting the elections as fraudulent. The 1993 and 1998 
elections were followed by coups launched by the monarchy, the military and opposition parties. The electoral model, 
the First Past the Post (FPTP) did not help the situation as it promoted winner takes all. In this situation, the 
opposition, which was voted for by a significant portion, felt marginalised as far as representation in parliament was 
concerned. Lesotho also went for national elections in 2007 through a new electoral model, the Mixed Member 
Proportion (MMP), but some political parties defrauded the model by forming alliances with smaller parties. In so 
doing, they distorted the proportional allocation of seats in parliament, leading to upheavals in which the opposition 
protested that the ruling LCD government had contravened the MMP regulation. These conflicts in Lesotho attracted 
the attention of SADC, which intervened in 1994, 1998 and 2007. During 1994 and 2007, SADC intervened through 
non-coercive means while in 1998; the regional body launched a military operation to restore law and order in the 
Kingdom. 
 
These wars as will be indicated later in the study had devastating and catastrophic social, economic and political 
effects on the continent. All the above conflicts have constrained Africa‘s development efforts and growth potential. 
There is an indisputable link between political stability and economic development. Economic prosperity cannot be 
realised in a conflict-ridden continent like Africa, as the already limited resources are diverted from productive use to 
sponsoring the war effort, and the obvious disruptions of conflicts on the economic activities. The conflicts also 
resulted in fragmentation of several African states, for example, Somalia, Sudan, Angola, Liberia, Sierra Leone and 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Another worrying trend of African conflicts is that they have become 
regionalised and spread to destabilise several countries in the continent, for example the Great Lakes region (the 
DRC, Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda), West Africa (Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea and Ivory Coast) and the Horn of Africa 
(Somalia, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Sudan). Therefore, they may require regional solutions (Zartman 1989, Annan 1998, 
Adedeji 1999, Adebayo and Gelin-Adam 1999, de Waal 2003, International Crisis Group Africa Report No 62, 2003, 
Ajulu, 2004). This position is justified in view of the ineffective and indecisive interventions by the United Nations and 
the international community in African conflicts. Joseph (1999: 9) summarises the inaction by the developed world 
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thus; ―[i]n Africa, it appears that the more intense and destructive the conflicts ...the greater the paralysis of 
international community in acting decisively to bring an end to the violence.‖ Worse still, according to Rugumamu 
(2002), while the international community paid less attention to the turbulent security crisis in Africa, the continental 
institutional and organisational conflict prevention, management and resolution capabilities have not developed at the 
same rate to counter the pervasive and escalating conflicts. It is in this light that it has become increasingly apparent 
and necessary that Africa should muster its resources and political will and commitment, to develop its capacity to 
deal with its growing and destructive security realities. In line with this, regional organisations formed security organs 
to intervene in their regional conflicts, as evidenced by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 
in Liberia and Sierra Leone and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in the (DRC), Lesotho and 
Zimbabwe. 
 
In this study, the SADC preventive missions of 1994, 1998 and 2007 in the Kingdom of Lesotho will be used as case 
studies to examine the efficacy and capabilities of the SADC‘s preventive diplomacy mechanism in preventing, 
managing and resolving regional conflicts. The SADC is an inter-governmental body comprising mainly Southern 
African states and a few others outside the geographical region such as Tanzania, the DRC, Mauritius and the 
Seychelles. The regional block was formed in April 1980 as the Southern African Development Coordination 
Conference (SADCC) to coordinate economic development and integration among the independent Southern African 
states of Zambia, Tanzania, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Mozambique and Angola. SADCC was later joined by 
Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa after they had attained their independence.  In the 1980‘s, the regional body‘s 
political solidarity and support to those countries which were struggling for their independence was championed 
through its political wing; the Frontline States. Apartheid South African destabilisation incursions in the regional 
member states drove them to form a solid economic and political bulwark against the pariah state. The post-Cold war 
era political climate forced the regional body to redefine its objectives and operational institutions. In 1992 at its 
Windhoek Summit of Head of States and Governments, the SADC Treaty was signed by member states, 
transforming it from a co-ordination conference to a development community. The realisation that economic 
development can only be achieved in an atmosphere of peace and stability moved the regional body to form the 
SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS) in 1996. The Organ and Mutual Defence Pact (MDP) 
protocols were ratified in 2001 and 2003 respectively. The Organ and MDP were bolstered by the establishment of 
the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) and the Inter-State Politics and Diplomacy Committee 
(ISPDC) in their cardinal task of promoting, maintaining and sustaining regional peace and security. The regional 
body pledged to intervene through peaceful diplomatic means in both regional intra and inter-state conflicts. It also 
emphasised the need for the use of coercive measures as a last resort where peaceful means failed or where gross 
violation of human rights and genocide was perpetrated.  
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As will be indicated in detail in chapters five and six, SADC intervened in the DRC, Zimbabwe, and Madagascar and 
Lesotho conflicts through both coercive and non-coercive measures. The SADC interventions of 1994, 1998 and 
2007 in Lesotho in the current study are used as a case study to determine the efficacy of the regional block‘s 
preventive diplomacy mechanism. The Lesotho case has been chosen because it was in Lesotho that SADC 
intervened through both coercive and non-coercive measures. As such, it was envisaged that Lesotho could be a 
reasonable case to determine the regional block‘s strengths and weaknesses in regional peacemaking, 
peacekeeping and peace-building operations. 
 
1.4 Preventive Diplomacy; Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution 
Several scholars on conflict concur on the inevitability of conflicts in human society. However, what is of importance 
is not whether conflict is indispensable but how conflicts can be prevented, managed and resolved, or what 
institutions can be put in place for the resolution of conflict. As Darby asserts ―the real issue is not the existence of 
conflict but how it is handled‖ (cited in Stewart 1998: 13). War is a practical problem that requires appropriate theory 
and mechanisms for understanding, mastering and dealing with it (Sandole 1999, Adedeji 1999). These positions 
emanate from the fact that conflict seems to be a permanent feature of human society and it cannot be totally 
eradicated, but measures can be taken to contain their persistence and mitigate their terrible outcomes. The 
experience of World War One and World War Two have been an eye opener to the international community on the 
importance of establishing international and regional organisations to maintain international peace and security. The 
League of Nations (1918-1939) and the United Nations (UN) organisation are the two international organisations that 
were formed at different historical epochs to shoulder the task of maintaining international peace through preventive 
diplomacy. The concept of preventive diplomacy was coined by a former UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskold 
during the Cold War in order to deter the escalation of conflict with the danger of involving the heavily armed and 
polarised East-West blocks. The concept was later broadened by another UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-
Ghali to embrace regional and international efforts to thwart the outbreak of conflict (conflict prevention), escalation or 
spread of conflict where they occurred (conflict management) and the recurrence of conflict where they were 
addressed (conflict resolution). Preventive diplomacy may be through coercive measures (military intervention, 
economic sanctions, cutting of diplomatic relations, isolation, expulsion) and non-military measures (peace envoys, 
peace and good offices missions, pledges for economic and political assistance, reconstruction and many other 
reconciliation and rehabilitation measures). However, efficient application of preventive diplomacy has remained 
elusive as conflicts rage on in spite of the UN‘s attempts, in partnership with the regional organisations, at addressing 
them. 
 
As an international organisation, the UN, through the Security Council, is responsible for the maintenance of global 
peace and security. From a global perspective, the UN is seen as the only institution with depth, width and a unique 
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claim on legitimate authority and mandate on international peace and security (Henrikson 1995, Doyle 1998, Annan 
1998, Van Nieuwkerk 2000). Since its inception, the UN has been engaged in conflict prevention, management and 
resolution in different parts of the globe and has roped in the assistance of regional organisations and civil society 
organisations in its bid to eradicate the misery caused by conflicts in human society. 
 
In Africa, numerous UN Peacekeeping missions were instituted albeit with varying successes and challenges. Some 
of the missions were in the Congo (1960s), Namibia (the United Nations Transitional Assistance Group) 1990, 
Mozambique 1994, Liberia (the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNAMIL), Sierra Leone (the United Nations 
Mission in Sierra Leone, (UNAMSIL) Angola (the United Nations Verification Mission in Angola), Somalia (the United 
Nations Mission in Somalia (UNISOM) and in the DRC (United Nations Mission in Congo). 
 
However, as successive UN Secretary Generals have observed, the task of maintaining international peace is a 
mammoth and overwhelming challenge. Conflicts have erupted and persisted in spite of the UN‘s efforts. The 
multidimensional and complex nature of today‘s conflicts requires partnership between the UN and different regional 
organisations (Ghali 1992, 1995, Henrikson 1995, Rothchild 2000, Berman 2000, Annan 1998, Adebayo and Gelin-
Adam 1999, Adedeji 1999, Berman 2000, International Peace Academy 2001). Thus the United Nations Charter 
chapter viii (Articles 51-54) accommodated the formation of regional organisations (arrangements) to complement the 
UN efforts in international peacekeeping as they have a comparative advantage in their respective regions. 
Subsequently, in accordance with the United Nations Charter, numerous regional organisations emerged in different 
continents for collective action in economic, political and security challenges within their respective regional zones. 
Some of the regional organisations which emerged are North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), Comecon (the 
WARSAW PACT), the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) (now the African Union), Organisation of American States 
(OAS), the European Union (EU), the Association of South East Asian States (ASEAN), the Arab League and many 
others including the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC), the Common Market for East and Southern Africa, (COMESA), and the Inter-governmental 
Authority on Development (IGAD). These regional organisations have established security organs in their founding 
treaties and security protocols to ensure peace and security in their respective regions through preventive diplomacy. 
For example, the SADC treaty and its protocols for the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS) and the 
Mutual Defence Pact (MDP) pledge to collectively address regional conflicts through preventive diplomacy measures. 
 
Most of these organisations in the Third World were formed in the 1970s and 1980s mainly with an economic 
agenda. The operations of these organisations were constrained and even shaped by the Cold War bipolar politics. 
For example the SADC could not effectively intervene and resolve conflicts in Angola and Mozambique because the 
different parties in the conflicts were backed by the then Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the United 
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States of America (USA) to serve their conflicting ideological interests (Boutrous Ghali, 1992, 1995, Schulz, 
Soderbaum and Ojendal 2001, International Peace Academy 2001, Berman 2000, Levit 2003, Adebayo and Gelin-
Adam 1999, and Rothchild 2001, Hurrell and Fawcett 1995, Henrikson 1995, Nathan 1995, Field 2004, Ngoma 
2005). Boutrous Ghali conceded in his report ―An Agenda for Peace‖ that the ideological tensions between the East 
and West, coupled with the veto power wielded by the permanent members of the Security Council hampered the UN 
in its task of maintaining world peace. This has resulted in protracted conflicts especially in Third Word countries 
such as in Angola, Mozambique, Afghanistan, Cambodia, South Africa and Namibia. In this sense, regional countries 
did not see the necessity and incentives for co-operation or making peace with each other as long as they enjoyed 
financial and military support from the two ideological blocks. In fact, according to some observers, the US and 
Europe often acted to undermine regional integration, as they believed it would limit and constrain their roles as 
power brokers.  
 
The end of the Cold War in the 1990s heralded in a period of new regionalism in which the existing regional 
organisations reorganised themselves in content, scope, structure and purpose. They became multidimensional in 
their approach to the social, economic, political and security ills engulfing their regions. The post-Cold War political 
order demands new approaches to conflict resolution that are a precondition for economic and social development, 
democratisation and good governance (USIP 1994, Hettne and Soderbaum 1998, Schulz, Soderbaum and Ojendal 
2001, Terriff, Croft, James and Morgan 2004, Buzan 1990). In Africa, leaders and governments became more 
committed to reorganising and consolidating regional organisations due to two factors. Of utmost importance was the 
realisation that the demise of the Cold War politics also marked the loss of Africa‘s strategic value to the Western 
governments, and by extension, the United Nations Security Council. The disengagement of superpowers from the 
African continent was marked by the eruption of numerous intra-state conflicts. The undemocratic regimes which 
prevailed during the Cold War era due to the backing of superpowers collapsed under internal resistance and 
uprisings. Many other conflicts erupted as a result of the vacuum created by the evacuation of the superpowers.  
 
Secondly the end of the Cold War was marked by calculated reluctance by Western powers and the Security Council 
in committing military resources for intervention in the escalating conflicts in Africa (Rugumamu 2002). This was 
mainly experienced after the 1991 abortive UN intervention in Somalia and the indifference of the international 
community and the UN during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. Western governments started sponsoring the policy of 
―African solutions to African problems.‖  The shift was also reflected by Western powers initiatives to enhance African 
peacekeeping capabilities by providing military training to African peacekeeping forces to take over the responsibility 
for peace and security in the continent. This came in the form of training a Rapid Reaction Force (RRF), the African 
Crises Response Initiative (ACRI) by the USA, the Reinforcement of African Capabilities for Peacekeeping 
(RECAMP) by France, and a variety of other military initiatives by Britain and other European powers. The United 
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States of America Congress passed the African Conflict Resolution Act of 1994 calling for the provision of material 
and technical assistance to institutionalize African conflict resolution capabilities (USIP 1994, Berman 2000, Adebayo 
and Gelin- Adam 1999, Miall etal. 2001, Levit 2003, International Peace Academy 2001, 2002, Mortimer 2000, Martin 
2002, Rugumamu 2002, de Waal 2003). 
 
In view of this reluctance and disengagement by the international community and the Security Council, African 
leaders and governments realised the cardinal responsibility of maintaining peace through re-organisation of regional 
organisations in the continent. The above stated sentiments were shared by the co-ordinator of the defunct Conflict 
Prevention and Research Division of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), William Nhara, that ―[r]egional 
organisations should realise that there is a need to take on the primary responsibility for their own problems 
especially those relating to issues of peace, security and stability. This is necessary as Africa‘s partners are 
increasingly less enthusiastic about sharing its problems‖ (cited in Herbst 2000: 310). 
 
African regional organisations established security mechanisms for prevention, management and resolution of 
conflicts in their respective regions. For example, in 1993, the OAU which for decades dismally failed to stem 
conflicts in the continent established the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, formation 
of a more revitalised continental organisation, the African Union and its Peace and Security Council unrestricted by 
its predecessor‘s principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states. ECOWAS established a 
peace-keeping force, the ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) and the Mechanism for Conflict 
Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security in 1998, through which the organisation 
successfully intervened and restored peace and stability in Liberia and Sierra Leone in 1993 and 1998 respectively. 
The Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) developed a programme on Conflict Prevention, 
Resolution and Management in its zone. The organisation was instrumental in mediating conflicts in Sudan and 
Somalia. While in 1992 at the Windhoek Summit, the SADC Treaty was signed and SADCC transformed to SADC 
with broadened objectives and operational mandates. It was buttressed by the entrance of South Africa which had 
attained majority rule in 1994 after decades of apartheid tyranny and regional destabilisation. In 1996 it formed the 
Organ on Politics, Defence and Security which was tasked with security issues in the region. Through its preventive 
diplomacy mechanism, the SADC intervened to restore stability in the DRC, Zimbabwe and Lesotho in 1994, 1998 
and 2007. All these changes reflect African countries‘ commitments to combating conflicts through regional 
organisations (Joseph 1999, Levit 2003, Berman 2000, Adebayo and Adam 1999, Field 2004, Van Nieuwkerk 2000, 
Ngoma 2005, International Peace academy 2000, 2001, 2002, Onyango 2002, Nathan 1995, Malan and Cilliers 
1997, de Coning 1999, Collier 1999, De Vries 1999). As Joseph correctly noted: ―[t]he first responsibility for mitigating 
conflicts in Africa should be with the Africans themselves and their collective organisations‖ (1999: 10). In fact, the 
United States Institute (1994) suggested a division of labour in which regional organisations would focus on conflict 
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prevention and peacemaking while the UN focuses on peacekeeping and peace enforcement. This scenario would 
ensure active involvement of regional structures in conflict mediation, resulting in ownership of the outcomes and 
effects which are necessary ingredients in conflict resolution. 
 
Furthermore, African leaders have always expressed a keen willingness to play a leading role in the prevention, 
management and resolution of their own problems, as embedded in the Pan Africanist ideology. Herbst (2000: 309) 
presents this sentiment thus: ―within Africa there had always been a desire to have African-led interventions…foreign 
military interventions by ex-colonial powers and others highlighted the fragility of the newly won political power and 
served to strengthen the historic memory of colonial domination,‖ that is, by pooling the continental resources for the 
resolution of the continent‘s problems without relying on external sources. Although it did not achieve the goal, the 
Organisation of African Unity was founded on the Pan African ideology in 1963 to struggle for social, economic, 
political and security independence in Africa. Henrikson (1995) mentions how the organisation wanted to Africanise 
the 1960 Congo crisis through a commission of 10 OAU members led by the first President of Kenya, Jomo Kenyatta, 
but failed due to interventions by Britain, USA and Belgium.  
 
In the first decade of the twenty-first century there are many African leaders such as the former Presidents of Nigeria 
and South Africa, Obassanjo and Mbeki respectively, who championed what Mazrui termed ―Pax Africana‖ a doctrine 
that Africa should stop depending on the international community to resolve their conflicts, but must marshal the 
continent‘s resources and resolve to shoulder the responsibility of African solutions to African problems. As the 
former OAU Secretary, General Salim Ahmed Salim, noted in his keynote address to the International Peace 
Academy at the Vienna Seminar (1995) on Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution, the prime role of regional 
organisations is to ―devise regional solutions to regional problems and should take primary ownership of their 
problems‖ (cited in Joseph, 1999: 11). In a bid for continental sovereignty in management of its affairs, Mbeki 
championed the idea of African Renaissance, while Obasanjo proposed a Conference on Security, Stability, 
Development and Cooperation through which Africans can dialogue over the problems bedevilling the continent 
including conflicts. The two leaders were also at the forefront in championing the establishment of the African Union 
and the New Partnership for Africa‘s Development (NEPAD) all of which are geared towards development of the 
African continent‘s political, military and economic capability to address its problems. It was within this framework that 
the NEPAD Abuja meeting of African Heads of States in October 2001 resolved that ―African leaders have learnt from 
their own experiences that peace, security, democracy, good governance, human rights and sound economic 
management are conditions for sustainable development…‖ and they pledged ―to work, both individually and 
collectively to promote these principles in their countries, sub-regions and the continent‖ at large (cited in Cilliers 
2004: v).  
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It is therefore argued that a study on the role of regional organisations in conflict prevention, management and 
resolution (in which the SADC interventions in Lesotho fall) is necessary because most of the African conflicts today 
are intra-state and regionalised in origin, character and effects as evidenced in West Africa, (Liberia, Guinea–Bissau, 
Sierra Leone, Ivory Coast), the Horn of Africa region, (Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea; Sudan), the Great Lakes region, 
(Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi). Regional organisations would be best suited for 
timely interventions as they are the most immediately affected by the spill-over effects of the conflicts. It would be in 
their urgent interest to mitigate conflicts and preserve regional peace, security and stability. One other important 
advantage is that regional members are in a better position to comprehend the historical, cultural and contextual 
dynamics of the conflict, which may result in fruitful dialogue and resolution of the conflict based on regional and 
leaders‘ personal trust (Henriksen 1995, Mortimer 1999, Hettne 2001, Rugumamu 2002, International Peace 
Academy, 2002). Among other things, the end of the Cold War has brought about fundamental shifts in global and 
regional alignments, definitions and thinking on security. The new security thinking is no longer restricted to military 
matters. It embraces a wide range of non-military issues such as human security, human rights, environmental 
protection, democracy and good governance, and economic security, some of which require regional approaches 
and solutions (Buzan 1991, Nathan 1995, Archaya 1994, Vita 2001, Rugumamu 2002, Munyae 2000, Terriff etal. 
2004, Swart and du Plessis 2004, Solomon 2004, Hammestard 2004, Ngoma 2005). In their reports, the UN 
Secretary Generals Ghali (1992, 1995) and Kofi Annan (1998) lamented the untapped potentials of regional 
organisations in the maintenance of world peace and security. They pleaded the imperative necessity of partnership 
between the UN and regional organisations in combating conflicts and building durable global peace. The SADC 
interventions in Lesotho in 1994, 1998 and 2007 should be viewed within this post-Cold War political climate. 
 
Although there is relative peace in the SADC region, after the demise of apartheid in South Africa, conflicts are 
looming, threatening regional peace and stability in several countries. The region faces the challenges of the 
economic and political crisis in Zimbabwe and Madagascar, and the latent political crisis against King Mswati‘s 
autocratic regime in Swaziland. The DRC has been enmeshed in conflict since 1997 and the situation has not fully 
stabilised. Lesotho has experienced post-election violence since independence in 1966, and despite SADC‘s past 
intervention, the political atmosphere remains volatile as the Kingdom prepares for national elections in 2012.  
 
Therefore, this study seeks to examine the efficacy of SADC‘s preventive diplomacy machinery in view of the 
Lesotho interventions of 1994, 1998 and 2007. The study analyses SADC, in terms of its structures, strategies, 
political commitments, successes, challenges encountered, lessons learnt and future prospects for resolving regional 
conflicts. This investigation emanates from differences among the SADC member states that resulted in 
uncoordinated and disjointed interventions in the DRC and Lesotho by different camps of the SADC community. It 
was not clear whether it was SADC or individual countries‘ interventions. This left a cloud of suspicion hanging over 
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the legality of the missions as regional peace operations. The study intends to establish whether SADC has a 
functioning security mechanism that can deal with the security challenges of the post-Cold War world. This is 
premised on the fact that the regional organisation seems to lack a clear basis on how and when to effectively apply 
its preventive diplomacy mechanism. The continued post-electoral conflicts in Lesotho despite the SADC preventive 
missions raise questions on the efficacy of the regional organisations‘ preventive diplomacy mechanism, application 
modalities and post-conflict peace-building measures. The study therefore seeks to establish why the application of 
preventive diplomacy has been so elusive in the Lesotho conflict context. 
 
1.5 Research Problem 
―If it is not clear what causes and conditions of war are, or how war can be prevented or otherwise dealt with, then 
war is a research problem‖ (Sandole 1999: 1). The SADC region was one of the most turbulent regions during the 
Cold War. The region experienced liberation wars in Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa. 
Although the post-Cold War period saw relative peace in Mozambique, Angola and South Africa. However, the region 
has not enjoyed durable peace. In fact, Lesotho, which is the focus of the current research, has never enjoyed peace 
since attaining independence from Britain in 1966. The country has been beset by numerous post-election conflicts 
as experienced in 1966, 1970, 1994, 1998 and 2007. The SADC treaty has pledged to employ preventive diplomacy 
in preventing, managing and resolving regional conflicts. As such, the regional organisation has intervened in the 
DRC, Zimbabwe, Madagascar and Lesotho. It is in Lesotho that the SADC preventive diplomacy mechanism was 
mainly engaged. In the 1994 and 2007 preventive interventions; the SADC employed non-coercive diplomacy while 
in the 1998 it employed coercive measures through military intervention. However, in spite of SADC‘s preventive 
missions, peace and stability remain elusive. Lesotho remains volatile as SADC appears to have failed to 
comprehensively address the structural sources of conflicts prevalent in the country despite its three preventive 
diplomacy missions. 
 
The current study is based on the assumption that regional organisations should play a leading role in preventing, 
managing and resolving conflicts and threats to security in their respective regions. This is because most of the 
African conflicts have become so regionalised that regional institutions would best address them before outside 
intervention is instituted. It is also believed that regional bodies are well placed for intervention in regional conflicts 
because they command better knowledge of the historical and cultural context of the conflicts. The experience of 
SADC in Lesotho, despite the hiccups encountered, provides lessons that regional organisations are capable of 
restoring peace and stability in their respective zones through preventive diplomacy. Further to that, several African 
countries such as Nigeria, Ghana, Senegal, Botswana, South Africa, and Tanzania have participated in the United 
Nations Peacekeeping missions and can carry the experiences and lessons acquired to their regional organisations‘ 
peace missions. It is further envisaged that the United Nations should come in at the invitation of, or to complement 
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the efforts of, regional bodies. As the United States Institute of Peace recommended in its 1994 Symposium, 
―Africans should determine under what conditions it is helpful to have the international community engage in conflict 
resolution efforts‖ (cited in Joseph, 1999: 10-11). 
 
Of utmost significance is to what extent regional organisations, especially in Africa, have resources, institutional 
capabilities and political will to effectively address the security issues in their regional spheres. The SADC, which is 
the focus of this study, has displayed numerous implementation and operational flaws in resolving its regional 
security challenges, as reflected in Zimbabwe, the DRC and Lesotho. The study investigates why peace has eluded 
Lesotho despite three SADC preventive missions, and also what lessons should be drawn from the Lesotho 
experience. 
 
1.6 Objectives of the Study 
 The research aims and objectives of a study denote a ―broader, more abstract conception of the end towards which 
effort or ambition is directed‖ (de Vos, 2005: 104). This study therefore seeks to analyse SADC‘s preventive 
diplomacy modus operandi in Lesotho to determine its efficacy, successes, and challenges, and determine how it 
could be transformed into a security mechanism for effective prevention, management and resolution of conflicts in 
the region. The gist is to find out whether SADC has an effective conflict prevention, management, resolution and 
post-conflict peace-building mechanism, in view of the Lesotho experience.  
The study therefore aims to: 
 Analyse the SADC preventive diplomacy missions of 1994, 1998 and 2007 in the Kingdom of Lesotho. 
 Assess the efficacy of the SADC preventive diplomacy mechanism in conflict prevention, management and 
resolution during the Lesotho interventions.  
 Examine the challenges faced by the SADC during its preventive diplomacy missions in Lesotho. 
 Establish the lessons learnt by the SADC from its Lesotho preventive missions. 
 Explore recommendations on how some of the challenges can be resolved. 
 
1.7 Research Questions 
Research questions are pivotal to the research process in that apart from providing the research focus, they guide 
the search and review of literature, the conceptual and theoretical framework, the choice of research methods and 
data analysis instruments, and the structure and presentation of the research findings (Bryman 2001). As Yin 
(1994:20-21) indicates, questions such as ―who, what, where, how and why‖ provide an important clue regarding the 
most relevant research strategy to be used. 
 
 
 13 
 
The study therefore seeks to answer the following questions: 
 To what extent were the SADC interventions of 1994, 1998 and 2007 in Lesotho justified or necessary? 
 Have the SADC preventive diplomacy missions of 1994, 1998 and 2007 in Lesotho been a success or failure? 
 What challenges were encountered by the SADC during its preventive diplomacy missions in Lesotho? 
 What lessons has the SADC learnt (should have learnt) from the Lesotho missions? 
 
1.8 Significance of the Study 
 Cox (1981: 128) notes that ―[k]nowledge is always for someone and for some purpose.‖ Generally, this study is 
considered significant as it was conducted during the post-Cold War period when most parts of the Third World, 
particularly Africa, is afflicted by numerous protracted, devastating and regionalised conflicts. Of paramount 
importance is the fact that the SADC region is faced with several security threats and challenges, as is evident in the 
DRC, Zimbabwe, Madagascar and Swaziland. The study is also conducted within the established political reality that 
the Security Council‘s peacekeeping efforts in the continent have drastically dwindled. The international community 
and the United Nations have shifted the responsibility of maintaining regional peace and security to the different 
regional organisations. As Archaya (1994: 79) correctly observes, ―[t]he end of the Cold War has brought about 
fundamental shifts in global and regional alignments calling for new approaches to peace and security.‖ The 
reluctance by the international community has sharpened African leaders‘ resolve to take the responsibility of 
peacekeeping and security in the continent by strengthening regional organisations‘ security mechanisms to conduct 
preventive diplomacy and peacekeeping missions. The establishment of the SADC, OPDS and Security and 
subsequently the MDP, took place in response to the above stated dynamics in international politics and governance. 
Therefore, the study‘s findings will be of significance to the following: 
 African regional organisations, particularly the SADC, by provision of strategies and mechanisms of conflict 
prevention, management and resolution (preventive diplomacy. 
 Regional organisations, policy makers and planners, peace and conflict resolution practitioners and preventive 
diplomacy institutional and security administrators through information on strategies and measures for 
effective prevention, management and resolution of conflicts. 
 The SADC security establishments in peacekeeping missions as it will establish where they went wrong and 
provide recommendations on what they should have done in view of the Lesotho missions. 
 Civil society organisations on what role they should play along regional organisations in conflict prevention, 
management and resolution. 
 Academics and peace practitioners as it will provoke further (future) research on the regional organisations‘ 
preventive diplomacy engagements in other regions and conflict situations. 
 Finally it is hoped the study will augment available research and information bases on regional security 
issues, particularly in the SADC region. Nathan (2004) and Ngoma (2005) have lamented the existence of a 
 14 
 
gap in the academic literature on international security, as it frequently ignores Southern Africa. It is envisaged 
that this study will contribute some insights and close some of the informational gaps existing in the available 
literature. 
 
1.9 Theoretical Framework 
Theories play a pivotal role in the organisation and conduct of research in different disciplines. In this study, theories 
on the causes, prevention, management and resolution of conflicts and regional integration and preventive diplomacy 
were used to provide the framework for comprehension of the causal factors of conflicts and how they can be 
resolved. Since the causes of conflicts are multifaceted, and conflict is dynamic and dictated by a broad range of 
contextual factors, the theories on understanding the sources of conflicts and how they can be resolved will also 
require multidimensional and multi-levelled theories and perspectives. In this study, different theoretical perspectives 
and positions were employed to explain the multiplicity of conflict causal factors and instruments for their resolution. 
This was motivated by the fact that there is no single unified theory of conflict which can sufficiently embrace the 
multi-faceted sources of conflict in their diverse forms and manifestations. The theories employed in this study ―do 
not explain why wars occur by any simple formula because they acknowledge that war is a multi-causal 
phenomenon. They point to various ways in which background conditions of many kinds, unexpected chance 
coincidences and war-conducive mechanisms of different sorts combine leading to outbreak of wars‖ (Suganami 
1996: 7-8). Each theoretical framework has its strengths and weaknesses. The different theories therefore 
complement each other in providing a comprehensive understanding of conflicts and how they can best be 
prevented, managed and resolved (Azar 1990a, Vasquez 1993, Suganami 1996, Miall etal 2001, du Pisani 2001). 
For example, Azar (1990a) notes that orthodox theories are flawed in that they tend to focus only on overt and violent 
conflicts at the expense of covert, latent and non-violent conflicts. Such theories will therefore be complemented by 
other theories which focus on the latent and non-violent conflicts. The process of triangulating the different theoretical 
positions will enhance the validity and authenticity of the research findings. Furthermore, ―[i]t cannot be known in 
advance which perspective is correct. The scientific utility of these different perspectives can only be assessed in 
light of their ability to generate a fruitful research program that culminate in an accurate and explanatory powerful 
theory‖ (Vasquez 1993: 23). 
 
In light of the above, different theoretical perspectives on the origins, causal conditions of conflict and what 
preventive instruments to employ in resolving each conflict situation, are explored in detail. The theoretical categories 
are as follows: the individual characteristics (biological/psychological theories) which comprise the frustration-
aggression theory; the basic human needs theory and the attribution theory; the social processes theories comprising 
symbolic interactionalism (interactional theory), the functionalist theory and the social structural theories comprising 
the Marxist-class and the Realist/Neo-realist theories. Each theory provides a position on the sources of conflict and 
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suggests strategies on how to resolve conflict. The discussions of conflict in Lesotho and how the SADC intervened 
to resolve them will be premised within these theoretical perspectives. The theories on regional integration have 
provided a framework on factors, motivations and conditions necessary for regional integration. They also illustrate 
the different types and patterns of regional integration. It is within these theoretical frameworks that the evolution of 
the SADC and its preventive diplomacy mechanism, conflict prevention, management and resolution missions are 
discussed. The selected theories are Realism/neo-realism theory, the structural interdependence and globalisation 
theory, functionalism, neo-liberal institutionalism, constructivism, the security complex/regime/community theory and 
the new regionalism theory. The evolution of the SADC and its operational structures and protocols will be discussed 
within the above stated theories. 
 
The theories on conflict, preventive diplomacy, regional integration and organisations mapped out the terrain within 
which the research findings were organised and analysed to find answers to questions on the origins of conflict and 
how they can be resolved. As Yin (1994) observes, the researcher should be aware of the full range of theories that 
may be relevant to his or her study. 
 
1.10 Research Methodology 
The study employs a descriptive, explanatory and analytic qualitative case study approach in the collection, analysis 
and interpretation of data on the SADC preventive interventions in Lesotho. The merit of the qualitative-case study 
research envisioned in this study is that it ―seeks to maximise the range of specific information that can be obtained 
from and about that context, by purposely selecting locations and informants that differ from one another‖ (Babbie 
and Mouton: 2003: 277). A qualitative approach is employed to develop an in-depth understanding and meaning of 
the context (Bryman 2001, Potter 2006, Babbie and Mouton 2006). A qualitative approach was also chosen because 
it is naturalistic and grounded on the researcher‘s interpretative faculties of the social world. Researchers ―study 
people in their ordinary settings, analyse what they have heard and seen and then convey to others in rich and 
realistic detail, the experiences and perspectives of those being studied‖ (Rubin and Rubin 2005: 30). Therefore, 
since this is a qualitative study, the aspects of reliability and validity are not central as in quantitative studies. It is the 
credibility, trustworthiness and authenticity of the data as interpreted and bolstered by ‖thick‖ information as provided 
by the participants which is pivotal in qualitative studies (Guba and Lincoln 1985, Cresswell 1994, Bryman 2001, 
Ezzy, 2000, Babbie and Mouton 2006). In addition it is based on the belief that ―reality is socially constructed and that 
the goal of the social scientist is to understand what meanings people give to reality, not to determine how reality 
works apart from these interpretations‖ (Shutt (2006: 43).  
 
Data for this study was collected through in-depth semi-structured interviews on the SADC preventive missions in 
Lesotho. Interviews were chosen because they allow open conversations between the interviewee and the 
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interviewer. The interview also provides insights from the interviewees‘ gestures and expressions, an advantage 
which cannot be obtained through other data collection instruments. Twenty-four participants for the study were 
purposively selected from the SADC Headquarters (mainly from the SADC, OPDS, from representatives of different 
political parties in Lesotho, the monarchy, retired BDF offiers, academics, Non-Governmental Organisations such as 
the Lesotho Council of Non-Governmental Organisations (LCNGO), the Christian Council of Lesotho (CCL) and the 
office of the former President of Botswana, Sir Ketumile Masire, all of which were involved in the Lesotho conflicts at 
different levels to find a lasting peace in the Kingdom.  
 
Data was also obtained through the study of document sources such as the SADC policy documents, archival 
records, records of the conferences and summits, books, journals, academic papers, Internet and the print media on 
conflicts and preventive diplomacy by different regional organisations with particular focus on the SADC missions in 
Lesotho. Sources on how the SADC interacted with the Lesotho government; political parties and non-governmental 
organisations and how they also interacted among themselves in their bid to resolve the conflicts in Lesotho were 
obtained from the Transformation Resource Centre and representatives of political parties in Lesotho. The merits of 
documents are that they provide an overview and details of events on the subject under investigation which might not 
be available from other instruments such as interviews. As such, data from documents may be invaluable in 
confirming or disputing data from interviews. The interviews and document analysis ensured a complementation of 
data which in turn enhanced the authenticity, credibility, conformability and trustworthiness of the research findings. 
These complementary methods broadened the scope of the study and offset any shortcomings. Data from the 
interviews was collated on the basis of related themes.  
 
1.11 Scope of the Study 
The study is confined to the SADC geographical and political region and its regional conflict prevention, management 
and resolution engagements. Although the study tackled the SADC preventive actions in other setups such as in the 
DRC and Zimbabwe, its focus is on the SADC preventive diplomacy missions of 1994, 1998 and 2007 in Lesotho. It 
examines the efficacy of the SADC preventive diplomacy mechanism in view of its experiences in the Lesotho 
interventions. The study is also restricted to intra-and inter-state conflicts. 
 
1.12 Limitations of the Study 
Every research study has its limitations, which may affect the original plan and method of data collection, analysis 
and presentation. The following are some of the limitations (constraints) of this study: 
 
Firstly as a case study through the qualitative paradigm, its findings may not be generalised and/or replicable to all 
regional organisations in Africa as each region has its own unique peculiarities and complexities regarding issues of 
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conflicts and their resolution. Neither can the Lesotho case study be regarded as representative of all the SADC 
conflict interventions as each conflict context has its unique requirements and challenges which dictate preventive 
strategies and outcomes. As Bradshaw (2007: 23) observes ―[o]utside of a laboratory situation and without pre-and 
and post-test opportunities, it is always difficult to know whether outcomes are the results of specific interventions, or 
whether they are the result of extraneous factors in the broader environment.‖ 
 
Secondly, the SADC, the envisaged case study, comprises a large number of nations (14) some of which are 
geographically spread outside the Southern African region. It was impossible due to time and resource constraints to 
access information on the different nations‘ views regarding the efficacy and challenges of the SADC in conflict 
prevention, management and resolution mechanism in Lesotho. It was also not possible to get the views of the 
governments of the intervening powers (South Africa and Botswana) on how the SADC faired in Lesotho. 
 
Thirdly, the researcher experienced difficulties in accessing some official documents on the operations of the 
organisation SADC on security issues, as some of them are still classified. This problem was clearly stated by 
Nathan (2004: 3) that: ―[r]esearch on the Organ [OPDS] is constrained by the paucity and uninformative nature of 
official documents in the public domain. SADC states place a premium on maintaining a posture of unity and 
solidarity, and they are overly sensitive about the confidentiality of security and defence issues.‖  
 
Fourthly, the record of regional interventions in domestic conflicts and regional conflicts resolution in Africa, 
particularly in the SADC region is a recent one, and therefore the empirical basis for an elaborate assessment may 
be constrained (Hettne 2001). This limitation is also expressed by Nathan (2004) and Ngoma (2005) on the paucity of 
literature on security issues in the SADC region. 
 
Finally, data was collected through interviews and document studies, and as such the findings may not be absolutely 
representative of the SADC preventive diplomacy missions; other data may be obtained from other research methods 
which did not form part of this study. 
 
 
1.13 Structure of the Study 
The study is divided into nine chapters. Each chapter is organised in terms of  relevant topics and sub-headings. 
 
Chapter One has provided the introduction to the study. It outlines the background (context) of the study, the 
research problem, objectives of the study, the research questions, significance of the study, theoretical framework, 
research methodology, scope of the study, limitations of the study, and structure of the study. 
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Chapter Two explores literature on conflict, providing different definitions of conflict, the nature of conflict, causes of 
conflict in Africa, effects of conflict, conflict dynamics and the theoretical framework on conflict and preventive 
diplomacy (Conflict prevention, management and resolution). 
 
Chapter Three discusses the theories of conflict and preventive diplomacy from diverse dimensions.  
 
Chapter Four examines the literature and theoretical perspectives on regional integration and organisation.  
 
Chapter Five deals with the origins and membership of the SADC, and the development of its operational structures, 
aims and objectives. It also provides an overview of the SADC preventive diplomacy missions in the DRC and 
Zimbabwe and the challenges it faces. This exploration serves to provide a framework to understanding SADC‘s 
preventive diplomacy missions in Lesotho. 
 
Chapter Six focuses on the SADC preventive diplomacy missions of 1994, 1998 and 2007 in Lesotho. It provides the 
historical background to the conflicts in Lesotho since independence in 1966 and how the SADC intervened through 
both non-coercive and coercive diplomatic instruments. The chapter also examines the successes, failures and 
challenges of the SADC preventive interventions in Lesotho. 
 
Chapter Seven reflects on the research methodology, research designs, selection of respondents, data collection 
instruments (interviews and document studies), justification for selection of each, the merits and demerits of each 
instrument, validation of research tools and ethical consideration.  
 
Chapter Eight provides an analysis, discussion and presentation of the research findings. It brings together data from 
the literature, interviews and document studies into coherent research findings supported by empirical evidence. Data 
from the different sources is critically analysed and compiled in relation to the research objectives and research 
questions. 
 
Chapter Nine provides a summary, conclusion, and recommendations of the study.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
Conflict Definitions, Causes, Dynamics and Consequences 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents a critical review of existing literature and discourse on conflict, conflict prevention, 
management and resolution (preventive diplomacy) from different contexts and perspectives. The chapter provides 
an overview of some of the research, debates, perspectives and insights into the definitions, nature, sources, 
dynamics and effects of conflict. As Rubin and Babbie (1993: 365) note, an important element of research 
preparation is ―to begin with a search of the relevant literature, filling in one‘s knowledge of the subject and learning 
what others have said about it.‖ In view of this Bryman (2001: 492-493) indicates that the researcher should explore 
existing literature in order to answer the following questions: 
 What is already known about this area? 
 What concepts and theories are relevant to this area? 
 What research methods and research strategies have been employed in studying this area? 
 Are there any significant controversies? 
 Are there any inconsistencies in findings related to this area? Are there any unanswered research questions in 
this area? 
 
 It is within the theoretical and literature surveys that some views, perspectives, insights and analytical frameworks on 
the nature of conflicts and how they can be resolved will emerge, and be explored and discussed. Mitchell (1981: 10) 
suggests critical key questions that are fundamental in understanding and conceptualisation of social conflict. The 
questions are as follows: 
1. What concepts are needed to analyse conflict? 
 2. What types of conflict can be discriminated? 
 3. What causes conflicts, and how do they develop? 
 4. What are the effects of conflict on the parties and their environment? 
 5. What outside factors exacerbate, moderate or resolve conflict? 
 6. Why and how do conflicts end? 
These questions, to some extent, guide the exploration and discourse on the literature review. An attempt was made 
to answer the questions although not in the above sequential order. 
 
2.2 Definitions of Conflict 
There is no single all-embracing universally accepted definition of the concept ―conflict‖. Most definitions are 
determined by the discipline and theoretical perspectives from which the definition emanates, and the causal factors, 
context, scope, duration, intensity and outcomes of the conflict.  
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The following definition of conflict has been selected for the purposes of this study. ―Conflict refers to purposeful 
struggles between collective actors who use social power to defeat or remove opponents and to gain status, power, 
resources and other scarce values‖ (Himes 1980: 14). Conflict is a multidimensional and pervasive phenomenon. 
However, scholars in the field have identified several common features of conflict. Conflict denotes a struggle 
between two or more contending parties with incompatible goals and interests. The struggle may be over a variety of 
issues, some of which are: limited or scarce resources, power, incompatible goals, interests, needs, values, 
aspirations, views, beliefs and ideologies. Contending groups of people or nations get involved in violent conflict 
either because their interests or values are challenged, frustrated or not met (Coser 1968, Bercovitch 1984, Kelter 
1987, Rubin, Pruit and Kim 1994, Adedeji 1999). The Marxists view conflict in the world as a struggle between the 
different social and economic strata for power and control of the means of production. Hence, in the Communist 
manifesto, Karl Marx and Fredreich Engels stated: ―[t]he history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class 
struggle‖ (cited in Schellenberg 1996: 81). According to Kriesberg (1982: 18), social conflict refers ―to a situation in 
which parties believe that they have incompatible goals. The term also refers to the interactional sequence in which 
the parties contend with each other; it is a war...‖ In a conflict situation, there is polarisation of behaviour, attitudes, 
and actions, leading to tensions and sometimes violent confrontations depending on at what stage mitigating 
measures are applied or generally, how the conflict is managed. A violent conflict situation and its diverse 
manifestations can be reflected by terms such as war, battle, strife, feud, collision, a fight, combat, incursion, 
invasion, aggression and dispute, all implying some manifested form and degree of physical violence (Stewart 1998). 
 
Other definitions emphasise conflict as emanating from incompatible values, aspirations, needs and beliefs. A more 
inclusive definition is offered by Anstey (1991: 4) who envisages conflict as ―existing in a relationship when parties 
believe that their aspirations cannot be achieved simultaneously; or perceive a divergence in their values, needs and 
interests, (latent conflict) and purposefully employ their power in an effort to defeat, neutralise or eliminate each other 
to protect or further their interests in the interactions (manifest conflict).‖ Essential to this definition is that it highlights 
both the latent and manifest aspects of conflict. The struggle over divergent and incompatible values, interests and 
needs (which may be social, cultural, religious, economic or political) have characterised many a conflict in the world. 
The Cold War was over conflicting political ideologies- capitalism and communism as pursued by the Western and 
Eastern blocks respectively.  
 
Basic human needs theorists define conflicts as based on incompatible values, needs and aspirations between the 
contending parties. According to Burton (1990a: 37), ―[v]alues are those ideas, habits, customs and beliefs that are 
characteristics of particular social groupings. They are linguistic, religious, class, ethnic or other features that lead to 
separate culture and identity groups.‖ Conflicts over differences of values are often protracted since values are non-
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negotiable and integral to each party; hence uncompromising attitudes are entrenched within the contending parties. 
Numerous ethnic- based conflicts have caused havoc in many parts of the world, as experienced in the former 
Yugoslavia and in Africa. Burton and other basic human needs theorists maintain that conflicts emanate from 
prolonged frustration of people‘s basic human needs. They argue that people whose basic human needs and values 
are frustrated will fight to the end until their needs are satisfactorily addressed. 
 
However, it should be noted that not all conflict is characterised by violence. Some conflict situations may be dormant 
(latent) for prolonged periods, and accumulation of unresolved frustrations and grievances may reach peak levels, 
leading to violent confrontations in the long term. Some conflict may remain latent and never manifest any form of 
violent coercion (Kriesberg 1982).  
 
Other theorists on social conflicts such as Coser (1956), Park and Burgess (1924), Boulding (1960), and Kriesburg 
(1982) have introduced an important element in defining conflict. They reason that an essential element in the 
definition of conflict is that the warring parties are aware that they have mutually incompatible goals and are in 
contention (Kriesberg 1982).  According to Kriesberg (1982: 18), ―[s]ituations that an observer assesses to be 
conflicting, but which are not so assessed by partisans are not social conflicts. We refer to such situations as 
objective, potential or latent conflicts.‖ Proponents of this defining aspect of conflict may appear, on the surface, to be 
at odds with Bercovitch‘s (1984) assertion that conflict exists whenever there are incompatible interests and goals, 
irrespective of whether or not the actors are aware of these interests. However, the proponents take note of the fact 
that an objective conflict situation underlies a dispute, and persists regardless of partisans‘ awareness. Kriesberg 
(1982) further notes that ―[a] comprehensive analysis of social conflicts should include the objective conditions 
underlying a conflict situation and the processes that lead to groups believing that they have incompatible goals…‖ 
and ―also examine the pursuit of conflicting goals, the termination and outcomes of social conflicts and the 
consequences of those outcomes‖ (1982: 18). Hence, Kriesberg (1982) has come out with the phase or cyclical 
model of conflict processes.  
 
Another important dimension in unpacking the definitional complexities of the conflict phenomena is provided by 
Galtung (1996). He illustrates a conflict relationship and situation through a Conflict Triangle reflecting conflict or 
contradiction (C) (underlying conflict situation incompatible goals, actual or perceived), behaviour (B) (threats, 
coercion, violence, and aggression), attitudes (A) (tensions, hostilities, the parties‘ perceptions and misperceptions of 
each other) in a triangular interactional format (Bercovitch 1984. Miall etal 2001, Galtung 1996). Galtung argues that 
all three components in the triangle have to be present in a full-scale conflict situation. Explaining the conflict triangle, 
Galtung (1996) notes that ―[a] contradiction (C) may be experienced as a frustration, where a goal is being blocked 
by something leading to aggressiveness as an attitude (A) and to aggressive behaviour (B)…. Aggressive behaviour 
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may be incompatible with the other party‘s concept of happiness…leading to a new contradiction on top of the old 
one, possibly stimulating more aggressiveness and aggression in all parties concerned. Violence breeds violence, 
the triangle becomes the projection of a spiral that may run its course the same way as a fire; stopping when the 
house is burnt down‖ (Galtung 1996: 72). 
 
Galtung‘s defining elements expand on what other scholars have projected, but introduce the element of hostile 
attitudes and behaviour as underlying a conflict situation. According to Bercovitch (1984: 6), Galtung‘s Conflict 
Triangle offers the only satisfactory formulation of conflict that gives room for an examination of ―a) a specific 
situation, b) motives and the parties‘ cognitive structures and c) the behavioural attitudinal dynamics of a conflict 
process.‖  
 
Bercovitch (1984: 3) indicates that ―[t]he range of conflict phenomena is…much wider than that implied by its physical 
connotations. It is used to describe inconsistencies as well as the process of trying to solve them; it has physical and 
moral implications; it embraces opinions as well as situations and a wide range of behaviour.‖  
 
The critical issue, however, is not whether scholars agree on the definition of conflict but whether they acknowledge 
their persistence, and devise constructive means of preventing, managing and resolving them for durable peace, 
security and development. As Rugumamu (2002: 4) aptly notes: ―what is at issue… is how to manage and resolve 
inherent social conflicts before they degenerate into violent expressions and massive destruction.‖  
 
 
2.3 The inevitability of conflict in human society 
Conflicts, latent or violent, exist at all levels of society, within and between individuals, communities and nation-
states. Lee portrays this position by stating that ―[s]ocial conflict is a likely guest wherever human beings set-up forms 
of social organisation. It would be difficult to conceive of an ongoing society where social conflict is absent. The 
society without conflict is a dead society…like it or not, conflict is reality of human existence and therefore a means of 
understanding social behaviour…‖ (Mitchell 1981: 8).  
 
The inevitability of social conflicts is also confirmed by theorists from different disciplines and perspectives. The 
psychological theories and approaches to conflicts expounded by psychologists (for example, Freud), Ethologists (for 
example Lorenz), and socio-biologists and Anthropologists of the Darwinian tradition, maintain that violence and 
aggression are natural and innate phenomena inherent in the biological and psychological nature of human beings. 
Social Processes theories hold that conflict is natural and inevitable because of interaction of people at different 
levels of society. The interaction of people results in differences, incompatibility and clashes of interests, goals, 
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values and aspirations, triggering competition, antagonism and sometimes violent conflicts. In line with this, Kriesberg 
(1982: 18) posits that ―[t]he term [conflict] refers to the sequence in which the parties contend with each other; it is a 
war, fight, struggle ...Once the parties believe they have incompatible goals, each or both may try to attain them. 
They will try coercive and non-coercive means in seeking to reach their goals.‖ The Structural Theorists such as the 
Marxists, on the other hand, argue that conflict is a result of how society is organised and structured, and how people 
from the different social strata interact and relate in society. These unequal relations create tensions and conflicts 
over the control of resources, making wars an inevitable feature of all human societies (Starr 1979, Schellenburg 
1982, Dougherty and Pfaltzgraf 1990). 
 
Realists and Neo-Realists also view conflict as a natural and indispensable feature of international relations and 
among nations of the world. Hence, they argue that nations reflect the inherent aggressiveness in human beings. For 
realists such as Morgenthau, Gilpin, Aroon, Carr, Wright and Nerbuhr (Schellenberg 1982, Terrif etal. 2004) the 
international order is anarchical by nature, and it is dominated by competitive and conflictual interests of nations in 
their quest for power. Morgenthau etal. (1993) defines international politics as a struggle for power. Their argument is 
premised on the fact that ―at any given period known in history, there were several states locked in deadly conflicts all 
desiring the augmentation or preservation of their power‖ (Terriff etal. 2004: 33). They argue that conflicts will remain 
a permanent feature of human society since nations will always have conflicting national interests and will clash in 
their perpetual quest for power. Wars and the constant possibility of wars make the anarchical international system a 
―war of all against all‖ in the words of Hobbes (Terriff etal. 2004). Further to this, according to Stewart (1998: 12), 
―[c]onflict is a present reality and no consensus theory about how society should work will wish conflict away.‖ 
 
The multiplicity of conflicts in the world and mostly in the African continent appears to vindicate perceptions that 
conflicts are natural, inevitable and pervasive in human society. This is because the continent (Africa) has never 
enjoyed durable peace and stability. It has been plunged into conflicts of different intensity and scope throughout 
history. The continent boasts of the most protracted conflicts in the world, such as the conflicts that raged in Angola 
and Mozambique and those still fermenting in Sudan, Somalia, the DRC and Uganda. In some nations, the 
recurrence of conflicts seems to confirm the cyclical dynamics of conflicts as propounded by the phase model 
theorists. Countries like Uganda, Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Chad and Burundi have since 
independence, suffered several vicious cycles of internal strife which seem to be structurally institutionalised, frozen 
and impossible to resolve.  
 
It is argued in this research study that the fact that conflict is natural and inevitable should not be used as a 
justification for incessant eruptions; rather, it should be a challenge to world nations, the United Nations, regional 
organisations, and civil society organisations to combine efforts and resources to develop functional and effective 
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mechanisms and structures to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts. This implies devising means of resolving 
incompatible goals without necessarily engaging in violent and bloody conflicts. As Darby (1994) correctly suggests, 
―the real issue is not the existence of conflict but how it is handled‖ (cited in Stewart 1998: 13). The reality is that 
conflict is a practical problem ―which requires an appropriate theory for understanding and dealing with it‖ (Sandole, 
1999: 1). 
 
2.4 Classification of Conflicts 
Conflicts vary in their manifestations of relations between adversaries, the degree of interaction between them, and 
their relative power within the conflict context (Kriesberg 1982). Miall etal (2001: 29) note that the field of conflict 
studies is littered with numerous typologies, such that it borders on confusion. They note that ―there are as many 
typologies as analysts and the criteria employed not only vary, but are often mutually incompatible.‖ Differentiations 
are in terms of goals, behaviour and attitude of conflict parties, conflict issues, conflict causes, contexts, scope and 
intensity, conflict trends, dynamics and outcomes (Deustch 1973, Kriesberg 1982, Bercovitch 1984, Galtung 1996, 
Miall etal. 2001). According to Singer (1996), it is unlikely that analysts will converge on a single typology which is 
―logically exhaustive, mutually exclusive, operationally explicit, semantically consistent and substantially comparable 
(cited in Miall etal. 2001: 30). 
 
However, for the purposes of this study, conflicts are classified under three broad categories, namely latent 
(dormant), manifest and frozen conflicts.  
 
2.4.1 Latent Conflicts 
In latent conflict, conditions for potential manifest conflict exist and the parties involved are aware of this and do 
perceive incompatible goals between them, but they have not reached the stage of violent confrontations. Latent 
conflict is characterised by an accumulation of grievances by one party which feels oppressed and marginalised, or 
that its basic survival needs are frustrated by another. The latent stage of conflict constitutes what Lund (1996) refers 
to as the stable (cold) peace stage of conflict in which there is hostility between the contending parties but it has not 
yet boiled to high-intensity armed confrontation. However, latent conflict will not remain so for ever, as the parties will 
at some stage realise their incompatibilities and engage each other in a manifest violent conflict. Most conflicts start 
as latent, but as tensions escalate and grievances accumulate, they shift to violent confrontation between the 
contending parties. The shift to violent encounter may be triggered by a wide range of factors, such as intensified 
oppression or persecution, the emergence of a powerful organisation to mobilise the oppressed and aggrieved group 
into a formidable force to engage in violent resistance, or the group getting external or internal financial, military and 
logistical assistance to launch a conflict to strive for the achievement of its goals. In some cases a spark will emerge 
providing an opportunity for the long-accumulated grievances to flare up into full-scale armed conflict. The latent 
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phase of conflict is ideal for effective execution of preventive diplomacy measures, unlike the situation where the 
conflict has erupted and the parties have inflicted harm on each other. At the latent stage, the levels of hostilities may 
be low and there is room for cooperative and integrative solutions to be reached by the parties. 
 
2.4.2 Manifest Conflicts 
―Manifest conflict‖ is the opposite of latent conflict, in that the warring parties have failed to resolve their incompatible 
differences through violent means. The definitions of conflict provided by Coser (1956), Himes (1980) and Bercovitch, 
(1984) reflect the manifest stage of conflict, in which the warring parties are bent on defeating their opponent to 
realise their goals. The opponent is viewed as an obstacle to attainment of certain goals, and has to be eradicated. At 
this stage of conflict, attitudes are hardened and enemy perceptions and images are entrenched within the 
contending parties. The parties are interested in eliminating each other by all means at their disposal. This phase of 
conflict is more often than not characterised by huge casualties and mass destruction of means of survival. Lund 
(1996) refers to this stage of conflict as ―unstable peace‖, ―the crisis phase‖ or ―hot war‖ stage. The stage is 
characterised by huge military expenditures, accumulation of weapons, and training of combatants to engage in the 
violent conflict. At this stage, it becomes very difficult to implement effective preventive diplomacy, since the conflict 
context has been polluted by the bloody confrontations between the contending parties. Preventive diplomacy 
missions have often failed or become protracted and costly because the UN and regional organisations failed to 
intervene at the latent stage of conflict when the situation would have been conducive to a negotiated settlement of 
the parties‘ incompatible differences. 
 
2.3.3 Frozen Conflicts 
―Frozen conflict‖ refers to protracted, deep-rooted and intractable conflict in which belligerent parties have developed 
irrevocable and irreconcilable hostilities, rivalry and goals. The parties have hardened their conflict positions to a 
competitive win-lose situation. In frozen conflict, opportunities for de-escalation and peaceful resolution are remote 
due to entrenched mutual distrust and negative enemy images (Kriesberg 1982, Bercovitch 1984, Keltner 1987, 
Northrup 1989, Miall etal. 1999, Isenhart and spangle 2000). This is characteristic of needs and value-based conflicts 
which involve non-negotiable issues such as religion, identity, recognition, ethnicity, self-esteem and personal/group 
development (Coate and Rosati 1988, Burton 1990, Fisher 1990, Azar 1990). Frozen conflict has a tendency to 
escalate and de-escalate at different times, depending on the might and commitment of the warring parties. To 
secure an integrative solution to frozen conflict has always proved elusive as none of the warring parties will be 
willing to compromise on their values. The warring parties are determined to pursue the conflict until they have 
achieved their goal. In some instances, the conflict is characterised by a series of peace accords which are often 
violated by one or both parties to the conflict. None of the parties are committed to peace, and peace accords are 
pretexts for re-organisation and re-strategising by each of the parties. The mediation efforts in such conflicts by the 
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international community or regional organisations may be ad hoc. Sometimes the international community is 
indifferent and we have what is referred to as ―forgotten wars.‖  
 
As stated earlier, the differences in the number or types or semantic connotations of conflict should not be 
problematic since all contributions complement each other and enhance our comprehension of the conflict 
phenomenon. For example, the classifications noted above capture most of the embracing grouping of conflicts 
around the world, and provide a framework in which different types of conflict can be analysed and understood. 
 
2.5 Antecedents of Conflicts 
A discussion of the sources of conflicts is essential for mastery and comprehension of conflicts and their subsequent 
resolution. As Adedeji (1999: 7) observes, ―[c]onflicts can only be mastered … if and when they are fully 
comprehended. This means that we must accept as axiomatic the proposition that until the root causes of conflicts 
have been fully comprehended and addressed, they cannot be mastered and that the mastery of conflicts is 
imperative to achieve lasting peace in any… country.‖ According to Zartman (1991: 299), although conflicts are an 
inevitable and inherent aspect of human society, they are ―brought on by the presence of several actors and 
compounded by several choices.‖ Suganami (1996) distinguishes three critical questions that provide a framework 
and benchmarks for effective discourse on the causes of conflict. The key questions are: ―What are the conditions 
which must be present for war to occur? Under what sorts of circumstances have wars occurred most frequently?; 
and How did this particular war come about?‖ (cited in Miall etal 2001: 97); ―What conditions produce violent fights? 
What makes groups believe that they have incompatible goals? How [do] aggrieved groups seek justice? Why [do] 
some groups attain what they seek and others do not?‖ (Kriesberg, 1982: 1). ―The prevalence of intra-state warfare 
and multifaceted crises in the present period has added new urgency to the need for a better understanding of their 
root causes‖ (Dress and Rosenblum: 2002: 232). The discussion which follows will attempt to answer these critical 
questions. 
 
The sources of conflicts are numerous, multidimensional and reflect the diverse and dynamic socio-economic and 
political complexities of the contexts in which they occur. The diverse sources of conflicts can be classified under 
political, economic, social, historical, internal and external, structural and surface factors. It is important that although 
conflict may have common patterns and trends, it is essential for research on conflict and conflict resolution to take 
note of the individuality, uniqueness and particularities of each conflict to put it in its appropriate historical, cultural 
and political context. This helps the conflict-mediating agent(s) to devise appropriate and relevant conflict resolution 
measures (Annan, 1998, Adebayo and Adam 1999, Adedeji 1999, International Peace Academy, 2002). 
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Realists and neo-Realists trace the sources of international conflicts to the anarchical and conflictual nature of 
international relation, in which nations are in perpetual pursuit of power and interests, in turn jeopardising 
international peace and security (Terriff etal. 2004, Schulz etal. 2001). This was true of conflicts such as those 
experienced during the colonial era when European nations expanded their imperial powers in other parts of the 
world through military conquest; the two World Wars; and during the Cold War when the Eastern and Western blocks 
competed for international hegemony. Expansionist and nation building conflicts also fall within this fold.  
 
2.5.1 Sources of Conflict in Africa 
Many scholars argue that the African continent has earned itself a negative reputation as ―a continent at war with 
itself‖. The questions to ask are: Why are there so many conflicts in Africa? Why are conflicts so perennial as to have 
become structural in some countries? What are the root causes of conflict in Africa? Why has there been so much 
violence in changing governments in Africa? What must be done to prevent or resolve these conflicts? (Buzan 1991, 
Chabal 1992, Adebayo and Gelin–Adam 1995, Annan 1998, Annan 2000a, Adedeji 1999, Cilliers 2004). It is 
essential to find answers to these questions if the conflicts are to be understood and resolved. Adedeji observes that 
attempts to resolve conflicts in Africa have been abortive due to lack of comprehension of the deep underlying 
causes and dynamics of the conflicts. As he puts it, ―unfortunately but not surprisingly, sustained and sustainable 
peace has proved elusive in many such cases largely because of the failure to comprehend fully the complexity of 
the forces that have brought about the conflicts‖ (1999: xvi). In the context of Africa, several scholars have identified 
numerous themes and perspectives in which to frame the sources of conflicts engulfing the continent. The sources of 
conflicts in Africa are as diverse as the conflicts themselves, thus making it impossible to reduce them to a single 
cause (Buzan 1991, Furley 1995, Annan 1998, Adedeji 1999, Rugumamu, 2002, Field 2004, Cilliers 2004, United 
Nations Office of the Special Adviser on Africa (UNOSAA), 2005). Cilliers observes that ―[e]xplanations about Africa‘s 
woes have tended to be presented in two analytically distinct ways; one emphasising the domestic factors, the other 
stressing external considerations‖ (2004: 31). 
 
The United Nations Office of the Special Adviser on Africa (UN OSAA) (2005) categorises the sources of conflict in 
Africa as remote sources (the colonial heritage and legacy), the immediate causes (competition for resources, poor 
governance, resources misdistribution, external factors to conflicting parties), and factors that exacerbate conflict 
(availability of arms, arms imports, food insecurity, pressures of refugees and internally displaced people). In the 
words of Annan (1998: 2), ―some sources are purely internal, some reflect the dynamics of a particular region, and 
some have important international dimensions.‖ However, ―despite these differences the sources of conflict in Africa 
are linked by a number of common themes and experiences.‖  In explaining why violent conflicts occur, some 
theorists distinguish between structural causes of conflict (root causes or imbalance of opportunities, deep underlying 
problems) and accelerating and triggering factors. The former include political, economic and social factors such as 
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state repression, lack of political participation, poor governance, and unfair distribution of wealth, the ethnic identity 
question of society, and the history of inter-group relations. While the latter include the emergence of radical 
ideologies, repression of opposition groups, sharp economic shocks, new discriminatory policies, external 
intervention, proliferation of weapons, and the collapse of central authority, all of which bring underlying tensions to 
the fore and increase the society‘s vulnerability to conflict (Azar and Burton 1986, Azar 1990a, Davis and Gurr 1997). 
These factors form the core of violent conflicts in Africa, as will be indicated in the following sections. 
 
2.5.2 The Colonial Legacy 
For a holistic study of African conflicts, it is necessary to reflect on the colonial legacy and its effects on the social, 
economic and political history of the continent. As Azar (199: 6) correctly notes, ―many conflicts currently active in the 
underdeveloped parts of the world are characterised by a blurred demarcation between the internal and external 
sources and actors.‖ Miall etal (2001: 29) also note that ―…the roots of all major conflicts reach back into the 
historical past...‖ There is no doubt that colonialism, Cold War politics, neo-colonialism and globalisation have had, 
and continue to have, an influence on the social, economic and political life of the Continent. Adebayo and Gelin-
Adams (1999: 3) maintain: ―the twin curses of colonialism and the Cold War are the defining forces in understanding 
the nature and causes of Africa‘s conflicts.‖  
 
However, this does not mean that African leaders do not share the blame for conflict generation. As will be indicated, 
several factors that resulted in bloody intra-state conflicts emanate from bad governance, dictatorship, corruption, 
flawed and defective electoral models, and processes and economic mismanagement by African leaders and 
regimes (Cilliers (2004). Hence, in his 1998 report, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan called upon Africa to look 
beyond its colonial past for the causes of current conflicts in the Continent. 
 
2.5.3 Colonial Boundaries and Conflicts in Africa 
The European powers‘ partitioning of Africa had devastating effects on the map, as well as the socio-economic and 
political livelihood of the Continent. The colonial partition of the colonies was arbitrary, and reflected the imperial 
powers‘ selfish agenda to the detriment of the indigenous people. Muller vividly posits that ―[t]he African politico-
geographical map is thus a permanent liability that resulted from...ignorant, greedy acquisitiveness during a period 
when Europe‘s search for minerals and markets had become insatiable‖ (in in Boateng 2010: 14). The carving up of 
the Continent ignored the ethnic, cultural and social differences of the indigenous populace, culminating in the 
creation of heterogeneous, multi-ethnic nations, which African leaders inherited upon attaining independence in the 
1960s (Buzan 1991, Power 2004). As Rosenberg correctly notes: ―[w]hat ultimately resulted from the Berlin 
conference was a hodgepodge of geometric boundaries that divided Africa into... irregular countries. ...The new 
countries...divided coherent groups of people and merged together groups who really did not get along‖ (cited in 
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Boateng 2010: 15). This resulted in numerous ethnic tensions and conflicts, for example in Nigeria, Ethiopia, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Rwanda, Burundi and Sudan. These conflicts were in most cases fuelled by 
support from similar identity groups in other countries, culminating in regionalised conflicts. 
 
The motive of the imperial powers was to exploit the ethnic diversities for their imperial advantage through the policy 
of divide and rule, Buzan (1991: 99) notes that the colonial project ―for the most part …neither took much account of 
existing cultural and ethnic boundaries, nor created new nations to fit within them.‖ Post-colonial independent African 
regimes inherited these colonially defined nation-states with their volatile and explosive ethnic questions, tensions 
and rivalries, thereby exacerbating national tensions, and threatening national cohesion and stability (Thomas 1991, 
Buzan 1991, Bayart 1993, Chabal (1992), Benjamin 1992, Furley 1995, Annan 1998, Adedeji 1999, Adebayo and 
Gelin-Adams 1999, Vita 2001, Power 2004, Cilliers 2004, Ajulu 2004). The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) 
recommended the wholesale inheritance of the colonially carved nation-states, supposedly in fear of opening a can of 
worms if the different ethnic groups were granted the opportunity to reclaim their pre-colonial territories‘ borders and 
sovereignty.  
 
However, international law and the OAU Charter established that upon decolonisation, the inherited boundaries 
would constitute the legitimate boundaries of the newly independent states (Thomas (1991, Furley 1995, Kissangani 
2011). According to Aluko (1977), post-colonial leaders were forced to build the new nation-states on the foundations 
laid down by the colonial states, ―...for any attempt to challenge the colonial invention (which in most cases had 
provided the territory not only with its boundaries but with its name) would have been to challenge the very concept of 
the nation-state‖ (cited in Chabal 1992: 122). The situation was aggravated by the fact that not all African states 
attained independence at the same time. One other reason may have been that the OAU realised that ―to open the 
question of borders would ferment discord and strife when the urgent need was to promote unity…‖ (Furley 1995: 3). 
Whether the Continent would have experienced worse conflicts if Africa had redrawn its territorial boundaries, is not 
clear. The reality is that several post-independence African states were plunged into border disputes, secessionist 
and bloody ethnic conflicts. It was due to these post-independence crises that Buzan argued that decolonisation in 
Asia and Africa ―left behind an entire international system organised along sovereignty-anarchy lines‖ (1991: 204-
205). This is mainly because Africa is a ―continent where in geopolitical terms, the idea of the ‗state‘ has remained in 
perpetual conflict with that of the ethnic identity‖ (Kisiangani 2011: 10). Thus in Chabal‘s (1992) view, some of the 
bitterest conflicts today in Africa concern cases where there is a contested interpretation of the colonial legacy. 
 
2.5.4 Border Disputes 
The unsatisfactory nature of inter-state borders has become a source of recurrent conflicts in Africa. This is because 
―nearly all these borders were inherited from colonial times and were the products of negotiations and treaties 
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between colonial powers, decided in Europe with the aid of poor maps and scant attention to African people‖ (Furley 
1995: 2). According to Zartman (1991: 304), ―boundaries in Africa have often been described as a Pandora‘s box, a 
source of both real and potential conflict that threatens the emerging interstate order of the continent.‖ This assertion 
was vindicated as post-independence Africa experienced numerous border disputes. Boundaries between the 
independent nation-states were characterised by uncertainties and contestations that brought many of the nations to 
violent confrontations while others were constantly on the brink of full-scale wars. Mazrui refers to these border crises 
in Africa emanating from the colonial legacy as ―the bondage of African boundaries‖ while Mamdani (1996) labels it 
the ―inherited impediments of colonial history‖ (cited in Power (2004: 274). Chabal (1994: 130) rightly notes that ―[t]he 
geographical boundaries of colonial territories almost never took into account the realities of pre-colonial Africa and 
thus neglected to consider whether these boundaries would make it more or less likely for the peoples of that territory 
to live together.‖ In view of this picture, Zartman (1991: 305) further suggests that in Africa ―[c]onflict is often a useful 
way of making artificial boundaries African, since nations have fought and died in the defence of borders formerly 
regarded as only colonially imposed.‖ The numerous disputes raise important questions on the legitimacy of Africa‘s 
borders. The supposed sanctity and inviolability of these borders have become a source of conflict or seeds for 
potential and recurrent conflict in the continent. 
 
2.5.5 Secessionist Conflicts 
Another source of conflict in Africa that emanates from the arbitrarily drawn colonial borders is secessionist 
nationalist tendencies. Post-independence African regimes had to shoulder the challenges of building unitary nation-
states by bringing the heterogeneous and sometimes historically hostile groups under one central government. 
Chabal (1992) notes that colonial powers entrenched seeds for  ―territorial‖ consciousness and secessionism through 
the policy of divide and rule. This was because all colonial states explicitly wished the subjects of their territory to 
think of themselves as citizens of the particular territory rather than a nation-state including other ethnic groups. This 
created serious problems for post-independence leaders in building coherent nation-states. As Mazrui and Thomas 
(1992: 160) vividly state, ―…there was nothing national about post-colonial African borders ....‖ Upon attaining 
independence, African leaders adopted the colonial borders because they granted them international recognition and 
power within those borders (Kisiangani 2011). In most cases, post-independence African governments failed to 
balance the ethnic equation and representation, resulting in marginalisation of some groups and domination by other 
ethnic groups. In other instances political parties and regime, like the colonial government, also exploited the ethnic 
differences for their selfish political ends resulting either in regionally and ethnically based regimes and political 
parties. This scenario has culminated in groups who feel marginalised or who feel their territory is the economic vein 
of the nation but is underdeveloped, engaging in secessionist wars for independence. According to Azar (1990a) and 
Burton (1988, 1990a, 1990b), the marginalisation, denial and deprivation of a group of its fundamental human needs 
such as equality, security, recognition of identity, equal opportunity and access to resources and services, are the 
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root causes of deep and protracted social conflicts. Secessionist threats remain a major threat in many African 
nations. This is because, as Chabal (1992: 133) observed: ―[i]n Africa, as elsewhere, there are a number of countries 
where groups of people do not accept the legitimacy of the existing nation-state and would wish to join or create 
another nation-state.‖  
 
2.5.6 Ethnicity as a Source of Conflict 
The other major source of conflict in Africa resulting from the colonial legacy is the ethnic question. Bayart (1993: 51) 
notes that ―[a]lthough it would be too much to maintain that all contemporary ethnic groups are the products of the 
colonial period; the precipitation of ethnic identities becomes incomprehensible if it is divorced from colonial rule.‖ 
With the exception of a few states such as Lesotho, Swaziland and Cape Verde, which are relatively homogeneous 
linguistically and culturally, most of the colonial states in Africa are heterogeneous. With arbitrarily drawn borders, 
different groups with dissimilar cultural backgrounds and histories of rivalry were yoked together (Buzan 1991, Gurr 
and Harff, 1994, Bayart 1993, Power 2004). This enabled colonial powers to employ their policy of divide and rule, 
thereby crushing any collective resistance.  
 
According to Chabal (1992: 121), ―[f]ew African countries were ‗natural‘ nation-states…geographically, ethnically... or 
politically…. Some were hardly plausible candidates for nationhood.‖ The post-independence leaders battled with the 
challenges of building nation-states, a phenomenon which was non-existent in the pre-colonial African political setup 
(Chabal 1994, Kisangani 2011). Consequently, some African nations have had ―...to spill much blood fighting many 
civil and ethnic wars to preserve the monolithic structures, the west created out of naturally dissimilar blocks‖ 
(Kumuyi, 2007: 18).  
 
In many post-independence African nation-states, ethnic tensions have created volatility with a high potential for civil 
war. Some undemocratic regimes, politicians and unscrupulous political movements have exploited and galvanised 
their power bases by appealing to ethnic and regional divisions and loyalties, hence aggravating ethnic tensions. This 
has, in cases of such regimes, resulted in nepotism and corruption, with government and security apparatus 
dominated by people from a particular ethnic group or region (in most cases the ethnic group from which the 
president originates). Azar, (1990a: 10) posits that in such states power ―[t]ends to be monopolised by the dominant 
identity group or a coalition of hegemonic groups which use the state to maximise their interests at the expense of 
others.‖ According to Bayart (1993), in the context of several autocratic African states, ethnicity has become an agent 
of accumulation of wealth and of political power. The ―ethnic community is a channel through which distribution is 
demanded, as well as being a means of accumulation.‖ Munyae (2000) refers to this scenario as the ―ethnicisation of 
politics or politicisation of ethnicity‖ in his thesis on the conflict in the DRC. He indicates how denial of citizenship and 
rights to land to the Banyamulenge (Tutsi ethnic group) in the DRC by the Mobutu regime resulted in the emergence 
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of a Tutsi-dominated movement that dethroned him in 1997. Mangu (2003: 239) also notes the same problem under 
the regime of Laurent Kabila in the DRC (Country) when he comments that ―[t]he tribalisation or ethnicisation of 
power was even faster than it was under Mobutu…Under Kabila…the rights curtailed were not only individual rights 
but also collective rights, including the rights of minorities such as the Banyamulenge who were denied of their 
Congolese citizenship.‖ Therefore as Bayart (1993: 55 and 54) further observes: ―[i]n Africa ethnicity is almost never 
absent...The candidates saw themselves as trapped by their ethnic perceptions of their supporters and their 
opponents.‖ The consolidation of political power by a sectarian regime has often led to subjugation and 
marginalisation of other ethnic and regional groups, threatening the cohesion, legitimacy and stability of the nation at 
large (Bayart 1993, Bobrow and Chan 1988, Azar and Moon 1988, Jackson 1990, Ayoob 1991, Benjamin 1992, 
Fisher 1997, Anan 1998, Adedeji 1999). 
 
In response to intolerance and marginalisation by the political elite, opposition groups (the alienated groups) also rally 
their marginalised ethnic, religious or regional followers to dislodge what they consider autocratic ethnic-based 
regimes. According to Benjamin (1992: 6), ―[p]rejudice against [some] groups or minorities within a state deprives 
such groups of the basic protections that should ideally be afforded to all its people.‖  In his view, such a scenario, 
devitalises the productive capacity of the state and weakens its legitimacy, cohesion and foundation (Benjamin 
1992). The mobilisation of group interests and identities by the ruling elite, and counter-mobilisation of the excluded 
groups by the opposition, precipitate a crisis of legitimacy for the government. A security dilemma is fuelled as each 
group sponsors antagonistic, exclusionist and dehumanising propaganda, culminating in violent ethnic conflicts and 
genocide, as experienced in Sudan (Darfur) and Rwanda (Azar 1990a, b, Gurr and Harff 1994, Annan 1998, Munyae 
2000, Munyae 2000, Miall etal 2001). The conflicts generate a sense of separateness and self-defence. Personal 
interests and ambitions by political leaders are framed in ethnic terms, in order to rally the solidarity and support of 
ethnic loyalty and sentiments for the cause (Chabal 1992, Bayart 1993, Fisher 1997, Adedeji 1999, Annan 1998, 
2000a, Rugumamu 2002).  
 
Bayart (1993) states unequivocally the reasons for ethnic-based politics in Africa. He notes that ethnicity is ―less an 
actual political force than a ‗shadowy theatre‘ through which competition for the acquisition of wealth, power and 
accumulation is expressed and played out‖ (paraphrased in Power 2004: 267). The general failure of the state to 
satisfy political and socio-economic demands distances all the people, apart from those who are close and connected 
to the centres of power (Benjamin 1992). In the words of Fisher (1997), ―[e]thnicity becomes a driving force in the 
conflict through the colouring of all interactions and attributions to the point where inter-communal hatred is passed 
on through socialisation from one generation to the next‖ resulting in intractable conflicts in society. It was on the 
basis of this view that the Carnegie Commission on Prevention of Deadly Conflicts concluded that ―[t]he words 
‗ethnic‘, ‗religious,‘ ‗tribal‘ or ‗factional‘ – important as they may be in inter-group conflict do not, in most cases, 
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adequately explain why people use massive violence to achieve their goals. These descriptions do not of 
themselves, reveal why people would kill each other over their differences. To label a conflict as an ethnic war can 
lead to misguided policy choices by fostering a wrong impression that ethnic, cultural or religious differences 
inevitably result in violent conflict and that differences must therefore be suppressed‖ (1997: 29). Annan illustrates 
this point that ―ethnic differences are not in and of themselves either symptoms or causes of conflict;... Ethnic 
differences become charged-conflictual when they are used for political ends, when ethnic groups are intentionally 
placed in opposition to each other.‖ For Annan, most of the post-Cold War conflicts ―…are not ethnic conflicts, but 
political conflicts in ethnic clothing‖ (2000a: 175).  
 
In extreme cases, some brutal and criminalised leaders have trained and armed ethnic militias to defend their 
unpopular regimes through repressive and genocide atrocities of the opposing ethnic groups. Examples include the 
Hutu-based Interahangwe in Rwanda, the Arab-based Janjaweed in Sudan, and the Fifth Brigade and ZANU militia in 
Zimbabwe. The politicisation and militarisation of ethnicities and religious cleavages create permanent insecurity and 
the potential for bloody ethnic conflicts in Africa (Bayart 1993, Anan 1998, Annan 2000a, de Waal 2000, Munyae 
2000 Onyango 2000). This is because ethnic and religious conflicts are value-based and have the potential to be 
intractable and irreconcilable (Azar 1990a, Burton 1990a, Burton1990b, Fisher 1990). In Africa, the problem is 
exacerbated by the existence of ethnic commonalities in the neighbouring states, which leads to regionalisation and 
the recurrence of ethnic friction as there will be cross- border sympathies, support and refuge to ethnic-based rebel 
groups. Lake and Rothchild (1999) observe that conflict spillover occurs through the processes of diffusion when ―[a] 
conflict in one state increases the probability of conflict in a second‖ and escalation when ―ethnic violence sucks in 
foreign belligerents‖ (cited in White, Little and Smith, 2005: 142). This scenario has resulted in the regionalised 
crises, coups and secessionist revolts in many parts of Africa, especially in West Africa, the Great Lakes region and 
the Horn of Africa (Benjamin 1992, Munyae 2000, de Waal 2000, International Peace Academy 2001, International 
Crisis Group Africa Report No 62 April 2003, Onyango 2003, Power 2004, Ajulu 2004). 
 
2.5.7 The Cold War and Conflict in Africa 
The Cold War period (1945-1990s) was characterised by intense ideological bipolar conflicts between the Capitalist 
Western and the Communist Eastern Blocs. Almost all the proxy bipolar-sponsored wars were fought in the Third 
World and Africa. In this regard, the superpower competition for global influence exacerbated and prolonged regional 
conflicts in an extensive bipolar rivalry (Ohlon 1993, Rugumamu 2002, Lund 2005). The ideologically hostile 
superpowers – the USA and the then Union of USSR – backed regimes and rebel opposition movements which 
championed their respective ideological positions. Adebayo and Gelin-Adams indicate that ―[f]rom 1984 to 1988, the 
former Soviet Union delivered $11.1 billion worth of armaments to Angola, Ethiopia and Mozambique while the 
United States provided $2.7 billion worth of security assistance to its African clients in the same period‖ (1999: 4). 
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Logistical and military support was generously provided to any regime which pledged to safeguard the ideological 
position of the superpowers, however brutal the regime was. For example, the USA backed the brutal Mobuto of 
Zaire and the apartheid regime in South Africa, while the USSR backed the brutal Mengestu regime in Ethiopia. 
Understandably, this is one of the major ways in which numerous dictators, mainly in the Third World, were born, 
bred and sustained (Benjamin 1992, Rugumamu, 2002).  
 
This superpower support triggered, fuelled and prolonged the most devastating conflicts that gripped the Continent 
during the Cold War period. It is worth noting that the imperialist West and the USA crushed any post-colonial leader 
such as Nkrumah (Ghana), Lumumba (DRC) and Gamal Nasser (Egypt), who strove for genuine economic and 
political independence, which they deemed to be at odds with their imperialist interests and agenda (Djanie (2011). 
Such a political route was deemed a danger to the interests of the West and the USA; hence their governments were 
violently overthrown. The effects of imperialist-sponsored wars are continuing in the form of unresolved, recurrent 
deep-rooted conflicts in some parts of the Continent. Rugumamu (2002: 5) summarises the situation thus: ―[t]he blind 
support by Cold War warriors of many unpopular and oppressive African regimes, inevitably led to aggrieved groups 
to carry out coup‘ d‘états, start secessionist and irredentist movements, and rebellions against the state. So powerful 
were the Cold War dynamics that they set in motion serious internal conflicts that have long outlasted the Cold War 
itself.‖ The post-Cold War period and the changing economic and political rules bred new uncertainties and 
insecurities among the rulers and the governed alike, leading to clashes of interests (Lund 2005). While there were 
eruptions in Europe, they were not as numerous and intense as in Africa. In most cases, developed nations still have 
enormous influence in the economic and political affairs of many African countries through financial and military 
assistance. France, for example still maintains military bases as well as economic and political influence in her former 
colonies in West Africa, to safeguard her economic, political and security interests in the Continent in line with the 
Colonial Pact and the Cooperation Defence Agreement France signed with its former African colonies before granting 
them independence in the 1960s. 
 
Subsequent to the end of the Cold War, Africa markedly lost her strategic value and significance after the ideological 
warfare ended with the collapse of the Berlin wall and the USSR in the early 1990s. As Buzan (1991: 435) observes, 
―Africa‘s geo-strategic significance has become marginal to the vital interests of the West. Europe, in particular, 
seems to be gradually diverting its attention away from Africa in favour of those regions of the world with which it has 
closer cultural, economic and strategic connections.‖ Rugumamu (2002) notes that the European Union‘s 
preoccupation with the crisis in the former Yugoslavia and the concomitant inattention or feeble attention to the same 
situation in the DRC, Liberia, Rwanda, Burundi, Somalia and Sierra Leone, is indicative of this shift. Necessarily, the 
end of the Cold War and the withdrawal of superpowers did not bring peace to Africa. Instead, it opened a period of 
incessant internal turbulence that culminated in the fall of most of the despotic regimes that had once been backed 
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by the superpowers. The break-up of the Cold War alliances, partnerships, and regional support networks, coupled 
with the Western powers‘ policy of disengagement in Africa, exposed the weak African states to manifest systemic 
instability and vulnerability as experienced by the Mengistu regime in Ethiopia, Siad Barre in Somalia, Samuel Doe in 
Liberia, Mobutu Seseko in the Democratic Republic of Congo (the former Zaire). The unpopular autocratic regimes 
fell to internal opposition groups because the superpower pillars on which they had rested for more than four 
decades were uprooted (Buzan 1991, Holsti 1996, Cillers 2004, Reno 1998). Cilliers (2004: 17) summarises the 
effects of the end of the Cold War on Africa thus: ―Africa‘s governing elites lost much of their ability to extract capital 
support from the East or West…With the removal of this external scaffolding, the weaknesses of the African state 
was ultimately exposed to a world that was in the middle of a new revolution.‖  The end of the Cold War left many 
weak state regimes bereft of internal legitimacy and incapacitated in the face of new post-Cold War socio-economic, 
political and security challenges. As Lund (2005: 70) puts it, most of the corrupt regimes ―...came under intense 
pressure from ‗above‘ as support from their Cold War patrons declined and from ‗below‘ as democratic expectations 
from their hitherto suppressed political opposition increased.‖ 
 
The Western powers started peddling policies of ―African solutions to African problems,‖ and ―layered responses‖ in 
which regional bodies were called upon to fend for themselves in the maintenance of regional peace and security. 
Security projects like the USA‘s African Crisis Response Initiative ACRI) and French Reinforcement of African 
Capabilities for Peacekeeping (RECAMP) are reflective of strategic withdrawal by Western powers from the 
persistent turmoil in Africa. In 1994, the USA Congress passed a resolution calling for the provision of material and 
technical assistance to institutionalise African conflict resolution capabilities (Rothchild 1999, Adebayo and Gelin-
Adams 1999, International Peace Academy 2001). With a few exceptions, most of the states in which the Cold War 
proxy wars were fought, such as the DRC and Somalia, have never known peace to date. Therefore as Ohlson 
(1993) observes, while the end of the Cold War has removed the Third World as an arena of superpower 
competition, it has also to some extent removed it (Third World) from the attention of the North. Instead of ushering in 
a new world of democracy, peace and security, the post-Cold War world order brought new challenges, tensions, 
insecurities and violent conflicts. Conflicts raged on with greater frequency, intensity and complexity, as evidenced by 
the emergence of numerous intra-state conflicts worldwide (Chigas, Evans 1998, Kittani 1998, Lund 2005).  Ghali 
Ghali (1998: 21) observes that ―[a] majority of conflicts in the world today are intra-rather than inter-state, involve 
irregular forces instead of national armies and result in high civilian casualties, sometimes accompanied by the 
collapse of state institutions.‖  
 
The conflicting remnants of the Cold War era are still bedevilling Africa‘s unity and development. In some cases 
those groups which toppled former repressive regimes became dictatorial in turn, leading to further civil strife as 
experienced in Liberia under Charles Taylor and the DRC under Laurent Kabila. Therefore, although the end of the 
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Cold War removed some of the causes of conflict, it also created opportunities for a new class of actors lusting after 
power, loot and plunder, much to the suffering of the Continent (Joseph 1999). Rugumamu (2002: 5) could not have 
more been accurate when he concluded that ―[o]ne of the primary defining features of the post-Cold War era in Africa 
is the increase in the number, scope, and intensity of domestic conflicts that have spilled, or have the potential to spill 
over into neighbouring states.‖  
 
The evil hand of the former colonisers and Cold War uni-superpower (USA) remains intact in Africa, and is causing 
havoc by continuing to support particular regimes, which accommodate their interest. The USA backed the brutal 
dictatorships in Egypt (Mubarak) and Tunisia (Ben Ali). Among other things, the Cold War politics have been 
replaced by another version of foreign domination and exploitation – globalisation, which, like its predecessor also 
fuels conflicts in Africa. Through the structural conditionalities of globalisation, the Developed countries still impose 
their model and forms of democracy, namely good governance and economic management systems in Africa as a 
condition for acquiring financial assistance from the Breton Woods institutions, the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund. This has resulted in economic crisis in the form of crippling debts and the economic collapse of 
‖deviant‖ nations, creating fertile grounds for conflicts. According to a June 2006 report by the International Crisis 
Group on Zimbabwe entitled Zimbabwe‟s continuing self-destruction, Zimbabwe still owes 119 million dollars to the 
IMF, and new loans are conditional on major political and economic reform (ICG, Africa Report No 38, 6 June 2006: 
15).  
 
Although not entirely responsible for conflicts in Africa, the interference of the Western powers in the domestic affairs 
of African countries is a cause for concern. It is the responsibility of African countries through their continental and 
regional bodies to establish mechanisms to deter former colonial powers and the Western power‘s intrusion in the 
affairs of the African continent. As Wambu (2011: 90) observes ―[o]nce we lose the authority to internally resolve our 
own conflicts in Africa, opportunities are presented to powerful outside powers, with their own interests and agendas, 
to intervene and chip away at our hard-fought and hard-won sovereignty.‖  
 
2.6 Politics, Power and Governance in Africa 
One major source of conflict in Africa is the struggle for acquisition and maintenance of political power. As Annan 
stated in his 1998 UN Report, ―[t]he nature of political power in many African states, together with the real and 
perceived consequences of capturing and maintaining power, is a key source of conflicts across the continent‖ (1998: 
3-4). Most of the post-independence African regimes were characterised by poverty of democratic credentials and 
structures of social justice, freedom of political expression and choice, democratic representation, transparency, 
accountability, free and fair elections for smooth transfer of power, and weak institutions of governance. The 
Continent experienced a large number of highly centralised, militarised and repressive regimes which lacked 
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democratic legitimacy and survived through brutal repression of the opposition and heavy reliance on the security 
apparatus and ethnic loyalties and cleavages. Buzan argues that in most of the Third World countries political 
disorder emanates from ―the struggle for control over state‘s institutions since) only a minority of the states have 
developed stable mechanisms for the transfer of political power‖ (1991: 45). In situations where governments rule 
more by military power and force than by consensus, their authority and legitimacy will be internally contested, 
leading to erosion of national democracy, security and ultimate national instability (Azar and Moon, 1988, Buzan 
1991, Thomas 1991). Azar, to some extent, locates the origins of these undemocratic institutions of governance to 
the colonial administration which was characterised by ―weak participatory institutions, a hierarchical tradition of 
imposed bureaucratic rule from the metropolitan centres‖ (cited in Miall etal, 2001: 74). These repressive state 
machineries and apparatus were wholly inherited by the post-colonial leaders, some of whom became more brutal 
(repressive) towards any dissent and challenges to their power. 
 
In most cases post-colonial leaders inherited these repressive institutions and systems of governance to prolong their 
stay in power. Chabal (1994: 121) summarises it thus: ―[t]he colonial state was a coercive state.‖ Consequently, ―the 
neo-colonial state was born a coercive state.‖ Decay in governance in most of post-colonial independent Africa was 
aggravated by the Cold War politics in which the Eastern and Western blocks sponsored regimes that spearheaded 
their ideological positions and interests, irrespective of the governance records in terms of transparency, 
accountability, democracy and human rights protection (Buzan 1991, Annan 1998, Adebayo and Gelin-Adam 1999, 
Cilliers 2004). The question of undemocratic governance as a legacy of repressive colonial regimes is better 
expressed by Williams (2007: 12) ―[i]t may also be the time to find out whether we have not been living a lie in post-
colonial Africa if we had expected nations founded on anti-national principles of extractive predation and the 
suppression of indigenous rights to self-actualisation to become democratic exemplars.‖ This is mainly so ―because 
there was little need to seek political legitimacy, the colonial state did not encourage representation or participation...‖ 
As such, ―a number of African states have continued to rely on centralised and highly personalised forms of 
government…‖ (Annan 1998: 17). However, the New Economic Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) 
founding document of October 2001, while acknowledging the impact of the colonial legacy on governance in post-
independent Africa also apportions blame to poor leadership, corruption and bad governance as well as a lack of 
visionary leadership on the post-independence governing elite (cited in Cilliers 2004). For example in some countries 
―[a]fter independence, the elite took over power, shutting out the vast majority of the population, gathering virtually 
uncontrolled executive power and limited only the capabilities of the coercive instruments at their disposal‖ (Cilliers 
2004: 40).  
 
Miall etal. (2001) note that despotic regimes successfully manipulated the state apparatus and constitutions in order 
to cling to power and block political access to all those who do not form their patronage network. Forsyth (1999) 
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vividly captures this problem when stating that ―[i]n Africa as elsewhere political power means success and 
prosperity, not only for the man who hold it but for his family, his birth place and even his whole region of origin. As a 
result there are many who will go to any length to get it and having got it will surpass themselves in order to keep it‖ 
(cited in Odunuga 1999: 44). Some leaders and regimes resort to ―politics of the belly‖ (Bayart 1993) or what is 
described in Nigeria as the ―democracy of the stomach‖ (Sheyin 2007). According to Cilliers (2004: 25) the political 
behaviour and activities of politicians in the majority of African countries is shaped and aggravated by the prevalent 
material poverty or resource scarcity, to the extent that ―the object of political contestation is to secure economic 
consumption which in turn is best guaranteed by capturing state power‖. 
 
Cilliers (2004) also notes a trend in Africa in which some post-colonial leaders exploited their liberation credentials to 
become dictators who presided over political decay and economic collapse in their nations-states. Museveni of 
Uganda and President Robert Mugabe are often cited as such leaders who brutalise their people, denying them 
freedom and free political participation based on their contribution in the liberation of their respective nations.  
 
National elections in most African states have become the source of vicious conflicts between the ruling parties and 
the opposition, instead of a process to deliver democratic dispensations and good governance. In some cases 
elections are conducted just as a formality since they are controlled and highly doctored to retain the ruling elite. In 
the words of Jonathan Moyo (before joining the Mugabe regime) ―[t]he assertion that the majority of African 
governments are now democratic…has no empirical basis. It is true that multiparty elections are now common in 
Africa but this truth does not describe a fundamental development. The change is strategic, not substantive…‖ (cited 
in Nathan 2003: 16-17). In most of the African nation-states electoral fraud, vote rigging, voter trafficking, repression 
and intimidation of the opposition, abuse of the state media and resources, manipulation of the election results, and 
other electoral ills are institutionalised. Such flawed electoral processes never deliver legitimate and democratic 
regimes. The continued electoral contestations are bred by the incumbent regimes‘ control of the entire electoral 
process including the electoral commission, the delimitation of constituencies, the government media machinery, the 
security forces and the national resources which they often abuse to boost their grip to power to the detriment of the 
resources-starved opposition. It has become a permanent feature that most of the elections in Africa are followed by 
vicious contestations of the election results by the opposition, resulting in violence. For example, elections in Nigeria, 
Zimbabwe, Uganda, Lesotho, Malawi, Zambia, Egypt, Ethiopia, Algeria, Angola, DRC, Congo-Brazzaville, Togo, 
Kenya, and Ivory-Coast have been marked by turmoil. Only in a few countries such as Botswana, Tanzania, South 
Africa and Ghana, are elections relatively fair although not always free. Commenting on the April 14th and 21st 2007 
Nigerian state governors and presidential elections which most international observer missions denounced as not 
credible, Williams posits that: ―[i]n Nigeria…we are discovering that an attempt to transit from military rule to full 
civilian rule may also be accompanied by a democratic regression manifested in deepening despotism and an elite 
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conspiracy to thwart the democratic aspirations of the people‖ (2007: 13). In many, if not all African countries, 
elections are followed by violent protests and rejection of the electoral results by the opposition, mass killings and 
other forms of political repression. The elections in Kenya (2007), Lesotho (2007), Zimbabwe (2008), Ivory-Coast 
(2010), and Nigeria (2011) were marred by violent confrontations and huge casualties. In such cases, the electoral 
playing field always gives an unfair advantage to the ruling party. The ruling party has unfettered access to the state 
resources such as transport to traverse the entire country to canvass for support, monopolise and abuse the state 
media and other forums and institutions to sway votes to them. The opposition parties, on the other hand, are 
severely hampered by paucity of resources to canvass for support, especially in the remote rural constituencies, and 
are adroitly denied airing their campaign packages through the state-controlled media. The poverty of resources is 
aggravated by the fact that in many African nations, there is no political party funding. This skewed playing field 
always give the opposition parties justification to question the credibility of the poll, culminating in conflicts. 
 
Apart from the fact that the electoral playing fields are not plain, the incumbents have devised a sinister strategy of 
refusing to vacate the seat of power even if they lose the elections, as experienced in Zimbabwe (Mugabe) Kenya 
(Kibaki) and Ivory Coast (Gbabgo). Against the democratic and loud voice of the Ivorian electorates and appeals from 
the regional organisations, the UN and the international community, Gbagbo declared himself the winner, with the 
backing of the Constitutional Council and the military throwing the country into a constitutional crisis. The editorial in 
the Telegraph Newspaper (Botswana), April 13, 2011: 8) denounced this undemocratic tendency when it stated that 
―Africa still has a long way to go before incumbents get to appreciate the true reasons behind holding elections... It is 
a tragedy that every time an incumbent leader loses elections, they resort to technicalities to disrespect the people‘s 
wish.‖ As we have seen in many countries, if the election results do not go down well with the ruling elite, they are 
manipulated to legitimise their continued stay in power. This diabolic tendency has created legitimacy crises for such 
governments, leading to conflicts. 
 
Worse still, in most cases, the electoral systems are based on the winner-takes-all system, which tends to limit and 
frustrate mass democratic participation. In the words of Annan, ―political victory assumes a ‘winner-takes-all‘ form 
with respect to wealth and resources, patronage and the prestige and prerogative of the office‖ (1998: 4). Miall etal. 
(2001) and Odunuga (1999) also observe that civil strife abounds in many African countries because political power 
has been taken to mean a winner takes all affair. The political history and the bitter conflicts that have besieged 
Lesotho since independence emanate from the flawed electoral system of the winner-takes-all (the first-past the post 
electoral system). Since 1966, Lesotho‘s national elections have been followed by violent conflicts with the opposition 
questioning the credibility of the election results. The conflicts of 1994, 1998 and 2007 culminated in the regional 
body, the SADC, intervening to restore order in the Kingdom. The Human Development Report (2002) and the United 
Nations Office of the Special Adviser (OSAA) 2005 recommend proportional representation as the most democratic 
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and inclusive system which can reduce conflicts emanating from electoral contestations. As the OSAA (2005) 
suggests ―[m]ajority votes do not guarantee stability or security…majority rule versus the opposition model of 
democracy…may be a much less useful focus than seeking to ensure fundamental democratic ideals like free and 
fair elections, respect for human rights and the separation of legislative, judiciary and executive powers.‖  
 
In some SADC countries electoral irregularities are prevalent in stark contravention of the organisations‘ established 
Principles Governing Democratic Elections in the region (Sachikonye 2004, Kibble 2005, and Townsend 2005). 
Contestations of election results have been experienced in many SADC countries such as Malawi, Zambia, and 
Tanzania, and have culminated in violent political turmoil in Zimbabwe and Lesotho. Commenting on the political and 
economic crisis in Zimbabwe, the leader of the then pro-senate faction of the Movement for Democratic Change 
(MDC), Mutambara, noted that ―our country is ruled by a corrupt, incompetent, criminal and brutal kleptocracy, which 
has retained power through fraudulent elections‖ (Mutambara 2007: 79). The connection between failed states, 
undemocratic and de-legitimised governance and the emergence of conflicts is an established fact (Buzan 1991, 
Annan 1998). As Annan (1998: 4) observed, ―[w]here there is insufficient accountability of leaders, lack of 
transparency in regimes, inadequate checks and balances, non-adherence to the rule of law, absence of peaceful 
means to change or replace leadership, or lack of respect for human rights, political control becomes excessively 
important, and the stakes become dangerously high.‖ Conflicts erupt because the regimes are highly insecure and 
regard any different political views, no matter how democratic and constructive they seem to be, as a challenge to 
their authority and legitimacy, hence the repressive counter measures as experienced in many African countries. As 
long as there is denial of democratic participation in the political dispensation, politically motivated conflicts will 
remain a permanent feature of the Continent. This is because ―[g]overnance issues are closely linked to the 
empowerment of people and communities. Without effective governance, people are not empowered. And unless 
people and communities are empowered to let their voices be heard or to participate in decision making, governance 
is not feasible‖ (Commission on Human Security 2003: 68).  
 
The Freedom House surveys of civil and political liberties in the SADC region (2002) and Isaksen and Tjonneland 
(2001) reflected that currently Botswana, Mauritius, Namibia, Mozambique and South Africa were ―free‖; Lesotho, 
Malawi, Mozambique, Seychelles, Tanzania and Zambia were ―partly free;‖ and Angola, the DRC, Swaziland and 
Zimbabwe were ―not free‖ or were less democratic. This scenario tends to vindicate the observation by the SADC 
Parliamentary Forum that most of the politicians in the region ―talk democracy but use undemocratic means to stay in 
power‖ (cited in Nathan 2003: 16). In the view of Landsberg and Barengu (2003: 4) ―Façade‘ or ‗virtual‘ democracies, 
where incumbent regimes manipulate the democratic process while pretending to be highly democratic, are the 
standard in Southern Africa. In fact, many states are caught between democracy and authoritarianism.‖  
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Subjected to such a hostile political situation, the groups or institutions which felt oppressed by the despotic regimes 
have no choice but to dislodge it by violent means. In most countries in Africa, ―[t]he extraordinary privileges of most 
African rulers and bureaucrats and their use of state powers for private gain would be regarded as prima facie 
evidence of the illegitimacy and a potent incentive for…resentment… largely by the disadvantaged and deprived 
masses‖ (Gurr, 1991: 154). Firstly, it was the military assuming power through military coups. Buzan argues that ―the 
political conditions of weak states often propel the military into government as the only organisation possessing 
power and /or the national legitimacy to hold the state together‖ (1991: 104). However, in most cases this has not 
ensured democratic governance, but continued repression and dictatorship by those who proclaimed themselves as 
saviours when they assumed power.  
 
In many African countries, the politicisation of the armed forces through protection of their undemocratic regimes has 
backfired when the armed forces have turned the military machinery against them. Adedeji (1999: 3) observes that 
―between the decades 1960s and 1990s… there have been as many as 80 violent changes of government in the 
continent.‖ Participants at the Foundation for Global Dialogue (1999) noted that the 1994 and 1998 crisis in Lesotho 
emanated from decades of pollicisation of the army by the Leabua Jonathan government as will be reflected in 
Chapter Six. The International Peace Academy (2001), Adebayo and Gelin Adams (1999), Adedeji (1999) has noted 
that among the regions in Africa, West Africa tops the list with the highest number of military coups. This is an 
appalling reality that more than half of the countries have experienced military rule, which in most cases has proved 
to be a travesty of democracy. The military rulers who purportedly seized power to remove a dictatorship for 
democratic rule have in most cases turned to be the worse evils. In the DRC, Munyae (2000) notes how Kabila 
toppled the Mobuto despotic rule, ―Mobutuism‖, and replaced it with his own form of autocracy, ―Kabilaism‖, resulting 
in another protracted and destructive conflict against his regime in 1998. 
 
In some cases, civil wars in Africa were/are launched by power-hungry warlords and rebel groups who wish to topple 
democratically elected regimes, as was the case in Liberia, Somalia, Uganda, Sierra Leone and Congo Brazzaville. 
Most of these groups are not guided by any ideological orientation but by the quest to seize power, retain it and 
further their opportunistic interests (Annan 1998, Joseph 1999, Adebayo and Gelin-Adams 1999, de Wall, 2000 and 
Miall etal. 2001. Mitchell (1996) describes the Somali militia as having ―no issues…no ideological differences and 
nothing to negotiate‖ (cited in Joseph 1999: 10). Rule by military and warlord dictatorship has robbed the Continent of 
democracy and opportunities for stable development and peace. Most of these military regimes have been 
characterised by suspension of the constitution, presidential autocracy, and rule by military decrees, political 
repression, oppression, corruption, media crackdown and grave human rights abuses (Annan 1998, Barclay 1999, 
Levit 2003). Todaro (1977) rightly notes that military intervention in politics has proved to be ―a notorious vehicle by 
which one elite replaced another while the welfare of the poor remained unaffected‖ (cited in Barclay 1999: 302). Put 
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differently, ―Africa‘s soldiers have been as unsuccessful as the politicians they replaced in transforming their societies 
in any fundamental way…and their claims to legitimacy were often as questionable as those of the politicians they 
displaced‖ (Adebayo and Gelin-Adams 1999: 5). In view of the political turmoil and bickering brought by military rule 
in most African countries, the former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan appealed to political leaders thus: ―[w]e 
Africans must summon the will to resolve our problems by political and not military means. For every day we fail to do 
so, the innocent people of this continent pay a terrible price..‖ (Public Eye 13-17 September 1998, cited in Pherudi 
and Barnard 1998: 39). 
 
In some parts of Africa such as the Great Lakes region and West Africa (the Mano River region) these militarised 
regimes harboured and sponsored rebel group networks which destabilise and regionalise conflicts. The former 
warlord president of Liberia, Charles Taylor, was responsible for sponsoring rebel movements, which caused 
disruptive atrocities in Sierra Leone (Sankoh, Revoluntionary United Front (RUF), in Guinea and in the Ivory Coast. In 
retaliation, Ivory Coast and Guinea also sponsored rebel groups such as the Liberian United for Peace, 
Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL), which led to the 
collapse of the Taylor regime in 2004. Since 2005, Charles Taylor has been on trial at The Hague for a variety of 
crimes against humanity in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Cilliers maintains that Liberia under Taylor was ―a direct source 
of insecurity-adopting policies that undermined the livelihood of the majority, using state instruments to the benefit of 
the presidential circle of patronage [and] deploying armed forces in pursuit of commercial gains in neighbouring 
countries…‖ (2004: 39). The military regime of Blaise Compaore in Burkina Faso was also accused of harbouring and 
backing the rebels of the New Forces which controlled the northern part of Ivory Coast during the civil war (Ero 1995, 
Munyae 2000, International Peace Academy 2001, Soderbaum 2001, ICG Africa Report No 62, April 2003, ICG 
Africa Report no 72 November 2003).  
 
The same trend is also experienced in the Great Lakes region where militarised regimes in Uganda, Rwanda and 
Burundi have sponsored rebel groups, for instance, the Congolese Rally for Democracy-Kisangani and the 
Congolese Rally for Democracy-Goma rebel factions to destabilise the DRC since 1998. Military support for rebel 
groups has become a major source of continued conflicts in Africa. This concern prompted Annan in his 1998 report 
to remark that ―the role that African governments play in supporting, sometimes even instigating, conflicts in 
neighbouring countries must be candidly acknowledged‖ (1998: 4), and ― the continent must look beyond its colonial 
past for the causes of current conflicts‖ (Annan 1998: 3).  
 
International and regional organisations have come to the realisation that military and other forms of unconstitutional 
regimes constitute a major source of conflicts; instability and insecurity in the world, and most of them have included 
clauses in their operational documents to denounce it. For example in 1991, the Commonwealth Heads of States 
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Meeting in Zimbabwe adopted the Harare Declaration, which called for protection and promotion of political values of 
democracy, democratic processes and institutions, together with just and honest government (Ngoma 2005). Article 
31 of the Constitutive Act of the African Union (2003: 14) states that ―Governments which shall come to power 
through unconstitutional means shall not be allowed to participate in the activities of the union.‖ In its 1991 Santiago 
Declarations, the Organisation of American States (OAS) declared that ―violations of basic democratic norms, such 
as a military coup affected regional stability and would trigger a collective response‖ (USIP 1994: 3). SADC‘s 
interventions in Lesotho in 1994 through the Troika (Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe and the 1998 military 
intervention by Botswana and South Africa through Operation Boleas were indicative of the region‘s intolerance of 
unconstitutional means of assuming power (Neethling 2000, Martin 2002, Nathan 2003, 2004, Ngoma 2005). The 
African Union (AU) and SADC have also indicated their indignation to unconstitutional seizure of power by taking 
mediation steps and threatening to impose sanctions on the Andre Rajoilina government who, with the backing of the 
military, seized power from the democratically elected government of Mark Ravalomanana in Madagascar 
 
However, in spite of pledges for good governance, peace, security and development by African leaders in various 
forums, most of them are still driven by unbridled greed to cling to power. Examples abound where some African 
leaders attempted, and sometimes succeeded, to legitimise their continued stay in power by amending the 
constitution to allow them to stand for a third term despite the dangers posed by such constitutional manipulations. 
Chiluba of Zambia, Muluzi of Malawi and Obassanjo of Nigeria and Mamadou Tanja of Niger whose government has 
been toppled by the military in protest against this undemocratic move, made abortive attempts. Nuyoma of Namibia, 
Museveni of Uganda, Idris Darby of Chad, Paul Biya of Cameroon and Hosni Mubarak of Egypt successfully 
legitimised their prolonged stay in power by amending the constitution for numerous third terms. In Southern Africa 
volatile political climates, threatening regional peace and stability and which pose as threats of potential conflicts, 
exist in Zimbabwe where President Robert Mugabe has prolonged his dictatorial regime through violence and 
electoral rigging. The regional organisation, SADC, has dismally failed to handle the Zimbabwean question through 
its fruitless strategy of ―Quiet Diplomacy.‖ The government of national unity that was effected in 2009 between ZANU-
PF and the two MDC factions remains dysfunctional as Mugabe still wields immense powers to manipulate its 
operations to his party‘s advantage. 
 
Swaziland also serves as an explosive scene for potential political turmoil as the only monarch regime in Southern 
Africa which resists both internal and external pressure to institute democratic political reforms in the country. This 
ugly political scenario prompted Joseph (1999: 19) to conclude that ―it is unlikely that a wholly revamped Pax 
Africana based on respect for democratic governance, the rule of law and human rights would be established‖ in 
Africa. Conflicts in Africa can only be prevented or resolved if African governments can commit themselves to 
democratic systems of governance in which there is tolerance of opposition, transparency, accountability, popular 
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participation in governance and all levels of decision-making, independence of the judiciary, observance of the rule of 
law, protection of the fundamental (basic) rights and freedoms of citizens, legitimate, fair and free elections, free 
press and general socio-economic and political justice. Denial and suppression of popular democracy only create 
opportunities for military coups, civil wars and armed struggles. As a former President of the USA noted, ―those who 
make peaceful change impossible, make violent change inevitable‖ (cited in Odunuga 1999: 44). 
 
2.7 The Struggle for Scarce Resources 
The struggle for scarce and limited resources has also been identified as lying at the heart of many conflicts not only 
in Africa but the world over. Ajulu (2004: 268) reasons that ―concrete economic interests have underpinned every 
major war of the past century.‖ It is within this view that many conflict analysts define conflict as the struggle for 
scarce resources. Acquisition of external sources of raw material for industrial manufactures and the defence of 
economic interests were at the centre of European imperial conquest and colonisation of overseas territories in the 
15th and 18th century. The Marxists regarded this imperial expansion, conquest and export of capital as the source of 
international conflicts, domination, oppression and global exploitation. Many scholars and theorists on conflict tend to 
converge on the fact that the struggle for limited resources to satisfy the ever-growing survival needs has resulted in 
wars within and between communities, regions and nations of the world. The conflicts are mainly over control, 
allocation and distribution of the resources among different sections of the population with diverse needs, interests, 
and aspirations. As Adedeji (1999: 10-12) suggested, ―[c]ompetition for resources typically lies at the heart of conflict. 
This accounts for the intensity of the struggle for political power in many an African country. In these nations, political 
power is sought in order, inter-alia, to acquire control over the means of production. Those who win in the intense 
and brutal political power competition no longer need to exert themselves in furthering their economic well-being.‖  
 
In Africa, the competition and struggle for resources have resulted in more debilitating conflicts due to two main 
factors. First, Africa‘s abundant resources have been plundered and exported to develop the European nations. 
Colonial exploitation brutally undermined Africa‘s economic development, and is largely responsible for the 
Continent‘s current miserable economic position in the world order. Economic exploitation of the continent has 
continued after independence through neo-colonialism and the process of globalisation, which have stifled economic 
growth in the Third World through tied loans, unfair trading relations, the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund‘s (IMF) Structural Adjustment Programmes, and their imposed conditionalities. As Cilliers (2004: 20) puts it, 
―Africa was left to the machinations of the international financial institutions and the vagaries of globalisation…‖ In the 
current world order, the economic resources of the African continent mainly benefit the developed nations while the 
African populace wallow in poverty. For example, the industrialised nations determine the prices of Africa exported 
raw materials. The manufactured goods made from the raw materials are then exported back to Africa at exorbitant 
prices. In an interview with New African (April 2007), the former president of Ivory Coast Laurent Gbabgo lamented 
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the fact that the country was the leading producer of cocoa yet it does not control the cocoa market. In view of this 
situation, Annan (1998: 3) posits that ―the character of commercial relations instituted by colonialism created long 
term distortions in the political economy of Africa.‖ 
 
Most African nations are highly indebted to the developed nations and their Bretton Woods institutions through which 
their economies are controlled by the same developed nations (Cilliers 2004). This negative economic historical 
legacy and continued economic domination by the developed world nations makes it extremely difficult for post-
independence regimes to muster the limited resources for the mammoth task of nation-building, development and 
service delivery to its deprived masses. Frustrated by these economic hurdles, the former president of Ghana, Jerry 
Rawlings, is quoted as having once remarked that the independence of African nations is restricted to the flag and 
the national anthems (Sheyin 2007). It is within this global economic framework that Bedjaoui (2000: 36) describes 
underdevelopment as ―a structural phenomenon linked to a specific type of international economic relations, and to a 
certain international division of labour … [It] is the product of unequal system of domination and exploitation [which] 
…thwarts the prospects for prosperity of two thirds of mankind.‖ On the basis of the above, it is safe to argue that the 
―externally initiated and funded development strategies such as the Structural Adjustment Programmes, have been a 
major contributing factor in the emergence of conflicts and /or their exacerbation…‖ (Adedeji 1999: 10). 
 
Consequently, post-independence African regimes face the wrath of the citizenry for failure to deliver and satisfy their 
basic needs. As Ajulu (2004: 266) puts it, ―[c]onflicts in Africa are invariably sparked off by contestations over 
resources. This is occurring against a background of economic globalisation that had adverse effects on the 
peripheral economies of the African type‖ resulting in incessant conflicts in the Continent. Hettne (2000) also 
observes that regions in the peripheral zone of the global order are economically stagnant and politically turbulent. 
There is a consensus by scholars of conflict that underdevelopment is a threat to international peace and security. 
According to Bedjaoui ―[t]he North-South economic gulf represents a profound seismic fissure running through the 
earth‘s sociological crust. It might-it would occasion thunderbolts and violent tremors‖ (2000: 36). Mazrui (1995: 26) 
argues, in view of the fact that most of the conflicts in the Third World emanate from the problem of 
underdevelopment, that perhaps Nkrumah‘s clarion maxim ―[s]eek ye first the political kingdom and all else will be 
added unto it‖ should now be ―[s]eek ye first the economic kingdom and all else will be added unto it.‖ That is to say, 
the Third World regions should now organise a struggle for economic independence as one way for sustainable 
eradication of the perennial conflicts consuming their member nations. 
 
There is also the problem of what Bayart (1993) referred to as ―politics of the belly.‖ The history of Africa is littered 
with numerous rapacious and corrupt dictators who plundered national resources and amassed wealth for personal 
benefit to the detriment of national development and service delivery to the impoverished populace. As Duodu (2011: 
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73) aptly puts it, [African] ―leaders so often renege on their pledge to serve their people. Their luxury mansions and 
private jets tell the real story.‖ Such greed and plunder by the political elite has resulted in grave underdevelopment 
and impoverishment of the masses. It has also given an impression that having political power means having 
unfettered access to national resources. That is, as Balandier asserts, ―[p]articipation in power...provides a hold over 
the economy...and one‘s position in relation to the apparatus of the state also determines one‘s social status and 
one‘s material power‖ (cited in Bayart, 1993: 70). These perceptions gave birth to the emergence of some more 
brutal and ruthless warlords who would commit heinous crimes against humanity to assume power and access to 
national resources. Allen (1999: 377) refers to this situation as ―spoils political systems‖ in which access to political 
power is often the main route to resources and wealth.  
 
Some leaders and regimes have presided over economic policies with skewed and corrupt allocation and distribution 
of resources and development facilities among the different sections of the population and regions of the country. 
Some economies benefit a few, mainly the ruling elite, their cronies and the regions from which the president hails, at 
the expense of marginalisation and exclusion of the masses. Corruption in terms of employment opportunities and 
access to basic services such as education, clean water, food, shelter and health, is rampant. Labels such as 
kleptocratic, predatory, extractive and vampire-like regimes have been used by scholars such as Englebert (1997), 
Frimpong- Ansah (1991), Rodrianja (1996), and Goldsmith (2000) to describe the degree to which some African 
leaders have drained the nations‘ resources to sustain their autocratic regimes. As such, according to Ajulu (2004: 
266) most of the conflicts in Africa ―have their roots in the scarcity of resources...and the absence of, or failure to craft 
institutions that could guarantee their equitable distribution.‖ The resource maldistribution culminates in structural 
inequalities, which the disadvantaged groups violently resent. Azar and Farah (1981) posit that ―[s]tructural 
inequalities and differential political power lie at the heart of protracted social conflicts. When these inequalities and 
power differences are expressed through distributional inequalities, such that certain social groups get more or less 
of society‘s rewards, the seeds for a protracted social conflict are sown‖ (paraphrased in Fisher 1997: 82-83). The 
Marxists and the Basic Human Needs theorists maintain that the struggle for equal opportunity and access to the 
basic means of survival remain at the core of conflicts the world over. Azar (1990a: 9) asserts that ―[g]rievances 
resulting from need deprivation are usually expressed collectively. Failure to redress these grievances by the 
authority cultivates a niche for protracted social conflicts.‖ It was in light of the afore-stated problems that participants 
at the United States Institute of Peace (1994; 4) concluded that ―[c]onflict resolution in Africa will be successful only 
when the underlying sources of violence are addressed and ameliorated and when citizens of African states perceive 
that economic resources are distributed fairly to all segments of the population.‖ 
 
Benjamin (1992) notes how most of the nation-states in the SADC region have fragile economies characterised by 
low industrial and agricultural output, inability to equitably distribute resources and other essential services, and 
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general failure in fulfilment of the basic human needs of the masses of their citizens, which is a fertile ground for civil 
commotions. The incessant conflicts which have rocked Lesotho since independence are traced to the failure by the 
successive governments to ensure equitable distribution of resources to the different social strata of the population. 
What aggravates the situation in Lesotho is its hyperdependence on South Africa for its economic livelihood (Matlosa 
1993, Santho 2000). 
 
That conflict in Africa results from the struggle for resources is evidenced by the plundering and looting which 
accompany the conflict process. The exploitation of resources by both the regime and the adversary party to finance 
the conflict has been a conspicuous trend in the history of wars (Annan 1998, Chabal and Daloz 1999, Naidoo 2000, 
Maseti 2001, Ajulu 2004, Cilliers 2004). In some of the conflicts in Africa, rebel groups have established parallel or 
―war zone economies‖ where they ruthlessly exploit and export resources to sponsor their war effort. This has 
encouraged rebel groups to continue the protracted conflict and would be opposed to any peaceful settlement, as it 
would deprive them of their economic base which they also exploit for self-enrichment. Le Billon defines these 
resource-based wars as ―armed conflict[s] in which the control of revenue and natural resources are significantly 
involved in the economy of the conflict and/ or the motivation of the belligerents‖ (2000: 22).  
 
It was within this framework that analysts introduced the economic theory of conflicts premised on the belief that the 
profitability of wars immensely contributes to eruption and escalation of conflicts (resource wars) (Annan 1998, 
Cilliers 2004, Cilliers and Dietrich 2004). Naidoo (2000) argues that subsequently resource wars culminate in the 
creation of what he terms war economies, which perpetuate intractable conflicts through the expropriation and 
exploitation of the nation‘s resources by the warring parties. These criminalised war economies establish both 
internal and external commercial networks and partnerships to facilitate trade in the stolen resources, making the 
possibility of resolving the conflicts more elusive. The international community and the Security Council embargo on 
the trade in diamonds suspected of fuelling conflicts were geared towards curbing such conflict trends. Groups such 
as National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) in Angola, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in 
Sierra Leone and the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) as well as the different rebel movements in the DRC, 
survived through war economies during the conflicts in their respective countries. The Ugandan, Rwandan and 
Zimbabwean forces have also been accused of looting the DRC resources during their 1998 interventions in the 
country (Zartman 1989, Ero 1995, Annan 1998, Adedeji 1999, Adebayo and Gelin- Adams 1999, Mortimer 2000, 
Malaquis 2000, Le Billion 2000, Miall etal. 2001, Schoeman 2001, Martin 2002, de Waal 2003, Cilliers 2004). 
 
It can be concluded that social, economic, political, internal and external factors are intertwined as sources of conflict 
in Africa (Azar 1990a, Buzan 1991, Ayoob 1995, Alagappa 1998, Du Plessis 1998). This has prompted Azar to refer 
to contemporary conflicts in Africa as international social conflicts. ―That is conflicts that are neither pure international 
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(inter-state) conflicts, nor pure social (domestic) conflicts but sprawl somewhere between the two‖ (cited in Miall 
2001: 77). Many analysts contend that in the Third World, external involvement is invited by the existence of weak 
states, legitimacy crises, poor governance and fragmented governance structures, weak economies, corruption, 
ethnic and religious divisions (Buzan 1991, Rupesinhe 1990, Thomas 1991, Chabal 1992, Benjamin 1992, Munyae 
2000). As Buzan (1991: 106) puts it, ―in weak states domestic threats to government can almost never be wholly 
separated from the influence of outside powers. In this sense, the domestic security problems of weak states are 
often hopelessly entangled with their external relations.‖ 
 
 It is important for regional organisation and the UN to have a full understanding of the sources and dynamics of 
conflicts in particular contexts in order to devise appropriate resolution strategies and mechanisms. Unless the root 
causes of conflicts are identified, comprehended and addressed, durable preventive measures and lasting peace will 
always be elusive. Lack of comprehension of the nature and causes of African conflicts by both African governments, 
regional organisations and the international community are responsible for failure to devise durable solutions to the 
conflicts (Burton 1990a, 1990b, Azar 1990a, Prendergast 1997, Annan 1998, Adedeji 1999, Sorbo 1999, Adebayo 
and Gelin- Adams 1999, International Peace Academy 2001, Isenhard and Spangle 2000, de Waal 2003). The 
following section deals with trends which were identified in many conflicts globally and conflicts which have ravaged 
several countries in Africa have followed some of the conflict patterns as will be discussed below. 
 
2.8 Conflict Processes, Trends and Dynamics 
A range of factors determines the dynamics of conflict in different contexts. Once conflict behaviour manifests, 
several social, psychological, political and contextual mechanisms are triggered, which influence the patterns, scope, 
intensity, duration and dynamics of the conflict. The factors include: the issues in contention, goals, perceptions, 
commitment of the parties to the cause, conflict tactics, weapons employed, power relations between the contending 
parties, the resource base of the parties, support base (internal and external), the physical, cultural and political 
context in which the conflict occurs; strategies of resolving the conflict, termination of the conflict and its outcomes 
(Mitchell1981, Bercovitch 1984, Kriesberg 1982, Carpenter and Kennedy 1988, Azar 1990, Northrup 1989, Zartman 
1989, 1991, Zartman and Faure 2005, Morgan 2005, Kim 2005, Pruit 2005, Carlson 2005). 
 
 Literature on conflict converges on the fact that there are different stages in the life cycle of any conflict. Conflicts are 
not static but dynamic, and do not follow a standard linear path. The intensity level changes over the life history of 
each conflict depending on the prevailing circumstances. The dynamics of each conflict are determined by the 
existing contextual factors such as the sources, the goals of the warring parties, the commitment of the disputants, 
the parties‘ perceptions and/or misperceptions about each other, the resource bases of the contending parties, and 
the efforts at resolving the conflict (Steadman 1991, Miall etal 1999, Lund 1996, 2005, Swanstrom and Weissmann, 
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2005). Despite the different phases and dynamics of conflicts, scholars in the field have identified common trends in 
most conflicts. Samarasinghe (1990) notes that typically a conflict evolves through five stages, namely the pre-
conflict phase, the conflict emergence phase, the conflict and crisis phase (characterised by chaos and complex 
emergencies), the conflict settlement phase, and the post-conflict phase. In the same vein, Draman (2003) notes that 
conflict moves through the pre-violence, escalation, endurance, de-escalation, and post-conflict phase. There are 
differences in labelling and numbering of stages by different scholars but all enhance the understanding of the nature 
and patterns of conflicts. It is essential to note that each conflict stage requires particular intervention measures and 
instruments in accordance with the dictates of the particular conflict. It is therefore, optimally important for an 
intervening entity to establish the stage at which a particular conflict is, in order to determine when to intervene 
(timing), how to intervene (the strategies and instruments for intervention) and where (conflict phase and place) to 
apply each preventive diplomacy instrument (Lund 1996, Carment and Schabel 2003). 
 
2.8.1 The Phase Model of Conflict 
The phase model describes conflict development and process as cyclical and moving through a predictable 
sequence of stages. Although not all conflicts go through the identified stages, they are mutually and symbiotically 
dependent on each other (Kriesberg 1973, 1982). The full cycle of conflicts according to the phase model, consists of 
the following stages: 
 
The existence of objective or underlying basis for social conflict: this stage suggests the existence of issues which 
have the potential to cause conflict but are still latent or dormant. The parties to the conflict have not yet perceived 
the incompatibility of their goals in relation to the issues. What exists is what Kriesberg (1982) refers to as objective, 
latent or potential conflict. 
 
Awareness of conflicting and incompatible goals: this stage suggests that the conflict is manifest and the parties to 
the conflict are aware that they have incompatible goals and are in contention over attainment of their goals. The 
parties regard each other as an obstacle to the attainment of their intended goals (Coser 1955, Boulding 1962, 
Kriesberg 1982). At this stage, hostile attitudes and enemy perceptions and images build up as each party meditates 
on strategies of outdoing each other on the issues in contention. 
 
Initial strategies by the adversaries: the adversaries organise and select strategies of pursuing their contradicting and 
conflictual goals. In most cases, the party which feels its goals are frustrated will opt for peaceful and non-coercive 
means such as negotiations and mediations, in which the parties have the opportunity to present, discuss and 
dialogue on their differing goals and positions on the issues in contention. The next stage is determined by the 
outcome of the dialogue. If it is satisfactory to both parties, the conflict may be amicably resolved. However, if the 
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aggrieved party‘s objectives are not positively attended to, it may resort to coercive and contentious tactics, for 
example the use of force. 
 
Escalation of conflict (intensity and scope): Kriesberg (1982: 164) defines conflict escalation as a ―movement towards 
greater magnitude of conflict behaviour.‖ Deutsch (1973), Wright (1965), Fisher and Keashly (1990) developed a 
model of conflict escalation comprising four stages of intensity, namely discussion, polarisation, segregation and 
destruction (cited in Fisher 1997). This stage of conflict is characterised by intense mobilisation of support (internal 
and external) and resources, enhanced group cohesiveness in preparation for manifest confrontation, communication 
breakdown, development of dehumanising and distorted enemy perceptions about each other, hardening of positions 
and conflict behaviour to a win-lose dichotomy, development of irrevocable commitments to the conflict, polarisation, 
mistrust and suspicions about each others‘ intentions, accusations and counter-accusations, intimidations, threats, 
raids and counter attacks. The contentious tactics, negative attributions and images perpetuate antagonism and 
solidify conflict commitments and spirals. Conflict escalation also depends on the balance of power between the 
belligerents that is whether both parties have the resource power to sustain the war and see no possibility for an 
integrative or mutually beneficial solution. In the words of Azar (1990a: 15) ―...the space for compromise and 
accommodation shrinks as proposals for political solutions become rare and tend to be perceived on all sides as 
mechanisms for gaining relative power and control.‖ This stage of conflict is characterised by competitive and 
destructive episodes. The belligerent parties are entangled in the conflict to the extent that each perceives the 
solution to be solely the crushing of the other. Fisher (1997: 87) summarises the situation thus: ―psychological 
ossification of perceptions, cognitions, and attitudes results from the vicious cycle of fear and hostility and contributes 
to a war culture in which meaningful communication among antagonists is nonexistent.‖ However, it is important to 
note that not all conflicts escalate. Some conflicts remain frozen in the early stages (Mitchell 1982, Kriesberg 1981, 
Pruit and Rubin 1986, Deustch 1987, Sears etal 1991, Fisher 1997, Isenhart and spangle 2000, Anstey 2006). 
 
De-escalation of conflict: According to Kriesberg (1982: 174) ―[c]onflict behaviour does not increase in magnitude 
indefinitely. It must de-escalate or stop.‖ At some stage ―the war fever which characterised the period prior to, and 
following the outbreak of war… is replaced by war weariness and there is often a growing desire for a negotiated 
peace‖ (Dougherty and Pfaltzraff, 1990: 344). However, Mehler (2005) argues, on the contrary, that de-escalation in 
a lot of contemporary conflicts is often temporary, while the antagonists prepare for the next battle. Experience has 
shown that in some conflicts, one warring party may call for a ceasefire or sign a peace treaty only to get a breathing 
space (after some military setbacks) for resource re-mobilisation, re-armament and re-strategising and resume 
armed conflict thereafter.  
 
Several factors determine conflict de-escalation and ultimate termination. The following are some of the factors. 
 51 
 
. 
When a conflict has reached a stalemate, that is the power balance, resource and support bases of the adversaries 
are such that an absolute victory by one of the parties is not possible: This was experienced during the Cold War 
when it appeared the parties were prepared to carry on the conflict but there was no sign of an outright victory by any 
one of the contestants. Zartman (1989, 1991, and 2000) calls this stage of a conflict the ―ripe moment‖ for mediation 
and peaceful resolution of the conflict, as all the warring parties feel the pains of continuing the war and are 
compelled to negotiate. 
 
The exhaustion of necessary resources due to the high costs of the war and risks, loss of support or disintegration of 
the war coalition: This creates a situation where none of the warring parties have the capability to escalate the 
conflict. Zartman (1989, 1991, 2000, and 2005) refers to this stage as a mutually hurting stalemate in which both 
parties are cornered in plateaus or deadlocks. Zartman recommends intervention and mediation at this stage of a 
conflict, as both parties will be ready and willing to be rescued from the conflict entrapment. It may also result when 
the invading force, for example a rebel group, experiences some operational and logistical setbacks. De-escalation 
can also occur as the adversaries retreat for resource replenishment, remobilisation of support, re-organisation and 
re-strategising (what the leader of the Russian Revolution, Lenin, referred to as a strategic retreat in the form of one 
step backward in order to take two steps forward in the struggle). 
 
When there is a shift in the balance of power and one of the disputants is defeated or incapacitated and forced to 
surrender and the conflict comes to an end: Examples could be Germany during World War One, Iraq during the First 
Gulf War, and UNITA after the death of its leader, Jonas Savimbi in 2002. 
 
Domestic, regional or international pressure on the warring parties to find a peaceful solution to the conflict:  For 
example, domestic pressure may be through mass uprisings or protests against the continuation of the conflict as 
experienced in the USA during the war in Vietnam. 
 
Emergence of new relations between the adversaries: that is a situation where the warring parties reach a common 
understanding that continuation of the conflict is immaterial and destructive and there are other options of resolving 
their incompatible goals such as through dialogue and third-party mediation. A change in relations may be reflected 
by changes in behaviour and attitudes towards each other, the signing of peace treaties, peace accords and the 
realisation that the parties need each other in resolving their common problem (Bercovitch 1984, Azar 1990a,b, 
Burton 1990a,b,c, Burton and Dukes 1990, Fisher 1997, Anstey 2006). 
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Termination and outcome of conflict (Distributive or Integrative): Conflict may be terminated through outright defeat of 
one party or through a negotiated settlement. Conflict termination can result when one or both parties in a conflict 
resolve to abandon coercive behaviour and embrace concessions and reconciliation as settlement strategies. The 
adversaries may adopt a peaceful resolution of the conflict after a realisation that instead of continuation with 
coercive and costly military operations, they would rather employ peaceful bilateral negotiations on how to reach 
durable peace (Mitchell 1981, Lund 1996, 2006). The method by which a conflict is terminated will more often than 
not determine the outcome of the conflict and its impact on the contending parties. In an outright defeat of one party, 
the victor has the leverage to impose a solution and conditions on the defeated party. This constitutes a distributive 
outcome, in which the victorious party attains its goals and the defeated party loses. Distributive or unilateral 
outcomes tend to create fertile grounds for recurrence of conflict when the dissatisfied and humiliated party re-
organises and restarts the conflict if the conditions that precipitated the conflict are not satisfactorily addressed. 
Integrative, mutual or joint outcomes often emanate from conflicts that are terminated through negotiations and 
problem-solving for a solution in which the parties thresh out their differences through dialogue, in which the parties‘ 
needs are addressed for a mutually beneficial settlement and outcomes (Deustch 1973, Kriesberg 1982, Bercovitch 
1984, Azar 1990, Miall etal 2001. It is at this stage of conflict that Burton (1990 a, b, c) and other scholars on conflicts 
such as Azar (1990a, b), Sandole (1990), Mitchell (1982) advocate the engagement of the warring parties through 
problem-solving workshops chaired by a panel of experts, for a permanent resolution of the conflict. In his works on 
conflict, Burton (1990a, b, c) distinguishes conflict resolution from conflict settlement. He argues that a conflict is 
resolved when all the needs of the conflict parties are addressed and an acceptable outcome reached through 
dialogue. On the other hand, settlement denotes a situation where one of the parties is coerced through 
compromises, power-based negotiations and bargaining, to accept a particular outcome. In the latter, peace will be 
brief because the needs of one of the parties which led to conflict will not have been genuinely addressed. 
 
Proponents of the phase or cyclical model of conflict dynamics maintain that the outcomes of every conflict create 
possible or potential bases for another conflict, culminating in vicious conflict cycles or spirals. Conflicts may recur 
when a victim of an imposed distributive conflict outcome makes a comeback to pursue its goals, or when one of the 
parties reneges or violates the peace agreement due to a shift in the goals by the organisation. Mao Zedung (1995) 
acknowledged the cyclical life of conflict when he remarked that ―[w]hen one contradiction has been conquered, 
another emerges. The process of competition repeats itself…‖ (cited in Starr 1979: 30). According to de Waal (2003: 
37) ―if a country has been at war before, it is likely to succumb to war again. The most important reason is that no 
peace settlement will satisfy all. There is always unfinished business after a settlement.‖ Using a number of case 
studies such as Sudan, the DRC, Uganda, Somalia, Rwanda, Ethiopia, Burundi and Liberia, de Waal observes that 
most of the conflicts in Africa in the 1990s occurred in countries that were engulfed by wars in the 1970s and 1980s. 
The cyclical mode of conflicts has been proved by concrete examples worldwide. 
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According to Kriesberg (1982: 323) ―[n]o conflict returns to exactly the same conditions that existed before it began.‖ 
The differences may be in scope, intensity, number and composition of belligerents, patterns of coalitions, the 
technology and logistics used, and the political climate in which it occurs, all of which will in one way or another affect 
the trend and dynamics of the conflict. Rugumamu (2002: 15) succinctly captures the point thus: ―[a] combination of 
factors will generally determine whether a conflict escalates, recedes or retains the same tempo.‖ 
 
Rugumamu (2002) raises three important issues in his critique of the phase model of conflict cycles. Firstly he argues 
that clear progressions from one stage to another, though theoretically plausible, are rare and that most conflicts 
oscillate between two or three of these stages over the years. Secondly, he posits that the determinism inherent in 
the conflict cycle may draw too much attention to events management and allow little space for searching for 
structural alternatives that can break the cycle: and finally that the apparent clear-cut phases of the conflict cycle 
detract attention from the crucial movements from one stage to another. 
 
2.8.2 The Conflict Spiral Model 
The conflict spiral model shares numerous characteristics with the cyclical or phase conflict model. Carpenter and 
Kennedy (1988) identify an eight-phased sequence of events common to conflict spirals as follows; 
 Problem emerges. 
 Sides form as controversy grows. 
 Positions harden as parties become more rigid in their perspectives. 
 Communication stops and parties become adversarial. 
 Conflict goes outside of the immediate context and parties look for support and power. 
 Perceptions become distorted and parties lose objectivity. 
 Sense of crisis emerges as the community divides into factions and coalitions. 
 Uncertainty arises about outcomes as options for the parties become fewer (cited in Isenhart and Spangle 2000: 
18). 
 
The escalation dynamics of the conflict behaviour are dominated by a vicious cycles and spirals of action-reaction, 
aggressor-defender and retaliatory–defensive spirals between the parties (Pruit and Rubin 1986, Isenhart and 
Spangle 2000, Zartman 1989, 1991, 2000,  Pruit 2005).  Just like in the phase model, belligerents may commence 
with less contentious tactics and move to heavier and more contentious tactics. Deutsch (1973) maintained that if 
there is no third party mediation, the conflict spiral continues until one of the parties is defeated, or when both parties 
are exhausted and none have the capability to escalate the conflict.  
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Isenhart and Spangle (2000) note that to successfully resolve spiralling conflicts it is necessary to recognise the 
spiral patterns and break the destructive cycle by identifying the antagonistic behaviours and attitudes, 
depersonalising the issues, and search for an outcome that mutually attends to the underlying needs, interests and 
goals of the contending parties. Kriesberg (1982: 18) observes that ―[a] comprehensive analysis of conflict should 
focus on the objective conditions underlying a conflict situation and processes that lead to groups believing that they 
have incompatible goals...‖ Azar (1990a) and Burton (1990a, b) note that deep-rooted social conflicts emanate from 
basic human needs and value deprivation, and are not negotiable. That is, since they ―centre on threats to 
fundamental human needs, they are not open to compromise and cannot be bargained away‖ (Anstey, 2006: 10). 
The conflict spiral can only be resolved by transforming the existing structural imbalances through analytic problem-
solving dialogue which fully satisfies the needs of the aggrieved parties and eliminates or transforms the conditions 
which precipitated the conflict.  
 
Other research by Stedman (1999), Lund (1996) and Miall etal. (1999) has produced a description of a common life 
cycle for international conflicts comprising four stages, which are: 
 Crisis creation in which tensions deepen and conflict behaviour and attitudes are so hardened that violent 
confrontation appears inevitable; 
 Turning to war; the stage when there are actual manifest confrontations, attacks and counter attacks between 
the belligerent parties; 
 Stopping the fighting; mediation and intervention in the conflict for instance, through peacemaking and 
peacekeeping deployment of troops by the UN or regional organisations. This takes root especially after the 
adversaries have experienced what Zartman (1989, 1991, 2000) called a ―mutually hurting stalemate‖ when 
none of the parties have the steam to continue the war and are all prepared for a peaceful settlement; 
 Building a stable peace; the stage when, through a third party mediation the parties are engaged in dialogue 
over the underlying sources of the conflict with the aim of resolving it (Hauss 2001). 
 
However, it is essential for conflict mediators or peacekeeping agents to have some insights into conflict dynamics, to 
delineate underlying factors to devise appropriate and comprehensive resolution measures and strategies to apply in 
the different stages of the conflict. As Northrup (1989) points out, ―[c]onflict goes through stages and each of the 
stages may require different strategies‖ (cited in Isenhart and Spangle 2000: 9). The question when to intervene and 
through which method is determined by the nature and degree of the conflict escalation dynamics. Interventions 
based on poor mapping and analysis of the conflict trends often fail to provide a lasting solution (Zartman 1989, Lund 
1996, 2006, Adedeji 1999, Burton 1990a, Azar 1990a, USIP 1994, Fisher 1997, Sorbo, 1999).  
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2.9 Consequences of Conflicts 
There are two perspectives regarding the outcomes of conflicts on human society, depending on the theoretical 
persuasions of different scholars. On the one hand, there are those who maintain that conflict is an inevitable 
consequence of social life, is desirable, functionally constructive, innovative, and a transformational catalyst for 
societal change and development. This position is held by various theorists, among others, the structural theorists 
who look beyond the destruction caused by conflicts and focus on the long-term positive objectives of war. As Coser 
states ―[a]n overly moralistic negative assessment (of conflict) based on its short term consequences may act to 
preclude an objective evaluation of its longer-term beneficial functions‖ (paraphrased in Anstey 2006: 46). For 
example, the following are some of the views on the positive effects of conflict: conflict is an inevitable by-product of 
human interaction and serves a positive social purpose (Coser 1956), ―social conflicts have long been considered as 
the premium mobile for social changes and transformations‖ (in Rugumamu, 2002: 3), ―conflict prevents stagnation, 
stimulate interest and curiosity, is the root of personal and social change‖ (Deustch 1973: 9) and ―conflict is a 
beneficial characteristic of the world in that the change it promote is positive and progressive‖ (Mao Zedung cited in 
Starr, 1979: 3). Other positive views about conflict are expressed by Robson, namely that ―war is the midwife of 
change‖ (in Marvick 1978: 7). Bercovitch (1984) summarises the positive effects of conflict into two categories, 
namely the beneficial consequences to the parties themselves and the beneficial consequences to their environment. 
The beneficial consequences to the parties include the creation of a sense of identity and solidarity; facilitation of 
interaction between unequal parties and resultant modifications of their opinions, prevention of rigidity, and facilitation 
of internal change. Beneficial consequences to the society include prevention of social stagnation; facilitation of 
growth and change, stimulating innovation, system enhancing, integration of social system, creation of new 
institutions and value systems (Bercovitch 1984). This position is shared by Barnett (1963) and Worsflod (1919) who 
assert that ―war is a great auditor of institutions‖ and that ―war is a supreme test of existing institutions forcing 
reorganisation in the interest of greater efficiency‖ (cited in Marvick 1978: 7). Coser (156) also maintains that conflict 
may act to maintain a social relationship, freeing feelings of hostility rather than allowing them to accumulate...It 
provides specific safety valve institutions to drain off hostile and aggressive sentiments‖ (cited in Anstey, 2006: 7). 
 
Anstey (2006: 46-47) provides an insightful illustration of the functional purposes of conflict based on Coser‘s 
reflections: that it 
 May provide groups barred from legitimate access to opportunities in society an alternative means of establishing 
an identity, and act to symbolise commitment to a given cause; 
 Provides the means for a group to acquire a sense of achievement and commitment where more peaceful 
alternatives are absent; 
  Performs the function of a danger signal to a society, its manifestation sensitising more privileged groups of the 
need for social reconstruction; 
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 May act as a catalyst, arousing new levels of solidarity in a community as it seeks to campaign against 
…government authorities abusing their power.  
In view of the above reflections, Zartman (1991: 319) concludes with a call for insightful studies that would alter the 
prevalent attitudes and views that ―consider conflicts as deviant and disruptive behaviour rather than an indication of 
a problem to be solved.‖ 
 
Mao Zedung distinguished between what he referred to as ―just wars‖ and ―unjust wars‖ as a way of providing an 
appropriate determination of the consequences of conflict. He argued that ―[h]istory shows that wars are divided into 
two kinds, just and unjust. All progressive and transformational wars are just and all wars that impede progress are 
unjust. We Communists oppose all unjust wars that impede progress but we don‘t oppose progressive wars‖ (cited in 
Starr 1979: 37). Beach lists the principles of a Just War as, a ―just cause, comparative justice, legitimate authority, 
right intention, probability of success, last resort, proportionality, and non-combatant immunity‖ (cited in du Plessis, 
2000: 45-46). The position that progressive conflicts are just, forms the hub of the Marxist theory on conflict. They 
maintain that transformation of an unjust system and emancipation of the oppressed masses can justifiably be 
attained through a violent revolution. Himes (1980) echoes Mao‘s and Marxist‘s sentiments on just wars when he 
points out that achievement of intended ends is a functional aspect of conflict, citing political liberation through 
guerrilla warfare as an example. Indeed, conflicts may have positive long-term effects. As Rugumamu (2002: 4) 
observes ―[o]n the ashes of destruction and disintegration caused by the previous system, social revolutions provided 
societies with unique opportunities to devise more conducive institutional arrangements to meet the challenges of the 
new times‖ and the future. 
 
On the other hand, there is the view that conflicts are negative, destructive, pathological, and dysfunctional, and an 
aberration of humanity and society which therefore should be abolished or eradicated. This position is championed 
by the Functionalist School of thought, which views conflict as diabolic to societal stability, function and development. 
They view conflicts as ―… the nastiest and most destructive of all human activities‖ (Marvick 1978: 7). Conflict is also 
viewed as ―disruptive, and a hindrance to development, and are an obstacle that must be surmounted before 
progress can be made…‖ (Starr 1979: 43). In an analysis of conflict and violence on society, McKendrick and 
Hoffmann (1990) posit that ―all forms of violence are damaging and disruptive to the quality of life…it injures and 
destroys, restricts lifestyles, evokes fear, damages relationships, dehumanises, alienates, causes psychological 
disruption and leads to moral atrophy‖ (paraphrased in Anstey 2006: 46). This Liberal-Functionalist view of conflict 
was influenced by the high casualties incurred during the two World Wars. The catastrophic horrors of the wars led to 
a recommendation by Professor Shotwell in the editorial preface to ―The Economic and Social History of the Great 
War”, that ―[a] study be made of the displacement caused by the war in the process of civilisation, in order that its full 
lesson should be brought home to the world which will be bound to appreciate peace all the more because of the 
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catastrophic nature of the war…‖ (cited in Marvick 1978: 8). Contemporary African intra-state conflicts and their 
concomitant atrocities and destruction can only vindicate the functionalist view of conflict. Most of the post-1990 intra-
state conflicts fit well in Himes‘ definition of violent conflict as the ―intentional struggle between collective actors that 
involves the application of significant social power for the purpose of injuring, disrupting or destroying human beings, 
human psyches, material property and /or socio-cultural structure‖ (cited in Anstey 2006: 46). 
 
Other scholars maintain a more balanced and objective position that conflict has both positive and negative effects. 
As Terraine (1904) correctly notes ―[i]t is largely hypocrisy to discover virtues in war, yet it is hypocrisy too to pretend 
that there are none‖ (cited in Marvick 1978: 22). Hence, Deustch (1987) classifies conflicts into those that are 
constructive because they provide impetus to creativity and innovation, promote positive interparty relations, foster 
communication, understanding and trust, and those that are destructive, characterised by intense hostilities, 
escalation of coercive conflict behaviour, and misperceptions about each other, situational entrapment, and 
contentious tactics. Isenhart and Spangle (2000: 24) maintain that ―[c]onflicts can move in either a cooperative and 
constructive path or a competitive and destructive path depending on the warring parties‘ choice of action,‖ while 
Bercovirch (1984: 8) posits that ―conflicts are neither intrinsically bad nor intrinsically good...‖ 
 
What is important therefore is not whether conflicts are bad or good, functional or dysfunctional, but how they are 
constructively managed to avert degeneration into violent and massively destructive crisis (Anstey 1991, Sorbo 1999, 
Brand-Jacobsen 2002, Rugumamu 2002). The researcher is compelled to concur with the view that the discourse 
should centre on what mechanisms should be put in place to effectively manage and resolve conflicts from 
degenerating into destructive phases. This is because it appears that conflicts will continue to erupt in human society 
and that peace appears to be desirable to both those who view conflicts as constructive and those who view them as 
destructive.  
 
2.9.1 Social Outcomes 
Most civil wars are a crime against humanity. There is no doubt that armed conflict constitutes a major threat and 
tragedy to human security through direct human costs such as death (massacres and genocides), injury (mutilations, 
amputations), grave human rights abuses (torture, rape, and denial of survival human needs and freedoms and 
forced migrations and displacements, (refugee crises and humanitarian emergencies) and their concomitant 
atrocities (Ghali 1992, 1995, Annan 1998, Adedeji 1999, Newman 2007). The University of British Columbia Human 
Security Report (2005: 4) points out that ―at the turn of the 21st century more people were being killed in wars in this 
region (Sub-Saharan Africa) than in the rest of the world combined…‖ The conflicts have resulted in huge casualties, 
gross human rights abuses, and mass displacement of people, creating refugee and humanitarian crises in different 
parts of the continent. The catastrophic human tragedy of conflicts in Africa is vividly captured by Martin (2002: 185): 
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―[o]ver the last 40 years, Africa has been (and continues to be) one of the most conflict-ridden region of the world 
which has resulted in untold human suffering. …it has been estimated that... some 10 million people died as a result 
of the violent conflicts in Africa. In Central Africa and the Great Lakes region alone, the death toll is over 6 million, 
including two million in Sudan, about one million in the Rwanda genocide of 1994, 3 million in the DRC (1998-2001), 
and 200.000 in Burundi. Out of the 48-recorded genocides in the world, 20 occurred in Africa. Out of 66 minorities‘ 
threat world wide, 27, representing 37 percent of the world population are in Africa. Africa is responsible for about a 
third of the world‘s 22 million refugees. Ongoing conflicts in more than 15 countries on the continent forced at least 
two million people to seek asylum across the borders in 1999.‖ This chronic and colossal human tragedy is also 
lamented by Annan (1998: 2) when he said ―[i]n 1996 alone, 14 of the 53 countries of Africa were afflicted by conflicts 
accounting for more than half of all war related deaths world wide and resulting in more than 8 million refugees, 
returnees and displaced persons. The consequences of these conflicts have seriously undermined Africa‘s efforts to 
ensure long-term stability, prosperity and peace for its peoples.‖ Cilliers (2004) equates the numerous conflicts in 
Africa and the concomitant high casualties, massive displacement of people and human rights atrocities, to acts of 
terrorism. 
 
2.9.2 Economic Outcomes 
The numerous recurring and protracted intra-state conflicts in Africa have damagingly undermined and constrained 
economic development, growth and prosperity in the Continent. According to Joseph (1999: 9), ―Africa is the world‘s 
poorest continent and these conflicts deepen her impoverishment‖ These sentiments are shared by Chabal, who 
states that as a result of incessant conflicts, ―Africa has virtually been reduced to the television images of the 
emaciated refugee child in the arms of an almost lifeless mother‖ (1994: 3). There is no shadow of doubt that the 
economic development of any country or region is inextricably linked to, and flourishes in, a climate of peace, 
stability, security and democratic governance. Bedjaoui succinctly notes this umbilical link between peace and 
development in ―there is no peace without development and no development without peace‖ (2000: 40). These are 
prerequisites for sustainable development, economic growth and prosperity anywhere in the world. War and 
insecurity are enemies of development and economic growth. The absence of such an environment in most African 
countries has seriously hijacked development opportunities in the concerned countries and the continent at large 
(Annan 1998, 2005, Van Nieuwkerk 2000).  
 
in a conflict situation, corruption by political leaders, business magnates and warlords finds fertile grounds to prosper 
since the attention is on the war. Foreign military entrepreneurs and governments establish unscrupulous trade 
partnerships with both the government and rebel forces, intensifying the plundering of Africa‘s resources in exchange 
for military armaments. As Annan notes, ―[d]espite the devastation that armed conflicts bring, there are many who 
profit from chaos and lack of accountability, and who may have little or no interest in stopping a conflict and much 
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interest in prolonging it‖ (1998: 4). This was supported in Reno‘s interview with one fighter in the National Patriotic 
Front of Liberia when he said ―[t]he Kalashnikov is our business advantage‖ (Reno 2005: 15). Bayart etal. (1999: 30-
31) vividly describe this predatory economic networks thus: [t]he multiplication of conflicts, the main political logic of 
which is simply predation, and which tend to be accompanied by a growing insertion in the international economy of 
illegality,…the spread of a culture of institutional neglect, systematic plunder of the national economy and the 
uncontrolled privatisation of the state suggests a slide towards criminalisation through [out] the sub-continent.‖ The 
‖blood diamonds‖ trade which involved UNITA, RUF and some foreign governments and commercial firms, is a living 
example of such dirty trading partnerships which fuelled destructive conflicts in Africa (Zartman 1979, Annan 1998, 
Adebayo and Gelin-Adams 1999, Le Billon 2000, Malaquis 2000, de Waal 2003, Power 2004, Cilliers 2004, Cilliers 
and Dietrich 2004).  
 
In such conflict-ridden situations, it is the development of the country and its citizens that suffer since no development 
can flourish under conditions of war. Adedeji (1999: 14) notes that ―[w]henever violent conflicts exist; human poverty, 
income poverty and social exclusion are on the rise. There is decline in the Human Development Index value.‖ The 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) report of 2005 also observes that ―armed conflict naturally has a 
strong negative correlation to human development. [As] most of the countries with the lowest human development 
rankings in 2005 were either in the throes of conflict or had just emerged from it‖ (paraphrased in OSAA 2005: 7).  
 
Cilliers (2004) presents an insightful picture of the gloomy economic trends in most of the African countries as a 
result of incessant conflicts and bad governance. He posits that the continent‘s economy is characterised by decline 
in agricultural and industrial production, endemic financial and debt crisis, balance of payment difficulties, decline in 
trade, breakdown of physical infrastructure and public services, poor services delivery, ubiquitous unemployment, 
abject poverty, low living standards, low income, high mortality rates, brain drain of skilled personnel, disinvestment 
of private capital and wealth and general underdevelopment. One disturbing feature of contemporary conflicts in 
Africa is that they have become regionalised, therefore undermining regional integration and development. 
 
It would be logical for collective regional security efforts to nip in the bud these regionalised conflicts and their 
disruptive effects. Regional organisations, mainly ECOWAS IGAD, SADC and the AU, have acknowledged the 
umbilical cord--like link between security, peace, stability and development. They have come to the realisation that in 
order for them to attain regional economic integration and development, there is a need for collaborative regional 
security efforts to establish a stable environment. Accordingly, they have established regional preventive security 
structures for prevention and resolution of conflicts, for example ECOWAS‘s Economic Community Monitoring Group 
(ECOMOG) and the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security 
(1999), IGAD‘s Programme on Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, SADC‘s Organ on Politics, Defence 
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and Security (1996) and the African Union‘s Peace and security Council (2003), all of which are geared towards 
eradicating conflicts and creating peaceful climates for peace, democracy and development. The Constitutive Act of 
the African Union states that ―[m]embers, [are] conscious of the fact that the scourge of conflicts in Africa constitutes 
a major impediment to the socio-economic development of the continent and of the need to promote peace, security 
and stability as a pre-requisite for implementation of our development and integration‖ (Constitutive Act of the African 
Union 2002: 3). Article 2, sub section 2(a) of SADC‘s specific objectives on the Organ on Politics, Defence and 
Security is to ―protect the people and safeguard the development of the region against instability arising from the 
breakdown of law and order, intra-state conflict and aggression‖ (OPDS Protocol, 2001). This reflects the 
commitment and determination by regional organisations in confronting the security challenges to attain economic 
progress in their respective regions. At its summit in Windhoek Namibia in 1992, the SADC Heads of State observed 
and pledged that ―war and insecurity are the enemies of progress and social welfare. Good and strengthened political 
relations among countries of the region, and peace and mutual security, are critical components of the total 
environment for regional cooperation and integration. The region needs, therefore, to establish a framework and 
mechanism to strengthen regional solidarity and provide for mutual peace and security‖ (Cited in Ngoma 2005: 111). 
 
2.9.3 Political Outcomes 
Conflicts in Africa have severely impeded the process of nation-building, national and continental cohesion and 
development of peace, security, democracy and good governance. Conflicts have resulted in the disintegration of 
several states, which have been consolidated after independence. As Joseph (1999) observes, one of the painful but 
real consequence of conflicts in Africa is the erosion of the state itself through the contraction of territory under its 
control and mounting threats to the regimes in power. There are several fragmented, failed and collapsed states in 
Africa due to prolonged or frequent recurrence of conflicts. Civil wars and situations of state failure contribute to 
national, regional and international insecurity in the form of displacements and refugee flows, arms proliferations, and 
spreading of insurgencies, collapsed nation-states (Newman 2007). During the civil war, the DRC was carved into 
several portions controlled by warlords and militia groups (1998-2004), while Somalia since 1991 is a collapsed state 
with different religious and clan warlords battling for control of what was once the capital of a unitary state, 
Mogadishu. With no central government these fragmented nations fall under what Robert Jackson (1990) terms 
―quasi-states‖, a term used to describe ―states which enjoy international recognition but lack substantial and credible 
statehood by criteria of international law‖ (in Soderbaum, 2001: 65).  
 
Conflicts have also provided fertile grounds for political anarchy in many African countries. Some nations are 
governed by autocratic military warlords and dictators, whose duty is to safeguard the survival of the regime and 
state power through repression and violations of the rights and freedoms of citizens. Most of the leaders who came to 
power through the barrel of the gun establish militarised states in which there is no political freedom, democracy, law 
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and order, but political repression, enforced loyalty, networks of patronage and patrimony (Chabal and Daloz 1999). 
Some of the despotic leaders have nefarious agendas for regionalisation of autocracy by sponsoring and harbouring 
rebel groups to destabilise their neighbours. According to Cilliers (2004: 26), ―[s]ome state and sub-state actors may 
have a vested interest in continued war and disorder since it allows them additional opportunities to extract and 
conceal rewards and thereby serve the various patrimonial networks that provide their legitimacy.‖  
 
Furthermore, conflicts have seriously hijacked development of democracy in Africa. What exists especially in conflict-
ridden countries is ―low intensity democracy‖ (Adedeji 1999: 15). In the words of Cawthra (2004: 31), in such 
countries, ―democracy is only a shell within which undemocratic politics prevail.‖ Landsberg and Barengu (2003) note 
that most of the states in the SADC region fall within what they termed ‖formal or procedural‖ democracy and most of 
them are in between democracy and authoritarianism. It should also be noted that conflicts in Africa have weakened 
the Continent‘s coherence, status and power in the global political arena. The Continent is in turmoil, with a large 
number of countries engulfed by internal strife; it is not united in calling for recognition in world affairs such as 
permanent representation in the Security Council. It is just dismissed as a continent at war with itself, a continent 
incapable of democratic development and good governance, and a continent that has dismally failed to resolve its 
problems and is always crying for external assistance. 
 
Reychler summarises the social, economic and political costs of conflicts in Africa under eight categories: 
1. humanitarian cost; number of deaths, wounded, refugees, internally displaced persons and famine; 
2. political cost; state collapse, anarchy, subversion of the democratic process, political corruption, criminalisation of 
power; 
3. economic cost; loss of revenues from trade and tourism, destruction of economic, transport and educational 
infrastructure, diversion of resources away from development; 
4. ecological cost; loss of arable land, soil erosion, deforestation and desertification; 
5. social cost; breakdown of family structures, female victims of sexual violence, war orphans; 
6. cultural cost; breakdown of traditional socio-cultural values, institutions and lifestyles; 
7. psychological cost, psychological disorders, post-traumatic syndromes, fear and mutual hostility between groups 
in conflict; 
8. spiritual cost; loss of values related to the sanctity of life, development of a culture of violence (cited in Martin 
2002: 186). 
 
That conflicts have plagued the continent with little or abortive peacekeeping efforts by the United Nations Security 
Council, is reason enough for regional organisations to reorganise and shoulder the responsibility of preventing and 
resolving the conflicts in their respective regions. Numerous political observers are of the opinion that the slow pace 
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at which the UN Security Council deploys troops, coupled with the reluctance of its most powerful members to 
mandate new UN peace missions in Africa, has forced the AU and African sub-regional organisations to develop their 
own conflict management capacity to conduct their peacekeeping, peace-making and peace-building roles 
(International Peace Academy, 1999, 2001). With coordinated political will and resolve, and the pooling together of 
the regional sovereignties and resources, the task in not insurmountable.  
 
However, for effective preventive diplomacy and global peace to be attained, it is essential to develop more effective 
collaborative partnerships between regional organisations, the AU and the UN. These multilateral organisations must 
strive to develop a common understanding of the connections between preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and 
peace building that goes beyond peacekeeping. Restoring peace in Africa ―is unlikely to succeed unless the root 
causes of conflicts are properly addressed and means to prevent the rekindling of terminated conflicts through 
effective post-conflict peace building‖ (IPA 2000: 2). 
 
2.10 Conclusion 
This chapter has provided definitions of conflict from diverse scholars. It has emerged that the definitions converge 
on the fact that conflicts have been inevitable in human society since time immemorial. It was also established that 
conflict can be latent or manifest, depending on the prevailing causal and triggering (contextual) factors. The chapter 
also revealed that although each conflict has its unique particularities, most conflicts in human society (especially in 
Africa) emanate from poor governance (autocracy, electoral mismanagement, weak institutions of governance), 
under-development, resource scarcity and maldistribution, and other factors bred by the colonial legacy such as ill-
defined nation-state boundaries, the ethnic/identity question (crisis), neo-colonial intrusion by the former colonial 
powers, and the complexities of globalisation. The chapter emphasised the fact that the issue is not whether conflicts 
will occur, as indeed they will inevitably occur, but how best to prevent, manage and resolve them. Post-Cold War 
politics has seen the UN Security Council‘s dwindled involvement in African conflicts and has even devolved the 
responsibility for maintaining peace and stability on to the Africans themselves through what they called ―African 
solutions to African problems.‖ It also became evident that regional organisation should take the initiative in 
preventive diplomacy missions in their different regional zones as they are the most affected and would be in a better 
position to master the history, causal factors and dynamics of the conflicts, hence devising appropriate preventive 
measures. The chapter also indicated the centrality of partnership between the regional organisations and the UN in 
striving for global peace and security. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Theories on Conflict and Preventive Diplomacy 
3.1 Introduction 
The exploration of theory in this study will provide frameworks, perspectives and insights into the dynamics of 
conflict, and the underlying factors that trigger fuel and sustain conflicts in their different settings and manifestations. 
Theoretical frameworks also provide illuminating insights into the strategies and approaches to conflict resolutions 
(Schellenberg 1982). As Burton (1990a: 25) notes, ―[o]ne of the major obstacles in dealing with basic problems such 
as deep-rooted conflict has been the absence of an adequate theoretical framework and, even more serious, the 
absence of a realisation that such a framework is necessary for solving a problem.‖ Thus ―[i]t is from theory that 
conflict resolution processes and prevention policies must be deduced. Evidence from past situations or from present 
empirical data, must be subjected to tests of theory‖ (Burton 1990a: 26). 
 
Given the above scenario, there is no single theoretical framework for a comprehensive study of social conflicts. This 
dovetails with Cohen and Manion‘s position that ―[a] theory can never be complete in the sense that it encompasses 
all that can be known or understood about the given phenomena‖ (1994: 16). This is due to the multidimensional 
nature, complexities, uniqueness, and particularities of conflicts. For example, the causes, processes and outcomes 
of a conflict are largely determined by the social, economic and political context in which it occurs (Annan 1998, 
Adedeji 1999, Odunuga 1999, Deutsch 2000a, International Peace Academy 2001). Miall, etal (2001: 66) suggest 
that ―it seems unlikely on the face of it that a single, all encompassing explanation will be adequate for conflicts of 
different types, with different starting points…that have different histories and cultures, and are at different stages of 
economic and political development.‖ Adedeji (1999) laments this lack of a clear theoretical framework for 
comprehension and mastering of the sources and dynamics of conflicts as the main reason for the failure, on many 
occasions, to find lasting resolutions and durable peace in the African continent. 
 
Therefore, a comprehensive analysis of social conflict requires an integration of both macro and micro theories to 
unpack both the universal and unique characteristics of the conflict processes. It calls for multi-disciplinary inter-
disciplinary and multilevel approaches with inputs and insights from various fields such as sociology, psychology, 
biology, anthropology, political science, philosophy, theology and economics. Reliance on a single theoretical 
framework may prevent scholars, researchers and conflict resolution practitioners from uncovering both the latent 
underlying and covert sources and dynamics of conflicts (Dougherty and Pfalzgraff 1990, Burton 1990a, Adedeji 
1999, Jeong 1999, Deustch 2000a, Deutsch 2000b, Miall etal 2001). The call for a fusion of paradigms in the study of 
conflicts and their resolution is well articulated by Deutsch (2000b: 598) when he states that ―[c]ombining traditional 
disciplinary paradigms and methodologies with multidisciplinary ones is a daunting task, though an essential one if 
the field of conflict is to offer effective solutions to the complex problems of society.‖ Dougherty and Pfaltzgraf (1990) 
 64 
 
concur that there is no consensus on a single general theory of conflict that is acceptable to social scientists in their 
respective disciplines.  
 
However, despite the complex and multidimensional nature of social conflict, scholars from different disciplines have 
produced comprehensive theoretical frameworks and approaches to conflict causal factors, dynamics and the 
outcomes of conflicts in human society. Several theoretical frameworks reflect the disciplinary inclinations of the 
proponents that complement each other in understanding the nature of social conflict. As du Pisani asserts, none of 
the theories should be viewed as superior since ―[e]ach theory has its peculiar strengths and weaknesses in 
selecting, organising, explaining and relating what we study and observe in the real world‖ (2001: 199). Schellenberg 
(1982) classifies theories of conflict into three broad categories: 
A)  Individual Characteristics theories (biological/psychological theories) 
B)  Social Processes theories (sociological/interactional theories) 
C)  Social Structural theories (sociological/structural theories). 
 
Schellenberg‘s broad classification and the related sub-theories will be used in the discussion that follows. 
 
3.1.1 Biological and Psychological Theories 
The Individual Characteristics theories view conflicts in terms of the biological nature of human beings in general and 
the psychological and personality traits of individuals involved in the conflict (Schellenberg 1982, Sandole 1990, 
Suganami 1996, Steger 2004). The theories emanate from diverse disciplines such as Biology, Psychology and 
Ethnology and are premised on the argument that human beings naturally have innate traits and instincts of violence 
and aggression (destructive instincts). There is scientific evidence dating from the Darwinian scientists that violence 
and aggression are genetically ingrained in the biological nature of human beings. Lorenz noted that the innate 
human violent instincts do not necessarily have to be triggered by certain situations such as the defence of territory, 
as some people have observed, but ―...could also spontaneously discharge without any external stimulation‖ (in 
Seger 2004: 122). If so, social conflict is an expression of innate forces of aggression deeply inbuilt within human 
nature and can be genetically transmitted and inherited. As Wilson (1980) notes, ―[h]uman beings have a marked 
hereditary predisposition to aggressive behaviour‖ (cited in Sandole 1990: 68). Human beings are naturally, 
―endowed with an instinct of aggression, it is this innate drive that in the last instance accounts for individual and 
group violence in society‖ (Steger 2004: 122). According to Ury (2002: 11) ―[t]his attribution of violence and war to 
human nature has a rich intellectual heritage.‖ 
 
The Evolution scientists of the Darwin tradition such as Lorenz and Ardrey, maintain that the inborn aggression 
mechanism of human beings is also shaped by the survival needs and challenges of each species. The Ethnologists, 
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Anthropologists and Socio-biologists of the Darwinian tradition argue that ―[h]umans have an inborn tendency 
towards aggression as part of the universal struggle for survival‖ (Schellenberg 1982: 43). It is also proposed that the 
main sources of human violence and aggression are found in their culture and social environment, from which the 
two vices are learned. Scientific evidence abounds with the notion that human beings have the potential to learn 
different behavioural patterns from the dictates of the existential environment. Social learning theory also postulates 
that the social environment in which they live shapes the aggressive nature of human beings (refer Bandura 1973 in 
Bradshaw 2007: 50). Critics of the innate aggression theory argue that in as much as violence might be innate in 
humans, similarly they are also predisposed to peaceful existence as an innate feature (Suganami 1996: 4). 
Stoessinger notes that ―[w]hereas aggression may be inherent in human nature, war is a learned behaviour and as 
such can be unlearned, ultimately selected out entirely (cited in Terriff etal. 2004: 23-24). 
 
Classical Realists also sponsored the view that human nature is inherently imperfect, fixed and aggressive and 
―ought to be accepted for what it is rather than what it might be‖ (Burchill 2001; 80). Thomas Hobbes (1651) equated 
the state of nature with the state of ―war of every man, against every man‖ (in Suganami 1996: 54). They maintained 
that aggressiveness is evidenced by the anarchical world order in which we live. The aggression is driven by the 
human innate competitive quest for power and domination that results in conflicts. Hence Hobbes noted that ―… in 
the nature of man, we find three principal causes of quarrel; first competition, secondly diffidence, thirdly glory…‖ 
(cited in Terriff etal. 2004: 20). Classical Realists further contended that war is caused by ―man‘s selfishness, 
aggressiveness [and] stupidity... there is no denying the fact that war would be impossible in an imaginary world in 
which all human beings are entirely unselfish‖ (Suganami 1996: 4). According to the Classical Realists, ―[h]uman 
nature is constant or cannot be easily altered, the propensity to engage in conflict cannot be changed and the task of 
statesmen is to fashion a political framework within which it can be contained‖ (Terriff etal. 2004: 32). That is, human 
beings unconstrained by the rule of law display motives and behaviour that lead to conflict. Realists interpreted inter-
state wars as reflective of the inherent human quest for power that is projected through the state. Realists maintained 
that international conflicts would continue to exist since states‘ quest and pursuit of power and national interest are 
perennial biological features rooted in the nature of the statesmen who lead the institutions (Burchill 2001, Terriff etal. 
2004).  
 
Numerous scholars dispute the Realists‘ position that the anarchic international system is responsible for global 
conflicts: this is because there is no clear explanation as to why, if the international system is anarchical and 
reflective of the conflictual nature of human beings, ―...the frequency of wars varies in different periods and systems‖ 
such that ―there are cases where political actors do not exhibit the kind of power politics behaviour involved in the 
steps to war‖ (Vasquez 1993: 169).  
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3.1.2 The Frustration-Aggression Theory 
The Frustration-Aggressiontheory to conflict was propounded by John Dollard, Doob, Miller and Sears (1937) and is 
premised on the view that an individual or group may direct its anger and frustration towards others they consider a 
barrier to attainment of their goals or they perceive to be the source of their intended but frustrated goals in life. The 
theory is based on ―the hypothesis that violent behaviour results from frustration. In other words when people are 
blocked from meeting their basic needs or reaching their desired goals, they become irritable and aggressive‖ 
(Steger 2004: 124). According to Dollard and colleagues, frustration is both a necessary and sufficient condition for 
violent aggression. The logical base of the paradigm is that ―the occurrence of aggressive behaviour always 
presupposes the existence of frustration.‖ Although considered a natural instinct, the frustration-aggression posture is 
largely shaped by socialisation and the existential environment of individuals (Marvick 1978, Schellenberg 1982). 
Basic Human Needs theorists observe that frustration of substantive basic human needs such as security, 
recognition, identity, equality, and access to economic and political participation results in the deprived and frustrated 
groups embarking on violence against those viewed to be the source of the frustration and non-fulfilment of their 
basic needs. 
 
The Marxists‘ class struggle can also be located within this paradigm, where conflicts are traced to the frustrated 
survival socio-economic and political needs of the mass proletariat by the capitalist elites. Psychologists of different 
epochs tend to converge on the fact that the behaviour of a person is shaped by the environment in which one is 
brought up. ―The state of mind that is most associated with war is extreme hostility, frustration and insecurity‖ 
(Vasquez 1993: 77). For example, someone who grew up and socialised in the racially antagonistic and polarised 
societies of the then segregatory USA and apartheid South Africa tended to imbibe the racist traits, resulting in 
intolerance and direction of frustration to the other on the basis of race, regarding each other as alien and 
responsible for each racial group‘s predicaments. Du Pisani (1988; 23) is of the view that ―[t]he frustration-aggression 
approach to conflict constitutes a major and useful perspective on conflict: especially because it has influenced other 
approaches such as learning theory‖ and the basic human needs theory.  
 
The conflicts emanating from the frustration-aggression sources are best resolved by addressing the structural 
causal factors such as promotion of inclusive and democratic governance, justice, equality, human rights, human 
security, economic development and equitable distribution of resources and basic human needs in their diverse 
forms. 
 
3.1.3 Human Needs Theory 
The Human Needs theory is based on the belief that all human beings have universal basic human needs 
fundamental for their survival. The proponents of the basic human needs theory argue that human beings, 
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irrespective of race, colour, gender and religion, have ontological, biological and innate needs which are pivotal for 
their growth and survival in society (Burton 1990a, 1990b, Azar 1990a, Sites 1990, Sandole 1990, Roy 1990, Mitchell 
1990, Bay 1990). The exponents of the paradigm maintain that for harmony to be attained in society, these basic 
human needs have to be fulfilled, for if they are frustrated they become a source of perennial conflict and social strife. 
It is in this light that Burton (1987: 255), the guru of the basic human needs theory notes that ―[a]ll people, in all 
cultures, at all times and in all circumstances have certain needs that have to be, that will be fulfilled; not should, or 
ought, but will be fulfilled, regardless of consequences to the self or system‖. Bay (1988: 3) defines these ontological 
needs as ―[a]ny requirement for a person‘s survival, health, or basic liberties; basically meaning that, to the extent 
that they are inadequately met, mental or physical health is impaired.‖ Needs are ―necessities for not only biological 
survival but also for the health and development (physical and mental growth) of persons as human beings.‖  
 
Similar definitions reflecting the imperative necessity of basic human needs satisfaction for peaceful growth of human 
society, individuals and groups, are provided by Masini (1980) and Burton (1988). Masini (1980: 227) asserts that 
―[n]eeds can be understood abstractly to refer to those human requirements calling for a response that makes human 
survival and development possible in a given society. Needs are mediated by desires that express concrete ways in 
which humans wish to satisfy their needs at a given moment and place.‖ Burton maintains that ―needs describe those 
conditions or opportunities that are essential to the individual if he is to be a functioning member of society, 
conditions that are essential to this development and which, through him, are essential to the organisation and 
survival of society‖ (1988: 38). These basic needs as classified by different proponents include: security, access to 
economic and political participation, representation, equity, identity, need for freedom, human rights and the need to 
be perceived as rational, needs of love, recognition, belongingness and self-esteem (Bay 1988, Burton 1988, 1990a, 
1990b, Sandole 1990, Mitchell 1990, Galtung 1990). Sandole (1990) refers to these innate human traits as ‗biological 
imperatives which underlie human behaviour in general‖ (Sandole 1990: 81).  
 
Rugumamu (2002: 4) notes that ―[w]hether contending groups in a particular society are defined by ethnicity, religion, 
ideology, gender or class identities, they have, by definition, different needs, interests, values and access to power 
and resources. Understandably, such differences necessarily generate social conflicts and competition.‖ Proponents 
of the Basic Needs theory, therefore, trace the source of high intensity or protracted social conflicts to the denial, 
deprivation or frustration of the ontological basic human needs (Sites 1990, Burton 1990a, 1990b, Fisher 1990, Azar 
1990a, Sandole 1990). According to Burton (1990a, 1990b), conflicts occur mainly over material (for example, 
resources and power distribution) and non-material issues (values, interests, needs). He associates material conflicts 
with disputes over interests which can be settled by traditional forms of conflict management strategies such as direct 
negotiation, mediation and arbitration, and non-material conflicts with values and innate needs conflicts which cannot 
be repressed, negotiated, bargained over or adjudicated by the courts, but have to be resolved by removing the root 
 68 
 
sources and fulfilling the needs of the deprived group (Burton 1988, 1990a, 1990b, Fisher 1990, Gillward 1990, Dunn 
2004).  
 
Burton (1993: 55) therefore concludes that most of the deep-rooted ―conflicts are concerned with issues that are not 
negotiable, issues that relate to ontological human needs that cannot be compromised.‖ History has proved that 
denial, deprivation or frustration of these ontological and often non-negotiable needs, sometimes by the state, 
inevitably lead to conflict. According to Burton (1990a: 61), ―[i]t is these non-material needs that are discovered to be 
fundamental when parties to a conflict are brought into an analytical framework; their fight is not over material 
resources that are in short supply, but over identity and related issues that do not involve scarce energy resources. 
Material resources however may provide the means by which to pursue security, or some other goal, in 
circumstances in which it is denied or threatened.‖ Denial of such needs culminates in the excluded and deprived 
developing irrevocable value-based group solidarity commitments to struggle for fulfilment of their rights, resulting in 
deep-rooted intractable conflicts (Burton 1988, Burton1990a, 1990b, Azar 1990a, Sites 1990, Sandole 1990, Anstey 
1990, Fisher 1997). Azar (1990a: 9). As Fisher 1997: 84) notes, ―[i]t follows that protracted social conflicts arise when 
attempts by a disadvantaged group are taken to combat conditions of perceived discrimination that come from the 
denial of identity, an absence of security of culture and valued relationships and absence of political participation to 
remedy this victimisation.‖  
 
A state will unleash its repressive military apparatus to crush the resistance in the process, inviting ―a militant 
response from the marginalised group‖ (Fisher 1997: 86). Conflict perceptions and images are hardened when ―both 
groups perceive that their inexorable needs for identity, recognition, security and self-determination are being 
threatened or thwarted by the other‖ (Fisher 1990: 107-108). In the words of Burton (1990a: 14), ―[t]here are reasons 
for predicting that no form of coercion or control is likely to suppress conflict and its violence in the family, the street, 
the community, or within national or international society, while there exists an environment promoting conflict.‖ The 
courage, determination and spirit of resistance displayed by the oppressed masses in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, 
Bahrain and Syria, in spite of the brutal crackdown by the autocratic regimes, give credit to this theory.  
 
The Basic Needs theorists trace the root cause of conflict to undemocratic systems and institutions of governance, 
which are in most cases not representative and responsive to the needs of the ruled, but the interests and 
preservation of the status quo. It is the position of this paradigm that governance and societal institutions should cater 
for the ontological needs of the people and not the conversel where the people are expected to adjust to the norms of 
the institutions (Burton, 1990a, 1990b, Burton and Dukes 1990. The traditional power politics view is that conflict 
emanates from the innate aggressive instincts of human beings which must be repressed through law and order and 
other coercive instruments.  
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The Basic Needs theorists refute the realist power paradigm as ineffective and counterproductive in analysing the 
sources and resolution of conflicts in society. Burton (1988, 1990a) contends that the assumptions that conflicts are 
due to innate human aggressiveness justify the preservation of authoritative political structures and processes of 
punishment and containment as the means by which to control conflict. Basic Human Needs theorists hold that there 
are inherent human needs, which if not fully satisfied, lead to conflictual behaviour. Consequently, societies in which 
the citizens are deprived of their fundamental human needs are more often than not characterised by protracted 
conflicts.  
 
Many conflicts that plagued and continue to plague the African continent are struggles against social, economic and 
political marginalisation, exclusion and oppression, all of which coalesce in deprivation of basic human needs through 
poor governance, corruption and plundering of wealth by a minority elite at the expense of the deprived majority of 
the citizens. Protracted and deep-rooted conflicts arise when the deprived groups organise themselves to fight 
against the sources of their need deprivation, which in most cases are autocratic regimes and their oppressive 
institutions (Buzan 1991, Azar, 1990a, Burton 1990a, 1990b, Burton and Dukes 1990, Fisher 1990, Deng1991, 
Tessendorf 1993, Fisher 1997, Annan 1998).  
 
In their discussions of the SADC security mechanism, Barengu and Landsberg note that there are two forms of 
democracies: formal or procedural democracy characterised by regular elections, the protection of civil liberties, 
separation of powers and the role of opposition parties, and substantive democracy, which entails the ability of the 
state to be responsive to the needs of the citizenry, to eradicate poverty, and ensure effective participation in 
decision-making and addressing issues of social and economic justice. The authors conclude that in most African 
nation-states it is the formal or procedural democracy which exists, as most regimes fail to attend to the needs of the 
populace, resulting in numerous conflicts. Mutambara, the then leader of one of the factions of the opposition 
Movement for Democratic Change in Zimbabwe, recently described Mugabe as ―a dictator who brutalises Africans 
and denies them basic human needs and economic opportunities‖ (2007: 78). Mutambara argue that at the core of 
the Zimbabwean crisis are issues of governance and legitimacy because Zimbabwe is ruled by a brutal kleptocracy 
which has retained power through fraudulent elections (2007). Azar (1986: 33-34) observes that in most cases highly 
centralised political structures and states are the sources because they reduce the opportunity for a sense of 
community among groups, tend to deny groups the means to accomplish their needs, and constrain the state‘s 
responsibility to respond to the needs of the citizenry. He recommends the establishment of appropriate 
decentralised political systems designed to ―serve the psychological, economic and relational needs of groups and 
individuals within the nation-states‖ (cited in Miall etal. 2001: 85).  
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Resolution of such conflicts can only be attained by concerted reforms or destruction of the institutions that hinder the 
fulfilment of other people‘s basic needs. Fisher (1997), Azar (1978, 1990a, 1990b), and Burton (1990a, 1990) 
persistently maintain that conflicts emanating from denial of basic human needs can only be resolved by structural 
transformations which address the existing needs deprivations. In Burton‘s view ―[t]he task which is defined by a 
consideration of conflict, its resolution and prevention, is not to create some ideal political system, but to discover the 
processes that are required within any type of system by which relationships can be handled to resolve or prevent 
conflict, in other words to satisfy basic needs‖ (1990a: 267). Other than that, conflict would escalate into deep-rooted, 
protracted and intractable wars characterised by ―hostile interactions which extend over a long period of time with 
sporadic outbreaks of open warfare fluctuating in frequency and intensity‖ (Azar, 1978: 50). 
 
Burton (1990a) and Azar (1990a) note that the Basic Needs theory should form the basis of analysing and resolving 
conflicts instead of the classical power politics (state-centric) theories that have failed to resolve conflicts in society. 
The core of their argument is that the orthodox state-centric theories such as realism, advocate containment, 
deterrence, coercion, negotiation, power-based mediation and bargaining, as methods of conflict resolution. To the 
needs theorists, these classical methods can only achieve conflict settlement, which is temporary peace. Burton 
argues that ―deterrence and coercive approaches do not lead to the discovering or removal of the causes of conflict 
in the particular case and do nothing to stop others occurring‖ (1990a: 14). Basic human needs theorists distinguish 
between conflict settlement and conflict resolution. The theorists hold that conflict settlement emanates from orthodox 
methods of dealing with conflict, in which the conflict outcome is coerced or imposed by one of the adversaries or by 
powerful outsiders over the weaker party. Burton posits that ―[i]t is possible for a settlement to be arrived at in a 
power bargaining situation just as a court has the power to settle a dispute. A mediator can arrive at a settlement by 
offering a compromise which the less powerful party must accept‖ (1990b: 7). Conflict settlement materialises in 
material and interest-based conflicts that are negotiable and are often characterised by win-lose outcomes, which 
result in recurrence of future conflicts (Burton 1990a, 1990b, Burton and Dukes 1990). 
 
In the SADC region, the crisis in Zimbabwe, which threatens to destabilise the whole region, resulted from the 
regime‘s failure to address the socio-economic and political needs of the suffering masses of citizens. The crises in 
Lesotho in 1970, 1986, 1993, 1998 and 2007 also emanated from the government‘s failure to address the economic 
and political frustrations of the people regarding the undemocratic electoral process. Most countries in the SADC 
region, with the exception of South Africa, are underdeveloped, and the prospects for failed service delivery, 
exacerbated by corruption, are high, thus creating fertile grounds for violent conflicts. In Swaziland, the only absolute 
constitutional monarch in the SADC region has brutally crushed any demands for political reforms and allowing 
multiparty democracy and elections by the Peoples Democratic Movement (PODEMO). This has created a climate of 
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political insecurity and conflict as the oppressed masses of Swaziland relentlessly push forward for a democratic 
political dispensation in the country. 
 
The proponents of the Basic Needs theory recommend an analytical need- based problem-solving discussion of the 
conflict in which the warring parties are given equal opportunity to dialogue over their grievances, needs, interests, 
goals and perceptions of the problem, for an acceptable and mutually beneficial resolution of the conflict; that is a 
win-win outcome. As Azar (1990a: 21) points out, ―[t]he term problem-solving is intended to convey a view that 
conflict is not something which is to be ‗won‘ but rather something which must be ‗solved.‘ Burton (1990a: 13) states 
that ‖for a long lasting prevention and resolution of conflicts, therefore, there is need to provide a climate of peaceful 
discussions of the causal factors through analytical problem solving fora, in which there are no coercive and power 
based tactics.‖ The aim of such facilitated discussions is ―to pinpoint sources of conflict, to direct attention to them, 
and to find means of resolving and preventing them.‖ Burton coins the concept ‖provention‖ to stress the need to 
engage in holistic analytical problem-solving discourse geared towards structural reforms as well as ―the removal of 
causal conditions and the positive promotion of environments conducive to collaborative relationships (which extend 
to the scope of our concerns beyond the narrow area of conflict resolution)‖ (Burton, 19990a: 18). 
 
To Burton (1988, 1990a, 1990b, Burton and Dukes (1990) a win-win outcome can be attained in conflicts over human 
needs since the basic human needs such as identity, security, recognition, justice and political participation are not 
scarce in supply and should be achieved without necessarily depriving each other. ―There is no problem of scarcity in 
needs satisfaction; the more identity or security one party has, the more and not the less the other party will 
experience identity and security‖ (Burton and Dukes 1990: 143-144). Burton (1988: 199) recommends ―facilitated 
conflict resolution or the problem-solving approach because through these forums the conflicting parties are brought 
together to identify their frustrated interests and goals, to find an amicable solution which addresses the underlying 
basic motivations and values that cannot be bargained away‖. 
 
The Basic Needs theory and its concomitant analytical problem-solving conflict resolution mechanisms have made an 
invaluable contribution to the study of conflicts, their causes, dynamics, resolution strategies and mechanisms. 
According to Burton and Dukes, ―[t]hese processes have not developed out of any one discipline, but have taken 
much from many disciplines. They are processes that rest on generic theories of behaviour, and seek to incorporate 
any insights that can be gained from all other processes …Problem solving conflict resolution can reasonably be 
regarded as the synthesis and culmination of past and present thinking in the fields of management, dispute 
settlement and conflict resolution‖ (1990: 122). The introduction of the human dimension in the study of conflicts is 
pivotal in understanding the behaviour of parties in a conflict, their perceptions, frustrations and goals in relation to 
conflicts and their resolutions and how human behaviour and perceptions generally shape society. Burton points out 
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that ―[t]he emphasis on human needs as the basis of analysis and problem solving is oriented toward the stability and 
progress of societies; the human needs of the individual that enables him to operate as an efficient unit within a 
social system and without which no social organisation can be harmonious‖ (Burton 1988: 55). Burton commends the 
Basic Needs theory because it uses the human needs dimension in the study of conflicts and ensures efficiency in 
preventive diplomacy missions. He posits that the theory is ―a step towards the prevention, rather than merely 
avoidance or prevention of conflict, we are involved in discovering the causal factors that must be dealt with. The 
knowledge we look for, the discovery of what conditions provoke the behaviours, to be prevented, requires an 
adequate theory of human and societal behaviour, including a reliable theory of conflict and conflictual behaviours‖ 
(Burton, 1999a: 235).  
 
It can be argued that the Basic Needs theory provides the framework for the development of the post-Cold War new 
security thinking and the centrality of human security in society. The theory has instituted the necessity of studying 
conflict prevention, management and resolution, which take the survival needs of human beings as pivotal for lasting 
stability and peace to be realised. Post-Cold War War security thinking calls for world nations to expand the definition 
of security from the traditional militaristic restrictions to include human security issues such as democracy, good 
governance, human rights, freedoms, liberty, political participation and representation, social and economic justice 
(Buzan 1990, Swart and du Plessis 2004, Hammerstad 2004, Barengu and Landsberg 2003, Zacarias 2003). The 
clarion call is triggered by the realities that most of the post-Cold War intra-state conflicts emanated from unfulfilled 
and frustrated human needs. As Waltz notes, ―[m]ilitary power does not guarantee the well-being of society and non-
military phenomena can threaten states and individuals‖ (cited in Zacarias 2003: 33).  
 
However, the Basic Needs theory, like all other paradigms, has been subjected to a wide range of criticism. These 
arise from the fact that different societies have different cultures, values and perceptions of the world, and the needs 
of different people should also be shaped by each society‘s traditions and political systems. The criticism is also 
levelled against the supposed universality of the hierarchy of basic needs. The question is whether basic human 
needs are static or are dynamic and able to be influenced by the environment. Galtung (1990: 59) contends that the 
proponents should consider the impact of the different contexts and cultures on people‘s needs, priorities and 
conceptions. He doubts whether ―a list of needs can be established, complete with minima and maxima, for 
everybody at all given social times and social spaces as the universal list of basic needs.‖ Mitchell (1990: 165) 
argues that there is evidence that some needs theorists are party to the view that ―needs and needs hierarchies 
change over time according to circumstances and that different people can have different need hierarchies and 
conceptions of needs.‖  
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The other point of criticism against the needs theory is that the non-material ontological human needs which form the 
hub of the paradigm‘s analysis of conflict and conflict resolution are ―theoretical constructs‖ which ―can only be 
inferred, not observed directly‖ and be measured (Bay 1988: 88). This therefore, according to Lederer (1980: 3), 
means that ―the existence of an individual‘s needs or ...the ‗truth‘ of those needs cannot be proven in a direct, 
physical way‖. That is, ―needs cannot be measured directly, they can be measured only on the basis of their 
manifestations‖ (Gillward 1990: 116). This, to the critics, raises questions on the validity and reliability of the basic 
needs as theoretical instruments for the study of society and conflict. Furthermore, Fitzgerald (1977: xv) poses the 
question ―How can the genuine internally rooted needs of persons and groups be established empirically?‖  
 
Burton confesses to this confusion that ―there is no agreed term that covers the basic needs of the individual as a 
social unit and which are, therefore, basic to social organisation‖ (1988: 38). Fitzgerald (1977: xv and 61) captures 
the problem thus: ―[t]here are enormous difficulties involved in conceptualising needs. The very expression ‗human 
needs‘ is problematic and emotionally loaded…[and] Built into the word ‗need‘ is a notion of necessity and one is 
unsure whether what is meant is an empirical and factual necessity, a logical or analytic necessity, or a normative 
necessity.‖ The seemingly prevalent difficulty in establishing specifically what needs are and what they entail, may 
have provoked Rist‘s dismissal that ―[i]f everything is a need, then need means nothing‖ (1980: 241). It was in view of 
this problem that Sites (1990: 24), cautions that ―[i]f we are to establish a listing of needs as a viable basis for theory 
and subsequent social policy, we must be very careful in the use of language. Otherwise, we revert back to what 
might be called the MacDougall problem: positing a need for everything people do or ‗want.‖  
 
The way the basic needs theorists suggest conflicts should be resolved outside the power politics framework would 
be difficult if not impossible to successfully implement. In reality, conflict occurs within the framework of politics, and 
the dynamics of power politics will always be at play in resolving them. The classical strategies of conflict resolution 
such as negotiation, mediation, adjudication, compromises and trade-offs, which the needs theorists dismiss as 
ineffectual, are the ones used in both regional and international conflict resolution forums. This raises questions on 
whether the theory has failed the test in the international relations arena, or if the world‘s political establishments are 
just stuck with the orthodox power politics and their conflict resolution mechanisms.  
 
Further criticisms of the needs theory have emanated from Strange (1989: 433) who states that she cannot not 
accept  Burton‘s ―unrealistic notions that all conflicts could be resolved with better analysis and rational discussion…‖ 
Dunn (2004: 6) also argues that Burton was ―detached and incapable...of explaining what is going on in the realm of 
contemporary international relations.‖ 
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However, in spite of the criticism, there is no doubt that the Basic Needs theory of conflicts and their resolution has 
provided invaluable information, insights and theoretical perspectives. As Banks (1984: xii) notes, Burton‘s works 
―have gone further than any other single body of work towards the creation of a genuine synthesis of the fragmented 
islands of theory that have so teased the discipline.‖ According to Dunn (2004: 15), Burton‘s contribution is 
outstanding in its critique of the conventional philosophy on the sources of conflict. Instead ―he is more concerned 
with processes than structures… stresses change rather than order, legitimate social relationships rather than 
coercive relations…explanations of social behaviour, causes rather than symptoms, the fundamental rather than 
superficial, needs rather than wants or desires, and needs rather than nationalisms.‖ The theory is also pivotal in that 
it provides an alternative dimension to the study of conflicts and how best they can be prevented and resolved. 
 
The present study intends to investigate the SADC conflict prevention, management and resolution within the basic 
human needs theory, using the organisation‘s preventive diplomacy missions in Lesotho. This is because most of the 
conflicts or threats to peace and security are not inter-state but intra-state. This therefore calls for conflict mitigation 
strategies which will scrutinise the sources from the premises of basic human needs satisfaction or deprivation. In its 
founding treaty and security protocols, the SADC has items purporting to cater for the basic needs of the region‘s 
populace. For example, Article 5 (a) of the SADC objectives pledges to ―achieve development and economic growth, 
alleviate poverty, enhance the standard and quality of the peoples of Southern Africa and support the socially 
disadvantaged through regional integration‖ (SADC Treaty 1992). Objective (h) of the Organ on Politics Defence and 
Security, aims to ―promote and enhance the development of democratic institutions and practices within member 
states, and to encourage the observance of universal human rights as provided for in the Charters and conventions 
of the OAU [AU] and the United Nations‖ (OPDS Protocol 2001). The critical questions to be addressed are:  
Is SADC more concerned with state security or human security? 
Does SADC have mechanisms for defining sources of conflict from the basic human needs level? 
 
Experience seems to indicate that the SADC security architecture is state-centric, and that little practical attention is 
directed to the full satisfaction of human needs and security; hence the unrelenting conflicts and threats to regional 
security as experienced in Zimbabwe, the DRC and Swaziland. Benjamin (1992) suggests that one of the major 
challenges facing the Southern Southern Africa states and leaders in the 1990‘s will be how to meet the rising 
expectations of the masses for social upliftment and the satisfaction of their basic human needs. This challenge as 
framed in Benjamin‘s view, is that ―[a] shared characteristic of the states of Southern Africa is their level of economic 
underdevelopment and the structural weaknesses of their economies‖ (1992: 9). The link between development, 
satisfaction of human needs and peace is vividly captured by Azar (1990): 155). He writes; ―[r]educing overt conflict 
requires reduction in the levels of underdevelopment. Groups which seek to satisfy their identity and security needs 
through conflict are in effect seeking change in the structure of their society. Conflict resolution can truly occur and 
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last if satisfactory amelioration of underdevelopment occurs as well. Studying protracted conflict leads one to 
conclude that peace is development in the broadest sense of the term‖ (also cited in Miall etal. 2001: 73). In light of 
this, Benjamin (1992) recommends that the SADC region should address the structural deficiencies in its economies 
and cater for the ever- expanding needs, demands and expectations, through diversification of the regional 
economies, more realistic long-term economic and strategic planning, and greater regional cooperation and 
integration, which will ensure a stable political climate for development and foreign investment. 
 
3.1.4 Attribution Theory 
The Attribution theory is grounded in the works of such scholars as Heider, (1958), Jones and Nesbit (1971), Ross 
(1971), and Sillars (1980). It proposes that naturally, people often view and explain events around them in terms of 
assigning negative and positive qualities and perception to each other (Isenhart 2000). For example, Bradley (1978) 
finds in his study that people frequently have an inherent tendency to attribute positive consequences to their own 
actions and negative consequences to the actions of others. Pandy (1977) also observes that people or groups in a 
conflict situation frequently characterise their own tactics as co-operative and the tactics of their adversaries as unco-
operative (cited in Isenhart and Spangle 2000). In the words of Sears etal (1991: 304-305) ―[e]ach side projects 
negative qualities onto their opponents while reserving positive precepts for their own side.‖ The theorists trace 
origins and escalation of conflict from this situation because it is characterised by communication breakdown, 
polarisation, mistrust, misperceptions, negative stereotypes, mirror imaging and dehumanisation of each other‘s 
goals and actions, consolidated enemy perceptions, win-lose antagonistic postures and irrevocable commitments to 
the conflict cause by each side (Mitchell 1981, Kriesberg 1982, Holsti 1983, Pruit and Rubin 1986, Jones 1988, Azar 
1990a, Burton 1990a, Sears etal 1991, Fisher 1997, Anstey 2006, Swart 2008). Psychologists such as Ralph White 
(1984) and Herbert Kelman (1996) have demonstrated that ―attitudes that put blame for our problems on ‗the other 
guy‘ and that portray ourselves as wholly virtuous are a major reason why so many conflicts escalate into violence‖ 
(in Hauss 2001: 45). Mitchell (1981) observes that belligerent parties are susceptible to subjective cognitions and 
evaluations about themselves, the opposing party and the conflict context. Jones (1988) reflects ―how facts are a 
peculiar ordering of reality according to one‘s own personal bias which in turn, is determined by certain psychological 
drivers‖ (paraphrased in Swart 2008: 64). Thus according to Holsti (1983: 405) these ―attitudes and psychological 
predispositions typically surround any serious conflict or crisis.‖ These psychological variables have also been linked 
to failure of negotiations and peaceful resolution of many conflicts between warring parties. This is due to entrenched 
hostile relations, solidified enduring rivalries, mutual distrust and suspicions of each other‘s actions. These factors 
and the extent to which they are attributed to the other often trigger and aggravate conflicts and hamper effective 
prevention, management and resolution of conflicts in societies (Mitchell 1981, Azar 1990a, Ramsbotham etal. 2005, 
Swart 2008). 
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In Lesotho, the political parties attribute the turmoil that has erupted after every election since 1966 to each other. 
The governing party has often blamed the opposition for failure to accept defeat, while the opposition parties always 
accuse the governing party of rigging the elections. Preventive diplomacy would require measures to do away with 
the enemy perceptions and other psychological factors that lead the adversaries to demonise and dehumanise each 
other, to build confidence and trust between the adversaries, and transform the hostile relationship to a co-operative 
one in which mutually beneficial win-win outcomes are possible (Kriesberg 1982, Bercovitch 1984, Pruit and Rubin 
1986, Burton 1990, Mitchell 1990, Sears etal. 1991, Fisher 1997, Isenhart and Spangle 2000, Hauss 2001, Miall etal. 
2001, Swart 2008).  
 
Swart (2008) laments the lack of in-depth research on how the psychological variables such as negative images, 
enemy perceptions conflict behaviour, misperceptions, distrust, fear and suspicion, have triggered and fuelled 
conflicts, especially in Africa. Swart further notes that the failure of preventive diplomacy (conflict prevention, 
management and resolution) is mainly due to failure by the preventive diplomacy practitioners to pay attention to the 
psychological traits of the warring parties and their perception of the conflict, its causes and how best it could be 
resolved.  
 
Preventive diplomacy within this conflict framework can be successfully implemented when conflict mediators fully 
comprehend the sources of the conflict at hand, as well as the warring parties‘ attitude, behaviour and perceptions of 
the conflict, how the parties perceive each other, and what each believe is the best way to resolve the conflict. The 
peace mediators should aim at altering the established and emerging conflict attitudes and behaviours of the warring 
parties, their misperceptions about each other, and their perceptions about how the conflict could be ended and 
lasting peace achieved. Well-co-ordinated and open communication and dialogue between the warring parties may 
reduce the perceived cognitive rigidities and embedded enemy images, and move the warring parties to a realisation 
of the necessity to shift from war to peace (Deustch and Schiman 1986, Lederach 1999). With such a base, the 
conflicting parties may be swayed into viewing each other not as an enemy but partners in resolving the conflict. 
Entrenched conflict behaviour may be altered into a desire for peace. In view of this, the United Nations Educational, 
Scientific, and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) Constitution notes that ―since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in 
the minds of men that the defences of peace must be constructed.‖  
 
3.2 Social Process Theories  
The Social Processes theories view conflict as a process of social interaction between individuals or groups. The 
theories seek to make generalisations about the nature of human interactions and how they result in conflict. The 
basis of the social process theories is that people‘s behaviour, actions, goals, interests, aspirations and expectations 
are determined or influenced by their interactions with others, and the social, economic and political forces of the 
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context in which they interact (Kriesberg 1982, Schellenberg 1984, Isenhart and Spangle 2000). This paradigm falls 
within the constructionist position in that ―[s]ocial meaning is constructed and reconstructed by social interactions 
which create certain mechanisms of norms, identities and interests that guide human action‖ (Adler and Barnett, 
1997, paraphrased in Hwang 2005: 55). 
 
Proponents of this sociological/interactional approach to conflict include Adam Smith, Park and Burgess, George 
Simmel, and Lewis Coser (Schellenberg, 1984). The theories are premised on the fact that where there is interaction 
of people, there are bound to be differences and clashes of interests, values, aspirations, expectations and goals, 
culminating in competition, tensions friction and conflicts. Hence, Simmel, a 20th century German philosopher and 
sociologist, observes that all social organisations rest on an intertwining of co-operation and conflict. He asserts: ―[a] 
certain amount of discord, inner divergence and outer controversy is organically tied up with the very elements that 
ultimately hold the group together‖ and that ―antagonism is an element almost never absent in human association‖ 
(cited in Schellenberg 1984: 65). Park and Burgess (1921) identify four main types and results of human interaction: 
competition, conflict, accommodation and assimilation. Park and Burgess view competition as the most elementary, 
universal and fundamental process in human interaction. They regard competition as an underlying struggle which, 
when more conscious and direct, is seen as conflict. 
 
The basic resolution from the social process of competition and conflict is accommodation, which entails contestants 
adjusting situations of competition and conflict without necessarily resolving the underlying conflict issues. The 
resultant interaction is referred to as ―antagonistic interaction‖ since the underlying conflict issues remain intact, 
creating a volatile context for future conflicts. The stage of assimilation occurs when a conflict is resolved and the 
adversaries have reconciled their incompatible goals in a mutually beneficial mode (Schellenberg 1982, Kriesberg 
1982). Proponents of this group of theories also focus on how human interaction promotes co-operation and 
harmony. However, the proponents differ on the effects of conflict in human society. For example, the functionalists 
(Talcott) view conflict as destructive and dysfunctional, while some like Coser and Deustch consider conflict to be 
functional and even desirable in society. The social process theories are an umbrella for a variety of theoretical 
perspectives and dimensions, some of which are as follows. 
 
3.2.1 Interactional Theory (Symbolic Internationalism) 
The Interactional perspective is influenced by the writings of William James, John Dewey, George Mead, Auslem 
Strauss; Herbert Himes, Herbert Blumer Corning Oberschall, Hugles, Becker and Goffman (Schellenberg 1982, 
Bercovitch 1984, Cohen and Manion 1994, Isenhart and Spangle 2000). Mead is regarded as the leader of Symbolic 
Internationalism. In a collection of his lectures entitled ―Mind, self and society‖ Mead posits that the individual and 
society are intrinsically woven together, and people are defined and moulded by the prevailing existential conditions 
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and societal activities (Babbie and Mouton 2006). The theory posits that social forces which act upon them do not 
only shape human beings‘ world but are actively involved in construction and reconstructions of their world, actions, 
behaviour and goals through interactions in different contexts. In their interaction with others, human beings define 
and interpret situations, actions and events, and develop meanings which determine their behaviour. The notion of 
the self‘ is a social construction established, maintained and altered in the process of interaction with others. 
According to the theorists human experience is mediated by interpretation, and the attribution of meaning to societal 
objects and events through symbols is a product of the dynamic process of social interaction in which human beings 
are actively engaged, rather than external forces. That is ―[t]he individual constructs, modifies, pieces together, 
weighs up the pros and cons and bargains‖ in a social context (Cohen and Manion 1994: 33).  
 
It is in the process of interaction that different competing and conflicting meanings, interpretations and perceptions of 
the world emerge, leading to incompatible goals and conflict. Thus, interactionist theorists view conflict as an ongoing 
negotiation of what is valued, how behaviours and situations are interpreted, and the meanings attached. As 
Lederach (1995: 8) points out, ―[s]ocial conflict emerges and develops on the basis of meaning and the interpretation 
individuals involved attached to action and events‖. Conflict is thus a ―...socially constructed cultural event…people 
are active participants in creating situations and interactions they interpret as conflict.‖  The definition of conflict as 
resulting from incompatibility of goals fits well into this theory. Conflicts in society are mainly hinged on different 
goals, interpretation of values and principles, the search for shared meanings, and what is best for society. For 
example, there are diverse interpretations of what democracy is and what it entails or should entail, depending on 
which part of the world it is viewed. This prompted Zartman (1991: 316) to comment that ―[a]ll positions are 
justifications in principles (or conflicting applications of principles). Sometimes such principles are fixed; in other 
cases, conflicts take place within the context of evolving or changing principles.‖ Park and Burgess‘s four types of 
human interaction -- competition, conflict, accommodation and assimilation -- fit into this interactional negotiation. 
Interactionist theorists view negotiation as the best strategy for diffusing conflicts. Strauss notes that negotiation is a 
fundamental process, through which society is formed, refined and remade (Schellenberg, 1982, Isenhart and 
Spangle 2000). Resolution of conflicts in the Interactionist paradigm therefore would require comprehension of the 
indigenous definition and interpretation of the conflict as well as the culturally rooted methods of resolving them 
(Lederach 1995, Avruch 1998, Annan 1998, Adedeji 1999).  
 
3.2.2 Systems Theory -- Functionalist Perspective 
Proponents of this perspective include Ludwig Von Bertalanffy, Emile Durkheim, Talcott Parsons, and Robert Merton. 
The theory views society as a social system composed of different but interrelated and interdependent parts or 
institutions which function together for stability, peace, and harmony to prevail. They view ―social institutions as parts 
of some larger whole and specific social practices constantly showing the signs of their integration into the larger 
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societal framework‖ (Schellenberg 1982: 72). The different social institutions have essential functions necessary for 
survival of society in its healthy composite whole. Parsons, Merton and Durkheim describe ―a stable, functional 
system as one where each of the members fits harmoniously into the larger whole‖ (Isenhart and Spangle 2000: 9). 
This approach uses the analogy of a living or biological organism whose body has to be healthy for it to live well or 
survive. If one part of the body is dysfunctional, it affects the whole body. However, the theory takes cognisance of 
the existence of conflicts within the different constituent parts of society. They state that ―within an organisation, there 
are always points of conflict, for the parts are never perfectly unified‖ (Schelleneberg 1982: 72-73). The systems 
theory regards conflict as an indication of the systems breakdown where one or more parts of the composite system 
become ineffective or dysfunctional, incapacitating the whole system. 
 
Generally, the theory considers conflicts as undesirable, pathological, dysfunctional and disruptive to the composite 
and harmonious society (Starr 1979, Schellenberg 1982). The theory appears to advocate maintenance of the status 
quo. It is primarily concerned with stability rather than transformation, and would shun any move which they perceive 
would disturb the existing harmony and peace. There are many undemocratic regimes in Africa which have used the 
assumed ―peace‖ within a repressive system to resist any reforms to democracy and inclusiveness in governance. 
Autocratic regimes in North Africa and the Middle East are good examples. The opening months of 2011 were 
characterised by uprisings and conflicts to dislodge the despotic regimes for democratic dispensations. Swaziland, 
the only absolute monarchy in the SADC region, resists any calls for democratic reform. This fear of change has 
created fertile grounds for conflict in the country. 
 
3.2.3 Social Exchange/ Equity Theory 
Proponents of the Social Exchange theory include Homans (1958), Thibaut and Kelley (1959), Blau (1964), Walster, 
Walster and Beisbeid (1978) and Rolof (1981). It is based on Adam Smith‘s contribution to economics. The theory is 
―essentially an attempt to apply the framework of market analysis to the phenomena of informal interaction and 
emergence of group patterns‖ (Shellenberg 1982: 73). In an essay entitled ―Social Behaviour as Exchange‖, Homans 
(1958) treats social interaction as an exchange of ‗‗goods‖ or social benefits that people provide for each other. 
Interaction of people is viewed in terms of rewards gained and costs incurred by the participants in the interaction. 
The proponents maintain that people tend to change their behaviour when rewards or benefits (profits) from the 
interaction are low, and maintain behaviour when it proves profitable. Conflict is viewed as arising from a situation or 
condition in which people fail to achieve the outcomes they consider to be equitable, just, or fair (relative gain). 
Conflict becomes intense when people see themselves committed to a social relationship that is inequitable 
(Schellenberg 1982). In the words of Rolof (1981) ―conflict emerges when people perceive that their rewards are too 
low, their costs are too high, or they anticipate resistance if they attempt to reach their goal‖ (cited in Isenhart and 
spangle 2000: 8). Social Exchange theorists analyse conflict from a perspective of distributive justice. They maintain 
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that people become distressed and frustrated when they perceive that they are not receiving a fair share or 
distribution of something they value.  
 
This theory captures most of the issues discussed in the previous section as sources of conflict, for example the 
struggle for limited resources, equitable allocation, and the distribution of resources (social, economic and political). 
As Schellenberg (1982: 74) notes, ―those conditions in which people fail to achieve outcomes they consider to be 
equitable are conditions apt to be marked by social conflicts.‖ Many wars are raging in Africa where some groups feel 
marginalised or deprived of what they consider central to their survival. For example, 2011 experienced revolts by the 
oppressed masses in the Middle East and Libya, Egypt and Tunisia, for equitable distribution of resources, access to 
economic and political resources and opportunities against the repressive and oppressive regimes.  
 
Proponents of the theory maintain that conflicts emanating from unjust distribution of resources can be resolved by 
identifying the needs and values of each party, to create a set of trade-offs where all parties achieve their goals 
(Isenhart and Spangle 2000). It is important to note that this is contrary to the position of the Basic Needs theorists, 
who maintain that needs and values, unlike interests, cannot be negotiated, compromised and bargained over, but 
have to be fully addressed for conflict resolution and long-lasting peace to be attained (Coate and Rosati 1988, 
Fitzgerald 1977, Bay 1988, Burton, 1990, Burton and Dukes, 1990, Azar, 1990a, Mitchell 1990, Sandole 1990). 
Political settlements such as governments of national unity, inclusive political representation, equitable allocation of 
resources, constitutional inclusivity, and reforms in institutions of governance to promote democracy and justice, are 
solutions to conflicts within the realms of the Exchange paradigm. 
 
3.2.4 Transformational Theory 
 The Transformational theory is the opposite of the Functionalist-Systems theory that views conflict as dysfunctional. 
Proponents of the transformational theory argue that conflicts are a permanent, necessary, desirable, constructive 
and innovative aspect of human interaction and society. Transformational scholars tend to focus more on the positive 
outcomes of conflict than on explanations about why conflicts occur, and the destructive effects of conflict (Isenhart 
and Spangle 2000). They argue that conflicts are functional, constructive, and developmental to the parties 
themselves and the context or system in which they occur (Starr 1979, Brercovitch 1984), Anstey 2006). As Coser 
(1957) explains, ―conflicts not only generate new norms, new institutions…it may also be said to be stimulating 
directly in the economic and technological realm‖ (cited in Isenhart and Spangle 2000: 9). From the transformational 
perspective ―conflict is the tension between what is, and what people believe ought to be‖ (Isenhart and spangle 
2000: 9). This position is in line with the basic human needs perspective.  
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Therefore, conflict is a struggle against the prevailing situation of economic deprivation or autocracy by the 
discontented masses for a better dispensation. The following are some of the constructive outcomes of conflict, 
according to the proponents. Conflict: 
 
 Forces parties to focus and deal with real problems and deeper issues; 
 Prevents rigidity, social stagnation and facilitates internal change and stimulate growth and innovation; 
 Facilitates interactions between unequal parties and forces them to modify their opinions; 
 Solidifies and creates a sense of identity and solidarity (mobilisation of energies of group members; increasing 
group cohesion); 
 Serves to establish and maintain identity and boundary lines between societies and groups; 
 Leads to establishment of new hierarchies and power structures and institutions (Coser, Himes, Deustch cited in 
Schellenberg 1982, Bercovitch 1984, Isenhart and Spangle 2000). 
 
Structural theorists such as the Marxists and the Maoists share the same view that conflict is constructive and 
transformational to an unjust system. For example, Mao Zedung considered conflict to be beneficial, positive and 
progressive (Starr 1979) The Marxists also consider conflict as necessary and transformational if, through conflict, 
the proletariats or the oppressed masses successfully uproot a capitalist bourgeoisie system and institute an 
egalitarian political and economic order. There are numerous conflicts in Africa in which the oppressed masses 
struggle for a just and democratic system. Conflicts raging in North Africa and the Middle East emanate from popular 
revolutions against despotic and parasitic regimes.  
 
3.3 Social Structural Theories 
Proponents of the Social Structural theories include Karl Marx, Engels, Weber, Dahrendorf and Madison. They view 
conflict as a product of the way society is formed, organised and structured. Gordon (1964) defines a social structure 
of a society as ―[t]he set of crystallised social relationships which its members have with each other which places 
them in groups, large or small, permanent or temporary, formally organised or unorganised, and which relates them 
to the major institutional activities of the society such as economic and occupational life, religion, marriage and 
family, education, government and recreation‖ (cited in Schellenberg, 1982: 93). Structural theorists argue that the 
social stratifications of these different and often unequal classes are the root cause of conflict. The conflict emanates 
from the fact that the different social groups have different and conflicting interests, goals, aspirations, and 
expectations, be they economic or political. Conflict also arises from the fact that the economic and political 
structures and institutions in society are always manipulated to serve the interests of the dominant socio-economic 
strata at the expense of the marginalised majority. Proponents of this group of theories maintain that conflict will 
remain inevitable as long as society is stratified into unequal antagonistic segments and the structural institutions 
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continue serving the interests of the few. However, like the transformational theorists, the structural theorists maintain 
that conflict is necessary, constructive and transformational to society and its systems. In fact, most of them, 
especially the Marxists, agitate for violent conflicts to dismantle unjust social, economic and political systems and 
structures. The following are some of the Social Structural theories. 
 
3.3.1 Marxist–Class Theory 
Karl Marx and Fredriech Engels are credited with providing the most comprehensive scientific analysis of societies, 
social classes, their relations to the material world and their competing and contradictory interests and goals as a 
source of conflicts and social transformation. Dahrendorf, a German sociologist, calls Karl Marx ―the greatest theorist 
of social change for laying bare the importance of conflict in shaping society‖ (Schellenberg 1982: 86). Karl Marx 
believed that a truly scientific analysis and understanding of human life has to begin with real material conditions and 
the social relations, because these provide the basis on which ideas, consciousness and institutions rest (Linklater 
2001). Contrary to the Realists, who hold that the international order is anarchical, the Marxists locate social conflicts 
within the structure of society, mainly the forces and relations of production. According to the Marxists, throughout 
history, human society has been stratified into diametrically opposed economic classes, and class struggle has been 
the dominant form of conflict in human history (Linklater 2001). The capitalist society is composed of the capitalist 
bourgeoisie who privately own the means of production (land, factories, and capital) and constitute the ruling elite, 
who make laws and control political institutions to protect their wealth and power. Capitalist wealth, according to the 
Marxists, is accumulated by unbridled exploitation of the labour of the poor working class masses. As such, 
―capitalism was a system of largely unchecked exploitation in which the bourgeoisie controlled the labour power of 
the proletariat and profited from their work‖ (Linklater 2001: 131).  
 
The relations of the two classes are characterised by domination, subordination and exploitation of the powerless 
class by the dominant propertied class. According to the Marxists, the capitalist system has ―…frustrated solidarity by 
pitting members of the bourgeoisie against each other as well as against the proletariat, and by forcing members of 
the working class to compete with each other for employment‖ (Linklater 2001: 133). These contradictions in the 
forces and relations of production provide fertile ground for social conflicts through industrial or political action by the 
exploited proletariat masses against the capitalist bourgeoisie regime and political order. In view of this, existential 
reality, according to Marx in the Communist Manifesto, is ―the history of all hitherto existing society is the history of 
class struggle‖ (cited in Schellenberg 1982: 81). In the Marxist (Critical theory) perspective, ―the study of international 
relations should be guided by an emancipator politic [and] the removal of various forms of domination and the 
promotion of global freedom, justice and equality [as] the driving forces..‖ (Devetak, 2001: 155-156). 
 
 83 
 
The Marxists blame capitalism for exploitation and perpetuation of conflicts in the entire world. They maintain that the 
capitalist exploitation of its capital accumulated through multinational corporations and skewed trade relations, was 
responsible for the imperialist expansion, conquest, occupation and exploitation of resources in the colonies for the 
benefit of the developed capitalist world. This expansionist posture of capitalism as the main source of international 
conflicts was developed by Vladimir Lenin in his work entitled Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism. Lenin 
viewed World War One as the product of the aggressive capitalist states‘ expansionist conquests in need of outlets 
for exploitation of surplus capital, and the search for new sources of raw materials for industrial manufacture 
(Linklater 2001). For Marxists, the current economic world order of the developed world of Europe and North America 
and underdeveloped nations in the Third World is a result of the capitalist system.  
 
 Neo-Marxists and Dependency theorists argue that exploitative alliances between the dominant capitalist core 
countries through their multinational corporations and financial institutions are responsible for the failed development 
in the Third World. Viewed in this light, in the Marxist tradition, globalisation and the resultant unequal development 
remain the source of international conflicts, especially in the underdeveloped world. Robert McNamara (1973) 
posited that ―[t]he North-South economic gulf represented a profound seismic fissure running through the earth‘s 
crust… which would occasion thunderbolts and violent tremors‖ (cited in Bedjaoui 2000: 36). The internationalisation 
of the capitalist relations of production and forms of governance perpetuate power and wealth inequalities and a 
hegemonic world order (Cox1993, Linklater 2001). This is because capitalist globalisation and global structures 
compel all states to bow to the power and dictates of the global markets and political institutions, to facilitate the 
continuing expansion of capitalism (Linklater 2001). However, according to the Marxists, in spite of its violent 
expansion, capitalism will ultimately collapse due to its internal contradictions and revolutionary resistance from the 
internationalist proletariat.  
 
The Marxists maintain that the solution to the class conflict lies in the mobilisation and conscientisation of the 
proletariat and peasants of the world into a strong revolutionary force (alliance) to forcibly remove the capitalist 
bourgeoisie regimes from power, to establish communist egalitarian societies under workers‘ governments.  It is 
envisaged that ―[t]hrough revolutionary action, the international proletariat would embed the Enlightenment ideals of 
liberty, equality and fraternity in an entirely new world order which would free all human beings from exploitation and 
domination‖ (Linklater (2001: 129). In the Marxist tradition, a proletariat revolutionary war against the exploitative 
capitalist system is justified as the instrument for transformation, emancipation and freedom of humanity. The 
persistent call by the Marxists for violent revolutions against capitalism and its exploitative and oppressive structures 
formed the core of the ideological bipolar Cold War conflicts from the 1940s to the 1990s.  
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This theory still has some relevance when studying contemporary conflicts, considering the perpetual strife resulting 
from the struggle for limited resources and how they are allocated and distributed among the different sections of the 
population. Continuous conflict is experienced at the international level between the structurally unequal Third World 
and the Developed World, vindicating the Marxist prediction that conflict will remain as long as structural inequality, 
be it at the national or international level. The contribution of Marxism to the study of international relations, 
organisation of societies and the structural sources of global conflicts has been immense, and remains influential in 
the increasing global inequalities of the post-Cold War world.  
 
Furthermore it should be noted that the Marxist paradigm was pivotal and essential in guiding liberation movements‘ 
struggles against colonial and imperialist conquest and domination in many Third World nations. Its emancipatory 
intent was reflected by the socialist world‘s international support for liberation movements fighting to free the mass of 
humanity from capitalist colonial domination and exploitation, and the evils of oppression in all its manifestations. In 
this light the Marxist paradigm should be viewed as problem-solving and transformational in purpose and vision. As 
Marx himself once commented, ―philosophers have only interpreted the world whereas the real point was to change 
it‖ (1977: 158). 
 
However, the Marxist paradigm and its interpretation of the international order have not escaped criticism. Realists 
argue that the Marxist vision of the eradication of conflict under a socialist politico-economic order is utopian since 
the international community is anarchical, and different states will continue to compete for power irrespective of the 
system of governance in place (Waltz 1959 and Wright 1966 in Linklater 2001). In view of this, the paradigm has 
―underestimated the impact of nationalism, the state and war, the balance of power, international law and diplomacy 
on the structure of world politics‖ (Linklater 2001: 129). Waltz (1959) also observes that the ―Marxists failed to 
appreciate that if the nation-state was to be the arena in which socialism would first be established then socialist 
governments would have to ensure its national survival before they could promote its global dissemination‖ (cited in 
Linklater 2001: 142).  
 
The Marxists are also criticised for being preoccupied with the economic sphere and class struggles of the human 
society as the main perspectives for understanding societal order and relations. Critics argue that the Marxists‘ 
prescription of the universal model and stages through which all human societies should pass enroute to 
communism, is flawed in that it fails to pay attention to the socio-economic and political values and development 
status of many non-Western societies. However, Linklater (2001) urges scholars of international relations to tap into 
the solid foundations laid by the paradigm while simultaneously addressing its identified flaws. Lesotho is umbilically 
dependent on South Africa for its economic survival. Many analysts argue that, though it appears to be political, the 
conflict which has rocked the Kingdom since independence emanates from the underdeveloped economic status of 
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the country. Economic hardships like unemployment, poverty, illiteracy, disease, and other social ills, are the 
underlying sources of the incessant conflict.  
 
3.3.2 Social stratification as a Source of Conflict 
Some structural theorists view racial, ethnic, religious or cultural differences and divisions in nations as sources of 
conflict. Although these are natural differences, they have been a source of conflict in different parts of the globe. 
Ludwig Gumplowitcz acknowledges that racial and ethnic-based conflict is fundamental to all forms of human society, 
and there is little anyone can do about such conflicts other than accept them (Schellenberg 1982). Where people of 
different races, ethnicity and religions interact or live in one place, there are bound to be differences in goals, 
aspirations, interests and expectations. In most cases, conflict arises when one group plays a hegemonic role and 
seeks to impose its racial, ethnic or religious supremacy or ideology on other groups. In such countries, power is 
wielded by one particular group, which imposes institutionalisation, discrimination and marginalisation on the other 
groups in governance, access to survival needs, and means of production. This position is in line with the 
conclusions of the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, that what matters are not the racial, ethnic 
or religious differences, but how the differences are manipulated and manoeuvred to benefit others at the expense of 
the dehumanised groups. These divisions have resulted in intractable conflicts in many parts of the world. Onyango 
(2002) vividly illustrates how the protracted Sudanese civil war was triggered and fuelled by the ―islamisation‖ of the 
country and institutionalised economic deprivation of the Black Sudanese population by the Arab-dominated regime. 
On the other hand, the destructive conflict raging in Darfur (Sudan) is a concerted struggle by the Darfurian 
Sudanese Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) for equitable allocation of resources and development. Other 
examples of conflicts which were triggered by oppression on ethnic, racial and/or religious differences are the wars 
against apartheid in South Africa, racial segregation in the USA (1960s), ethnic-based conflicts in Rwanda, Burundi 
and Nigeria, and religious-based conflicts in Northern Island, Yugoslavia and the Middle East. In Africa, ethnic- based 
conflicts were exacerbated by colonialism and the arbitrary boundaries which the colonial powers drew between 
nations, without due cognisance of the ethnic composition and histories of the different groups the colonial nations 
were bringing together to form one nation-state (Zartman 1989, Adebayo etal. 1995, Annan 1998, Adedeji 1999, de 
Waal 2003).  
 
Resolution of such conflicts can be attained through education, seminars and conferences on democratic, 
participatory and representative governance, transparency, accountability, tolerance, peaceful co-existence, unity in 
diversity, reconciliation, peaceful means of resolving differences, equitable allocation, distribution and accessibility of 
means of production and services, human rights, justice and freedom of all, irrespective of ethnicity, religion, gender 
and race. Such initiatives on the promotion of ethnic, racial and religious tolerance would go a long way in fighting 
ethnic, racial and religious-based rivalries and conflicts, culminating in the creation of coherent, democratic nation-
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states in which all are equal citizens with equal opportunities. The prevalence of this undesirable mode of politics and 
governance is a challenge to African leaders to democratise their national politics and governance, and desist from 
hiding behind the stereotypical and facile exercise of dumping everything, (including their own home-made autocratic 
deeds) at the door of colonialism, neo-colonialism, globalisation, ethnicity and tribalism (Adedeji 1999). 
 
3.3.3 Realism and Neo-Realism 
Realism (Classical realism and Neo-realism) was the dominant school of thought on international relations in the first 
and second half of the 20th century to counter the Liberal Internationalists‘ version of international politics and peace, 
which realists dismissed as utopian. The theory was championed by such scholars as Carr, Herz, Aron, Kenan, 
Wright, Morganthau, Neibuhr, Waltz, and Mearsheimer (Terriff etal, 2004, Schellenberg 1982).  According to Krasner 
(1992:39), Realism ―[i]s a theory about international politics. It is an effort to explain both the behaviour of individual 
states and the characteristics of the system as a whole. The ontological given for realism is that sovereign states are 
constitutive components of the international system. Sovereignty is a political order based on territorial control. The 
international system is anarchical. It is a self-help system, in that there is no higher authority that can constrain or 
channel the behaviour of states. Sovereign states are rational self-seeking actors resolutely, if not exclusively, 
concerned with relative gains because they must function in an anarchical environment in which their security and 
well-being ultimately rest on their ability to mobilise their own resources against external threats.‖ Realists therefore 
view conflict as resulting from the anarchic international order in which different states with conflicting goals and 
national interests are in perpetual struggle and competition against each other for power, domination and essential 
resources such as territory and wealth. 
 
For Neo-Realists, the nation-state is the supreme political authority, whose suspicions, mistrusts, competition and 
struggle for military and political power in the anarchical international political realm render the world perpetually 
violent and conflictual (Waltz 2000, Burchill 2001, Terriff etal. 2004, Morganthau 2004). Inter-state conflicts emanate 
from different nations‘ quest for the power to dominate others. Hence Morganthau, one of the leaders of modern 
realism defines international relations as a struggle for power and the pursuit of national interests, which are 
permanent, desirable and unavoidable activities which determine the survival behaviour and foreign policy of states 
in an anarchical international order. In his opinion, ―[a]ll history shows that nations active in international politics are 
continuously preparing for, actively involved in, or recovering from organised violence in the form of war‖ (cited in 
Kegley and Raymond 1999: 3). 
 
Given this anarchical international order, Realists regard international politics as dominated by suspicions and 
mistrust between nations, as well as a clash of national interests in their struggle for strategic power and domination. 
Each state must always be militarily prepared to defend itself from threats and attacks from others, because ―violent 
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conflict is always possible under anarchy‖ (Buzan 1991: 22). It is this mistrust and suspicion of each other, creation of 
alliances, arms races and balance of power politics that breeds intense power politics among states and creates 
fertile grounds for conflicts. An arms race increases the severity of war and makes it more probable that a crisis will 
emerge that escalates to war. Among equals, the use of coercion leads to more coercion, escalation, stalemate and 
hostility.  Where power politics is a way of life, war is more likely to occur. The anarchy is also exacerbated by the 
fact that there is no overriding authority to regulate and restrain the nations‘ behaviour in pursuit of their divergent 
goals, or to reconcile their conflicting interests (Groom 1990, Ohlson and Groom 1991, Weber 2001, Terriff etal. 
2004, Morganthau 2004). Given this scenario, Realists argue that nation-states exist in a self-help environment 
where the quest for survival requires them to seek security through the accretion of military power. This security 
dilemma is common to all states, regardless of their domestic, cultural or political complexions. The key question 
which guides every nation state‘s interaction behaviour and relation, therefore is: How does a particular policy affects 
the power and security of the nation? (Burchill 2001, Terriff etal. 2004). 
 
Realists further posit that although nation-states perform functionally similar tasks in pursuit of national power and 
interests, they differ greatly in their capabilities to carry out the task. According to Burchill (2001: 92), ―[t]he capacity 
of each state to pursue and achieve these common objectives varies according to their placement in the international 
system, and specifically their relative power.‖ This Realist position is no doubt a reality, considering the categorisation 
of the world into unequal classifications such as great and small powers, the First and Third World, the Developed 
and the Underdeveloped World, the Core and the Periphery, based on their political, economic and military power 
and influence in the global order. Realists also maintain that there is no established and practically proved way 
through which the national interests of the different nation-states can be harmonised, save through war and the 
pursuit of asymmetrical power relations (Burchill (2001). 
 
In addition, Realists trace conflict to the economic and political power disparities between the nations and regions of 
the world. This unequal structural world order is the source of tension, insecurity and conflict in the world. The 
problem is that there is an uneven distribution of capabilities within the system. The powerful nations use their power 
to dominate the international arena and the weak nations (Wallerstein 1974, Groom 1990, Burchill 2001, Weber 
2001). Galtung (1980) points out that the international system is characterised by tremendous disparities in terms of 
wealth and power, culminating in the prevailing relations of exploitation and domination by the core comprising the 
developed nations over the periphery-underdeveloped nations mainly in the Third World (Cited in Schellenberg 
1982). In the words of Gilpin (1992) and the Marxists, the uneven growth and economic inequality is the root cause of 
international insecurity, as it makes some states more secure and powerful while it increases the insecurity of some 
others. The current world order, championed by policies such as globalisation, are an extension of colonialism and 
neo-colonialism in which the developed world dominates and exploits the Third World through unequal trading 
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relations, imposed tied loans, and structural adjustment conditionalities. The economic and political might of the 
developed world will always be flexed by gains, to the disadvantage of the developing world. The gap between the 
rich and poor regions remains a threat to global peace and security. Therefore, ―until the unequal distribution of 
power in the international system became the central focus of a dispassionate analysis, the root causes of conflict 
and war would not be properly understood‖ (Carr cited in Burchill 2001: 73).  
 
However, it is useful to remember that Realists regard conflict as necessary, constructive and functional. For 
example, Waltz, Bull, and Gilpin posit that war plays a useful function as it enhances systemic stability and is the 
engine of change in the international system (Terriff etal 2004). Consequently, Realists have a pessimistic view of 
conflict resolution and prevention, international harmony and peace, and international or regional organisations‘ input 
in resolving international conflicts. They further argue that once a conflict has erupted, the possibilities for a win-win 
conflict resolution do not exist, because once states are in a conflict they do not easily seek solution as long as one 
of them is convinced it can win the war or at least avoid losing (Groom 1990, Burton 1990, Olson and Groom 1991, 
Hauss 2001, Terriff etal. 2004). In the Realist view, there is no overriding regulatory body with enforcement powers to 
prevent or resolve international conflicts or regulate the behaviour of states in their bid to pursue their national 
interests (Burchill 2001, Terrif etal. 2004).  
 
The above Realist position to some extent carries weight in the current world order. For example, the UN Security 
Council is a sacred domain of the dominant powers (USA, Britain, France, China and Russia) to the exclusion of 
other regions of the world, such as Africa, Asia and Latin America. The former powers have veto powers, and this is 
maintained to protect and preserve their national interests from any challenges and threats. For example, when 
Britain and France invaded Iraq in 2003 without the mandate of the UN Security Council, it was an outright violation 
of the sovereignty of Iraq and international law. However, because they are the world hegemons, no action was taken 
against them. When African civil wars result in massacres, the USA and Britain cry aloud against crimes against 
humanity and violation of human rights, and advocate the arrest of such leaders to account for their heinous deeds at 
the International Criminal Court (ICC). Conversely, when the USA commits the same brutal massacres against 
innocent civilians in Iraq and Afghanistan, the world remains actively passive.  
 
Realists denounce any measures which could transform the anarchical nature of the international order, as the 
Liberal Internationalists and the Marxists envisaged. The Realist tradition holds that the historical reality is that 
conflicts in the international relations arena are cyclical and recurrent. As such, ―international politics is a world of 
recurrence and repetition, not reform or radical change.‖ In view of this, for the Neo-Realists, ―the specific internal 
structure of states is largely irrelevant to their international behaviour. What is crucial in this systemic approach is the 
state‘s location in the global power configuration‖ (Burchill 2001: 86).  
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According to the Realist tradition, conflicts can only be regulated by means of: a balance of power; adjustments to 
new relations of power; the establishment of militarily and politically strategic alliances; negotiation and compromise; 
recognition of the status quo; shrewd diplomacy; deterrence, and other coercive mechanisms (Waltz 1979, 2000, 
Burton 1990a, Groom 1990, Weber 2001, Burchill 2001, Terriff etal 2004, Morganthau 2004). Neo-realists and 
Realists give high credit to the balance of power as a strategy to prevent international conflict. This was the political 
context which prevailed during the Cold War era when the then USSR and the USA were the World power rivalries, 
representing the conflicting ideological postures and alliance blocks. It can be argued that the Realists‘ view is in line 
with Flavius Vegetius Renatus‘s assertion that ―[i]f you want peace, prepare for war‖ (cited in Hauss, 2001: 30). For 
Realists, ―peace is never a permanent feature of the international system. It is merely a temporary truce based on a 
rough equilibrium of state power, between inevitable periods of tension and conflict. The balance of power system is 
an essential stabilising factor in international relations, and the best way of managing the tendency for states to 
accumulate strategic power‖ (Burchill 2001: 81). 
 
In this light, Neo-realists such as Waltz (2000) and Mearsheimer (1990) argue that the balance of power during the 
Cold War era was responsible for the consequent peace and stability which prevailed, as well as the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, and the end of the bipolar world order was a recipe for disorder. Waltz (2000: 6) posits that ―[i]n a 
system of balanced states, the domination by one or some of them [the powers] has in the past been prevented by 
the reactions of others acting as a counterweight.‖ It is envisaged by Realists that through an adroit and shrewd use 
of the balance of power, ―states can regulate their propensity for violence by maintaining strategic equilibrium 
between the major powers‖ (Burchill 2001: 86). Waltz (1991:670) further argues that ―in international politics, 
unbalanced power constitutes a danger even when it is American power that is out of balance.‖ In terms of Waltz‘s 
prediction the unipolarity of the post-Cold War order will be short-lived since ―in international politics, overwhelming 
power repels and leads others to try to balance against it‖ (1991: 669). However, Hwang (2005: 51) contends that 
―the mechanism of balance of power politics in the Southern African region played a role in endangering regional 
security instead of guaranteeing it.‖ The basic human needs theorists such as Burton also dismiss the realists‘ 
power- based coercive theory as a non-starter in conflict resolution and peace, but as only relevant in conflict 
settlement and management, rather than in resolution. 
 
The relevance of Realism in conflicts has been experienced in many inter-state wars. For example, World War One 
and Two, the conflict fought during colonialism, and the Cold War era, all have the hallmarks of nations at war to 
preserve and defend national power and national interests, and to establish strategic influences the world over. The 
conflicts were characterised by competition for victory and dominance of the world economic and political scene. The 
intervention of the developed nations in Third world conflicts in the name of humanitarian missions, defence of 
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democracy and international security, has been motivated by Realist national interests. There are many who argue 
that the intervention of France, Britain, Italy and the USA in Libya was mainly driven by the need for control of oil 
resources in the country which are vital for the economies of the West and the USA. Some African countries have 
also intervened in their neighbours‘ situations in the name of defending regional peace and stability, while in reality 
they were prompted by the defence of their regional power and national interests. For example, when Nigeria 
intervened militarily in Liberia and Sierra Leone in 1997 and1998, it was mainly to defend its regional influence and 
revitalise its tainted international image following Sani Abacha‘s military coup and the ugly undemocratic antics of his 
military regime. Similarly, the SADC military interventions in the DRC and Lesotho in 1998 have been interpreted by 
many as falling within the realists‘ theoretical fold. Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola were accused of plundering the 
vast resources of the DRC while they claimed to have intervened to safeguard the Laurent Kabila government 
against external aggression by Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi. These latter looted the DRC while claiming to be 
assisting the rebel movements. The South African-led SADC intervention in Lesotho was also viewed as a move to 
defend South African national interests at the Katse Dam, which supplied South African manufacturing industries with 
water and hydro-power. As such, to a large extent, Realists‘ vieew that a nation will always intervene in another 
nation only if its interests are in jeopardy, holds water, and history abounds in evidence of such scenarios. 
 
However, Realism has been subjected to numerous criticisms by scholars from a variety of other theoretical 
traditions. The following are some of the areas in which the Realists‘ paradigm has been found wanting in its analysis 
of world politics, conflicts and international relations. Firstly, many critics maintain that the theory fails to provide 
insights and perspectives on the intra-state conflicts, which plagued post-independence and post-1990s Africa, for 
example. It is flawed in that it only interprets international security in terms of military power, therefore devoid of 
analytical tools and insights into the numerous post-Cold War era new security challenges. According to Hwang 
(2005: 25), one of the flaws of neo-realism is that it is ―Euro- and Cold War–centric.‘ and mainly focuses on the Great 
power high politics and conflicts while ―the peripheries are simply unimportant‖ and ―invisible‖ (Hosti 1998: 108). The 
realist concern with the national power interests of the major powers is reflected by their indifference to how the 
ideological and military interventions caused conflicts and insecurity in the Third World during the Cold War East-
West bipolar ideological contestations and fermentations. It can be argued that in the realist tradition, as long as 
there was no direct military confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States, the balance-of-power 
formula was the best in guaranteeing global peace. 
 
Secondly, realists have been criticised for being reductionist in their analysis of world politics, as they focus on the 
significance of military power as the determining factor in international relations disregarding other factors such as 
economic gains, which have also played tremendous roles in shaping states‘ behaviour and foreign policies. For 
example, Liberal critics maintain that globalisation, interdependence and moves towards a ―borderless world‖ which 
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dominate the post-Cold War international order, are economic-driven rather than motivated by the nation-states‘ 
military power (Burchill 2001, Terriff etal. 2001). For example, Rosecrance (1986) notes that the ―trading state‖ is 
displacing the ―military state‖ in the contemporary world because competition for global market shares has become 
more important than territorial conquests (cited in Burchill 2001). Realists have countered that ―there is no evidence 
that globalisation has systematically undermined state control or led to homogenisation of of policies and structures. 
In fact, globalisation and state activity have moved in tandem‖ (Krasner1999; 223). According to Waltz (1988, 2000) 
the uneven distribution of power capabilities in world nations remains the key factor in understanding international 
politics. Realists and Marxists would argue that globalisation remains predominantly a Western experience, driven by 
the powerful Western nation-states for their benefit, and the periphery regions continue to be disadvantaged and 
exploited.  
 
In the view of Cox (1989), realism should be criticised for its failure to recognise how its suggested model for 
international stability preserves and protects social and economic inequalities in the world. In fact, realism ―...is 
concerned with the reproduction of the international system of states. It uses notions of order, stability, deterrence 
and especially the balance of power to convey its message of constraints and to reify the structure of the international 
system. At the same time it marginalises those theories offering alternative or contradictory accounts of the reality of 
world politics‖ (Burchill 2001: 87).  
 
Thirdly, realism has been labelled by several critics as a conservative theoretical paradigm, which is anti-change and 
pro-status quo. The realists project the international system as anarchical, recurrently conflictual, insecure and static, 
thereby implying that the nation-states are powerless to institute transformations to the world order. Critical theorists 
contend that in view of the latter position, realism ―naturalises or reifies the international system by treating structures 
which have a specific and transitory history as if they were permanent, normal or given political fixtures‖ (Burchill 
2001: 93). The moves by several world nation-states to embark on liberal democratic political order with 
transformations and commitments to resolve their differences peacefully through collective security co-operation, are 
clear challenges to the realist view that states have no power to alter the international system. Regional organisations 
world over, including in the Third World, have established security organs with the aim of collectively resolving 
regional security challenges. In spite of the hurdles encountered, regional organisations such as the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organisation (NATO), the European Union (EU), ECOWAS, SADC, IGAD and Organisation of American 
States (OAS)-, have to some extent co-operated in addressing conflicts, contrary to the Realists‘ denunciation of the 
practicability of collective security and peace.  
 
The UN has managed to bring together world nations under one collective body in spite of their different and 
sometimes conflictual ideological orientations, development status, and national interests, contrary to the Realists‘ 
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position that no world authority can modify or regulate the national interests of nation-states. Although dominated by 
the developed nations, the UN has provided forums, through its various organs such as the World Health 
Organisation (WHO), United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), United Nations Education, Scientific 
and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), the General Assembly and the Security Council, where world nations can air 
their views on  global socio-economic, political and security issues. The UN has also provided laws, rules and 
principles on how nations should conduct their political and governance affairs according to international law, without 
endangering other nations., The UN Security Council has played a prominent role in peacekeeping, peacemaking, 
peace enforcement and post-conflict peace building missions in the world since its birth. Africa has benefitted 
tremendously from such collective peace missions by the UN. For example, Namibia, Angola, Mozambique, Liberia, 
Sierra Leone, and Ivory Coast are some of the countries in which the UN peace efforts have borne fruit. All these 
counter the Realists‘ postulations that no world body can collectively resolve conflicts in an anarchical international 
order. 
 
3.4 Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution 
Despite the multidimensional theories and perspectives on conflict, its sources, dynamics and outcomes, there 
appears to be a consensus on the need to devise means and measures for prevention, management and resolution 
of conflicts for a peaceful, secure and stable world order. The chronic effects of the First and Second Wars (1914-
1918 and 1938-1945) conscientised the world of the need to establish international and regional organisations with 
the aim of conflict prevention, management, resolution and general maintenance of international peace and security. 
The League of Nations, the United Nations Organisation and several regional organisations such as the OAU, 
presently the AU, ASEAN (ASEAN), (OAS), the EU, NATO (NATO), ECOWAS),SADC and IGAD are all tasked with 
creating the agenda for development, promotion and maintenance of international and regional peace and security 
(preventive diplomacy). 
 
The formation of these economic-cum security blocks with the goal of ensuring economic development, security, 
peace and stability, was in line with the calls by the former USA President, Franklin Roosevelt (October 1935) for 
global collaboration against the evils of war and preservation of world peace. Reports by the UN successive 
Secretary Generals Ghali: ‗An Agenda for Peace, Preventive Diplomacy, Peace Making and Peacekeeping‘ (January 
1992), ‗Improving Preparedness for Conflict Prevention and Peacekeeping in Africa‘ (November 1995) and Kofi 
Annan: ‗The causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa‟, raised 
concerns about conflicts, especially in Africa. The documents all called upon the world to search for more effective 
strategies for preventing, managing and resolving conflicts. The Secretary Generals proposed preventive diplomacy, 
preventive deployment, peacekeeping, peacemaking and peace building as techniques which could be used to 
prevent, contain and resolve conflicts in the world, and for durable and sustainable peace to be realised. In his report 
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to the UN Security on Africa in April 1998, the former Secretary General Annan expressed the hope that conflict 
could be prevented and resolved through concerted collective efforts by the international community.  
 
At this juncture, it would be worthwhile to define the concepts conflict prevention, management and resolution and 
what each entails. It is important to note that the concepts are interdependent components of a continuum of 
activities undertaken at different stages in the lifecycle of a conflict (Ghali 1992, Miall etal. 2001, Levit 2003). Ghali, 
(1992: 4) notes the link thus: ―preventive diplomacy seeks to resolve disputes before violence breaks out, 
peacemaking and peacekeeping are required to halt conflicts and preserve peace once it is attained. If successful, 
they strengthen the opportunity for post-conflict peace-building, which can prevent recurrence of violence among 
nations and peoples.‖ Miall etal. (2001), present the interlink between conflict prevention, conflict management and 
conflict resolution in a cyclical model from conflict formation (prevention), violent conflict (peace-keeping), conflict 
transformation (peacemaking), social change (peace-building), conflict formation (prevention). In the final analysis, 
conflict prevention, management and resolution strategies should be coherent, comprehensive and integrated, and 
geared towards mastering and addressing the root causes of the conflict.  
3.4.1 Preventive Diplomacy 
Scholars on conflict, in spite of their different theoretical orientations and approaches, are unanimous about the need 
to devise measures for prevention and resolution of conflicts through preventive diplomacy, for a stable world order. 
The UN and regional organisations, in their diverse formations, recommend preventive diplomacy as the most 
effective preventive toolkit for conflict mitigation and peace building, although they fail to efficiently implement it in the 
face of the numerous conflicts dissecting the world (Van Walraven 2005, Carment and Schnabel 2003). 
 
The term preventive diplomacy was coined by the former United Nations Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold in 
the Cold War world order, to contain escalation of conflicts which might directly involve the heavily armed 
superpowers and the East-West military blocs and ignite another calamitous World War. The concept was expanded 
and gained momentum when Boutros Ghali as the Secretary General launched his UN Agenda for Peace campaign 
to prevent, diffuse and resolve the numerous intra-state conflicts which afflicted the post-Cold War world order (Peck 
1993, Chigas etal. 1996, Lund 1997, 2005, Fourie and Solomon 2002, Hampson 2002, Vayrynen 2003, Lund 2005). 
 
Preventive diplomacy as a concept experienced definitional ambiguities. It has, in some instances, been used 
interchangeably with such concepts as preventive action, preventive deployment, preventive engagement, preventive 
measures and crisis diplomacy (Lund 1996, Chigas etal. 1996, Swart 2008). Chigas etal. (1996) note that 
international discourse on preventive diplomacy has been conceived largely in politico-military terms, such as 
international intervention, settlement and enforcement. There are also many others whose understanding of the 
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concept is limited to peaceful intervention in conflicts, as opposed to coercive measures. In view of this problem, 
Lund (2005: xii) posits that ―[t]he operational meaning of the term has not been easy to specify. While some 
advocates contend that preventive action should come into play only in cases of eminent or even hot war, others 
insist that it is no less relevant to humanitarian disasters or instances of political repression. Still others believe that it 
should address such issues as over population and poverty. Likewise issues of who should act preventively and how 
and when they should do so, have also been subjects of disagreements. Reflecting this diversity of opinion the very 
name given to the idea varies widely with terms such as preventive diplomacy, preventive action and crisis 
prevention vying for acceptance.‖  
 
In spite of the definitional complexities, in this study Ghali‘s (1992) and Lund‘s (2006) definitions embracing conflict 
prevention, management, resolution and post-conflict peacebuilding measures will be adopted. Currently, preventive 
diplomacy has come to denote ―[a] response generated by a state, a coalition of states, or a multilateral organization 
intended to address the rapid escalation of emergent crises, disputes, and interstate [intra-state] hostilities…‖ 
(Carment and Schnabel 2003: 12-13). The preventive strategies are determined by the conflict context dynamics, the 
belligerents involved, their goals and interests, military and political strength and availability of resources for 
sustenance of the mission, and the concomitant post-conflict peace-building efforts. 
 
Ghali (1992:4) defines preventive diplomacy as ―[a]ction to prevent disputes from arising between the parties, to 
prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur.‖ He 
further notes that the pivotal goal of preventive diplomacy ―...is to ease tensions before they result in conflict or if 
conflict breaks out, to act swiftly to contain it and resolve its underlying causes‖ (1992:4-5). Ghali provides a 
broadened definition which embraces preventive measures at different phases of conflict, such as early intervention 
when preventive diplomacy focuses on the basic sources of disputes to prevent eruption (conflict prevention); later, 
when it prevents vertical and horizontal escalation of conflict through peace enforcement, peacemaking; 
peacekeeping (conflict management); and much later, when it seeks to prevent the recurrence of conflict (post-
conflict peace-building. It embraces both direct and structural preventive measures which are geared towards 
preventing the eruption of violent conflict (conflict prevention), minimise, diffuse or halt the horizontal and vertical 
escalation of an on-going conflict (conflict management), and the eradication of a  the recurrence of conflict or 
relapse to conflict by a country emerging from war (conflict resolution or post-conflict peace building) (Ghali 1992, 
1995, Annan 1998, 2000a, Bedjaoui 2000, Miall etal 2001, Hampson, Wermester and Malone 2002, Hampson 2002, 
Levit 2003, Jentleson 2003, Carment and Schnabel 2003, Van Walraven 2005).  
 
There is interdependence between conflict prevention, management and resolution within the continuum lifecycle of 
preventive diplomacy. According to Ghali (1992), the main goal of preventive diplomacy is to resolve disputes before 
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violence erupts, while peacemaking and peacekeeping are required to halt conflicts and preserve peace and facilitate 
post-conflict peace building initiatives to prevent recurrence of violence. Lund (2002:161) defines preventive 
diplomacy as ―[a]ny structural or intercessory means to keep intra-state or inter-state tensions and disputes from 
escalating into significant violence and use of armed force, to strengthen the capabilities of potential parties to violent 
conflicts for resolving such disputes peacefully, and to progressively reduce the underlying problems that produce 
those issues and disputes.‖ As such, the major aims of preventive diplomacy are to prevent latent disputes from 
developing into violent confrontations, devising measures to manage and resolve conflicts when they have erupted 
before escalation and to avert a relapse to violent engagement during the post-conflict peace-building phase (Ghali 
1992, 1995, Lund 1996, 2006, Annan 1998, 2000a, Swart 2008).  
 
3.4.2 Developmentalist, Preventive and War Diplomacy 
Jentleson (2000) distinguishes between three forms of preventive diplomacy missions, namely: developmentalist 
diplomacy, preventive diplomacy, and war diplomacy, as determined by their durability and goals. Developmentalist 
diplomacy involves ―efforts to address long-term societal and international problems that, if allowed to worsen, have 
the potential to lead to violent conflict.‖ On the other hand, preventive diplomacy involves situations with shorter 
timeframes ―where the likelihood of violent mass conflict is imminent and the objectives are to take the necessary 
diplomatic action within the limited time frame to prevent those crises or wars which seem imminent,‖ while war 
diplomacy entails ―situations where conflict or war has already broken out‖ (Cited in Hampson 2002: 141). War 
diplomacy is reminiscent of what Lund referred to as ―crisis diplomacy‖. However, it is important to note that a 
comprehensive preventive diplomacy strategy would embrace both the short-term and long-term operational goals. 
For many, preventive diplomacy also reflects short-term problem-solving initiatives complemented by long-term 
structural approaches that tackle the underlying sources of conflict, such as poverty, underdevelopment, inequitable 
distribution of wealth, poor governance, and denial of human rights and freedoms (Lund 1996, Hampson 2002). It is 
from this premise that Hampson (2002) argues that preventive diplomacy should not exist independently from a 
broader strategy of conflict prevention, which addresses the deep-rooted causes of conflict. This has also led to 
growing appreciation that preventive diplomacy can work only if there is a co-ordinated system-wide approach in the 
United Nations that brings together the resources from diverse bodies such as the World Bank and the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) into preventive diplomacy initiatives. 
 
3.4.3 Timing of Preventive Diplomacy Interventions 
Of significant importance in the application of preventive diplomacy at any stage of conflict are the timing, the nature 
of the intervention, and the factors prevailing within the conflict context. The core issues are where to intervene 
(conflict situation/context), when to intervene, (conflict stage) and how to intervene (mode of intervention). Lund 
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(2005: 108) argues that to implement a more informed and coherent approach, five key issues have to be addressed, 
whatever the particular circumstances facing specific preventive interventions. The issues are as follows: 
 Where and when are tensions and disputes likely to escalate into violent conflict (early warning)? 
 Which of these potential conflicts warrant responses (deciding priorities)? 
 What preventive responses are the most timely and cost effective for a given conflict situation (devising effective 
interventions)? 
 How can political, bureaucratic and material support be obtained (mobilising political will and resources)? 
 What is needed to organise an on-going, co-ordinated system for preventive diplomacy (linking international 
actors in a coherent system). 
 
Jentleson (2000: 338) posits that seven elements determine the success or failure of preventive diplomacy; they are 
as follows. 
 Negotiators who gain and keep the trust of the major parties; 
 Terms of the negotiations that allow all sides to be able to show their domestic constituencies that there are real 
gains to be had from co-operation; 
 Special envoys and lead diplomats who enjoy credibility with the parties; 
 Actions that have to be taken early… because one of the strongest, least conditional conclusions we can draw is 
that the longer you wait, the more there will be to do and the more difficult it will be to do well; 
 Sanctions that are an important part of a mixed strategy (comprehensive, decisive and tightly enforced sanctions 
work better than partially or incrementally enforced sanctions; 
 Inducements such as the lure of membership in major international and regional organizations or the threat of 
expulsion;   
 Political, especially executive leadership, which is a key ingredient for effective preventive diplomacy. 
 
The Carnegie Commission (1997: xix-xx) suggests four elements that can ensure the operational efficacy of 
preventive diplomacy, namely: (1) ―the lead players (international organizations, states, or individuals‖ (2) ―coherent 
military-political approaches to engagement that addresses the humanitarian and political aspects of the problem‖ (3) 
―adequate resources‖ and (4) ―advance plans for the restoration of host country authority.‖ 
 
There are diverse views about the appropriate timing of preventive interventions. However, several scholars on 
preventive diplomacy advocate early preventive interventions as more likely to achieve positive results (Peck, 1995, 
Jentleson 2000a 2000b, 2000c, Fourie and Solomon 2002). Peck (1995) questions preventive interventions at the 
stage when a dispute is on the verge of erupting or has already erupted, ―on the ground that in an escalating conflict 
it may be too late to really influence the parties because the pressures to escalate are too intense‖ (paraphrased in 
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Hampson 2002: 144). Peck advocates early intervention in a dispute, when opportunities for dispute resolution are 
most ―ripe‖ Carment and James (1995) also note that third parties are more likely to achieve positive results if they 
launch early preventive interventions rather than during an escalating conflict. These positions contrast with Lund‘s 
(1996) view that preventive diplomacy missions should only be instituted when the conflict has erupted and the 
warring parties have reached a mutually hurting stalemate, which he views as the ripe moment for successful 
preventive diplomacy. Experience has shown that most preventive diplomacy interventions have failed because of 
late preventive actions, when conflict has erupted and the warring parties have entrenched and solidified their 
commitments to war and victory. Preventive interventions in conflicts in Rwanda (1994), Somalia (1992), Yugoslavia 
(1995), and DRC 1998) came late when the conflict had caused so much damage (Wallensten 2002, Carment and 
Schnabel, 2003, Jentlesson, 2003, Vayrynen 2003, Talentino 2003, Engel 2005). Jentleson refers to these late 
preventive diplomacy interventions as ―missed opportunities‖ because early intervention would have prevented the 
eruption of conflict and/or limited its vertical and horizontal escalation and the concomitant costs. 
 
However, it is important to note that preventive diplomacy instruments can successfully be applied at any phase and 
level of the conflict lifecycle, provided that the appropriate measures are devised and appropriately implemented. The 
crucial question to ask before instituting preventive intervention is ―What is the problem on the ground?‖ The answer 
to this question begs for need assessment by the intervening entity, to determine the conflict context, the underlying 
causes of the conflict, as well as the parties involved and their perception of the conflict, in order to devise 
appropriate responses. What is pivotal is whether the envisaged action is aligned with the context and phase of the 
conflict at hand. The preventive measures need to embrace the entire spectrum of the conflict and contextualise it, to 
attain its basic objectives of forestalling and reducing violent escalation and recurrence of conflict (Leatherman etal 
1998, Cockell 2002). This is crucial because conflict is dynamic, and the intensity levels vary over a conflict‘s lifecycle 
as dictated by the conflict context, belligerent parties‘ perceptions of the conflict, the parties‘ commitments to their 
conflictual goals, the weapons used, and other causal factors. As such ―an understanding of the conflict cycle is 
essential for an understanding of how, where and when to apply different strategies and measures‖ of preventive 
diplomacy (Swanstrom and Weissmann (2005: 9). The dynamic nature of conflict poses mammoth challenges to 
preventive diplomacy. 
 
Lund (1996) maintains that preventive diplomacy should be instituted when tensions between the belligerent parties 
are in danger of shifting from stable peace to unstable peace. It should also be applied in situations where conflict 
has been terminated but there are signals of relapse due to insufficient post-conflict peace-building measures, or to 
one party reneging on the negotiations and peace accords. Lund projects a stage in the full lifecycle of a typical 
conflict, where preventive diplomacy may be successfully applied, namely the stage of unstable peace. He notes that 
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application of any preventive measures when violent confrontation has manifested will no longer be preventive 
diplomacy, but crisis diplomacy.  
 
Swart notes that although Lund‘s (1996) preventive diplomacy approach has positive benefits in defining the phases 
of conflict and when effective preventive measures can be applied, it is flawed in that it envisages a theoretical 
framework that could be applicable to all conflict situations irrespective of their location, irrespective of the fact that 
each conflict situation, while characterised by similar patterns of violence, has different trigger factors, circumstances 
and complexities that require contextualised preventive diplomacy initiatives (Swart 2008). 
 
Zartman (1978, 1996, and 2006) has devised what he terms the ―theory of ripe moment‖ and sees mutually hurting 
stalemate as the determinant of when and how to apply preventive diplomacy within the lifecycle of a conflict. 
According to this theory, a ripe moment in a conflict is experienced when the warring parties are trapped in a 
condition of mutually hurting stalemate, an uncomfortable and costly predicament. Each party is compelled by the 
prevailing circumstances to realise that neither can achieve its objectives through armed conflict, and as such they 
are forced to seek a way out through a negotiated settlement. This suggests that when both parties are 
uncomfortable with the calamitous stage of the conflict and in fear of further catastrophe if the conflict is continued in 
the same way, the parties will opt for a change of action in ending the conflict (Wallensteen 2007, Zartman 1996, 
2006). The theory is also premised on the assumption that before preventive diplomacy can be applied, the warring 
parties should have engaged in violent confrontation to the extent that they have tested each other‘s might, have 
experienced dreadful and hurting moments of violent confrontation, and are now ready for a way out of the conflict 
deadlock and stalemate. According to the theory, it is on the basis of this enticing opportunity presented by the 
mutually hurting stalemate that preventive diplomacy can be successfully implemented, as the parties tend to be 
more willing to come to a peaceful resolution of the conflict. The theory raises the issue that for successful preventive 
diplomacy to be instituted there must be a perception by all the warring parties that the present course of the conflict 
is unsustainable, and there exists a suitable and less destructive way out of the conflict deadlock.  
 
The gist of the theory therefore is to provide guidance on why and when parties to a conflict are susceptible to their 
own or others‘ efforts to transform the conflict from a violent phase to a negotiated settlement. The main objective is 
the termination of both warring parties‘ conflictual behaviour and the development of a compromise solution based on 
the abandonment of the coercive strategies to attain their different goals (Mitchell 1981, Lund, 1996, 2006, Swart 
2008, Wallensteen 2007). Lund (1996: 135) advises that preventive diplomacy ―...is best launched at points where 
there already exists sufficient interest and motivation on the part of the disputants to seek a peaceful resolution, yet 
not so early that the disputants are incited to intensify their confrontation. Early action is vital if violence is to be pre-
empted and the disputants are not to entrench themselves in rigid positions from which it is difficult to withdraw.‖ The 
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central argument here is that there are focal points in the lifecycle of conflicts at which it is more useful for mediators 
to successfully intervene and resolve the conflict. That is ―[w]hen a situation is not ‗ripe‘ as determined in large part 
by the extent to which the parties to the conflict are disposed even to seriously consider an agreement, international 
strategies have much less chance of succeeding‖ (Jentleson 2003: 32). 
 
Critiques of the ripe moment and mutually hurting stalemate maintain that it is seriously flawed as an instrument of 
preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution. Firstly, if preventive diplomacy entails prevention of conflict from 
erupting (conflict prevention) as well as managing to curb both vertical and horizontal escalation (conflict 
management) and preventing the recurrence of conflict (conflict resolution and post-conflict peace-building), then 
awaiting the ripe moment and hurting stalemate before preventive action will be flawed as a conflict prevention 
instrument at the pre-violence stage of conflict. While the ripeness theory is central in guiding the assessment of 
when and where to engage, it is sometimes applied in ways that underestimate the risks and costs of waiting. That is, 
―[t]he conflict may be intervened in too early, but it also can deteriorate over time and grow worse, become too far 
gone‖ as conflict trends are not unidirectional (Jentleson 2003: 32). 
 
Secondly, conflict is a highly dynamic phenomenon with different intensities; trends and processes.There are 
conflicts where the belligerent parties may pursue goals of continuing the conflict and simultaneously make overtures 
for a peaceful resolution of the conflict. As such, it becomes very difficult at any particular moment in the lifecycle of a 
conflict to determine with some certainty that the ripe moment has set in. In the same vein, most conflicts are intense 
and destructive at the onset, and would call for urgent (swift) intervention. Therefore, in practice it would appear 
irrational for any entity with the intention of mitigating the conflict to wait for a stage where the parties would have 
done untold damage to each other as the ripe moment for preventive diplomacy (Wallensteen 2007). This is because 
the longer a conflict rages on, the more difficult and costly it is to resolve it. In fact, the hardened rivalries, mistrusts 
and hurting moments which the parties inflict on each other during the conflict may become obstacles for effective 
preventive diplomacy. There are conflicts which never show signs of ripeness for resolution, but are protracted and 
may even be frozen. For example, conflicts which are centred on frustrated basic human needs are difficult to 
mitigate, as each party is strongly entrenched in achieving its goals, and neither party may submit to defeat. The 
parties‘ develop solid and reciprocal enemy images and mutually exclusive belief systems about each other, which 
perpetuate antagonisms and solidify the conflict spirit of the warring parties as well as legitimising atrocious means of 
winning the war (Burton 1996a, b, c, Azar 1990, a, b, Swart 2008).   Such entrenched enemy labelling becomes an 
obstacle in resolving the conflict even when the intervention is launched at the phase of the ripe moment. 
 
Thirdly, Swart (2008) argues that the ripe moment is a perceptual event and not something to objectively ascertain 
with certainty, as it exists in the minds of the warring parties. If the ripe moment and hurting stalemate is to be 
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determined by an entity which wants to intervene, there is also a possibility that the determining entity may misjudge 
the warring parties‘ perceptions of the conflict as being ripe for intervention, resulting in a suicidal intervention 
mission. On this score, Swart (2008) criticises Lund‘s framework for failing to address the impact of psychological 
variables such as entrenched mistrust, rivalries, enemy attitudes, images, histories and experiences, on the 
application of preventive diplomacy. However, in spite of the criticisms, Lund (1996) provides an invaluable 
theoretical perspective on the marked phases of a typical conflict, and an analysis of what and when preventive 
diplomacy measures should be applied at some particular stages in the lifecycle of a conflict. He also raises the 
pertinent issue of what conditions are needed in the relationship of the warring parties and their circumstances vis-a-
vis the conflict, before preventive diplomacy can be meaningfully implemented. 
 
According to Carment and Schnabel (2003: 20), ―[s]tructural factors create several problems that contribute to 
conflict, such as reconciling multicultural reality with the principle of national self determination; the pursuit of stable, 
democratic society in a tumultuous regional system; uneven economic development; and coping with fundamental 
changes brought about by the outbreak of violent conflict.‖ As such greater understanding of this deeper problems 
are necessary if structural preventive diplomatic measures such as developmental assistance can be 
comprehensively and successfully implemented (Wallensteen 2002, Carment and Schnabel 2003; Engel 2005). 
Other scholars advocate a combination of both track one (official sanctioned diplomacy) and track two (informal 
diplomacy) ventured through private institutions and non-governmental organisations in addressing conflicts and the 
post-conflict initiatives. Some regional organisations have realised the significance of track two diplomacy in the 
prevention, management and resolution of complex protracted conflicts. Carment and Schnabel (2003: 13) argue that 
―[o]fficial diplomacy can be greatly strengthened by private sector activity…Track Two diplomacy is increasingly the 
strategy of choice for dealing with problems beyond the reach of official efforts.‖ Track one and track two diplomatic 
initiatives should be operationalised on a complementary basis. Basic human rights theorists such as Burton and 
Azar recommend the centrality of track two diplomacy measures such as conflict resolution workshops conducted by 
expert conflict mediators in brokering political agreements and supplementing the official mediation efforts. As Fourie 
and Solomon (2002: 3) correctly notes, ―[i]n this way track two does not seek to compete with track one but rather 
seeks to complement and reinforce it‖ However Fourie and Solomon warn against solely relying on track two 
diplomacy without the official track one mode. In their view ―track two should be seen as an extension of, rather than 
a replacement to the official diplomacy.‖ This is because no settlement can reach its full potential without the official 
support and authority of the official entity (Fourie and Solomon 2003). 
 
Several commentators also note that there are many conflict situations in which the regional and/or international 
bodies could have applied preventive diplomacy measures in their diverse forms for peace and stability. Many 
scholars indicate that most of the factors which lead to failed preventive diplomacy missions are paucity of resources, 
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lack of political will, and the question of national interests. Jentleson states that leaders have been reluctant to take 
on comprehensive conflict prevention because they weigh the costs of intervention and the rewards of such 
intervention to the nation. In most cases the ―[t]he costs to be borne and risks to be run are too high, and the 
interests at stake are too low‖ (paraphrased in Carment and Schnabel 2003: 18). Lund (2005: 107) notes that 
preventive diplomacy has been tried and is sometimes effective. However, to reap its full potential, preventive 
diplomacy should focus on addressing structural problems in societies to avert outbreak of armed conflict and attain 
long-term peace. Attention to structural problems through well-coordinated, well-timed and executed preventive 
diplomacy policies and actions would ensure structural stability, signified by sustainable economic development, 
democracy, and respect for human rights, as well as viable political structures, capable of managing change without 
resorting to violent conflict (Commission of the European Communities (1996) cited in Mehler 2005). Structural 
preventive diplomacy should be integral to any preventive diplomacy mission, because it facilitates identification of 
the root causes of conflicts and application of appropriate preventive and post-conflict peacebuilding measures. 
Swart (2008) observes that in Africa preventive diplomacy has always failed because of insufficient diagnosis of the 
conflicts, to ascertain their deeper underlying sources. 
3.4.4 Preventive Diplomacy Instruments 
In the toolkit of preventive diplomacy there are several instruments which the intervening entity can select to mitigate 
a conflict situation. The techniques can be classified into diplomatic non-coercive and coercive diplomatic measures. 
Non-coercive measures include peaceful, non-violent and conciliatory actions such as fact-finding, peace envoys, 
eminent persons‘ mediation and Good offices missions, shuttle diplomacy, third-party arbitration, adjudication and 
mediation, deployment of observer teams, international appeals problem-solving intervention, peacemaking, positive 
rewards and inducements, confidence-building measures, establishment of risks reduction centres, (―carrots‖), 
humanitarian intervention, moral persuasion for accommodation by the adversaries, and post-conflict peace-building 
programmes (positive inducements) such as revival and reconstruction of the socio-economic and political 
institutions, targeted economic assistance programmes, access to advanced technology, promotion of democracy 
and good governance, election monitoring, government of national unity, power sharing and reconciliation, exchange 
of military missions, information exchanges and monitoring of regional arms control as well as signing of non-
aggression pacts, commissions of inquiry and human rights observers. Post-conflict peace building measures also 
entail creating institutions and procedures through which the warring parties can be engaged in dialogue on the 
conflict issues and how they can be amicably settled. It also requires measures to modify the perceptions and 
attitudes of mistrust, misperceptions, suspicion, positional rigidity and enemy images between, the warring parties for 
lasting peace to be attained.  
 
 102 
 
On the other hand, coercive measures entail the use of force or threat of force and sanctions to obtain co-operation 
from the belligerent parties. For example, military intervention, preventive deployment, peacekeeping, peace 
enforcement, economic, moral, political and military sanctions and embargoes, establishment of deterrence security 
policies, de-militarised zones and disarming the belligerents, arms control regimes, establishing local and/or regional 
balances of power, non-offensive display of force, isolation by the international and regional organisations and war 
crimes tribunals (Boutros Ghali 1992, 1995, Annan 1998, 2000, Adebayo and Gelin-Adam 1999, Miall etal 2001, 
Hampson 2002, Hampson, Wermester and Malone 2002, Hampson 2002, Cockell 2002, Wallesteen 2002, Jentleson 
2000, Surhke and Jones 2000, 2003, Vayrynen 2003, Carment and Schnabel 2003, Talentino 2003). According to 
Hampson (2002), there are wide debates over a range of techniques and instruments that are relevant to preventive 
diplomacy. Some people view preventive diplomacy as referring to non-coercive diplomatic measures and peaceful 
means described in Article 33 of the UN Charter, while others take a broader view that both coercive and non-
coercive methods should be applied to complement each other. 
 
Of utmost important is how the intervening body plans and applies the techniques on the basis of the early warning 
signals and information available on the sources of the conflict, its dynamics, the goals and perceptions of the 
belligerent parties, the phase and context of the conflict, and the timing of the execution. Due to the complexity of the 
conflict causal factors and the dynamics of the conflict cycle, the preventive diplomacy toolbox should be flexible and 
open to alterations on the dictates of the conflict situation. Each response technique and option should be assessed 
to determine its situational advantages and disadvantages within the context of the conflict at hand (Cockell 2002). 
For preventive measures to be effective, they should be appropriately timed and executed such that they optimally 
engage the underlying causal factors, conflict dynamics, interests and attitudes of the actors. Effective preventive 
diplomacy entails a substantial understanding of the history and dynamics of conflicts, their structural causes and the 
processes by which they become violent, to avoid treating only the conflict symptoms rather than the underlying 
causes. An in-depth analysis of the conflict situation, its structural causes, the parties involved and their perceptions 
about the conflict and the conflict phase, will help the intervening body to determine how to intervene, the appropriate 
preventive instruments and when to intervene to transform or mitigate the conflict circumstances (Cockell 2002, 
Wallensteen 2002, Carment and Schnabel 2003, Lund 1996, 1999, 2002, 2005). It is vital that preventive diplomacy 
strategies should be multi-faceted and long-term in their set operational goals. The proponents of developmental 
diplomacy prefer interventions through economic assistance, programmes on promotion of good governance, 
democratisation, rule of law, and political reconstruction, electoral reform assistance, targeted anti-poverty projects, 
humanitarian assistance reintegration, rehabilitation and reconstruction programmes to prevent the recurrence of 
conflicts (Annan 1998, Swart 2008).  
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In line with the above, the Organisation of Security and Cooperation in Europe‘s (OSCE) preventive diplomacy 
approach cherishes cooperative, consultative and peaceful mediation as the core framework of its preventive 
diplomacy machinery for intervention in potential, imminent and ongoing conflicts (Chigas etal. 1996). However, in 
most cases the government, if it is one of the belligerent parties, may exploit the appeasement overtures as signs of 
weakness by the powers or body providing the ―carrots‖. The autocratic Mugabe regime adroitly interpreted the 
SADC non-coercive policy of quiet diplomacy against its despotic rule as a sign of weakness by the regional 
organisation. The regime therefore resisted implementation of any meaningful democratic reforms in the country.  
 
Others argue that most preventive diplomacy interventions by third parties have relied on some form of coercive 
diplomacy. For example, Jentleson‘s (2003) case studies reveal that sufficiently credible threats and/or earlier and 
more decisive uses of military force would make a crucial difference in preventive diplomacy missions. The 
deployment of the United Nations forces in collaboration with the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE) in Macedonia has been cited as indicative of the success of coercive diplomacy in restoring order 
(Hampson 20002). However, it has also been noted that coercive diplomacy techniques such as economic sanctions 
frequently backfire and buttress the will to resist, or misfire and cause misery to civilians than on the government as 
in the cases of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe and the apartheid regime in South Africa 
(Hampson 2002). There are many conflict situations in which dictatorial governments have been hardened to tighten 
their despotic leadership in spite of the sanctions imposed. This has led to criticisms from some quarters that 
sanctions are not an effective preventive diplomacy technique as the perpetrators of the evil are often cushioned 
from its adverse effects. More often than not, its victims are the innocent masses who will already be suffering under 
the autocratic regime. 
 
Several scholars on preventive diplomacy recommend that optimal efficacy can be attained by a combination of both 
coercive and non-coercive preventive measures (carrots and sticks). This is mainly because the reasons for conflicts 
are multidimensional and therefore would require cross-sectoral and multi-pronged strategies to mitigate them 
(George 1994, Adedeji 1999, Hampson 2002, Lund 2002, Wallensteen 2002, Dress and Rosenblum-Kumar 2002, 
Cockell 2002, Carment and Schnabel 2003, Jentleson 2003, Cawthra 2004, Swart 2008). The diplomatic 
components must be backed by a credible threat of coercive strategies The parties to the conflict must know that 
both cooperation and non-cooperation have their consequences. ―In this regard fairness and firmness go together 
quite symmetrically (Jentleson 2003: 39)‖ 
 
Some conflicts, once erupted, can be so intense and deadly that only military intervention through preventive 
deployments, preventive enforcements, peacekeeping and peacemaking deployments can provide opportunities for 
dialogue and mediation for peaceful resolution. On this score, Jentleson argues that ―[f]orce rarely if ever should be a 
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first resort, but it often needs to be more of an early resort‖ Chigas etal. (1996: 386) argue that ―military forces may 
serve as an adjunct to diplomacy, a form of ‗muscular diplomacy in which the threat of force hovers in the 
background and is used in conjunction with diplomatic efforts and in coordination with a wide variety of civilian tasks. 
They may prove particularly effective in the very early stages of a conflict when it has not hardened and compromise 
and resolution remain possible.‖ This strategy of engaging in non-coercive diplomatic measures backed by threats of 
force is credited with the success of SADC preventive diplomacy in the 1994 Lesotho intervention. 
 
However, there are instances where coercive interventions have exacerbated the conflict situation, as was 
experienced by the UN in Somalia, ECOWAS in Liberia and Sierra Leone, the SADC in the DRC and Lesotho. In 
some instances, when an organisation employs coercive diplomacy strategies, it might make cooperation of the 
warring parties less attractive. That is to say, the swift resort to the use of force may undermine the receptivity of the 
force, and result in escalation of violence in the area of operation (Chigas etal. 1996) One of the former SADC 
Executive Secretaries, Kaire Mbuede (2001: 48), lamented the existence of  ―...a disturbing tendency to militarise the 
process of peacemaking….‖ This is because ―while the role of preventive diplomacy is generally recognized, in 
practice, the first thing that comes to most peoples‘ minds is military intervention.‖ What is important is to note that 
―[i]n the short term war and conflict situations often require immediate military action to restore normality, in the long-
term, however, this should take place within a broader context of demilitarizing peace making…Peace can also be 
made without military intervention.‖ 
 
Many coercive preventive diplomacy missions by the UN and regional organisations have failed due to ill-defined 
operational mandates, flawed rules of engagement, lack of political will by the intervening member states, and 
paucity of resources to finance the operations to their logical conclusions. Hampson (2002: 146) posits that ―[a]bsent 
from much of the literature about different preventive techniques and the relationship between preventive diplomacy 
and coercive diplomacy is any kind of sustained analysis on whether some techniques are better suited to certain 
kinds of conflict situations than others, what the real tradeoffs are in adopting different preventive diplomacy 
strategies, and whether choosing one/some option(s) forecloses the use of others.‖ 
 
In practice, several conflicts have been resolved by employment of the ―carrots and sticks‖ preventive diplomacy 
measures. Hence, Lund (1999) notes that preventive diplomacy ―can involve the use of a variety of diplomatic and 
other instruments that should be effectively and collectively implemented by governments, multilateral organizations, 
Non-Governmental Organisations, individuals or the disputants themselves.‖  What is significant is that each conflict 
situation has its unique existential peculiarities and will require preventive instruments which are appropriate to the 
conflict context. This suggests that there is no fixed and definite preventive toolkit and formula for success since each 
conflict situation has its own requirements. For example, causal factors such as ethnic persecution, regime failure, 
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massive human rights violations, inequitable distribution of resources, underdevelopment and refugee flows, are 
results of different combinations of factors, hence ―...require somewhat different models, explanations, strategies, 
and responses.‖ (Lund 2005: xiii). Among other things, the efficacy of a preventive operation is determined by the 
stage at which it is implemented in the lifecycle of a conflict. That is whether they are deployed before hostilities 
occur (such as some form of preventive deployment), during low-intensity conflict, during full-scale war, or after 
armed conflict (Swart 2008). As such it is not advisable to ―...generalize too quickly on the basis of individual cases; 
nor should [one] transplant an approach that has worked under specific cultural, political and economic conditions to 
a different setting. Regional variations can be of great significance‖ in determining the success and/or failure of 
preventive diplomacy (Mehler 2005: 116). Therefore, the central issue is not so much whether preventive diplomacy 
works, but rather under what conditions it can be effective. For example, in the case of SADC‘s interventions in 
Lesotho, both coercive and non-coercive measures were employed with different success. In the 1994 intervention, 
the SADC employed non-coercive diplomatic measures and it has been hailed as a success. In the 1998 intervention 
SADC launched a military intervention and although they managed to bring order in the Kingdom, it has been 
criticised from many quarters as an abortive mission; it raised questions on the efficacy of the SADC preventive 
diplomacy mechanism.  
 
The success of preventive diplomacy depends on the extent to which measures are geared towards addressing the 
deeper, structural underlying sources of conflict (Galtung 2000, Hampson 20002, Wallensteen 2002, Carment and 
Schnabel 2002, Engel 2005, Mehler 2005, Talentiono 2005). Hampson (2002: 148) maintains that ―preventive 
diplomacy initiatives when taken alone and independently of a broader strategy of conflict prevention are likely to fail 
unless they are linked to measures and actions that tackle the deeper, or ‗root‘ causes of conflict.‖ In view of this 
factor, any intervening body should embark on an in-depth analysis of the conflict in question to determine the deep, 
underlying structural sources of the conflict. This is essential in determining appropriate intervention strategies and 
post-conflict peace-building initiatives to address the real issues and avoid attending to the symptoms of the conflict. 
3.4.5 Preventive Diplomacy and Early Warning Systems 
The efficacy of preventive diplomacy is determined by availability of comprehensive and coherent early warning 
system structures for collection and analysis of data on potential, imminent and ongoing conflicts. As Levit (2003:4) 
notes, ―[n]o conflict prevention mechanism can be sustained…in the absence of viable early warning and risk 
assessment systems.‖ Early warning systems are institutions established to provide information on potential conflict 
zones and the status of ongoing conflicts with the goal of mapping and nipping them in the bud, (conflict prevention), 
facilitating the de-escalation of an ongoing conflict, (conflict management) and devising measures for post-conflict 
peace building and reconstruction, (conflict resolution and post-conflict peace-building). It was in this light that Nhara 
(1996) held that preparedness, prevention and mitigation are the main pillars of an early warning system. According 
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to Carment and Schnabel (2003: 24) ―[t]he policy relevance of early warning systems is not restricted to analyzing a 
crisis, but also to assess the capacities, needs, and responses for dealing with a crisis.‖ In other words it is the 
analysis of information on the conflict and development of appropriate response strategies to the crisis in a timely 
manner which is significant in preventive dipolmacy (Forum on Early Warning and Early Response (FEWER) cited in 
Carment and Schnabel 2003). The main goal is to establish an early warning and risk assessment network that is 
multi-departmental, multi-purpose and multi-dimensional in definition, interpretation and response operation. 
 
The assessment of early warning data is used to identify the ongoing conflicts, potential and future conflict zones, 
and a sequence of events that are logically consistent with the required operational responses (Carment and 
Schnabel 2003, Lund 2005). Generally, provision of early warning information is the first step in conflict intervention 
as it gives both the intervening entity and the conflict parties a clearer understanding of the origins, nature and 
dynamics and strategies for resolution of the conflict at hand (Miall etal 2001). The crisis signals which have been 
employed by the United Nations, Inter-governmental Organisations and Non-governmental-Humanitarian 
Organisations to anticipate and monitor imminent crisis and conflict escalation include manifestations of autocracy 
and undemocratic governance, violent conflict, gross political repression, religious, minorities and opposition 
persecutions, genocide, gross violation of human rights, state sponsored and institutionalised violence, forced 
migrations, refugee crisis, increased number of internally displaced persons, weak and dysfunctional institutions of 
governance, crumbling economic structures, failed delivery of human security and material services, deteriorating 
living standards and other humanitarian emergencies (Rupesinghe 1992, Kuroda 1992, Thoolen 1992, Beyer 1992, 
Ramcharan 1992, Davies, Harff and Speca 1997, Davies and Gurr 1998, Annan 1998, Miall etal 2001, Levit 2003, 
Engel 2005).  
 
The aim of early warning is to provide the recipient entity with comprehensive information on impending crises, 
ascertaining the underlying structural sources of the conflict for informed decisions on how best to respond. As 
Rugumamu (2002:15-16) puts it ―effective early warning combines historical, social, political and humanitarian 
information in order to forecast the dynamics of a particular conflict and the instruments to effectively address it 
before it reaches crisis proportions.‖ Carment and Schnabel (2003) state that after the conflict information is analysed 
and weighed and possible resolution strategies decided upon, it is relayed to policy makers for further assessment 
and implementation. The early warning systems are not confined to simply analysing a conflict, but also relate to and, 
indeed, see their raison d‟etre in the capacities and response strategies for dealing with a conflict. As such the 
―message must state clearly what the threat is, and what action the receiver is being urged to take‖ (Rupesighe 1992: 
xxiv). The central purpose of early warning is not only to identify potential conflict zones but also to trigger political 
will among the decision-makers for timely and appropriate preventive action (Rupesinghe 1992, Walker 1992, 
Gordenker 1992, Nhara 1996, Annan 1998, Jentleson 2003). Nhara (1996: 1-2) clearly articulates this point thus: 
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―[t]he provision of information alone does not constitute Early Warning…the receiver of such a forecast and what is 
done with the information provided become critical in determining the success or failure of an Early Warning system.‖  
 
Political will to act is pivotal to the success of preventive diplomacy. In most instances, failure to act by the UN or 
regional organisations has not been due to lack of early warning signals about incipient conflicts, but lack of political 
will to act. For example, the international community failed to stem the 1994 genocide in Rwanda despite the 
availability of information on the impending crisis (Suhrke and Jones 2000, Jentleson 2003). A critical task in 
preventive diplomacy is ascertaining where and when the most harmful conflicts are most likely to occur or recur, so 
that appropriate measures of preventive responses may be launched and appropriate resources be committed to 
averting and/or mitigating the crisis. Conflict mapping, appropriate interpretation and analysis are vital as early 
warning tools. This is because, if undertaken by experts, they should facilitate provision of data on the underlying 
conflict sources, character of the conflict, the parties involved, conflict phase, conflict dynamics, diffusion, and 
escalation, estimation of operational costs, risk assessment, intervention strategies and timing of the intervention. 
The mapping and analysis of early warning data around a particular conflict will help in identifying the scope for 
conflict prevention, management and resolution (Mial etal. 2001, Lund 2005.  
 
Research has shown that the UN and regional organisations, more often than not, fail to respond promptly to 
conflicts before they reach destructive proportions. Most of the post-Cold War conflicts which erupted in the former 
Yugoslavia, Somalia, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Burundi and the DRC, reflect what has been referred to as 
―missed opportunities‖ for the effective implementation of preventive diplomacy. Failure to act timeously may have 
resulted from: a lack of early warning structures; flawed analysis of data on eminent conflicts or conflict escalation; a 
lack of political will; poorly resourced intervention missions and failure to fully comprehend the historical underlying 
sources and dynamics of the conflict (Adedeji 1995, Annan 1998, Surhke and Jones 2000, Hampson 2002, Lund 
2002, Cockell 2002, Wallensteen 2002, Jentleson 2003, Carment and Schnabel 2003.  
 
There are numerous problems associated with the gathering, interpretation and analysis of regular, reliable and 
complete early warning information. This has prompted Nye to assume that ―post-Cold War era holds fewer secrets 
but more mysteries‖ in terms of resolving the numerous conflicts in the available early warning information (in Lund 
2005: 111). Lund (2005: 110-112) identifies some of the factors which hamper gathering of reliable early warning 
information especially in the post-Cold War era, as follows:  
 The sources and loci of emerging threats…are more numerous and widely dispersed, and the processes of 
gathering and interpreting information about them are likewise widely scattered as well as uneven in their 
coverage and varied in quality.  
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 The more diffuse nature of both the pertinent information and the criteria for interpreting (lack of a set of 
interpretive categories in relation to which news of emerging troubles can be assessed and its significance 
judged); 
 Distinguishing between more and less serious emerging risks and threats (separating ‗signals‘ from ‗noise‘ or 
‗migraines‘ from ‗headaches‘ has become more difficult. 
 Ominous signs for a given country or region may be detected, but it is hard to estimate what kinds and levels of 
violence or other problems may actually erupts, as well as when, where and how. 
 Existence of numerous channels of information or analysis available…may provide contradictory and politicised 
predictions, thus suggesting widely varying degrees of concern and types of response. 
 All information, including early warnings of future conflict is subject to the self-interested biases of its producers 
and it can be politically manipulated for partisan reasons. 
 The potential import for national, regional and international security of signs of instability and discontent is harder 
to decipher, especially when the signs are low level and dispersed. 
 Even if one has adequate early warning information, the psychological tendency exists either to interpret it along 
familiar lines or to filter out its unfamiliar or inconvenient aspects and thus fit the data into preconceived notions. 
 
The UN and regional organisations in their diverse forms have realised the significance of early warning systems in 
their bid to prevent outbreaks and recurrence of conflicts in their respective regions. In his Agenda for Peace, Ghali 
(1995) pledged to strengthen the UN preventive diplomacy by bolstering its early warning structures and information-
gathering organs, fact-finding and preventive deployments. Similarly,through the Helsinki Decision (Chapter 11 (3), 
the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) mandated the High Commissioner for National 
Minorities (HCNM), to provide appropriate early warning and early responses to tensions involving national minority 
issues which have the potential to develop into a conflict within the OSCE regional block (Chigas etal. 1996). 
Regional organisations in the developed world such as the OSCE and OAS have more developed and established 
early warning systems and capabilities for preventive diplomacy missions than those in the Third World regions such 
as the SADC and ECOWAS. 
 
The SADC Organ on Politics Defence and Security (OPDS) and the Mutual Defence Pact (MDP) protocols in their 
goal to prevent contain and resolve inter- and intra-state conflicts, pledge to establish early warning units in each 
member state, and promote exchange of information on and reviews of regional matters and developments. The 
question is whether the SADC has any established early warning system to detect potential conflict zones, and if so, 
has identified whether there is any collective capacity to act pre-emptively. In its coercive preventive diplomacy 
mission of 1998 in Lesotho, the SADC operation is said to have encountered serious operational challenges due to 
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lack of intelligence information on the intensity of the conflict in the country (Nathan 1999, 2004, du Plessis 2000, 
Neethling 2000, 2004, Ngoma 2005). 
 
The ECOMOG preventive operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone in 1990- 1997 and 1997 to 2000 and 1998 
respectively have also been labelled as flawed due to poor or general lack of reliable early warning data on the 
conflict context (Iweze cited in Sessay 2000). In both the SADC and ECOMOG operations, the troops were hastily 
thrown into the battlefield without adequate warning information, risk assessment and sufficient preparations for 
effective engagements. Generally, if preventive diplomacy is to be effectively practised, it is necessary for the UN 
and the regional organisations to develop strong early warning institutions, information interpretation, analysis, 
assessment and appraisal systems and capacity to act appropriately (Evans 1998, Carment and Schnabel 2003, 
Wallensteen 2002, Cockell 2002, Jentleson 2003, Talentino 2003). Central to the planning of preventive action are 
―the specification of concrete objectives, the identification of realistic preventive measure options to achieve those 
objectives, and the coordinated integration of the chosen measures to ensure comprehensive unity of effort on the 
ground‖ (Cockell, 2002: 192). 
 
This study seeks to investigate whether the SADC has any early warning structures which guide interventions in 
regional conflicts, as in the case of the Lesotho missions of 1994, 2007and 2007. 
 
Preventive diplomacy embraces conflict prevention, management and resolution of conflicts. The following section 
will delve into what each of the three concepts entails. It will also discuss how the concepts are inter-related and how 
preventive diplomacy tools and strategies are applied in each stage of conflict mitigation. 
 
3.5 Conflict Prevention 
―Since assuming office, I have pledged to move the United Nations from a culture of reaction to a culture of 
prevention‖ (Annan 2001: 3). This statement by the former UN Secretary General is indicative of the imperative need 
for regional organisations and the UN to focus on preventive measures if global peace and security are to be realised 
and sustained. Conflict prevention is an integral aspect of preventive diplomacy and maintenance of international 
peace and security in the founding and operational documents of almost all the regional and international 
organisations. For example, conflict prevention is the first pledge in the Charter of the United Nations in its bid to 
maintain global security. Lund (1996: 37) defines conflict prevention as ―...action taken … to avoid the threats or use 
of armed force and related forms of coercion by states or groups to settle the political disputes...‖ In a paper 
presented at the Conflict prevention Network Annual Conference in Berlin (31 October 1999), Lund expanded the 
definition of conflict prevention to embrace structural prevention: that it ―entails any structural or interactive means to 
keep intrastate and interstate tensions and disputes from escalating into significant violence and to strengthen the 
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capabilities to resolve such disputes peacefully as well as alleviating the underlying problems that produce them, 
including forestalling the spread of hostilities into new places. It comes into play both in places where conflicts have 
occurred recently and where recent largely terminated conflicts could recur....‖ (cited in Carment and Schnabel 2003: 
21). It is supposed to be the first intervention action before conflict eruption, which would require conflict 
management and conflict resolution. Conflict prevention therefore entails pro-active, as opposed to reactive, actions 
in fighting the emergence of violent conflicts. Reactive preventive actions have proved to be highly costly for the 
intervening organisations, hence the shift in emphasis to pre-emptive measures. The latter denotes any measures 
geared towards anticipating, averting, defusing or containing a conflict in its embryonic stages before it escalates into 
a violent full-scale war. Van Walraven (2005: 78) distinguishes conflict prevention from other preventive actions that 
are instituted after the conflict has erupted. He explains that ―[t]he essence of the concept involves pre-emptive action 
being taken before a conflict develops into armed violence‖ as opposed to mediation, intervention and management 
of conflicts which envisage mitigations after the conflict has erupted. Van Walraven (2005) stresses the significance 
of establishing the difference, as many politicians and diplomats have a tendency to refer to conflict prevention in the 
context of existing violence, in which case conflict mediation would be more appropriate.  However, there are many 
people who view conflict prevention as inclusive of conflict management and resolution. According to Lund (2002: 
161), there is confusion over which specific actions constitute conflict prevention and are exclusive of conflict 
management or one of its synonyms. This has resulted in the diffusion of the preventive concept. Thus, ―[w]ith so 
much existing activity lumped under conflict prevention, there is also a risk it will lose its distinctive value-added 
meaning.‖  
 
Conflict prevention requires both short-term and long-term strategies and policies whose impact will prevent the 
emergence of conditions that give rise to conflict and its escalation (Annan 2000a, Rugumamu 2002, Jentleson 2003, 
Talentiono 2005). As Zartman (1991) puts it, conflict prevention is the pre-emptive attention or satisfaction of the 
parties‘ incompatible demands and goals before they become the basis of violent confrontation.  Miall etal. (2001) 
describe preventive measures as geared towards choking off‘ the conflict causal sequence. Cahill (2000) and Annan 
(2000a) view conflict prevention as analogous to preventive medicine administered to a patient to prevent illness 
before it occurs. Suganami (1996) and Annan (2000a) provide a set of comprehensive questions to guide any 
discourse on conflict prevention, namely: ―What prevents violent conflicts?‖ ―Can war be prevented by removing its 
necessary conditions?‖ ―Can the incidence of wars be reduced by controlling the circumstances under which they 
arise?‖ and ―How can this particular war be prevented from becoming violent?‖ ―How do we define and diagnose the 
disease of conflict‖, ―What are its symptoms?‖ There is no shadow of doubt that these are thought-provoking and 
searching questions which, if properly addressed, would go a long way to enhancing deep understanding of conflicts, 
their prevention, management and resolution, and consequently attainment of durable peace and security.  
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There are different stages and/or modes of conflict prevention. The Carnergie Commission on Preventing Deadly 
Conflict (1997: 40) classifies them into two broad categories; namely; operational prevention, which is ―early 
engagement to help create conditions in which responsible authorities can resolve tensions before they lead to 
violence and structural prevention which entails ―strategies to address the structural causes of deadly conflicts.‖ 
Operational prevention embraces direct/light prevention whose main goal is to control and eliminate the imminent 
and short-term sources of conflict before it erupts into violent escalation (Miall etal. 2001, Cockell 2003). Lund (1996) 
classifies conflict prevention into pre-conflict peace-building, pre-emptive engagement and crisis prevention. All these 
are pre-emptive actions geared towards reducing or eliminating tensions between parties, creating channels for 
negotiation and mediation to diffuse uncertainty, mistrust and animosity and deter violent confrontation between the 
belligerents. Advocates of non-coercive preventive diplomacy maintain that the outbreak of violent conflict reflects a 
failure of diplomacy. However, these ―direct actions [may] reduce or eliminate violence, without necessarily 
eliminating the conflict as such or its underlying causes‖ (Wallensteen 2003: 213). In view of this flaws conflict 
resolution practitioners have called for structural prevention which involves longer time programmes inclusive of 
―measures such as the promotion of democracy, ethnic integration, international regional cooperation, arms control 
and disarmament‖ (Wallensteen 2003: 213-214). 
 
Numerous studies have found that preventive diplomacy measures devoid of actions to tackle the underlying 
structural sources of conflict are bound to fail in preventing the eruption of violent conflict in the long term 
(Wallensteen 2002, Hampson 2002, Cockell 2002, and Engel 2005). Structural (Deep) prevention denotes long-term 
preventive actions geared towards addressing the deeper structural sources of conflicts such as political 
marginalisation, political oppression, threats to human security, poor governance, weak institutions of governance, 
failed or collapsed states, electoral frauds, social breakdowns, denial and frustration of basic human rights and 
needs, economic deprivation, economic failures, underdevelopment, unequal distribution of resources, poverty and 
any other socio-economic and political ills, and sources of insecurity which deprive the citizens of full rights and 
liberties which any free human being should be able to enjoy. In view of the significance of addressing structural 
causal factors, Lund (2002: 161) notes that the core definition of conflict prevention should be ―any structural means 
to keep intra-state or inter-state tensions and disputes from escalating into significant violence‖ by strengthening the 
parties‘ capabilities for resolving their disputes peacefully and reducing the underlying causal factors. Structural 
prevention is premised on the belief that conflicts emanate from some form of societal malfunction, and preventive 
measures focused on the structural factors that have the potential to trigger violent conflict should be devised and 
implemented at a time when that society is not directly enmeshed in violence (Wallensteen 2003). Since the goal is to 
prevent eruption of violent conflict, the preventive measures must be directed towards reforming and /or reviving the 
institutions to be functional and able to satisfy the people‘s needs and wants. Structural prevention is pivotal in 
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thwarting violent confrontation in the long term. Most conflict prevention measures have not been successful because 
they fail to tackle deeper or structural causes of conflict.  
 
Several scholars on conflict have observed that it is critically important for the intervening entity to conduct an in-
depth analysis of the structural and underlying sources of conflict in order to devise effective and appropriate 
responses to eliminate the circumstances, attitudes and motives giving birth to an outbreak of violent conflict (Mitchell 
1981, Azar 1990a, 1990b, Burton, 1990a, 1990b, 1990c, Galtung 2000, Jackson 2006, Swart 2008). If the deep 
underlying structural sources of conflict are not addressed, the conflict will remain latent and will erupt or recur at 
some stage. There can be no successful conflict prevention that can bring lasting peace unless the structural conflict 
triggers are fully comprehended and the appropriate strategies are applied to tackle them. The European Union has 
come to the realisation that the cyclical and recurrent nature of conflict calls for the need to devise preventive 
instruments that address ―the social, economic and political circumstances underpinning conflicts, namely the root 
causes and the most proximate causes‖ (Perez in Swart 2008: 219-220). Similarly, the UN acknowledges the 
significance of shifting from operational prevention to a structural prevention strategy ―...that would address the root 
causes of armed conflict, addressing the various political, social, cultural, economic and environmental and other 
structural causes that often underlie the immediate symptoms of armed conflicts‖ (Annan 2003: 2). Reactive 
measures targeting proximate factors tend to be superficial and adhoc, and make little strategic impact on conflicts 
for the long-term prevention, management and amelioration of the conflict sources (Cockell 2002, Wallensteen 2002, 
Carment and Schnabel 2003).  
 
Numerous organisations such as non-governmental organisations, development assistance agencies, educational 
institutions, the business community, religious institutions, regional organisations and the UN through its functional 
agencies the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations‘ Fund (UNICEF), the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the World Food Programme, the World Health Organisation 
(WHO), and the Bretton Woods Financial institutions (the World bank and the International Monetory Fund (IMF), can 
contribute to structural prevention and durable peace and stability. The United Nations has the challenge of linking 
the efforts of these bodies into a coherent preventive diplomacy strategy (Hampson 2002). The then UN Secretary-
General Kofi Annan (1997: 37) acknowledged the significance of structural prevention when he stated that ―[t]he 
prevalence of intra-state warfare and multifaceted crises in the present period has added new agency to the need for 
a better understanding of their root causes.‖ However, this requires the ―awareness and willingness of the states 
composing the membership of the council and the full UN membership, regarding the realisation of the potential for 
preventive action. Politicians and diplomats must learn to be more daring in the conception of feasible approaches 
and in the execution of a commonly arrived plan of action‖ (cited in Hampson 2002: 149). 
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Leatherman etal. (1999) maintain that preventive actions should embrace the entire spectrum of conflict, namely the 
pre-violent stage, the escalation stage and the post-conflict conflict stage. Hence, they categorise preventive actions 
into: conflict prevention which denotes preventing violent disputes from erupting between parties either through 
structural, institutional, social, economic and political remedial measures; escalation prevention, which arrests both 
the vertical and horizontal escalation of hostilities, and post-conflict prevention which entails measures such as 
economic, political and social reconstruction, reintegration and rehabilitation of the states emerging from conflict to 
prevent relapse to war.  
 
Preventive action ―is best launched at points where there already exists sufficient interest and motivation on the part 
of the disputants to seek a peaceful resolution, yet not so early that the disputants are incited to intensify their 
confrontation‖ (Swart 2008: 53). In reality, the success or failure of preventive action at any stage of the conflict is 
influenced by the conflict context, the conflict causal factors, the behaviour of the warring parties and their 
constituents, the mediation strategies of the third party and the positional powers of the belligerents as determined by 
their military engagements. 
 
The Rwandan genocide of 1994, the Yugoslavia catastrophe and the calamitous effects of conflicts currently gripping 
most parts of Africa, have awakened the UN, the International community, regional organisations, non-governmental 
organisations and civil society organisations‘ resolve about the importance of preventive measures. According to 
Annan (2000a: 173) ―each of the conflicts would either have been prevented completely or nipped in the bud‖ if 
proactive measures had been taken.  
 
Central to conflict prevention is the existence of viable Early Warning Mechanisms and Risk Assessment Systems. 
According to Levit (2003) no conflict prevention mechanism can be effectively implemented and sustained in the 
absence of viable early warning and risk assessment systems. These mechanisms are vital for the provision and 
dissemination of information on impending catastrophes or signs for an escalation of existing conflict. Adequate early 
warnings followed by prompt preventive responses are key measures in conflict prevention (USIP 1994, Khumalo 
1996, Annan 1998, 2000 a, Maxted and Zegeye 2001, International Peace Academy 2001, Adebayo and Gelin-
Adams 1999, Levit 2003). Rugumamu recommends that if early warning is to be useful, it must promptly trigger the 
political will to act in a preventive fashion, with coherent coordination and cooperation and commitments to make 
available adequate resources for preventive operations. There are no divergent views on the necessity of early 
warning information in nipping incipient conflicts in the bud. In their reports as UN Secretary Generals, both Ghali 
(1992, 1995) and Annan (1998) proposed strengthening the UN Early Warning systems, and pledged support to 
reinforce such mechanisms in the existing regional organisations. For example, in his 1995 UN report, Ghali pledged 
UN assistance in the establishment of an OAU Situation Room to receive and disseminate information on political 
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developments in Africa, with the intention of expediting conflict prevention, management and resolution. Adebayo and 
Gelin-Adams (1999: 7) note that ―within the UN Secretariat, a Multi-Agency Conflict Prevention Team assesses 
potential crises spots and submit reports to the Executive Committee for Peace and Security consisting of the UN 
Secretary General‘s principal advisors.‖ Early detection of conflict symptoms would facilitate early diagnosis of the 
sources, conflict dynamics and processes, and provide information on what techniques should be employed to 
prevent its eruption, escalation and diffusion internally and/or externally to neighbouring countries., Regional member 
states would be in a better position to diagnose and comprehend the history and dynamics of conflicts in their 
neighbour states, and should therefore devise appropriate preventive measures. This is essential because conflict 
prevention that is not based on full comprehension and mastery of the fundamental long-term historical causes, as 
well as the short and medium term causes, will invariably prove abortive (Adedeji 1999). 
 
Conflict prevention can be undertaken through a variety of measures and techniques including fact finding missions, 
special envoys, confidence and trust-building measures, mediation and negotiations, preventive diplomacy, 
preventive deployment, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, reconciliatory measures, and post-conflict 
peace-building (Boutrous Ghali 1992, Annan 1998, 2000a, Adebayo and Gelin-Adams 1999, Van Nieuwkerk 2000, 
Maxted and Zegeye 2001, Miall etal 2001). Fourie and Solomon (2002: 3) recommend that the preventive 
instruments should be applied through both Tracks One (official) and Two (informal) diplomacy approaches in 
addressing the often complex nature and dynamics of conflicts. They note that ―optimal preventive diplomacy would 
seek to build synergy between the two tracks of preventive diplomacy in terms of what some observers have labelled 
‗multi-track.‘ In this way, Track Two does not seek to compete with Track One but rather seeks to complement and 
reinforce it.‖ According to Carment and Schabel (2003) several Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) such the 
Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy, International Alert, the Carter Centre‘s International Negotiation Network, the 
International Crisis Group, the Project on Ethnic Relations the Human Rights Watch, and the Conflict Management 
Group have developed models for multi-track diplomacy to coordinate dialogue between conflict parties, offering 
training in diplomacy and conflict resolution as individual entities or in collaboration with governments, regional 
organisations and the UN.  
 
Miall etal. (2001) categorises conflict prevention into ―light prevention‖ which is aimed at preventing a situation with a 
clear potential for violence from degenerating into armed conflict, and ―deep prevention‖ which is geared to 
addressing the underlying conflict factors, the root causes of the conflict. It is a communicative action aimed at 
forestalling conflict through fact-finding missions, early warning systems, negotiation, mediation, peace envoys, good 
offices, confidence-building measures and preventive deployment, enforcement, peacemaking and peace keeping 
(Ghali 1992, 1995, Annan 1998, Adebayo and Gelin-Adams 1999, Miall etal. 2001, Rugumamu 2002, Levit 2003). 
For Realists, conflict prevention can be attained through measures such as balance of power, alliance formations, 
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and coercion and deterrence measures as experienced during the Cold War era. However, while these traditional 
preventive measures succeeded in preventing direct war between the nuclear super powers, they dismally failed to 
halt conflicts between and within smaller nations, most of which were fuelled by their ideological bickering. The post-
1990 violent intra-state conflicts and the concomitant multidimensional security challenges require new preventive 
approaches and strategies. Human needs theorists such as Burton (1990, a, b,c) and Azar (1990, a, b) maintain that 
effective prevention of conflicts can only be attained by addressing and/or attending to the frustrated basic survival 
needs, such as provision of services, recognition of people‘s rights, dignity, identity, security, participation in 
governance, and access to economic opportunities. If these existential essentials are satisfactorily provided and 
equitably distributed, there could be no basis for conflicts by any group in society. 
 
 Prevention of conflicts and maintenance of international peace is the core duty of the UN Security Council through its 
various organs. In fact, conflict prevention is a core precept in the Charter of the United Nations (Malone 2002). The 
UN has been involved in preventing and defusing conflicts in many parts of the world. With regard to pledging the 
continued and unwavering commitments by the UN in conflict prevention, Annan (1998: 1) states: ―[f]or the United 
Nations, there is no higher goal, no deeper commitment and no greater ambition than preventing armed conflict… 
Genuine and lasting prevention is the means to achieve that mission.‖ The 1990s UN missions‘ successes in the 
prevention of imminent armed conflicts and diffusion of conflicts in progress have been recorded in Macedonia 
(1992), Guatemala (1993) and Fiji (1996 and Cambodia (1999) (Annan 2000a, Miall etal. 2001). On the other hand, 
failed UN preventive missions were recorded in Somalia (1991) and Rwanda (1994) with disastrous effects. 
 
The lesson learnt from the abortive missions in Somalia and Rwanda was that peacekeeping should be in 
collaboration with regional blocs. This is because the frequency of conflicts has made it difficult for the UN to 
effectively carry out this mammoth challenging task. Accordingly, several regional organisations have established 
mechanisms for conflict prevention, management and resolution within their organisational institutions for 
interventions as individual entities or in partnership with the UN. The European Union established the Organisation 
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). At its 1992 conference in Helsinki, the OSCE states committed 
themselves to ―identify the root causes of tension and provide for a more flexible and active dialogue and better early 
warning and dispute settlement‖ (cited in Miall etal. 2001: 116). In addition, in its 1999 Charter for European Security, 
the organisation committed itself ―to preventing the outbreak of violent conflicts wherever possible‖ (Jentleson 2003: 
37). The organisation made significant headway in operationalising its range of preventive diplomacy tools. Through 
its High Commissioner on National Minorities (Max Vander Steel), the OSCE is credited for having successfully 
diffused tensions in Estonia in 1992. Among other things, the OSCE established missions for long and short duration 
preventive actions to more than twelve countries, whose aims were to provide first hand information on potential 
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conflict spots by gathering early warning information to curb outbreak and escalation of conflicts in their region 
(Jentleson 2003).  
 
In the same vein, Kreimer (2003) explains how the Organisation of American States (OAS) established conflict 
prevention structures to deal with structural sources of conflicts in their region. He notes: (a) the system for regional 
security: (b) the mechanism defined by Resolution 1080 of the General Assembly to defend democracy and 
constitutional regimes; (c) the good offices of the Secretary General; (d) the work of the Unit for the promotion for the 
Promotion of Democracy in the areas of conflict prevention and electoral observation; (e) the system for the defence 
and promotion of human rights, where the principal organs are the Inter-American Commission and the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights‖ (Kreimer 2003: 8). Its most important preventive diplomacy is Resolution 1080, 
which was reinforced by the Washington Protocol in 1991. The resolution calls for swift action against any member 
which threatens democracy in the regime, including undemocratic means of attaining power through military coups 
against democratically elected regimes. 
 
SADC has also established institutions for preventive diplomacy to resolve regional conflicts. In 1996, SADC 
established its security wing, the Organ on Politics Defence and Security (OPDS) for preventive interventions in 
regional disputes. Its operations were enhanced by supportive structures such as the Mutual Defence Pact, the 
Ministerial Committee, the Inter-state Politics and Diplomacy Committee (ISPDC), the State Defence and Security 
Committee (ISDSC) and the SADC Summit of Heads of State. Objective (f) of the OPDS reads thus: ―use preventive 
diplomacy to pre-empt conflict in the region, both within and between states, through early warning systems.‖ The 
SADC pledges to resort to coercive measures only in cases where there are humanitarian crises, threats to 
democratically elected regimes, and where there is a breakdown of law and order. In 1994, the SADC Troika, 
comprising Zimbabwe, Botswana and South Africa diffused political tensions in Lesotho while in 1998 Botswana and 
South Africa, sent a peacekeeping force that prevented a political crisis which was precipitated by a military-royal 
axis coup, from escalating into full-scale war (Neethling 2000, 2004, Martin 2002, Nathan 1995, 2003, Ngoma 2005). 
The SADC also delegated the former President of Botswana, Sir Ketumile Masire, to mediate the post-2007 election 
crisis in Lesotho between the government and the opposition, although with limited success. As will be indicated in 
later chapters, the crisis in Lesotho is still brewing. After the collapse of the Masire-led SADC mediation effort, the 
Lesotho Christian Council (LCC) and the Lesotho Council of Non-Governmental Organisation (LCNGO) are leading 
the mediation, with the SADC as a supportive structure.  
 
However, a crisis is looming in Zimbabwe, and regional members are passively watching after their abortive efforts to 
avert the crisis through what they called ―Quiet Diplomacy‖ and formation of the government of national unity in 
2009.. Alden and Le garth (2003) point out that signals for an imminent economic and political crisis have been 
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salient in the early 1990s, which could have prompted the regional powers to proactively launch preventive measures 
and curb the current meltdown. Examples of the signals include state-sponsored land invasions and expropriation, 
electoral violence and fraud, total breakdown of the rule of law, collapse in the industrial and agricultural sectors, and 
brutalisation of opposition party activists, all of which have had adverse effects in the SADC region. Zacarias (2003: 
49) recommends that there should be a common vision and shared operational principles and framework for SADC 
and its intelligence organs if its early warning system and preventive action is to be realised. 
 
The political crisis in Zimbabwe has been unfolding and has escalated throughout the 2002 and 2008 elections, all of 
which were marked by violence by the ZANU PF Mugabe regime against the MDC of Morgan Tsvangirai. Despite the 
fraudulent elections as reflected by the Commonwealth Observer Mission and the SADC Parliamentary Mission, the 
SADC Observer Mission maintained that the elections were fair and free. After the violence-ridden 2008, the Mbeki-
led SADC mediation team brokered a peace deal between the ZANU PF and the MDC through the Global Political 
Agreement (GPA). Through the GPA the two rival parties formed a government of national unity, in which Mugabe 
remained President and Tsvangirai became the Prime Minister while Mutambra of the MDC-M became the Deputy 
Prime Minister. Although the formation of the government of unity was a commendable initiative by the SADC, the 
political scenario in Zimbabwe remains tense, as there are numerous fault lines in the operations of the government. 
Several attempts by the Zuma-led SADC mediation through numerous Summits seem to be failing to save the GNU. 
Tsvangirai has on numerous occasions appealed to the SADC to rein in Mugabe to respect the GPA, but in vain. As 
the parties brace themselves for elections in 2011, there are already reports of violence by the Mugabe-security 
backed supporters against the MDC. The conferences for constitutional reforms have been disrupted, but the SADC 
has adhered to the policy of quiet diplomacy despite its apparent shortcomings in addressing the Zimbabwean crisis. 
 
ECOWAS is one regional organisation which, more than any other regional organisation in Africa, has successfully 
diffused conflicts in its turbulent region. Through its military wing ECOMOG, and its security mechanism the 
Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security (1998), the Mutual 
Defence Pact Protocol ECOWAS diffused conflicts in Liberia, Sierra Leone, the Cape Verde, Ivory Coast and 
Guinea-Bissau in the 1990s. 
 
There are calls for collaborative preventive missions between the UN and regional organisations as the way forward 
to attain global peace and security. It has become evident that the two can play a complementary role (Knight 1996, 
Jentleson 2003). Collaboration of the UN and regional organisations is pivotal because ―it is likely that some key 
objectives will not be achievable through the actions of one external actor alone, such as the UN, but will likely 
require the involvement of others (e.g, regional organisations, non-governmental organisations ) donors as well‖ 
(Cockell, 2002: 193). 
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In fact, the UN Chapter V111 of the UN Charter has acknowledged the comparative advantages of regional 
organisations in the maintenance of international security. In line with the above, the Carnegie Commission (1997: 
xiv) made a clarion call to the regional arrangements to strengthen their preventive mechanisms in order to bolster 
the UN efforts at global peace and security. 
 
However, evidence on the ground suggests that there is a serious lack of any well-integrated, collaborative and 
institutionalised long-term strategy for strengthening national, regional organisations and the UN capacities to prevent 
conflicts. Dress and Rosenblum-Kumar (2002: 231) note that ―[t]he international community has not yet come to grips 
with the difficult, yet essential, process of visualising an entire system of conflict prevention and determining how the 
numerous elements of that system can work together as a more coherent, integrated whole.‖ In view of these flawed 
preventive mechanisms, the authors have called upon the United Nations to engage in an internal process of inter-
organisations, inter-sectoral and inter-agency dialogue to enhance and maximize the capacities of its agencies and 
departments in structural conflict prevention, post-conflict peace building and long-term peace planning. 
 
The challenge for regional organisations is to build and reinforce regional early warning systems and conflict 
prevention mechanisms through which they can share information on impending conflicts, and establish coherent and 
effective monitoring of potentially violent conflicts in their respective regions. These mechanisms are based on what 
Boulding (1962) calls Social Data Stations, which he views as analogous to networks of weather stations for 
―reflection of social temperatures and pressures‖ and the prediction of ―cold or warm fronts‖ (cited in Miall etal. 2001: 
100). Such mechanisms would help regional organisations in developing comprehensive, effective, holistic and 
coherent conflict preventive measures to nip conflict in the bud. Soderbaum (2001: 76) notes the existence of an 
International Forum of Early Warning and Early Response (FEWER) in which 22 Non-Governmental Organisations, 
lobbyists, academics and governments could join forces with the UN agencies to ―complement existing early 
warnings and processes, and to make research more relevant to policy and useful to local actors.‖ Regional 
organisations could benefit in their preventive measures if they could establish regional based early warning systems 
affiliated to the Forum for Early Warning and Early Response. The West African Network for Peace (WANEP), a 
NGO aimed at cross-fertilisation of ideas and exchange of research programmes on conflicts in West Africa, is a 
member of FEWER (Soderbaum, 2001).  
 
Regional organisations in Africa lack the capacity and resources for preventive measures such as early warning 
systems and standing peace intervention forces, which can be rapidly deployed to diffuse crises. However, in most 
cases regional leaders hide behind the principle of non-interference in the affairs of a sovereign state. The principle 
of non-interference has actually legitimised inaction by regional organisations in the face of impending crises. This is 
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the same principle which saw the conspicuous inaction of the OAU when the continent was in flames. Critics have 
argued that the principle is jealously guided by regional leaders in order to protect their counterparts, some of whom 
have presided over the most brutal and repressive regimes. SADC has used this principle in defence of their 
passivity towards the unfolding economic and political crisis in Zimbabwe, hence their policy of ―quiet diplomacy‖, 
which is tantamount to indifference to the crisis. Critics have accused SADC‘s inaction as akin to ―quiet approval‖ of 
the political meltdown in Zimbabwe (The Business Day, March 22, 2007). Worse still, the principle is discriminatory, 
because it can be violated when it comes to other conflict situations as evidenced by the SADC military interventions 
in Lesotho and the DRC in 1998. 
 
In his works on conflict resolution, Burton (1990a,1990b), denounces conflict prevention as a strategy by state-centric 
power politics theories which do not contribute to resolution of conflicts but only succeed in settlement and 
containment. Instead of conflict prevention, Burton recommends conflict provention in which the belligerent parties, 
with the assistance of a panel of expert third party mediators, engage in analytical problem-solving discussions and 
analysis of the conflict issues, positions, frustrations, constraints, perceptions and resolution options, and reach an 
acceptable peace outcome free from the power- based, state-centric settlements. According to Burton (1990a: 18), 
conflict provention (as opposed to prevention) ―addresses the problems of social relationships and all the conditions 
that affect them.‖ It is ―…concerned with social problems generally, with altering the environments that lead to 
conflict, and with creating environments that mitigate conflict.‖ That is, conflict provention involves the discovering of 
the causal factors that must be dealt with, and the human conditions which led to behaviours which contributed to the 
conflicts. Provention would therefore ensure attainment of what Cachill refers to as ―dynamic peace‖ which ―is a 
ceaseless activity geared towards the banishment of all the social ills that generate tensions, violence and war‖ 
(2000: 36-37). 
 
Mehler (2005) provides tips on the best practices for successful conflict prevention, namely timeliness of concern, 
early action, ownership of the process by concerned parties, coordinated partnership between the UN and regional 
organisations, and consistent monitoring and evaluation of the process. The former Chairman in the Office of the 
OSCE and former Swedish Foreign Minister Margaretha Af Ugglas, notes that successful conflict prevention is 
determined by application of five key factors, namely: ―the degree of political support from the parties concerned; the 
prudent selection of political and diplomatic instruments to be applied; a careful balance between public and quiet 
diplomacy; the adoption of a long-term approach; and the extent of cooperation with other international 
organizations‖ (cited in Carment and Schnabel 2003: 24). 
 
Failure of conflict prevention missions has been more pronounced in Africa, which has experienced more conflicts in 
the post-Cold War era. This is mainly due to paucity of resources, the unmanageable eruption of violent conflicts in 
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the continent, lack of political will, regional rivalries, partisan regional bonds, failure of collective actions against 
dictatorial counterparts, and failure to practise good governance and democracy (Mehler 2005, Carment and 
Schnabel 2003). 
 
It is on this basis that regional organisations in Africa have in most cases depended on the Developed World and the 
UN to effectively address the conflicts in their regions. This has become a great challenge for African regional 
organisations as they are engulfed by a barrage of socio-economic and political problems, some of which require 
prompt regional attention. 
 
3.6 Conflict Management 
Conflict management entails measures used for the limitation, mitigation and containment of violent conflict (Miall 
etal. 2001). It also involves elimination, neutralisation or control of the adversaries‘ means of pursuing the conflict 
through measures such as denying both sides the means of combat, neutralising one party‘s means by slightly 
increasing the means of the other one, and separating the combatants in space or time with the aim of preventing 
conflict from erupting into a crisis, or to cool a crisis in eruption (Zartman1989). Conflict management tools include 
mediation and negotiation where the conflicting parties are brought together by a neutral third party to dialogue their 
differences for a peaceful resolution. Conflict management measures also include preventive diplomacy, through 
sending of peace missions and special envoys to build confidence and trust between the warring parties, preventive 
deployment, peacemaking, peace-keeping, peace enforcement and peace-building, all of which may involve 
deployment of troops to monitor the conflict situation and protect the peace agreements between the belligerents, 
together with any other tasks which could lead to de-escalation of conflict. Anan 1998, 2000a, Maxted and Zegeye 
(2001), Ero (1995) and Levit (2003) assert that conflict management should include humanitarian relief measures to 
alleviate the suffering of refugees and internally displaced people. This is integral to the physical and legal protection 
of refugees and internally displaced persons as it should ensure peace, security and stability to facilitate voluntary 
repatriation, re-integration and rehabilitation of people displaced by conflict. This is because the humanitarian 
emergencies, tragedies and crisis resulting from conflicts, if left unattended, will aggravate the conflict dynamics and 
its effects such as loss of lives and the spread of conflicts into neighbouring states. This was experienced in the 
Great Lakes region (Rwanda, DRC, Burundi and Uganda) and West Africa (Liberia, Sierra Leone, Ivory Coast, and 
Guinea). Annan stresses the essential interlink between the humanitarian, political and security components in 
peace-keeping, when he says: ―[w]here security is absent, humanitarian aid is blocked, violence increases, political 
stability is weakened, and the situation is exacerbated‖ (2000a: 177). 
 
Bercovitch (1984) defines conflict management in terms of the conflict outcomes and their distribution among the 
belligerent parties. He argues that the gist of conflict management is to try to influence the course of conflict 
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termination and the distribution of outcomes between the contestants in a mutually beneficial manner. Bercovitch 
categorises conflict management into two classes; the endogenous and exogeneous conflict management‖. 
Endogenous conflict management is undertaken by the parties to a conflict through bargaining negotiations to 
resolve their differences. Several scholars on conflicts have noted that it is difficult and sometimes impossible for the 
parties in a conflict on their own, to reach positive and mutually beneficial solutions. This is because the process is 
always dominated by a win-lose victory-defeat dichotomous position and negative labelling between the adversaries 
leading to destructive, distributive and unilateral outcomes, which will increase the conflict (Deustch 1973, Kriesberg 
1982, Bercovitch 1984, Fisher 1997, Miall etal. 2001, Hauss 2001, Anstey 2006). As such, it is not an effective way of 
managing conflicts. In fact, there are few, if any conflicts worldwide, in which the warring parties, on their own, have 
reached a sustainable cease-fire, negotiated and reached a mutually acceptable agreement. This is mainly because 
once relations have deteriorated because of violence, and attitudes are embedded in ―we-they‖ images of the enemy, 
it becomes very difficult, if not impossible for the same hostile warring parties to meet without a third party mediator 
and engage in sober reflections about the conflict and the necessity for peace (Cockell 2002). In a real conflict 
situation, it is imperative for a third party to mediate and guide the negotiations between the disputants, cool the 
tempers, transform the parties‘ negative perceptions and images about each other and the significance of viewing the 
conflict as a problem which both should be involved in resolving. 
 
Exogenous conflict management entails mediation or intervention by a neutral third party designed ―to arrest possible 
destructive consequences and inhibit a dysfunctional conflict cycle as well as help the parties find a proper and 
satisfactory basis for an agreement‖ (Bercovitch1984: 9). That is to say, the main task of a third party is to help the 
adversaries realise and acknowledge that they both have a common problem which needs their collaborative efforts 
to resolve. The third party has to guide and transform the contestants‘ attitudes from the confrontational, hostile, 
polarised, destructive enemy perceptions, hardened win-lose attitudes and zero-sum perceptions, to cooperative, 
collaborative, problem-solving and tolerant perceptions for a joint, integrative mutually beneficial peace outcome 
(Kriesberg 1982, Bercovitch 1984, Burton 1990, Isenhart and Spangle 2000, Hauss 2001, Miall etal. 2001). In this 
sense, an effective way of conflict management is through a third party who may be invited by one or both parties to 
help them out of the conflict entrapment.  
 
A third party in conflict management can be a prominent person such as a former head of state, an expert, or a panel 
of experts in conflict issues, a NGO, regional organisation or the UN as individual entities or in partnership. The 
success and /or failure of the mediation entity is determined by several factors such as the conflict context, the 
complexity of causal factors, attitude and behaviour of the belligerents, the mediation approach embarked upon and 
how it is executed, how the mediator acts, operational mandate, availability of resources and political support and will 
to resolve the conflict.  
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Conflict management may be facilitated through a variety of strategies such as mediation, peacemaking and peace-
keeping. 
 
3.6.1   Mediation 
Mediation and negotiations facilitated by a third party is crucial for the contending parties to dialogue their differences 
and conflicting goals, intentions and perceptions in order to reach a peaceful resolution of the conflict. Most conflicts 
contain inherent obstacles to attainment of a mutual and integrative solution by the conflicting parties on their own. 
This difficulty emanates from the enemy perceptions and harm committed against each other during the conflict. The 
aim is to extract a cease-fire and the signing of a peace treaty for de-escalation of violent conflict for more 
constructive peacemaking efforts. SADC mediated the conflicts in Lesotho in 1994 and 2007 through non-coercive 
preventive diplomacy, and through coercive military intervention in 1998.  
 
3.6.2   Peacemaking 
―Peacemaking‖ refers to measures intended to bring the hostile parties to an agreement through non-violent and non-
coercive means such as mediation, negotiation, arbitration, and economic sanctions. Civilian and military missions of 
limited scope may be deployed for observation and monitoring of the peace process, facilitating dialogue, defusing 
tensions, promoting national reconciliation, protection of human rights and building confidence among the warring 
parties and the civilian population. Peacemaking efforts should involve all the stakeholders, that is, all the warring 
parties, non-governmental organisations and civil society organisations. This will ensure a comprehensive and all-
embracing peace outcome owned by all the concerned parties. Several researchers on peacemaking have lamented 
the marginalisation of the civil society in the peacemaking process as a serious shortcoming, on which all peace 
mediators should ponder (Botrous Ghali 1992, Salmon and Alkadari, 1993, Fisher 1997, Annan 1998, Adebayo and 
Gelin-Adams 1999, Van Nieuwkerk 2000, Miall etal. 2001, the International Peace Academy, 2000, 2001, 2002, 
Soderbaum 2001, Ngoma 2005, Barclay 1999).  
 
 3.6.3   Peacekeeping 
―Peacekeeping‖ entails deployment of both military and civilian personnel in a conflict context to help parties to 
adhere to the peace treaties and agreements as signed. The lightly armed peacekeeping troops are deployed after a 
cease-fire between the belligerents with the aim of averting breaches to the truce and preventing resumption of 
violent conflict. The troops may be deployed in a buffer zone separating the warring parties, as in the case of French 
forces in Ivory Coast and the UN forces in the Temporary Security Zone between Eritrea and Ethiopia during their 
1998 border war. In the words of Ghali (1992: 4), ―[p]eacekeeping is a technique that expands the possibilities for 
both the prevention of conflict and the making of peace.‖ Therefore, for peacekeeping to achieve its goals, it must be 
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accompanied by ―economic and social development, promotion and protection of human rights, good governance 
and national institution building‖ (Vraalsen 1999: 34-35). A peacekeeping mission should be well resourced and have 
a comprehensive mandate with clearly stated provisions for implementation and follow-up in the post-conflict peace-
building period if it is to succeed in achieving its mandate (Adebayo and Gelin-Adams 1995, Annan 1998, Annan 
2000a, Vraalsen 1999, Adedeji 1999). As Annan puts it ―if we are to respond adequately to the needs of a situation, 
present a credible and effective response, and maximise the safety and productivity of those who have gone to 
serve; the structure and strength of a peacekeeping operation must permit it to do two things: carry out its mandate 
and defend itself‖ (2000a: 183 and 184). 
 
A peacekeeping mission requires the consent of all the warring parties before deployment, for it to be accepted as a 
neutral force. Consent of all the parties is vital to ensure that they own the entire peace process, its outcomes and 
implementation (Burton 1990a, Azar 1990a, Adebayo etal, 1999, Miall etal 2001). Obtaining consent from both 
belligerent parties has been a thorny issue for both the UN and regional organisations‘ peacekeeping missions. This 
has resulted in the targeting of peacekeepers by a group that does not recognise or accept their presence. The UN 
Peacekeeping mission in Somalia suffered from such a fate when General Mohammed Farrah Ideed‘s faction 
targeted them, resulting in the killing of 18 USA marines and the withdrawal of the forces (USA) in 1992 (Henrickson 
1995, Adebayo etal 1999, Berman 2000, Annan 1998). The ECOMOG peacekeeping forces in Liberia and Sierra 
Leone became the target of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia and the Revolutionary United Front in Sierra Leone 
respectively (Barclay 1999, Ero, 2000, Soderbaum 2001, International Peace Academy 2002). The South African 
intervention force met stiff resistance from the Lesotho Defence Force (LDF) and opposition parties during the 1998 
SADC military intervention in Lesotho. In all the above-cited instances, the intervening forces were deemed to be 
defending the incumbent government, therefore being impartial. Since they were invited by the regimes without 
consultation with the opposition, they were viewed with suspicion by the other warring parties. This resulted in the 
forces becoming part of the conflict instead of a neutral peacekeeping force. The legitimacy of SADC forces in 
Lesotho was also seriously questioned and disputed by Lesotho opposition parties during their intervention in 1998. 
The difficulties may have prompted Annan to state that ―[t]here must be a genuine desire for peace among the 
warring parties...no agreement, no matter how well intentioned can guarantee peace if those who sign it see greater 
benefit in war‖ (2000a: 179). 
 
Fisher and Keashly (1990) developed taxonomy of third-party facilitation and intended functions and goals as follows: 
 Conciliation: A trusted third party provides a communication link between the antagonists to assist in identifying 
major issues, lowering tension, and moving them towards direct interaction, typically negotiation. 
 Consultation: A knowledgeable and skilled third party attempts to facilitate creative problem-solving through 
communication and analysis using social-scientific understanding of the conflict processes. 
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 Pure Mediation: A skilled intermediary attempts to facilitate a negotiated settlement on a set of specific 
substantive issues through the use of reasoning, persuasion, control of information and suggestion of 
alternatives 
 Power Mediation: The intermediary provides the functions of pure mediation and adds the use of leverage in the 
form of promised rewards or threatened punishments to move the parties towards a settlement (carrot and 
stick diplomacy) 
 Arbitration: A legitimate and authoritative third party provides a binding judgement through considering the merits 
of the opposing positions and imposing a settlement deemed to be fair and just 
 Peacekeeping: An outside third party (typically the UN) provides military personnel to supervise and monitor a 
ceasefire between antagonists (cited in Fisher 1997: 164-167). 
 
3.7 When is it the best time to intervene in a conflict? 
One critical question on the discourse on conflict management is: At what stage of the conflict do mediators 
intervene? Put differently, the question is: ―[w]hen is the appropriate time for third party intervention? What criterion is 
used to determine the appropriate time for intervention? Given the sustained importance of the principles of 
sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, when should a situation in a state be 
considered to have deteriorated to such an extent that international and/or regional response is required? Can we 
always wait for a conflict to ebb and the will for peace to emerge before we intervene? What norms, standards and 
principles should determine the time for intervention? How long should an intervention take? When should it be 
withdrawn? (Zartman 1989, Annan 2000a, Neethling 2000, Anstey 2006). Research on how best to manage conflict 
should strive to address these questions if effective management and subsequently resolution of conflicts can be 
achieved. However, it is difficult to determine a standard uniform formula on when to intervene in conflict 
management, since different conflicts have different complexities and dynamics, and many other contextual factors 
and issues. As such, each conflict will require different stages of intervention, intervention measures and outcomes. 
 
Scholars on conflicts have attempted to answer these questions albeit from different theoretical standpoints. 
Prominent among them is Zartman (1998, 1991, and 2000) who came up with the principle of a ―mutually hurting 
stalemate‖ between the adversaries as the determining factor or ripe moment for mediatory intervention in a conflict. 
According to Zartman (1989), successful conflict management and ultimate resolution depend on identification of the 
―ripe moment‖ through the different trends and patterns of the conflict escalation and de-escalation. At this stage, the 
parties are ready or compelled by the prevailing conflict context to accept a mediator to rescue them from the 
entrapment corner and impasse by means of negotiations. It is the moment for parties to search for an agreed 
definition of the problem and how it can be resolved, and to assess the costs of continuing with the conflict (Azar 
1990 a, Burton 1990 a, Lund 1996). Rugumamu (2002: 18) notes that ―genuine negotiations have proven possible 
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when the fear for continued fighting exceeds the fear of reaching an agreement.‖ The parties have to be in a situation 
where they perceive the costs and prospects of continuing the war to be more burdensome than the prospects and 
cost a peace settlement. 
 
On the other hand, there is a school of thought that advocates immediate mediation and management of conflicts 
before they intensify and escalate to destructive and unmanageable levels. This school of thought maintains that 
early entry reduces positional rigidity, polarisation and the build-up of solidified enemy perceptions and wins-lose 
attitudes between the adversaries that are barriers for effective resolution of conflicts. The core argument here is that 
conflicts must be nipped in the bud at the early stages of flare-ups rather than waiting for a period when the 
belligerents have caused harm to each other. Critics of the late entry in management of conflicts have always argued 
that mediation comes too late after the harm has already been done, which makes it even more difficult for effective 
management and resolution. Africa is a victim of this situation hence the continent has hosted the highest number of 
protracted, deep-rooted and frozen conflicts which have become a structural problem. Thus proponents of early 
intervention have asked ―[c]an we always wait for conflict to ebb and the will for peace to emerge before we 
intervene? (Annan 2000a: 179). Experience has shown that early intervention to stabilise the situation and limit the 
extent and momentum of the conflict would be ―far preferable to the devastation which is their alternative‖ (Annan 
2000a: 180).  
 
The international community, the United Nations and various regional organisations have decided on the prevalence 
of humanitarian emergencies during the course of a conflict as the determining factor for intervention (Ghali 1992, 
1995, Annan 1998, Ero 2000, Miall etal. 2001, Levit 2001). Beck and Arend (1993: 112) define humanitarian 
intervention as ―the use of armed force by a state (or states) tp protect citizens of the target state from large-scale 
human rights violations there.‖ In most cases, humanitarian intervention is ostensibly directed at repressive states 
which for whatever reasons unleash their repressive security apparatus on the civilian population of particular 
sections of an ethnic group of people (Du Plessis, 2000). However, in most cases it involves employment of military 
force to protect civilians, defend humanitarian and relief organisations from attacks, and oversee the transportation, 
allocation and distribution of relief services to the war victims. 
 
In view of this complexity and considering the humanitarian crises which accompany most conflict-ridden countries 
such as mass displacements of people, refugee crises, hunger, disease, loss of life and other damaging social ills 
such as grave human rights abuses, humanitarian intervention whether coercive or non-coercive, it is imperatively 
logical and necessary to alleviate and mitigate the ghastly dire effects of conflicts. Whether the intervening power or 
body has ulterior motives should not affect the need to defend human life, dignity and security. The intervening power 
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should embody the principal peaceful and positive reasons for humanitarian intervention in order to distinguish it from 
ordinary self-motivated aggression. According to Du Plessis (2000: 13), the intervening body should: 
 Give concrete expression to the emerging norm of intervention in pursuit of peace and humanitarian concerns, 
particularly where ethnic and the gross violation of human rights occur; 
 Require a mandate from the UN in the form of a Security Council resolution (and similar resolutions from other 
nongovernmental organisations), as well as impartiality or neutrality on the part of the intervening forces; 
 Be mandated and legitimised by the international community of states. 
 
The human rights abuses, influx of refugees, increased number of displaced people, genocide and other 
humanitarian catastrophes that accompanied most of the post-1990 intra-state conflicts precipitated the move by the 
UN Security Council and regional organisations to intervene and thwart genocides and massive humanitarian crises. 
The human tragedies and humanitarian emergencies which were experienced in Rwanda, Somalia, Sierra Leone, the 
DRC, Sudan, Ivory Coast, Libya and Yugoslavia, in which innocent civilians became the mass victims, were shocking 
and unpardonable. As such, intervention has to be justified in the name of protecting civilians‘ rights, freedoms and 
security, in safeguarding humanitarian relief and supplies. The humanitarian justification was used when the UN 
intervened in Somalia in 1992, NATO in Yugoslavia, and ECOWAS in Liberia and the SADC in Lesotho for example 
(Henrickson, 1995, Boyadjieva, 2003). The UN Security Council passed Resolution 1973 in March 2011 to halt the 
imminent bloodbath and humanitarian crisis by the pro-Gaddafi forces against the rebel revolutionary forces in Libya. 
The French, British and the USA (later handed to NATO) forces were deployed in Libya to defend, protect and 
provide relief services to the civilian population, which the long-time despotic Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi had 
vowed to slaughter. In the name of civilian defence, Resolution 1973 mandated a no-fly zone for the Libyan 
government military flights. NATO has constantly targeted the Gaddafi military installation, command centres and 
residences to constrain its destructive plans against the civilian population (although civilian casualties have also 
been high).  
 
These interventions on humanitarian grounds have been questioned by some as being a smokescreen for realist-
motivated interventions by the bigger powers in weaker nations to protect their economic and political interests. In 
light of these perceptions, Roper (1993: 208) argues that ―[b]y definition humanitarian falls within the narrower 
conceptualisation and is limited to the use of military force for altruistic humanitarian objectives, the humanitarian 
rationale being predominant‖ Hence, Arend and Beck, (1993: 114) posit that ―[a]lthough humanitarian motives are 
often cited to justify intervention, genuine instances of humanitarian intervention are rare, if they have ever occurred 
at all.‖ For example, the SADC interventions in the DRC and Lesotho were viewed by critics as resource-based 
missions to safeguard the interests of the intervening powers. Currently in the Libyan case, critics argue that the 
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motivating factor is not protection of civilians, but the greed to gain access and control of the vast oil resources in the 
country. 
 
Worse still, although there are established procedures and rules governing the conduct of humanitarian intervention, 
in many instances some regional bodies and powerful member states have intervened without following the 
established route stipulated in the UN Charter and international law. For example, the UN Charter stipulates that 
regional organisations should seek the mandate of the UN before intervening in another state. However, in their 
interventions in Liberia (1990) and Sierra Leone (1997), the DRC and Lesotho (1998), ECOWAS and SADC did not 
have the authority of the UN as required. This gives room for member states, especially regional hegemons, to 
exploit the situation for the promotion of their national interests under the guise of humanitarian intervention.  Such 
scenarios have seen powerful nations violating the sovereignty of the weaker ones, hiding behind the need for 
humanitarian assistance, defence of democracy, international law and security. The USA has invaded numerous 
countries on this basis, as was the case in the 2003 Iraq invasion. 
 
Accordingly, several regional organisations have included in their founding treaties clauses which mandate members 
to intervene in cases of humanitarian crises. For example, Article 4 (h) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union 
gives the union the ―[r]ight to intervene in a member state pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave 
circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crime against humanity‖ (Constitutive Act of the African Union, 
2003: 5). Article 11 (b) (i) of the jurisdiction of the SADC‘s Organ on Politics, Defence and Security mandates 
members to intervene in ―significant intra-state conflict‖ which involves ―large-scale violence between sections of the 
population or between the state and sections of the population including genocide, ethnic cleansing and gross 
violation of human rights.‖ At the opening of the SADC Summit of Heads of State and Government in Blantyre, 
Malawi (8 September 1997), Nelson Mandela, the then SADC chairperson, emphasised this imperative need to 
protect humanity from the evils of conflict. He stated that ―our dream of Africa‘s rebirth as we enter the new 
millennium, depends as much as anything else on each country, and each regional grouping in the continent, 
committing itself to the principles of democracy, respect for human rights and basic tenets of good 
governance…(sovereignty of states and non-interference in internal affairs of member state) cannot blunt or totally 
override our common concern for democracy, human rights and good governance in all our constituent states‖ (cited 
in Ngoma 2005: 175).  
 
Other criteria which have been used for intervention include invasion or threat of sovereignty and security of other 
states, or a state being on the verge of total collapse. For example, in 1991, the UN Security Council authorised the 
invasion of Iraq after the latter had invaded and occupied Kuwait. Similarly, the AU has sent a feeble intervention 
force into the collapsed state of Somalia with the aim to reverse functional democratic governance in the country. 
 128 
 
Vale (2003), cautions that some of the interventions in the name of humanitarian assistance may in reality be geared 
to safeguarding the political and economic interests of the intervening powers. The interventions of such nations as 
Nigeria in Sierra Leone and Liberia, Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia in the DRC and South Africa and Botswana 
under the auspices of ECOWAS and SADC bombarded with accusations that the national interests of the intervening 
powers were at the heart of the intervention. Hence, according to Vale, the intervening powers ―establish their 
credentials through the technical aspects of the ‗mission‘-casting intervention in narrow, non-political terms-a process 
that sanitizes its true purpose. This approach…avoids the necessity of asking the important political and moral 
questions that are at the base of the …intervention‖ (Vale 2003: 123). 
 
Moore (1986) is non-committal on a particular time which is appropriate for intervention. He argues that ―not enough 
is known to give an unqualified answer as to which circumstances favour early or late entry into a dispute‖ 
(paraphrased in Anstey 2006: 254). He suggests that the choice of when to enter should be left to the mediating 
agent‘s assessment of the conflict at hand, which will determine ―whether an early entry would be more detrimental to 
the parties than delay‖ (Anstey 2006: 255). However, the most practical answer to the question is that intervention 
should always be at the invitation of by one or both of the parties. The mediating agent should be one who is 
acceptable to both or all the belligerent parties, that is, it must be seen to be neutral and impartial. Of utmost 
importance is that the mediating agent should be well acquainted with the context, sources, trends and dynamics of 
the specific conflict in order to provide viable alternative management options for the resolution of the conflict. Ohlson 
(1991) provides some questions that may guide conflict mediators as follows; What is the conflict about? How 
polarised are the conflict issues? What is the balance of forces? What is negotiable and what is non-negotiable?  
 
It should be a basic and imperative requirement for any third party involved in conflict management to have a 
sufficient comprehension of the conflict in question. The United Kingdom Department for International Development 
(DFID) (1995) introduced what it called the ―stakeholder framework‖ into the conflict management literature. The 
framework is essential to conflict mediators in the mapping or identification of key stakeholders in the conflict, their 
relations to the root causes of the conflict (conflict issues), and to each other, their agendas and capacities, and 
ongoing peace efforts if any (cited in Rugumamu, 2002). This is important because each crisis is distinctly different 
from any other, and has unique complexities and peculiarities. There is no one-size-fits-all toolkit which provides 
ready-made solutions to all conflicts. There is a feeling among African scholars on conflict that too often the 
international community has intervened in conflicts in Africa without sufficient understanding and mastering of the 
complex forces generating these conflicts, resulting in abortive missions (Ghali 1995, Annan 1998, Adedeji 1999, 
Vraalsen 1999, International Peace Academy 2001). This brings in the issue of regional organisations as wielding a 
comparative and pivotal advantage in regional peace initiatives, with the UN working in close bilateral partnership 
with them.  
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The general aim of conflict management is to ensure a peaceful transition from war to peace, and post-conflict peace 
building which falls into the area of conflict resolution. It gives the parties time and space to refocus and redefine their 
perception of the conflict goals, and reduce the pressures and hostilities that hinder creative measures to achieve 
interactive resolution (Bercovitch 1984, Azar 1990, Burton 1990, Mitchell 1990, Zartman 1991, Fisher 1997, Miall 
etal. 2001). Conflict management is a very difficult process and/or period, in the sense that it requires transition from 
a highly volatile and polarised conflict situation to peaceful negotiations, collaboration, sacrifices and compromises 
which should result in mutually beneficial conflict outcome if properly executed. This is to say the transition from 
conflict to peace is more problematic than that from peace to conflict. Attempts by SADC to manage the Zimbabwean 
crisis through ―Quiet Diplomacy‖ have been a disaster as the region is passively watching a member state sinking 
deeper and deeper in crisis escalation. SADC also projected a disjointed effort in managing the DRC conflict with 
Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola, opting for military intervention while South Africa and the rest of the membership 
advocating a negotiated settlement of the conflict. The SA-led military intervention in Lesotho was also criticised by 
several critics as illegal and operationally flawed (Nathan 1995, 2003, Neethling 2000, 2004, Martin 2002, Ngubane 
2004, Solomon 2004, Hammestard 2004, Ngoma 2005). This fractured response was viewed by some critics as 
signalling the collapse of the organisation‗s resolve of preventing, managing and resolving conflicts, embodied in its 
founding treaty and the protocols of the Organ for Defence and Security and the Mutual Defence Pact. One 
commentator had this to say: ―[t]he conflicts in the DRC may have tolled the death-knell of diplomatic unity within the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) and has considerably darkened the future chances of this 
promising regional cooperation organisation‖ (Democratic Republic of the Congo War, <http;//www.synapse.net/> in 
Ngoma 2005: 141). 
 
3.8 Conflict Resolution 
The concept ―conflict resolution‖ has been used by many scholars interchangeably with ―conflict management‖. In 
fact, the dividing line is thin and blurred. The two concepts are tightly interwoven and interlinked for the ultimate goal 
of attaining durable peace. Mitchell (1981), Bercovitch (1984) and Zartman (1989) distinguish conflict management 
from conflict resolution in terms of the stages of the conflict, the levels of operations, and the outcomes. They 
maintain that conflict management is mainly concerned with de-escalation of violent behaviour and confrontation 
between the adversaries, while conflict resolution goes beyond that to ensure the elimination of the socio-economic 
and political conditions, structures, attitudes and practices that precipitated the conflict. Bercovitch (1984: 11) 
explains that ―a conflict is settled when destructive behaviour has been reduced and hostile attitudes have been 
lessened. In contrast to that, a conflict is said to be resolved when the basic structure of the situation giving rise to 
the destructive behaviour and hostile attitudes has been re-evaluated, or re-perceived by the participants in conflict.‖ 
This distinction is similar to that projected by Burton and other basic human needs theorists who stress that the 
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distinction is vital in devising conflict resolution theories and strategies. The theorists associate conflict settlement 
with outcomes imposed on one of the parties through authoritative decisions, power-based negotiations, bargaining, 
coercion, mediation and judicial systems. On the other hand, conflict resolution involves analytical problem-solving, 
facilitated and exploratory interactions by the adversaries which deal thoroughly with the underlying issues to the 
conflict to attain an acceptable, durable, long-term and self-supporting relationship between the adversaries, and 
implementation of the solutions to the conflict (Burton 1990a, 1990b, Burton and Dukes 1990, Mitchell 1990, Azar 
1990a, 1990b). Therefore, conflict management is a process towards the complex and enduring route to conflict 
resolution. Zartman (1989: 8) observes that ―[c]onflict resolution is a tall order. It is rarely accomplished by direct 
action and is more frequently achieved only over long periods of time.‖ 
 
 Basic human needs theorists envisage conflict resolution through an analytic problem-solving model which regards 
human needs of the individuals and groups as reference points in the analysis of conflict, as opposed to the orthodox 
state-centric theories which focus on the preservation of the state and its institutions. Burton (1988: 55) notes that 
―[t]he emphasis on human needs as the basis of analysis and problem-solving is oriented towards the stability and 
progress of societies: the human needs of the individual that enable him to operate as an efficient unit within a social 
system and without which no social organisation can be harmonious.‖ He further noted that ―any settlement of a 
conflict or attempt to order society that places the interest of institutions or even of the total society before those of 
individual members must fail – unless, as rarely is the case, institutional values happen to coincide with human 
needs‖ (Burton 188: 53). 
 
Conflict resolution therefore, also entails all post-conflict peace-building activities geared towards consolidating and 
maintaining the acquired peace. It suggests instituting changes in the behaviours, attitudes, mindset, structures, 
policies, decisions and institutions which may have given rise to the conflict, with the intention of preventing a relapse 
into conflict in the future. In his 1998 report, the then UN Secretary General Kofi Annan recommended that during the 
process of managing conflict ―there must be a clear assessment of key post-conflict peace building needs and ways 
to meet them.‖ He added that ―Peace-building elements should be explicitly and clearly identified and integrated into 
the mandates of the peacekeeping operation,‖ such that ―when a peace keeping operation comes to an end, the 
concluding mandate should include specific recommendations for a transitional period to the post-conflict phase‖ 
(1998: 16). 
 
According to Ghali, post-conflict peace building is ―action to identify and support structures which will strengthen and 
solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict‖ (1992: 4). The main aim of post-conflict peace building is to 
probe and redress the underlying socio-economic and political factors which gave rise to the conflict, and address 
any conditions which may lay the basis for potential conflict, to avoid a return to conflict. If the underlying sources of 
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conflict are not addressed on a sustainable basis in a post-conflict situation, conflicts are bound to recur, or new 
conflicts may erupt (Peck 1998, Vraalsen1999). It would be logical therefore, to argue that in countries, mainly in 
Africa, where conflicts have recurred, ,such as the DRC, Sudan, Somalia and Rwanda, the process of conflict 
resolution to transform the attitudes and policies that precipitated the war was not undertaken, or if any such 
initiatives were put in place, then they were flawed. Measures which address the symptoms of conflicts rather than 
deep, underlying causal factors do not fall within the conflict resolution realm. That is why the basic human needs 
theorists advocate problem-solving forums, which are geared towards total transformation of the institutions and 
behaviours that breed conflicts in human society. 
 
Post-conflict peace building is multidimensional. It involves concerted efforts to integrate economic, social and 
political tools and energies into a coherent reconstruction agenda. Kofi Annan (1998) and Adebayo and Gelin-Adams 
(1999) summarised post-conflict building activities as encouraging reconciliation between the adversary parties, 
revitalisation of institutions of governance, fostering inclusiveness and promotion of national unity, mobilising both 
domestic and international resources for reconstruction and economic recovery, reviving, restructuring and reforming 
the security forces, civil services and the judiciary, disarmament, rehabilitation, psychological reconstruction, and re-
integration of the ex-combatants into the national security structures and productive sectors of the economy, redress 
economic and social injustices, facilitation and coordination of safe repatriation and resettlement of refugees and 
displaced persons, monitoring and investigating human rights abuses, coordinating establishment of a representative 
transitional government, monitoring electoral reforms and election processes, formation of government of national 
unity and attention to minority rights. Post- conflict peace-building is crucial in the conflict resolution stage of 
preventive diplomacy, whose task is the eradication of all underlying conflict triggers and exacerbators which might 
lead to a relapse into conflict. Nhara (1992: 2) posits that peace building entails ―the need to change attitudes, 
encourage contact between the ordinary people in conflict situations, economic development, confidence building 
measures, education to enhance mutual understanding and technical assistance...‖ In this sense is ―is dependent not 
on the absence of conflict but... is instead dependent on the mechanisms and agreements we have in place (whether 
personal or national) to resolve such conflict‖ (Wambu, 2011: 90). 
 
Conflict resolution, therefore, suggests making sure that the peace agreement which terminate active conflict is 
properly implemented, to eliminate any justification for relapse into war by any of the belligerent parties. Generally, 
conflict resolution or post-conflict peace-building projects should comprehensively address the issues which bred the 
conflict. According to Adedeji, identifying the origins of the conflict is vital as it will facilitate a framework for 
comprehending ―how the various causes of conflicts fit together and interact; which among them are the dominant 
forces at a particular moment in time; and what policies and strategies should be crafted to address these causes in 
the short, medium and long term‖ (1999: 10).  Central to the peace building process is the initiation and sustenance 
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of a broad-based national dialogue that seeks to address critical issues of the forms of inclusive representation, 
power sharing, societal healing, reconciliation and reconstruction of institutions of governance and service delivery 
(Annan 1999, Rugumamu 2002).  
 
Conflict resolution also involves coordinated and concerted measures to change the behaviour and attitudes of the 
belligerent parties from hostility to cooperation and reconciliation. The social-psychological approach to conflict 
studies is premised on the belief that conflict reflects conflicting subjective attitudes, behaviours, interactions, 
negative enemy images, language and symbols and interests among the disputants (Mitchell 1981, Cockell etal. 
1999, Galtung 2000, Swart 2008). Therefore ―[b]ecause much of human conflict is anchored in conflicting perceptions 
and in misperception, the contribution of third parties lies in changing the perceptions, attitudes, values, and 
behaviours of the parties to a conflict. Social-psychological approaches stress the importance of changing attitudes 
and the creation of new norms in moving towards reconciliation‖ (Swart 2008: 225). The warring parties should be 
encouraged to understand that there are several peaceful means of resolving their differences, which can be adopted 
without violence as an option. This would entrench peace perceptions in the minds of would-be conflict perpetrators. 
Kelman (1996: 504) illustrates this point thus, ―[c]onflict resolution is a gradual process conducive to structural and 
attitude change, to reconciliation, to development of new relationship mindful of the interdependence of the two 
societies and open to cooperative functional arrangements between them. The real test of conflict resolution in deep-
rooted conflicts is how much the process by which agreements are constructed and the nature of the resultant 
agreements contribute to transforming the relationship between the parties.‖ As Swart (2008: 72) observes, ―[o]ne of 
the critical objectives of conflict resolution [therefore] is the elimination of violent and destructive manifestations of 
conflict, fuelled and exarcebated by persistent negative attitudes.‖ The process of reconciliation, though long, 
arduous and expensive, is of critical necessity in mending societal relations, building confidence, restoring dignity, 
trust and faith among the populace ―to prevent bitter memories of the past from poisoning visions of the future‖ 
(Rugumamu, 2002: 19). Reconciliation has been successfully implemented in the post-apartheid democratic South 
Africa, although much of the bitterness and ill feeling between the races remains intact. That is to say, without 
successful attitudinal transformation, the potential for recurrence of conflict will remain a latent time-bomb that may 
explode in the future.  
 
The ultimate goal of conflict resolution on which lasting and durable peace is built and sustained, is the assurance 
that the post-conflict socio-economic and political dispensation satisfactorily attends to the needs and goals of all the 
parties involved (Burton 1990a, b, c Burton and Dukes 1990, Mitchell 1990). Kelman (1996: 503) summarises the 
issue this way; ―[t]he satisfaction of the needs of both parties is the ultimate criterion for a mutually satisfactory 
resolution of a conflict. Efforts should ideally be directed not merely toward settling the conflict in the form of a 
brokered political settlement, but toward…arrangements and accommodations that…address the basic needs of both 
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parties and to which the parties are committed…Only this kind of solution is capable of transforming the relationship 
between societies locked in a protracted conflict…‖ As stated in the Constitution of UNESCO ―[a] peace based 
exclusively upon the political and economic arrangements of governments would not be a peace which would secure 
the unanimous, lasting and sincere support of the peoples of the world...‖ (cited in Swart 2008: 6). In view of the 
above, one of the critical goals of conflict resolution should be the eradication of violent and destructive 
manifestations of conflict and the concomitant attitudes which trigger, fuel and aggravate negative conflictual 
behaviour among the warring parties. 
 
Conflict resolution should pay more attention to structural defects in societies because that is where the deeper 
underlying sources of conflicts are found. Structural conflict prevention policies and strategies should target the root 
causes of violence, such as political marginalisation, economic underdevelopment, deprivation, discrimination, 
threats to human security, human rights and justice, poor governance and other socio-economic and political ills 
which breed societal contradictions and confrontations. ―Although specific objectives should be stated that address 
each of the causes of conflict, as a whole such objectives should reflect the larger outcomes of all forms of preventive 
action: that of enabling sustainable peace. A lasting peace cannot be built if continuing structural threats to human 
security needs have not been addressed‖ (Cockell 2002: 193). Cockell (2002) outlines three components of structural 
prevention that enhance conflict resolution and post-conflict peace building as: preventive peace building, preventive 
disarmament, and preventive development. Preventive peace-building measures are geared towards preventing 
threats to core aspects of human security. The measures should therefore be focused on the spheres of governance 
such as promotion of participatory democracy, multiparty democratisation, decentralisation of political power, power 
sharing and inclusive governance, strengthening institutions of governance, protection of human security and rights, 
recognition of minority rights, promotion of equality, democratic constitutional, electoral, media and judiciary reforms, 
economic reforms for economic growth and equitable sharing of resources to counter the paralysis of legitimate 
governance and rule of law.  
 
Preventive disarmament measures should be mainly applied in a society emerging from conflict, with the aim of 
preventing recourse to conflict. It mainly targets ex-combants through promotion of demonisation, disarmament and 
re-integration programmes, promotion of voluntary arms moratoriums, arms embargoes, monitoring and 
circumscribing access to weapons, establishing demilitarisation zones, destruction of arms, rewards and incentives 
for weapons surrendered, and moves towards integration of ex-combatants in employment and community/national 
development programmes. A poorly coordinated demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration programme may lead 
to accumulated grievances and disgruntlement by ex-combatants, which may result in resumption of war, as 
experienced in Liberia, Sierra Leone, the DRC and Somalia.  
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Preventive development is directed at reviving and reconstructing economic sectors and social measures, to promote 
social cohesion, reintegration, rehabilitation and tolerance. Developmentalist preventive diplomacy aims to produce 
long-term  goals, planning, implementation and outcomes. Economic measures include reviving and reconstructing 
economic sectors for economic growth, creation of employment, equitable distribution of resources, food security 
programmes, land reforms, intergroup enterprises, enhancing trade links, poverty alleviation and job creation projects 
and reforms, to promote equitable access to factors of production and livelihood. They should also involve ―strategic 
engagement of all key conflict causes such that local actors and communities see that there is a real opportunity to 
break out of the cycle of escalation and that basic grievances are going to be addressed in a concrete way‖ (Cockell 
2002: 193). In this way conflict resolution could be attained in the real sense of transformation of the conflict 
environment to durable and sustainable peace, stability and security. 
 
The call for structural prevention as an effective preventive diplomacy tool is propounded by Azar (1990a), Burton 
(1990a, 1990b, 1990c) and Fisher (1997). As discussed earlier, in their studies of deep-rooted protracted social 
conflicts, for example in the Middle East, they conclude that conflicts triggered by deprivation of fundamental basic 
human needs and values can only be resolved through transformation of the structural institutions which precipitated 
the conflict. This means that post-conflict rehabilitation, reconstruction and reconciliation should be a comprehensive, 
continuous and collaborative project involving and encompassing all social, economic and political sectors and 
sections of the population. A genuine conflict resolution process should address the structural sources that 
precipitated the conflict. Galtung (1996, 2000) views conflict as a dynamic process in which structure, attitudes and 
behaviour are interrelated and are constantly changing and influencing one another in breeding manifest violent 
conflict. According to Galtung, altering the conflict behaviour ends in direct violence and results in negative peace 
that does not deal with the underlying causes of violence, but only its manifestations. On the other hand, cultural 
violence is terminated by changing conflict attitudes, while structural violence is ended by eradicating the structural 
contradictions underlying sources of conflict in societies. 
 
Conflict resolution strategies geared towards addressing structural defects in societies would ensure durable, long-
lasting positive peace. Positive peace is based on efforts to search for positive conditions that resolve the deeper 
structural causal factors. Peace-building measures should target changing the conflicting parties‘ conflictual attitudes, 
contradictory roles and structural interactions that combine to cause violent conflict. Galtung (2000) observes that 
conflict resolution policies and strategies restricted to attitudes and behaviours are superficial because they fail to 
attend to the root causes, the deep contradictions borne by structural defects. Wallensteen (2002: 227) points out 
that structurally targeted preventive diplomacy ―offers an important opportunity to promote reforms in society in the 
direction of reconciliation, democracy, inter-ethnic cooperation, and economic growth-measures that may in 
themselves be more effective over the long-term to prevent the recurrence of violence.‖  
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In its bid to promote structural resolution of conflicts and attain durable peace the UN embarked on a holistic 
programme to eliminate the structural source of conflicts and structural problems that may lead to relapse to conflicts 
during the post conflict peace-building period. The former Secretary General projected the UN goal thus: ―[t]he United 
Nations operational prevention strategy involves four fundamental activities-early warning, preventive diplomacy, 
preventive deployment and early humanitarian action. The United Nations structural prevention strategy involves 
three additional activities-preventive disarmament, development and peace-building. Guiding and infusing all these 
efforts is the promotion of human rights, democratisation and good governance as the foundation of peace‖ (cited in 
Luck, 2002:253). The former Executive Secretary of SADC Kaire Mbuende (2001: 48) observes that development is 
a key to the achievement of sustainable peace and security in Africa. This is because ―a society cannot claim to have 
peace and security when the majority of its people live in poverty, unemployement, illiteracy, nor when it is 
characterised by large income disparities‖ 
 
However, while societies emerging from conflict may face similar challenges, there are no rigid blueprints for the 
remedy of all conflict situations. Post-conflict peace-building and resolution strategies and programmes should be 
adjusted to the demands of each conflict context. Attempting to transplant a programme which worked in a particular 
conflict without due consideration of the nature and history of the conflict at hand, the forces involved, conflict issues, 
conflict trends and dynamics and the general uniqueness and peculiarities of the context in which the conflict occurs, 
is a recipe for failure. Critics of Western conflict resolution strategies and programmes have always argued that they 
fail to resolve most of the conflicts in Africa because they are not comprehensively adapted to the conflict situational 
requirements. This is reason enough to have regional organisations taking leading initiatives in preventive diplomacy 
missions, as they may be conversant with the regional and historical dynamics of the conflicts. 
 
There is no shade of doubt that conflict resolution is a mammoth and challenging task that needs committed input 
and a unified approach from all stakeholders, namely the UN, the international community, regional organisations, 
national governments, non-governmental and civil society organisations in their various forms. Sufficient resources 
must be made available to help consolidate, implement and follow up agreements and peace accords reached to end 
the conflict. The United Nations has been involved, in collaboration with regional and Non-Governmental 
Organisations in post-conflict peace-building efforts in different parts of the world. Examples are Namibia, 
Mozambique, Somalia, Angola, Cambodia, Elsalvador, Liberia, Sierra Leone, the DRC, Sudan and Yugoslavia 
(Botrous Ghali 1992, 1995, Anan 1998, 2000a, Vraalsen 1999, Adebayo and Gelin- Adams 1999, Hauss 2001, Miall 
etal. 2001). 
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As reflected in the course of the study, different regional organisations have formed security structures and 
mechanisms geared towards conflict prevention, management and resolution (preventive diplomacy) in their 
respective regions. Examples are SADC‘s Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (1996), the European Union‘s 
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (1995), the Economic Community of West African States‘ 
ECOWAS Military Observer Group (ECOMOG) and the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, management, 
Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security (1998), the West African Network for Peace (WANEP) (1997), the Inter-
governmental Authority and its Programme on Conflict Prevention, Resolution and Management(1998), the African 
Union‘s Peace and Security Council (2002) and the Association of South East Asian Nations‘ ASEAN Regional 
Forum (1997). Partnership, collaboration and co-deployment between the UN and the various regional organisations 
would drastically reduce the occurrence-recurrence dichotomy of conflicts and maintenance of global peace and 
security. As Henrikson (1995: 24) notes, ―[t]he UN and regional groupings are no longer likely to be regarded as 
rivals or even as alternatives to one another in international decisions for peace and security, they must work 
together in partnership.‖ Different stakeholders need to pool their resources because conflict is a permanent feature 
of human society. Measures should be put in place to mitigate the effects of war, but it seems impossible to totally 
eradicate it.  
 
Zartman (1991: 8) posits that ―[c]onflict can be prevented on some occasions and managed on others, but resolved 
only if the term is taken to mean the satisfaction of apparent demands rather than the total eradication of underlying 
sentiments, memories and interests. Only time really resolves conflicts, and even the wounds it heals leave their 
scars for future reference.‖ This position is at odds with the basic needs theory‘s stance that through analytical 
conflict, resolution mechanisms and processes in which all the conflict parties are engaged with the intention of 
addressing all the basic needs frustrations and deprivation and the consequent satisfaction of the frustrated needs, 
the underlying conflict factors could be ameliorated and the basis for conflict eradicated (Burton 1990a, 1990b, 
1990c, Azr 1990a, 1990b, Mitchell 1990). It is clear from the discussions on the sources of conflict and how it should 
be eradicated, that there is no consensus. This calls for more concerted research on the complexities of the conflict 
phenomenon. As Sandole noted, ―[i]f it is not clear what the causes and conditions of war are, or how war can be 
prevented or otherwise dealt with, then war is a research problem as well‖ (1999: 1). 
 
At the core of conflict resolution is post-conflict peace building which is ―perhaps the only strategy that can remove 
the sources of conflict from society and/or create alternative means of resolving tensions.‖ This is because it ―seeks 
to address the social and political grievances that could lead again to violence. It looks at once both backwards and 
forwards, and encourages societal reconstruction along consensual, inclusive, and liberal lines. Peace-building thus 
includes all three dimensions of conflict... encompassing past and future sources of tension‖ (Talentino 2003: 72). On 
the basis of such necessity, governments, regional organisations, the UN and the international community need to 
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―focus more attention and consequently a greater share of their budgets and resources to the long-term aspects of 
peace building instead of short-term crisis management‖ (Dress and Rosenblum-Kumar 2002:230). 
 
Regional organisations in the Third World, mainly in Africa, have failed dismally in conflict resolution and post-conflict 
peace-building missions, as reflected by the existence and recurrence of conflicts. Apart from lack of political will to 
pursue the long-term goals of structural preventive strategies, regional organisations in Africa are constrained by 
paucity of resources. This has resulted in protracted and frozen conflicts, as experienced in such places as Somalia, 
the DRC, Sudan, Uganda, Burundi and Ivory-Coast. It can be argued that these regional organisations have only 
succeeded in feeble management of conflicts rather than their prevention and resolution. The experiences of 
ECOWAS in Liberia and Sierra Leone and the SADC in the DRC, Zimbabwe and Lesotho, point a bleak picture for 
their efforts in structural preventive diplomacy. Experience in the SADC has been that the organisation is reactive 
rather than proactive. The experience of the SADC preventive diplomacy missions in Lesotho, the DRC and 
Zimbabwe, attest to this approach to conflict which has resulted in failed attempts at conflict prevention and 
resolution. It is also clear that the SADC has no established and institutionalised early warning system to detect 
signals of impending or potential conflict. In instances where the SADC Organ has intervened in conflict resolution, it 
has failed to stay the course of the post-conflict peace building, and this has resulted in recurrence of war as 
experienced in Lesotho in 1998 and 2007. On the basis of this, Engel (2005: 116) notes that ―[r]espective 
organisations can succeed if they have enough...capacity for self-criticism and structures that permit them to 
translate the lessons drawn from such a stock taking of projects and instruments into better practice.‖ 
 
3.9 Conclusion 
This chapter has dealt with different theories on conflicts and preventive diplomacy. The theories outlined what each 
perceived to be the sources of conflicts and how they can best be prevented, managed and resolved for peace and 
security to be attained. The chapter also discussed what preventive diplomacy entails, its essential ingredients such 
as preventive instruments, early warning systems and the significance of timing for effective intervention missions. 
Among other things the chapter delved into the distinctions and links between conflict prevention, management and 
resolution. It also called upon regional organisations, especially in the Third World, to strengthen their preventive 
diplomacy mechanisms to nip the scourge of conflicts ravaging their regional zones in the bud. The role of different 
regional organisations, solely and/or in partnership with the UN in preventive diplomacy missions, with different levels 
of success and challenge was discussed. The chapter concluded with a call for well-coordinated partnership between 
regional organisations and the UN in preventive missions if global peace and security are to be realised. The next 
chapter deals with theories on the formation and operations of regional organisations. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Regional Integration: Theoretical Framework 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents a conceptual framework and literature review on the origin, development and functions of 
regional organisations in different contexts. It also discusses different theoretical perspectives on regional integration 
and operationalisation. The aim is to investigate the integration framework in which the SADC was founded and 
operationalised. The chapter provides insights and foundations on which the SADC evolution and development took 
place in the regional and global context. 
 
4.2 Regional Cooperation and Integration  
Chapter viii (Articles 52, 53 and 54) of the UN Charter authorised the formation of regional organisations to 
complement its operations in the task of maintaining global peace and security. Today the world is composed of 
several regional groupings operating within the regionally established rules, objectives, goals, policies, needs, 
aspirations, protocols and charters to collectively address the social, economic and political challenges faced by 
individual member states and the region as a whole. Annan reflects that ―[a]s a growing number of states found 
themselves internally beset by unrest and violent conflict, the world searched for a new global security framework‖ 
(1998: 3). Initially most of the regional organisations‘ goals focused on economic cooperation, development and 
integration of their respective regions. However, most of them have now expanded their goals to include security 
issues, with the realisation that economic development and integration will be elusive if not accompanied by peace 
and security. For example, the African Union and SADC founding treaties noted that security, peace and stability are 
prerequisites for development and regional integration. 
 
Scholars are not unanimous on the definition of the concept ―regionalism‖, and debates on a universal definition have 
not yielded any consensus. Each definition reflects the theoretical inclinations of the different scholars and the 
political dynamics of the region involved (Bennet 1984, Hurrell 1995). For purposes of this study, the following 
definition has been selected as it is deemed to be inclusive and comprehensive about what regional integration 
entails. A regional arrangement in the sphere of international politics may be described as ―[a]n association of states 
based upon location in a given geographical area, for safeguarding or promotion of the participants. A treaty or other 
agreement fixes the terms of this type of association. It may be designed to serve political, economic, cultural or 
defensive purposes or some combination of these‖ (Padleton 1954 in Bennett 1984: 347).  
 
Regional organisations in different parts of the globe have different reasons and challenges for deciding on regional 
integration. However, regional integration often encompasses cooperation of regional member states in a particular 
geographical zone in socio-economic, political and security affairs (Schulz, Soderbaum and Ojendal 2001). According 
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to Hurrell 1995: 37) regionalism is often analysed in terms of the degree of social cohesiveness (ethnicity, race, 
language, religion, culture, history, consciousness of a common heritage), economic cohesiveness (trade patterns, 
economic complementarity), political cohesiveness (regime type, ideology) and organisational cohesiveness 
(existence of formal regional institutions).  
 
Definitions of regions are not based on natural geographic characteristics. Regions are generally state-led political 
projects, constructed, shaped, re-shaped and operationalised on the basis of the prevailing regional and international 
economic and political dynamics, and will often be state-centric in their functions because they represent the power 
politics of the member states. The objectives, agendas and operations of different regional bodies reflect the 
aspirations and challenges of the different regions as perceived and interpreted by the regional actors (Nye 1968, 
Hurrell 1995). Hammestard (2004: 214) notes that ―[t]he countries of SADC make up a region because both insiders 
and outsiders recognise it as one and act, at least sometimes and in some policy fields as if it were one.‖  
 
4.3 Origins of Regional Organisations 
Although regional blocs are not naturally determined and emanate from diverse factors, scholars on regional 
integration are unanimous on the fact that most formal regional organisations took root and shape after World War 
Two. Therefore, they classify regional organisations‘ development in terms of their different character, diversity, 
goals, aspirations, content, scope and operations within particular historical, international, political and economic 
orders and trends. The categorisation of emergence and development of regional arrangements is premised on the 
historical epochs of the Cold War and post-Cold War (old regionalism and new regionalism respectively. The old 
regionalism epoch is described as the era of hegemonic regionalism since regional organisations‘ structures, content 
and operations were shaped to reflect the agenda of the superpowers, rather than their own regional interests and 
challenges. The post-Cold War era saw the transformation of regional organisations (freed from the bipolar politics) 
into regionally focused entities in terms of their character, content, goals, aspirations, operational scope, and 
intentions (Fawcett and Hurrell, 1995, Asante 1997, Hettne 1997, 2000, Sunkel 2000, Howell 2000, Schulz, 
Soderbaum and Ojendal 2001, Hwang 2005).  
 
Scholars on regionalism agree that the post-Cold War period marked a turning point in international relations, history, 
and the role of regional economic and security groupings. A new set of regional blocs freed from the grip of 
superpower influence, emerged and assumed greater regional responsibilities and significance (Buzan 1991, Job 
1992, Fawcett 1995). Accordingly, most regional organisations expanded in membership, as indicated by the EU 
admission of some of the former Eastern European states such as ASEAN admission of Vietnam (1995), Laos and 
Mynmar (1997) and Cambodia (1999), while SADC embraced South Africa in 1994, Mauritius 1995, the DRC in 1998 
and Madagascar in 2005. Fawcett and Hurrell (1995), Sunkel 2000, Schulz, Soderbaum and Ojendal (2001) refer to 
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the post-Cold war period of regional development as ―open‖ regionalism. One distinguishing factor is that regional 
organisations of the new regionalism order became inclusive of non-state organisations such as non-governmental 
and civil society organisations (in contrast to the regional arrangements of the old regionalism era, which were state-
centric in nature and operations). They were built on the principle of versatility, which accommodates dynamism, 
flexibility and inventiveness (Vraalsen 1999). 
 
It is in the context of the new regionalism that regional organisations are currently operating. Many regional 
organisations in the Third World have undergone structural and institutional transformations to face the diverse 
challenges in their respective regions. For example, post-Cold War Africa (mainly sub-Saharan Africa) was devoured 
by destructive intra-state conflicts and simultaneously abandoned by the Western powers. As such, they were 
compelled to reinvent their continental and regional groupings for preventive and peace-keeping reasons. Regional 
organisations were adjusted to the multidimensional challenges of the new economic, political and security order of 
globalisation. Therefore as indicated earlier, most regional organisations have developed regional security structures 
to collectively counter the scourge of conflicts and other challenges in their respective regions. Examples are  the 
EU‘s Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, (OSCE), ECOWAS‘ ECOMOG and the Mechanism for 
Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security, the SADC‘s Organ on Politics Defence 
and Security, (OPDS), the ASEAN Security Forum and the AU‘s Peace and Security Council (PSC). 
 
 Successive Secretary Generals of the UN, Ghali (1992, 1995) and Annan (1998), have acknowledged in their 
respective reports that the United Nations lacks the capacity, resources and expertise to address all problems that 
may arise in the world. It has therefore become imperative in the post-Cold War era for the different regional bodies 
to collaborate with the UN in maintaining regional and global peace and security. 
 
4.3.1 Factors influencing Regional Integration 
The range of factors that are involved in the formation and growth of regional groupings embraces social, economic, 
political, cultural, geographical, and historical dimensions. The influence of each factor differs from one region to 
another, implying that is there are no fixed factors which fit in all regional setups. Hurrell (1995: 41) states that 
―regions highlight some features…shared understandings and meanings given to political activity by the actors 
involved.‖ Therefore, it is important for regional arrangements to be shaped by contextual forces, problems and 
challenges if they are to achieve their intended collective goals. Clapham (1987) could not have been more accurate 
when he stated that ―[a]ny set of prescriptions for integration which does not start from an appraisal of the political 
and economic context of the region is built on sand‖ (cited in Fawcett 1995: 33). This is not to say that regional 
organisations cannot apply structural, institutional or policy frameworks from other setups, but that if a regional 
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organisation is not based on its contextual realities, experiences, challenges and conditions, it is bound to fail 
because it will be based on false and unrealistic grounds. 
 
Numerous scholars on regional integration projects have indicated that regional integration in the Third World often 
fail because they are solely premised on external models and experiences (Buzan 1991, Hurrell 1995, Fawcett 1995, 
Vita 2001, Ngubane 2004, Hammestard 2004).  Perhaps aware of this concern, the late former president of 
Mozambique Samora Machel was quoted (in reference to the SADC) as saying the SADC emerged mainly from the 
existential experiences of the region as opposed to external considerations (Green and Thompson, 1986). However, 
the practical reality of this assertion is highly questionable, considering the fact that SADC‘s integration model is a 
carbon copy of the EU model. Therefore, according to Hammerstad (2004: 215), the critical question to be kept in 
mind when discussing the future of regionalism in Southern Africa, is ―[t]o what degree is the agenda for regional 
integration set according to a western European model rather than adapted to the specific needs of Southern African 
countries?‖  
 
4.4 Theories on Regional Integration 
Hurrell (1995) classifies theories on regional integration into three broad categories, namely Systemic/Structural 
Theories, Regionalism and Interdependence Theories, and Domestic Level Theories. Other theoretical frameworks 
on regional integration include the New Regionalism Theory and the Security Community or Security Complex 
paradigm (Schulz, Soderbaum, Ojendal 2001, Mittelman 1999, Fawcett 1995, Hettne and Soderbaum 1998, Adler 
and Barnet, 1998, Buzan, 2000, Ngoma 2005). The theoretical perspectives are vital in explaining the dynamics of 
regional integration in different parts of the world (Hurrell 1995). It appears that regional formations all over the world 
have borrowed greatly from the theoretical perspectives, as they complement each other and provide benchmarks 
which guide nations and regions on what issues to consider and what challenges to expect in the formation and 
operationalisation of regional organisations. 
 
4.4.1 The Systemic Theories 
The systemic group of theories underlines the importance of the broader political and economic structures within 
which regionalist schemes are embedded, and the impact of outside pressures and forces working on the region 
(Hurrell 1995). There are two paradigms under the Systemic theories: 
 
4.4.1.1 Neo-Realism  
For the Neo-realists, the politics of regional formation are determined by the geo-political framework within which they 
occur. Regionalism is understood by analysing the place of the region in the broader international system. The 
proponents believe that regional organisations are formed in response to external economic and political pressures, 
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threats and challenges from a hegemonic power (Outside-in-pressure) (Hurrell 1995, Terriff etal 2004, Schulz, 
Soderbaum and Ojendal 2001). Hurrell (1995) note that the EU was formed both as a response to the Soviet Union 
Communist threat and the hegemonic moves of the USA through its Marshall Plan. Other regional organisations 
which came as a response to external threats are NATO against the communist threat and the SADC against the 
hegemonic aggression of the apartheid regime. 
 
Neo-realists also note two reasons why countries seek regional integration with a regional hegemony: firstly, the 
nations will be aiming at constraining the potential disruptive activities of such a power, and secondly the weaker 
states have hopes for economic and political gains by having a strong power in the regional fold. On the other hand, 
a regional hegemony which feels its power is declining will push for a regional integration to revive its image, pursue 
its interests, share burdens and generate international support and legitimacy of its status, influence and policies 
(Hurrell 1995). Neo-Realists envisage such a pattern of regionalism in situations where weaker states are in close 
geographical proximity to powerful states. One commentator referred to Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland‘s 
relations with South Africa in Southern African Customs Union (SACU) as ―hostage states‖ (Green and Thompson 
1986). However, despite the asymmetrical relations and skewed benefits, the three countries remained in SACU) 
(SACU) because of the economic gains, albeit meagre, which they obtained from the developed South African 
economy. In the same vein, the inclusion of a democratic South Africa into the SADC in 1994 has boosted the 
economic, political and security image of the SADC. South Africa has abundant resources and a highly developed 
economy to bolster the integration project which should ultimately benefit the entire region. 
 
Neo-Realists have a pessimistic view about the success of regional integration. They maintain that regional 
integration is doomed to fail for various reasons. Firstly, the organisations are formed and operate in an anarchical 
and conflictual international order characterised by intense power struggles, competition, rivalry, mistrust, suspicions 
and conflicts between nations. The anarchic nature of the international system will adversely affect the cooperation of 
countries in regional arrangements (Waltz 1979, Groom 1990, Ohlson and Groom 1991, Weber 2001, Terriff etal. 
2004). The issue of states‘ concern with relative gains and the contention that states are in perpetual competition is 
best captured by Waltz (1979: 105) stating that: ―[w]hen faced with the possibility of cooperating for mutual gain, 
states...must ask how the gains will be divided. They are compelled to ask not ‘Will both of us gain‘? But ‗Who will 
gain more? Even the prospect of large absolute gains for both parties does not elicit their cooperation so long as 
each fears how the other will use its increased capabilities… The condition of insecurity… the uncertainty of each 
about the other‘s future intentions and actions…works against their cooperation.‖  
 
Secondly, nations enter regional organisations mainly to expand and defend their different national power and 
interests, rather than for regional solidarity and prosperity. According to the Neo-Realists, in spite of membership of 
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regional organisations, different nations will not stop pursuing their national interests and in the process, undermining 
the goals of regional integration. To the Neo-Realists, regional cooperation may be counterproductive to a state‘s 
interests and survival, since events in the international scene are explained in terms of the power of each state rather 
than regional solidarity (Waltz 2000, Terriff etal. 2001). To some extent, this position by the Neo-Realists is true, 
because regional organisations, especially in Africa, fail because of lack of commitment and political will by the 
political leaders. Each state seems to be protecting its power and sovereignty from being eroded by the regional 
supra-national structure and authority (Groom1991, Nathan 1995, Weber 2001, Solomon 1994, Hammerstad 2004, 
Williams 2004, Morganthau 2004). Van Nieuwkerk (2000: 5) notes this problem in the arguments which paralysed the 
functioning of the SADC Organ on Politics Defence and Security. He writes ―the organisation is caught in essence; in 
a situation it purposely created. Invoking sovereignty and national interest, very few of the ruling elite in Southern 
Africa would want to see a powerful and influential Organ on Politics Defence and Security and consequently, it 
continues to bow to the wishes of its political masters.‖ Mfune (1993) observes that if countries want to cooperate and 
integrate, they must be prepared to give up some of their individual interests in order to promote cooperation. Where 
national interests take precedence, as experienced in most regional organisations, it is very difficult to achieve 
meaningful regional integration. 
 
Thirdly, in the case of regional organisations in developing nations, they will continue to be subordinated and 
dominated by the developed nations. Success of sub-regional organisations will be contingent upon the policies of 
either major powers acting unilaterally or using the might of their groupings (Bull 1977, Buzan 1991, Wendt 1992). 
Hurrell (1995) suggests that it is the evolving character of the Chinese-Japanese-USA balance that will ultimately 
determine the fate of existing sub-regional groupings such as ASEAN, APEC and the ASEAN Regional Forum. 
Considering the fact that almost all regional organisations in the Third World rely on external donors for their 
existence, there is no way they can escape external control and domination. One critic of SADC‘s dependence on 
Western financial assistance has stated that ―[w]estern strategy is no longer to divide and rule, but to re-group and 
dominate‖ (in Green and Thompson 1986: 269). Buzan also notes the adversities of dominance of regional security 
complexes in the Third World by the developed powers, and asserts that ―if the essential structure of a complex rests 
more on external than on internal sources of power, then its durability lies hostage to continued involvement by 
countries whose main interest lie outside the continent‖ (1991: 216). Third World regional organisations are victims of 
this situation because of insufficient resources to finance the integration project and its operations. This leaves them 
to seek external assistance through which the donors infuse their agendas into the recipient organisations. 
 
Fourthly, the leaders of individual member states suspect and fear loss of power to the regional organisation, and will 
want to curtail its powers by any means. Neo-Realists argue that a ―[s]tate cannot be certain that established higher 
authority would be used to do it harm in the future. Therefore states must be sceptical about both the idea of a higher 
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authority and the feasibility of creating it‖ (Terriff etal. 2001: 53). This problem was noted by Nathan (1995: 9) that 
―…certain of the SADC states fear that their membership of multi-lateral political and security forums will entail major 
infringements of sovereignty.‖  This has been raised by several scholars on different regional bodies as a major 
obstacle to the progress of regional integration. The fear of loss of sovereignty is more pronounced in regions where 
the nations are still in the process of consolidating their developments and nation building (Vita 2001), Hammerstad 
2004), Moller 2004). The EU did not have any difficulties of ceding parts of their sovereignty to the regional body 
because it was built on strong nation-states (Moller 2004). Akrasanee and Stifel (1995) maintain that the EU model is 
not suitable for ASEAN ―[s]ince the objective of ASEAN member states has been to cooperate with each other in 
order to ensure national independence and mutual benefit for all members, not to integrate within a supranational 
structure‖ and that ―the Bangkok Declaration, which is the basis of ASEAN‘s existence, guarantees the supremacy of 
the members states‘ sovereignty over ASEAN‖ (cited in Ojendal 2001: 157). In light of these problems, Hammerstad 
(2004: 216) concludes that ―[t]he experiences of other parts of the world have shown that regionalism-convincing 
states to give up some of their hard won sovereignty for a future common good is notoriously difficult.‖ The former 
President of Namibia, Sam Nuyoma, may have been compelled by realisation of this problem in SADC when he 
highlighted ―the need to put regional considerations above national interests and the need to relinquish some national 
sovereignty for the interest of the region‖ (cited in Nathan 1995: 9).  
 
Lastly, Neo-Realists have a pessimistic view about the success of regional organisations in conflict prevention, 
management and resolution (preventive diplomacy). Their argument is that regional organisations exist in an 
anarchical international order, and lack powers of enforcement. They also regard regional organisations as a 
temporal feature of international relations, since states will give them up in pursuit of their individual national 
interests. Neo-Realists note that history abounds with regional organisations which have collapsed ―no matter what 
kinds of states and society were involved‖ (Terriff etal. 2001: 41). This is because there will always be disagreements 
on the values and powers the regional organisation embodies, when and how it should exercise its authority. As 
such, a state will only submit to higher authority when it is not at odds with its benefits, when forced to do so, or when 
the benefits outweigh those of not doing so (Groom 1990, Olson and Groom 1991, Burchill 2001, Terriff etal. 2004).  
 
However, the Realists‘ pessimism on the existence of regional organisation has been outweighed by the fact that in 
spite of the numerous challenges, regional organisations have prospered, and have become a key and integral 
aspect of the current international order. Regional organisations such as the OSCE, ECOWAS and the SADC have 
been very instrumental in the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts in their respective regions. Through 
regional cooperation and integration, it has been shown that regional enemies can be brought together to co-exist 
and amicably resolve their differences on the basis of the integration treaties, institutions and procedures. The 
ideologically hostile nations of Western and Eastern Europe, managed through the EU and the OSCE operational 
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structures, to mend their differences and live together peacefully. As Sachs (2011: 40) notes, the EU has shown that 
―ancient enmities and battle lines can be turned into mutually beneficial cooperation if a region looks forward, to 
resolving its long-term needs, rather than backwards, to its long-standing rivalries and conflicts.‖ 
 
4.4.1.2 Structural Interdependence and Globalisation  
The Structural Interdependence and Globalisation theoretical paradigm is associated with Realist scholars such as 
Joseph Nye, Robert Keohane, and Edward Morse. It maintains that regional cooperation emerged as a response to 
the powerful trends of globalisation and global interdependence. Globalisation has become an important and 
pervasive theme in the post-Cold War political order that individual regions must be viewed within the broader global 
context. The forces of globalisation and international interdependence have created what Neo–realists call ―the 
borderless world‖ or the ―end of geography‖ (Hurrell 1995). The world has to work as one composite community, the 
global village of interdependent nations and regions. According to the theory, globalisation acts as a powerful 
stimulus to economic and political regionalism by intensifying the depth of economic interdependence, exchange of 
goods and services, communication, flow of information, values, knowledge and ideas which strengthen societal 
interdependence and impact on the ways in which regimes and regions define their position in the global context. The 
changing global environment has undermined the possibility of successful national-level responses to the challenges 
of international competition and other pressures of globalisation. Therefore, regionalism is a logical response by 
regimes in different regions to pool their resources for collective action within the complex global order (Hurrell 1995, 
Hettne 2000, Sunkel 2000, 2001, Schulz etal. 2001). Hence, Nye (1968) refers to regional integration as a deeper 
process which involves economic integration, (formation of a transnational economy), political integration (formation 
of a transnational political system with some minimum degree of transfer of sovereignty or functions to supranational 
organs) and social integration (formation of a trans-national society). 
 
Globalisation has forced regional nations to come together so as to have a collective bargaining voice on global 
economic and political issues such as trade, markets, and in important forums such as the World Trade 
Organisations, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the UN Security Council. However, it appears 
that regional organisations in the Third World remain marginalised and peripheral in the so-called globalised world. 
The global economy and political order are still shaped and dominated by the Developed World (Europe and 
America) at the expense of the underdeveloped and/or developing world.  
 
4.5 Regionalism and Interdependence Theories 
This cluster of theories regards regional interdependence (as opposed to global interdependence) as the determining 
factor in the emergence of regional cooperation and integration. The cluster is composed of three theoretical sub-
groups, namely Neo-Functionalism, Neo-Liberal Institutionalism, and Constructivism (Hurrell 1995). 
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4.5.1 (Neo-) Functionalism 
Neo-Functionalismis associated with scholars such as Mitrany, Nye, Haas, Lindberg, Keohane and Hoffman. The 
theory contends that regionalism emanates from the gradual working together of nations in a region in the social, 
economic and political spheres, culminating in formal regional integration and institutional development for 
management of regional affairs. Neo-functionalists regard regional integration as a process which starts from low 
level cooperation and grows through spill-over stages to higher levels of political integration. They maintain that the 
initial socio- economic cooperation and complexities of interdependence between nations in a region will create new 
challenges which will force governments and other stakeholders to expand their cooperative measures into the 
higher level of political integration and security cooperation (higher politics). Legislation and institutional development 
in one sphere of cooperation spills into another, necessitating further legislation, treaties, protocols, charters and 
harmonisation of policies, towards the final stage of political integration and union (Ostegaard 1993, Dougherty and 
Pfaltzgraff 1990, Howell 2000). According to this paradigm, regional integration will grow if supported by functional 
institutions (supranational structures) to coordinate and promote regional interdependence, and develop, foster and 
expand regional unity and cohesion. They consider development of regional institutions as highly pivotal in the 
effective functioning of regional organisations, solving common problems and creating a group identity and loyalty 
around a regional integration unit other than the nation-state. Functionalists therefore envisage a world society of 
regional organisational integration free from the pressures of state power politics. The world society will be 
characterised by a cobweb of regional organisations, with functional institutions geared towards resolving common 
problems, goals, basic needs, people‘s welfare and security, which separate states were unable to guarantee 
because of their focus on the pursuit of power politics and states‘ interests (Groom 1990, Olson and Groom 1991, 
Hurrell 1995, Howell 2000). As the cooperation and integration spillover spreads into the realm of high politics, 
member states‘ conception of and valuation of sovereignty will gradually change to accord more power to the 
regional supranational authority. 
 
The result of political integration is a new political community superimposed on the pre-existing ones (Schulz, 
Soderbaum, and Ojendal 2001, Howell 2000). For Shumitter the concept of integration is ―the process of transferring 
exclusive expectations of benefits from the nation-state to some larger unit... Nation actors of all sorts...cease to 
identify themselves and their future welfare entirely with their national government and its policies‖ (cited in Howell 
2000: 11). The definitions of regional integration as provided by Haas (1958) and Lindberg (1963) echo the same 
message of loss of sovereignty by member states to the supranational regional authority (Howell 2000).  
 
According to this theory, individual nation-states cede power and authority to the regional governance. Olson and 
Groom (1991: 91) summarises it thus: ―[s]tates sovereignty and national loyalties will be rendered harmless and 
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obsolete to the extent that they have no continuing functional rational by growth of other institutions based on 
systems of transactions that maximise welfare. To this extent, the state will wither away.‖  
 
The Neo-functionalist view of states losing sovereignty is diametrically at variance with the Realist view of states 
staunchly holding on to their national sovereign power while in regional coalitions. It is also at odds with the highly 
state-centric regional organisations in the Third World regions. Experience in the Third World regions has shown how 
states in regional organisations adhere to maintaining their sovereignty by including the principles of respect of 
national sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference in the affairs of member states in their founding treaties 
(Niewkerk 2000, Schoeman 2001, Adar 2002, Cawthra 2004, Hammerstad 2004, Solomon 2004). In fact, as 
Schoeman (2001: 143) concludes, ―[t]he attempts to regionalise Africa including the case of Southern Africa has 
been first and foremost aimed at state-building, …For this reason, any aim and approach that may be considered as 
threatening sovereignty of a state were destined to dissolve the realm of regionalisation.‖ This position is also 
maintained by Akraasanee and Stifel (1995) in the case of ASEAN, that its objective was regional cooperation which 
promotes national independence and supremacy of the state rather than integration into a supranational structure 
(Ojendal 2001). This adherence to the principles of national sovereignty has impeded numerous organisations‘ 
attempts especially at conflict resolution, and rendered many toothless in face of devastating conflicts. The regional 
organisations in Africa are a perfect example of this. The failure of the OAU can be traced to its adherence to the 
principles of national sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference in the domestic affairs of member states. It 
was these faults in its integration and operation formula which saw the organisation remaining a passive spectator 
amid numerous conflicts fermenting and tearing the continent apart. Adherence to national sovereignty and territorial 
integrity remains as prominent clauses in almost all regional organisations, and whenever they are reluctant to 
intervene for whatever reason, they will resort to the clauses. This has no doubt hampered the efficacy of many 
regional organisations in conflict prevention, management and resolution mission as ―no-one is prepared to hold in 
abeyance some elements of political sovereignty in order to preserve regional cooperation‖ (Mfune 1993: 288). 
 
Functionalists also envisage a working peace system in their model of functional regional integration. In their view, 
―[s]ecurity will depend not upon deterrence and threat systems, but will arise out of association, that is, through 
playing roles in systems of transactions that are valued and valuable to all parties concerned on the basis of criteria 
acceptable to them…it will be a working peace system‖ (Olson and Groom: 1991: 192). This is in line with Mitrany‘s 
(one of the most influential scholars on functionalism) assertion that ―the essence of security is not to keep the 
nations peacefully apart but to bring them actively together‖ (1975: 184). Functionalists assert that institutional 
flexibilities, participatory decision-making and trans-national ties will tame and transform the power politics and 
ensure development of legitimised conflict handling mechanisms. They conclude that ―[t]he greater the number and 
diversity of ties, the less likely is war to occur, since any war is likely to disrupt such ties and thereby diminish 
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welfare.‖ Therefore, ―war will be rejected as a policy…‖ (Olson and Groom 1991: 191). This position fits well in the 
realm of a security community. 
 
The Functionalist theory has been criticised for failure to reflect the reality of international politics, in which high 
politics and state interests shape the international agenda (Terriff etal. 2004). In fact, regional organisations have 
become forums through which the powerful members want to establish their hegemony and power in the region. 
Nigeria and South Africa have been accused by other members of hegemonic tendencies in their respective regional 
interactions. The theory is also flawed in that it seems to be based on inter-state conflicts and says little on intra-state 
conflicts, which have become a major threat to peace and security in the post-Cold War order. Intra-state conflicts 
have been fermenting in Sub-Saharan Africa despite the existence of regional organisations such as ECOWAS, 
COMESA, SADC and their security mechanisms, because members are more concerned with national sovereignty 
and power than regional integration and security. 
 
However, in spite of its flaws, the paradigm provides vital information based on the success of the EU integration 
model through development of institutions to operationalise their regional structure. Regional organisations the world 
over are beginning to develop structures and institutions to coordinate regional affairs. The EU has established the 
European Union Parliament and the High Commissioner on National Minorities, and the African Union has the Pan-
African Parliament. The SADC‘s Parliamentary Forum, the ECOWAS‘s Standing Mediation Committee and the 
Peace and Security Council (PSC) coordinate the regional continental affairs. Different regional organisations have 
also established security mechanisms to deal with regional security challenges such as SADC‘s Organ for Politics, 
Defence and Security co-operation (OPDS); ECOWAS‘ ECOMOG, the AU‘s Peace and Security Council and the 
EU‘s OSCE. The question is: To what extent are the institutions operational in preventive diplomacy missions? In 
most cases, Third World security arrangements are dysfunctional or ineffective owing to a lack of resources and lack 
of political will. For example, in the SADC region, the SADC security mechanism has remained ineffective in 
addressing the political, economic and security decay in Zimbabwe. Its moves at resolving the conflict through quiet 
diplomacy have been cosmetic at most, as the recalcitrant President Mugabe regime intensified its brutalisation of its 
citizens, and jeopardises regional security at will. 
 
4.5.2 Neo-Liberal Institutionalism 
Neo-Liberal Institutionalism is associated with the writings of Keohane and Martin Petri. The theoretical perspective 
embraces some elements of realism, structural interdependence and globalisation and Functionalism, but with slight 
adjustments. The theory maintains that increasing levels of interdependence generate increased demand for both 
regional and international cooperation, integration and building of institutions. Like the Neo-functionalists, it stipulates 
that the success of regional organisations revolves around the establishment of strong institutions for coordination 
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and harmonisation of their activities. They advocate establishment of supranational institutions with clear 
organisational norms, rules and procedures for effective coordination and collective action in resolving common 
problems, and collaboration in regional economic, political and security matters. According to Liberal Institutionalists, 
institutions are vital in regional cooperation because they provide information, promote transparency and monitor 
development of convergent and productive goals, expectations, aspirations and coordination between members in a 
regional organisation. Institutionalised rules, norms and procedures facilitate productive and cost-effective linkages 
between states in different issue areas thereby enhancing interdependence. It is envisaged that institutions can 
mitigate states‘ concerns about relative gains in cooperation, provide a framework within which disagreements which 
could be obstacles to cooperation are solved, provide mechanisms that permit states to make trade - offs, develop 
stable cooperative outcomes, and provide information about gains of all states in the cooperative arrangement (Hurell 
1995, Howell 2000, Schulz, Soderbaum and Ojendal 2001, Terriff etal. 2004).  
 
The Neo-Liberal Institutionalists maintain that the state is a leading player in the formation and growth of regional 
cooperation, and that their membership is guided by both national interests and considerations for regional 
interdependence. The proponents further contend that states in regional co-operations are concerned with absolute 
gains rather than relative gains. These positions are at odds with the Realists‘ insistence that the sole motivation for 
nation-states in regional membership is national power, self-interest and relative gains. Contrary to the Neo-
Functionalists‘ stance that nation-states will ultimately lose power and sovereignty to the regional organisation, the 
Neo-Liberal institutionalism is heavily state-centric and considers the nation-state as central in regional cooperation 
and as an effective gatekeeper to the domestic and international operations of regional organisations. This theoretical 
perspective embraces Gamble and Payne‘s (1996: 2) definition of regionalism as ―[a] state-led project designed to re-
organise a particular regional space along defined economic and political lines.‖ They use the example of the EU, 
that although the power of member states may be diluted through collective decision-making and regulated by 
institutional rules, the organisation does not challenge the autonomy and sovereignty of its members. It preserves 
and strengthens states‘ sovereignty, and integration is driven by bargains among member state governments. They 
envisage regional organisations as a multi-governance institution in which authority and policy-making influence is 
shared across multiple levels of government, sub-national, national and supranational organs of society (Howell 
2000). Hence Keohane (1993: 274) concludes that ―institutionalists do not elevate international regimes to mythical 
positions over states, on the contrary such regimes are established by states to achieve their purposes.‖  
 
However, Neo-Liberal institutionalism concurs with the Realists that states‘ membership in regional organisations is 
to some extent driven by national interests, and that states operate in an anarchical international system which will 
affect the likelihood of cooperation. Their point of differences is on whether supranational institutions can mitigate the 
states‘ quest for power and reconcile their interests within the regional organisation framework. Realists argue that 
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institutions lack the power to control states, therefore rendering successful regional cooperation and integration 
sterile. Moreover Realists doubt the power of institutions on security issues because ―...a state will not be willing to 
place its faith on institutions. The fear of cheating is much greater when security could be at risk and institutions 
cannot overcome this‖ (Terriff etal. 2001: 50). Liberal institutionalism, on the other hand, regards institutions as 
providing the forum, rules, information and mechanisms through which states can resolve and reconcile their 
differences, build trust and confidence, as well as mutual and shared vision among member states, alleviate 
insecurity and change states‘ notion of self-interest for the good of regional cooperation and integration (Hurrell 1995, 
Howell 2000). 
 
The theoretical perspective is instrumental in guiding the formation, growth and effective functioning of regional 
organisations. It has been vindicated in that regional organisations with established structures and institutions have 
proved to be more efficient and effective in their operations. The EU is a living example of such a success story. It 
has also been shown that regional institutions have brought regional states together more closely than driving them 
apart. Different regional organisations the world over are growing and identifying themselves as a community with 
shared values and visions embodied in the regional organisations and their institutions. For example, since its 
inception, SADC has signed and ratified numerous treaties and protocols (SADC Treaty of 1992, the Organ protocol 
2001, the Mutual Defence Pact of 2003) and established numerous structures such the Organ on Politics, Defence 
and Security, the Interstate Committee for Defence and Security (ISCDS), the Interstate Politics and Diplomacy 
Committee (ISPDC) and the SADC Parliamentary Forum, to enhance the functioning of the regional organisation. 
The critical question is: To what extent do regional organisations or individual member states abide by the rules, 
norms and standard procedures which they have ratified? In the Third World, regional groupings have included some 
clauses like non-interference in the affairs of member states, respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, which 
have become excuses for failure to take action even when a member state is in gross contravention of the stated 
rules and obligations of the organisation. In Zimbabwe the ZANU-PF government contravened the SADC Guidelines 
on the conduct of elections during the 2002 and 2008 elections and the SADC dismally failed to rein it in or hold it 
accountable for its violations of the protocol it ratified. 
 
However, it has been established that some regional groupings have operated and achieved their goals without any 
formalised and entrenched regional institutions. (For example, the Frontline States launched a formidable challenge 
to colonialism and apartheid in spite of the fact that they did not have any established institutions). Hwang (2005) 
also notes that the ASEAN organisation still maintains its informal and non-legalistic security approaches in resolving 
its regional problems. These examples confirm Caporao‘s assertion that regional entities can evolve with ―less 
formal, less codified habits, practices and norms of international society‖ (1993: 54). Mfune (1993) notes that in some 
instances the creation of supranational bureaucratised institutions tends to exacerbate conflicts of interest within the 
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regional groupings. The Neo-Liberal Institutionalists, like Neo-realists, overlook the role of sociological and inter-
subjective factors in the evolution and functioning of regional organisations which form the core of the constructivist 
position on regional integration (Acharya 1998, Reus-Smit 2001). 
 
4.5.3 Constructivism 
Constructivism is associated with the writings of Deustch, Adler, Barnett, Onuf, and Wendt. Constructivism takes a 
sociological approach to the formation of regional cooperation and integration. It gives insights beyond material 
factors in studying the evolution, nature and character of regional organisations. The theory maintains that regional 
awareness, cooperation and integration are driven and cemented by common and shared values, tradition, religion, 
history, identity, aspirations, loyalty and interests, all of which promote a sense of belonging to a particular regional 
community and interdependence. It cements a sense of ―we-ness‖ (cognitive regionalism) and the subjective idea of 
feeling part of a community (Hurrell 1995, Vale 2003, Ngoma 2005). Hurrell (1995) asserts that regionalism should be 
analysed in terms of the degree of social cohesiveness as reflected by ethnicity, race, religion, culture, history, and 
consciousness of a common heritage. The former (first) Executive Secretary of SADC, Simba Makoni, once 
commented that a feeling of region-ness was emerging within the region and the people began ―to think SADC‖ 
(Oden 2001). According to Hetnne, (2001: 24) ―[t]he starting point for understanding the origins of region-ness must 
be the historical and cultural preconditions for regional identity, without which there is no base for a process of 
regionalisation.‖ The character, interstate relations, interests and identity within a regional community are shaped by, 
and based on particular histories, cultures, religion, value sharing, economic policies, security and political 
experiences domestic factors, and process of interaction with each other and how the actors interpret the world in 
which their interaction occurs (Hurrell 1995). Hence, Jones (1988: 635) correctly notes that ―value sharing is one of 
the pre-conditions for a viable political community to come into existence.‖  
 
While Neo-Realists and Neo-Liberal Institutionalists regard norms, interests and identity of regional organisations as 
products of material and anarchical structure of the international system, constructivists maintain that in regional 
formations ―material resources only acquire meaning for human action through the structure of shared knowledge in 
which they are embedded‖ (Wendt 1995: 73). In their discussions of the formation and expansion of different regional 
organisations‘ case studies, different authors have reflected the centrality of shared knowledge, histories and identity 
as pivotal in bolstering regional integration. Ojendal (2001) mentions ―Aseanity or Asian-ness‖ as a unifying factor in 
ASEAN, Soderbaum (2001) notes the role of ―West-African-ness‖ in the formation of ECOWAS, while Hettne (2001) 
takes note of the process of ―Europeanisation‖ in the formation and expansion of the European Union. In the words of 
Wienner (1966) ―these shared sociological traits make states in a regional organisation ―to think together, to see 
together, (and) to act together‖ (cited in Ngoma 2005: 12). The constructivist paradigm is reflected in Evans and 
Newnham‘s definition of regionalism as ―[a] complex of attitudes, loyalties and ideas which concentrate the minds of 
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people upon what they perceive their region‖ (1990: 346). As Vale observes, ―constructivist theory suggests that what 
builds the [regional] community is not structures-treaties, protocols and buildings or even renewal but the subjective 
idea of feeling part of a community‖ (2003: 121). 
 
Constructivists have a vision of a dynamic regional community in which interests; identities, principles, and 
interactional trends change over time, and new forms, perspectives and dimensions of cooperation and integration 
are constructed and reconstructed by the actors (Hurrell 1995, Kowert 1998 Howell 2000, Reus-Smit 2001). 
Constructivists also share a view on the significance of operational institutions in regional formations with Neo-Liberal 
institutionalists. However, unlike the latter who envisage some minimal loss of national sovereignty to regional 
institutions, they hold a view that institutions ensure formalisation and institutionalisation of regional identity, mutual 
trust, a shared regional culture, and collective interests, and also reinforce a sense of belonging (Adler and Barnett 
1998, Hook and Kearns 1999). 
 
Neo-Realists criticise Constructivism for over-estimating the importance of shared values in the formation of regional 
organisations and their cooperation within the regional scheme. They hold that violent conflicts, instead of 
cooperation, have taken place among nations with shared identities and values. They also note that ―in Europe, the 
Americas and Asia, the politics of regionalism may be complicated by the existence of different national conceptions 
of the region, and there may be deep conflicts over the geographical scope of a region and the values which it is held 
to represent‖ (Hurrell 1995: 66). 
 
However, as indicated above, shared identities, cultural values, historical experiences and aspirations have played a 
pivotal role in the emergence and development of almost all regional organisations. One of the objectives of SADC 
(Article 5) (h) is to ―strengthen and consolidate the long standing historical, social and cultural affinities and links 
among the peoples of the region‖ (SADC Treaty 1992). In the same vein, a Report on the Review of Operations of 
SADC Institutions (2001) recommends the promotion of common political values, systems and other shared values 
which are transmitted through legitimate, democratic and effective institutions. In spite of these noble ideals, SADC 
states still lack a sense of commitment to shared principles, norms, values and community identity, all of which have 
adversely affected its integration process and the implementation of its regional security and preventive diplomacy 
goals (Vale 2003, Nathan 2004, Neethling 2000, 2004, Ngubane 2004, Hammerstad 2004, Africa Alternative 
Strategies 2004). According to Vale (2003), the legacy of deep mistrust and misunderstanding in the SADC 
emanates from decades of strife in the region. He posits that ―the SADC is not located where social relations are 
intimate, enduring or multistranded but…where social relations are impersonal, anonymous and contractual‖ (Vale 
2003: 121). This absence of intimacy, trust and subjectively feeling part of the community explains why the region‘s 
search for a common vision, shared sense of security, peace, development, good governance and meaningful 
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integration has in practice remained a mirage. The SADC preventive diplomacy missions in the DRC, Lesotho and 
Zimbabwe have been marred by implementational flaws, questions on the legality of the missions and efficacy in 
conflict prevention, management and resolution as will be reflected in chapters five and six. 
 
4.6 Domestic Level Theories 
This cluster of theories maintain that apart from shared identities and historical experiences, regionalism is also 
enhanced by other shared domestic attributes such as state coherence, regime type, democratisation and 
democratic ethics, commonalities and convergences of economic and political policies (Hurrell 1995). The theories 
stipulate that regional cooperation and integration prosper where there are coherent and viable nation-states with 
clearly established mutually accepted territorial boundaries and effective state machinery, as well as transparent and 
accountable institutions of governance. The assumption is that such a stable political climate will promote peace and 
coherent regional cooperation between member states. This is premised on the democratic peace theory that 
democracies do not go to war with each other, and that the more democracies in the world, the greater the zones of 
peace (Hurrell 1995, Terriff etal. 2001). Fukuyama, one of the democratic peace theorists, argues that ―an expanding 
number of democratic states will continue to change fundamentally the nature of the international system, 
overcoming the conflictual nature of anarchy‖ (cited in Terriff etal. 2001: 25). The theorists attribute formation of the 
most elaborate regionalist schemes in the EU, North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Organisation of 
American States (OAS), Common Market of the South/Southern Cone (Mercusor), NATO and the Warsaw Pact to 
the existence of relatively strong nation-states, democratic ethics, and commonalities in region types in the regions. 
Hurrell (1995: 67) states that ―regionalism and state strength do not stand in opposition to each other and states 
remain the essential building-blocks with which regionalist arrangements are constructed.‖  
 
The absence of a democratic culture, institutions and governance has been identified by many scholars as the 
source of failed regional integration projects in Africa. Their report, Assessing the Restructuring of SADC; Positions, 
Policies and Progress‘ Isaksen and Tjonneland (2001) and the Freedom House Surveys (2002) reflect that most of 
the SADC member states do not have any established democratic credentials intact, and some are experiencing 
internal political and economic crises, all of which adversely affect regional integration. Ngubane (2004) and Vita 
(2001) also note that regional integration in Southern Africa is flawed because most of the member states have not 
yet fully consolidated their existence as coherent nation-states. According to Vita (2001: 73), ―most of the states in 
the SADC region can be characterised as weak, and some of them as quasi-states. They posses juridical statehood 
recognised by the international community, but their empirical statehood is weak, ill-functioning or even non-existent.‖ 
Owing to weak national foundations, the security regionalism in most of the Third World can be characterised as 
―immature anarchy‖ (Buzan 1991), characterised by ―conflict formation‖ (Vayrynen 1984); ―insecurity dilemma‖ (Job 
1992) and ―‗security predicament‖‘ (Ayoob 1995) all of which threaten nation-building and regional integration. To 
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some extent, this position holds water in the sense that the undemocratic and repressive regimes in Zimbabwe and 
Swaziland, for example, have adversely effected regional integration and tarnished the image of SADC in the eyes of 
the international community. 
 
The call for democratisation, observance of human rights and economic liberalisation became immensely popular as 
vehicle and bench marks towards establishment of functional regional organisations in the post-Cold War era. At its 
Coppenhagen Summit in 1993, the EU stipulated the conditions for membership as the existence of stable 
democracy, the rule of law, a market economy, and acceptable minority rights (Hettne 2001). This came in the wake 
of application for membership by the former socialist states of Europe. Through Resolution 1080, the Washington 
Protocol (1991), the Santiago Commitment to Democracy and Renewal of the Inter-American System and the 
Democratic Charter, the OAS pledged to defend and encourage democracy and constitutional governance in its 
region. It also committed itself to swift collective action against any member who breached constitutional and 
democratic rule (Kreimer 2003). Similarly AU pledged to ―promote democratic principles and institutions of, popular 
participation and good governance‖ (Constitutive Act of the Africa Union, 2002: 4). 
 
The SADC integration prospered in the post-Cold War era as a result of the democratisation process in the region 
and the end of civil wars in Mozambique (1992), Namibia (1991), Angola (2003) and South Africa (1994). The 
stability which emerged enhanced regional cooperation and development, especially with the inclusion of the 
economically and politically powerful democratic and majority-ruled South Africa. In its protocols and treaties, the 
SADC has also pledged to collectively defend democratically elected regimes and not to accord diplomatic 
recognition to any government which attains power by unconstitutional means such as coups. Objective (g) of the 
SADC Organ is to ―promote the development of democratic institutions and practices within the territories of state 
parties and encourage the observance of universal human rights as provided for in the Charters and Conventions of 
the AU and the UN respectively‖ (SADC OPDS Protocol, 2001). These were some of the values which South Africa 
used to justify the 1998 military intervention of Lesotho. South Africa stated that ―the military faction in Lesotho 
threatened a democratically elected government and that the basic aim of the military intervention in the name of 
SADC was to restore stability in Lesotho‖ (du Plessis 2000: 349-350). In the ECOWAS region, the intervention in 
Sierra Leone (1997) was also justified as a mission in defence of the democratically elected regime of Tejan Kabbar.  
 
However, critics of the theory have argued that successful regional organisations have emerged and exist in regions 
where nations do not necessarily have common regime types, common economic policies, and a history of 
democratic institutions. The SADC was formed from nations which by then practised different political and economic 
ideologies. Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Angola and Tanzania practised some form of socialism while the rest 
were capitalist-oriented. The other issue is that some members practised multiparty democracy (Botswana) while 
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others were brutal and repressive one-party states (Malawi and Swaziland). Another example is the ASEAN in which 
increased regional interaction and institutional development in both the security and economic spheres have 
occurred in spite of the region‘s outright rejection of Western-style liberalism and democracy (Hurrell 1995, Ojendal 
2001).  
 
4.7 The Security Complex/Regime/Community Theories 
Buzan (1991) locates the discussion of regional security arrangements within the Realist paradigm. He argues that 
security complexes are products of the anarchical international system. The interaction of nations in different 
geographical regions and within the anarchic international structure determines their political power and security 
relations. In line with this position, Buzan (1991: 187) views security as ―a relational phenomenon; a seamless web‖ 
such that ―one cannot understand national security of any given state without understanding the international pattern 
of security interdependence in which it is embedded.‖ According to Buzan, the structure and character of security 
complexes are defined and marked by patterns of rivalry, enmity, amity, power shifts, domination and balance of 
power politics and dynamics. In the words of Waever (1987), ―[w]ithin any given complex, there exists a spectrum of 
relational possibilities described by the degrees of amity and enmity that define security interdependence‖ (cited in 
Buzan 1991: 218). Both the objective and subjective factors are involved in shaping the security arrangement, 
security perceptions, and the resultant policies and treaties of the key actors (Job 1992). As such, some regional 
security complexes may be monopolar where a single power is dominant or multipolar, and where two or more 
powers call the shots. Buzan (1991) gives the example of the Organisation of American States (OAS) as a 
monopolar complex dominated by the United States of America. The same can be said of Nigeria in ECOWAS and 
South Africa in SADC (du Plesis 2000, Sesay 2000, Moller 2005). 
 
Buzan (1991) structures the formation of regional security complexes through five evolutionary stages from the 
extremes of enmity to amity, as follows: 
 Chaos in which ―all relations are defined by enmity, each actor being the enemy of all the others;‖ 
 Regional conflict formation in which conflictual relations dominate but amity is also possible; 
 Security regimes in which a group of states cooperate to manage their disputes and avoid war by seeking to mute 
the security dilemma both by their actions and by their assumptions about the behaviour of others; 
 Security community in which disputes among all the members are resolved to such an extent that none fear or 
prepare for either political assault or military attack by any of the others; 
 Regional integration which ends anarchy and therefore moves the regional security issue from the national and 
international to the domestic realm (Buzan 1991: 218-219).  
This is the highest stage or the stage of ―mature anarchy‖ where nations in a regional complex are politically, 
economically and militarily embedded and operationalised as a single entity. Buzan‘s (1991), Lindsberg‘s (1963) and 
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Haas‘s (1958) definitions of regionalism reflect this level of integration. Buzan‘s (1991) categorisation of security 
regionalisation phases is also in line with the Neo-functionalists‘ phases of regional integration, in which a political 
union is the highest level. 
 
Neethling (2004) notes that the difference between a security complex, security regime and security community is 
very blurred. In fact, there are more similarities and overlaps between the paradigms although they also ―exhibit 
different attitudes to security cooperation‖ (Van Aadt, 1997: 4). Neethling employs the Buzan classical security 
complex theory to reflect the three approaches as a continuum in security cooperations. According to Neethling 
(2004: 2) ―[t]he internal dynamics of a security complex can be located along a spectrum according to whether the 
defining security is driven by amity or enmity.‖ At the negative extreme of the spectrum is the security complex 
resulting from rivalry and mutual perceptions of fear among the regional states. In the centre lies a security regime in 
which states still regard each other with suspicions as a potential threat but have agreed reassurance arrangements 
to mitigate security challenges among them. The positive end of the spectrum reflects a security community which is 
characterised by advanced integration guided by institutionalised norms, standards and procedures that the 
members will not resolve their security challenges using force but only through peaceful means (Neethling 2004). 
Buzan (1991: 221) designed several insightful questions which can be used to guide the study of regional security 
complexes and their operational dynamics. The questions are: ―[h]ow durable are the complexes in question? What is 
the relationship between their internal dynamics and their interaction with other complexes? What role does 
penetration from high level complexes play in the security of local complexes?, How do the trends within the structure 
of security complexes influence the foreign policy options available to the states concerned? How in turn do the 
foreign policies of individual states feed into the structure of relationship defined by the security complexes? Are all 
these states concerned essentially locked into patterns of relationships over which they have little control? Or do 
some of them have leverage over the structure of events and therefore real choices to make in the directions of their 
foreign policies?‖  
 
The security complex/regime/community approaches have been applied in the study of regional security formations 
in several regions such as  South Asia and the Middle East (Buzan1983), South Asia (Buzan and Rizvi 1986), South 
East Asia (Buzan 1988), the SADC region (Ngoma 2005) and Waever etal. (1993) applied it in the study of post-Cold 
War transformations in Europe. According to Buzan (2000: 2), ―the essential logic of the theory is rooted in the fact 
that all states in the system are enmeshed in a global web of security interdependence.‖ As such ―[a] comprehensive 
security analysis requires that one take particular care to investigate how the regional level mediates the interplay 
between states and the international system as a whole‖ (Buzan 1991: 188). The theory poses that security 
complexes are established in geographical regions for collective security against both internal and external threats. 
Buzan (2000) notes that most states fear their neighbours more than their distant powers, so they will come together 
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in a security complex to dispel threats from each other. This is because ―political and military threats are most 
strongly felt when they are at close range‖ (Buzan 1991: 188). The formation of the SADC in 1980 was mainly to 
counter the apartheid South African military and economic hegemonic posture in the region. In this case, 
independent regional states were compelled to the realisation that they are interdependent and more likely to obtain 
security through political cooperation in regional formations than military competition (Nathan 2003).  
 
4.7.1 Security Complex Theory 
A security complex is ―a group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently [and] closely that 
their national security cannot realistically be considered apart from one another‖ (Buzan 1991: 190). Thus ―[i]n 
security terms ‗region‘ means that a distinct and significant subsystem of security relations exist among a set of 
states whose fate is that they have been locked into a geographical proximity with each other‖ (Buzan 1991: 188). 
The definition suggests that countries in the same region will always have the same security threats and/or that 
security challenges in one nation in the region will affect the entire region. Therefore, the driving force for formation of 
regional organisations where nations pool their resources for collaborative defence and security in the region are the 
patterns of amity and enmity among nation-states in a particular geographical zone (Buzan, 1991, 2000). The 
dimensions and intensities of fear, shared interest, security and insecurity determine the nature, content, character 
and operations of security complexes. The evolution, development and operations of the Frontline States and NATO 
were characterised by the amity and enmity of apartheid and communism respectively. On the other hand, the former 
USSR formed the WARSAW PACT to defend their regimes from the capitalist onslaught. 
 
4.7.2 Security Regime Theory 
Acharya (1994: 89) defines a security regime as ―[a] formal or informal arrangement whose main objective is to 
significantly reduce, if not eliminate, the likelihood of war by securing adherence to a set of norms and values that 
constrain the conflictual behaviour of the regional actors in relation to one another.‖ Put differently, it is defined by a 
set of principles, rules, norms and decision-making procedures that guide states to ―exercise restraint in the belief 
that others will reciprocate‖ (Deustch cited in Nathan 2003: 3). The security regime paradigm is rooted in the realist 
and state-centric traditions that states will only become members of regional formations and alliances when they fulfil 
their national interests of state security, expansion and consolidation of their power bases. Such alliances therefore 
are inherently weak, since they are built on competition and mistrust, and member states are reluctant to establish 
strong security cooperation mechanisms which will bind them together (Morganthau etal. 1993, Terriff etal. 2004). In 
the opinion of Dittgen and Peters, the level of cooperation in a security regime ―will remain intergovernmental and the 
functional scope will strictly be limited to the military realm‖ (cited in Neethling, 2004: 2).  
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Van Aardt (1997: 6) provides an insightful summary of the characteristics of security regimes as follows: 
 Security cooperation is considered to be concerned with an ―individual‖ problem that can be solved in its own 
terms. In other words, problems can be ―isolated‘ and ―contained.‖ 
 Security cooperation is a reactive rather than a pro-active process. It results from the need to cooperate in order 
to defend national interests. 
 Common norms develop and rules are formulated as the need arises and patterns of behaviour are established 
over time. 
 Participants make a formal expression of expectations, principles, norms and outcomes and negotiate rules, 
practices and structures as and when the need arises. 
 The attitudinal base of this approach reflects a concern by member states to promote their national security 
through regional security cooperation, but the mutual understanding is that it can never lead to creation of a 
―larger state‖. 
 The nature of cooperation pursued is functional for the continued interests of the individual actors who form part 
of the security regime. 
 There is no specific provision for collective defence. This implies that a member not threatened by an external 
aggressor might jeopardise its own security should it become involved in the defence of a neighbouring partner in 
the regional security regime. 
 
This analysis reflects several aspects of regional security mechanisms in Africa. For example, in the SADC region, 
member states seem to be more concerned with protecting their sovereignty than promoting strong regional security 
integration. In the interventions which are said to have been authorised by SADC, the intervening states were mainly 
driven by their individual national interests. Angola intervened in the DRC for security reasons, while Zimbabwe and 
Namibia went in for economic gains. In Lesotho, South Africa is also alleged to have intervened to protect the Katse 
Dam Water project. ECOWAS suffered the same fate, as Nigeria was accused of sponsoring her national interests 
through the organisation when she led the military interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone. 
 
This confirms Van Walraven‘s (2005) assertion that third party interventions seldom occur without the motive of self-
interest. That is, ―[t]he third party will intervene principally in pursuit of his own interests, in whatever way these are 
formulated.... Since the third party has his own interests to consider, mediation or intervention might be achieved for 
reasons other than the peaceful settlement of the conflict...‖ (Van Walraven 2005: 79). 
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4.7.3 Security Community Theory 
Deutsch (1957) defines a security community as ―[a] group of people, which has become ‗integrated‘ [through]...the 
attainment, within a territory, of a sense of security and of institutions and practices strong and wide spread enough 
to assure…dependable expectations of ‗peaceful change‘ among its population. By sense of community we mean a 
belief…that common social problems must and can be resolved by a process of peaceful change‖ (cited in Ngoma 
2005: 8). Deustch, in Ngoma 2005), distinguishes between two types of security communities. The first is an 
amalgamated security community that is characterised by a salient formal merger of member states into a single 
larger regional unit with some type of common government. The second is a pluralistic security community which is 
defined by less political unity, as member states retain their legal sovereign independence. That is to say, the 
sovereignty of the member states is not compromised or jeopardised by their membership of the community. This 
form of a security communitywould be acceptable to the Third World regimes which tend to be fearful of regional 
integration as a threat to their national sovereignty. Deutsch (1957), Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff (1990) note three 
conditions for the success of a pluralistic security community as follows: 
 Compatibility of major political values; 
 Capacity of the governments and politically relevant strata of the participating countries to respond to one 
another‘s messages, needs, and actions quickly, adequately and without resorting to violence; 
 Mutual predictability of the relevant aspects of one another‘s political, economic and social behaviour. 
 
The authors maintain that pluralistic security communities are easier to establish and manage than amalgamated 
security communities because in the former members retain their sovereignty. Most of the security groupings in the 
Third World are pluralistic security communities (Archaya 2001, Ngoma 2005, and Hwang 2005). 
 
Both the amalgamated and pluralistic security communities pledge for peace and denounce war as an option in 
resolving their differences. In view of this Rosamond (2000: 12) defines a security community as ―[a] group of states 
amongst whom the prospects of war is eradicated…a condition where war as a means of dispute settlement between 
states becomes obsolete.‖  In a security community, in contrast to the realists‘ position, regional organisations, 
guided by established norms, values, standards, and institutions, can be established to mitigate conflicts peacefully. 
This entails a high level of integration in which nations in a security community share security concerns, visions and 
commitments for mutual and collective resolution of conflicts in the region. The member states are so interwoven in 
their military and security agreements and commitments that the issue of war among them or against each other 
does not arise. The region becomes what Vale refers to as a ―warm zone‖, Singer‘s ―zone of peace‖ or Bauman‘s 
―cozy and comfortable place‖ (in Ngoma 2005).  
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Deutsch‘s concept of a security community has been further developed by Adler and Barnett (1998) who have 
devised a three-tiered analysis of the phases of a security community development (Swart and du Plessis 2004, 
Ngoma 2005). The first phase consists of factors which precipitate states‘ gravitation to security cooperation, 
integration and joint coordination. The factors include existential social-economic and political realities, and internal 
and external threats to regional and global security. The second phase involves examination of factors such as 
shared cultural values, socio-economic and political goals, aspirations, interests, regime systems and other regional 
traits which are conducive to the development of mutual trust and collective identity. The third evolution stage 
consists of the actual development of mutual trust and collective identity formation to ensure conditions for 
―dependable expectations of peaceful change‖ in which members do not consider war as an option in addressing 
their regional challenges. Swart and du Plessis (2004: 18) refer to this stage as the ―acid test of a security 
community‖ as ―members do not fear war or prepare for it.‖  
 
Schoeman (2002) describes a security community as evolving through three phases. The first is the ―nascent phase‖ 
in which governments begin to consider ideas on how to coordinate their relations for ultimate security cooperation 
and integration. The second stage, the ―ascendant phase‖, involves the implementation of the cooperative ideas 
hatched in the first stage. It is characterised by development of new institutions, policies and mechanisms which 
reflect security cooperation mutual trust among the members. The third is the ‖mature phase‖ in which the security 
community has reached maturity in terms of institutional establishments, implementation of cooperative security 
measures, and the ultimate goal of a security community in which the option of war as a means of resolving 
differences among members is non-existent. According to Ngoma (2005; 24), a security community suggests a 
mature form of regionalism in which states ―move away from competition to cooperation, embracing consultation 
rather than confrontation, reassurance rather than deterrence, transparency rather than secrecy, prevention rather 
than correction and interdependence rather than unilateralism.‖ That is, ―[s]ecurity has to be defined together with, 
and not against other states‖ for joint survival and peaceful coexistence (Ohlson, 1991: 242). According to 
Hammerstad (2004), several regional organisations including SADC have not attained the status of a mature security 
community. She maintains that the reality is that SADC is still at the nascent phase of security integration. 
 
Members in a security community become militarily intertwined, such that they share information on security matters, 
and engage in joint military exercises so as to have peacekeeping troops with similar professional military standards, 
code of conduct and doctrines during peacekeeping missions. The European Union has such exercises through its 
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) while SADC also embarked on Blue Hungwe (1997) 
and Blue Crane (1999) joint military exercises in Zimbabwe and South Africa respectively (Moller 2004, Ngoma 
2005). 
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Van Aardt‘s (1997: 7-11) summary of the characteristics of security communities is as followst: 
 The members of a security community remain separate entities, but their cooperation takes regional security into 
consideration. The overriding concern is a belief that the security of a region is indivisible and of primary concern. 
 It is based on a belief that the identification of common interests, the building of common identities, and the 
spreading of moral obligations should be underpinning long-term security. 
 Security cooperation is a pro-active rather than a reactive process. This implies a heavy reliance on early warning 
measures, and the idea of community implies a vision or strategic goal of what is to be achieved. The structures 
and resources needed to build a community, as well as necessary steps and phases, are identified and tackled 
systematically. 
 Collective security is not so much aimed at protecting ―against‖ each other as at protecting each other in the face 
of what contemporary security terms ―threats without enemies‖, while mutual defence signifies military assistance 
against extra-regional aggression and threats. 
 Its attitudinal base reflects a concern by member states that the security of the region as a whole is of paramount 
importance. To this end, a sense of common regional identity prevails. In addition, a security community indicates 
involvement based on mutuality – a sense of belonging together as a group of individual entities. 
Van Aardt adds that the political will by members to implement all the necessary steps and procedures is pivotal for 
the realisation of an effective and functioning security community. 
 
One example of a security community is NATO. Article 5 of NATO‘s ratifying protocol reads thus: ―[t]he parties agree 
that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against 
them all, and consequently...if such an armed attack occurs, each of them…assist the party or parties so attacked by 
taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the 
use of armed force to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area‖ (cited in Moller 2004: 124). Moller 
(2004) and Hammerstad (2004) also make reference to the EU‘s transformation from a conflict formation to a security 
community in which there are policy assurances that the members will not fight each other physically, but will resolve 
their disputes amicably through dialogue. Moller (2004) refers to this regionally coordinated military move as 
―Europeanisation of European security.‖ Acharya (1994: 85) commends the EU ―as the most prominent example of a 
regional security community in the developed West.‖ It saw the EU developing a Common Foreign and Security 
Policy and the Stability Pact for Southern Europe, all intended to expand the EU‘s role in conflict prevention, 
management and resolution (preventive diplomacy). In fact, ―[t]he OSCE is a regime for cooperative, not collective 
security, designed to promote security through on-going dialogue and persuasion, not  coercion...The OSCE does 
not have any mandate for enforcement action or the commitments through sanctions, military enforcement action, or 
collective response against aggressors or other violators.‖ In this sense, it has ―evolved into one of the primary 
instruments for preventive diplomacy in Europe‖ (Chigas 1993: 33 and 35). 
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Although not yet fully fleshed security communities, some regional organisations in Africa have established security 
organs and signed mutual defence pacts which, in principle, would enhance security cooperation and collective 
defence to dissuade conflicts among member states. The ECOWAS has ECOMOG and the Mutual Assistance on 
Matters of Defence (MAD). Through MAD, ECOWAS member states: 
 ―Declare and accept that any armed threat or aggression directed against any members state will constitute a 
threat or aggression against the entire community‖ (Article 2). 
 ―Resolve to give mutual aid and assistance for defence against any armed threat or aggression (Article 3). 
 ―Agree that when an external armed threat or aggression is directed against a member state of the community, 
the Head of State of that country shall send a written request for assistance to the current Chairman of the 
Authority of ECOWAS... the request shall mean that the Authority is duly notified and that the Allied Armed 
Forces Council (AAFC) are placed under a state of emergency. The Authority shall decide in accordance with the 
ermegency procedure as stipulated in Article 16...‖ (ECOWAS Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance on 
Defence, May 29 1981: 19 and 23). 
 
4.7.4 SADC: A Security Complex, Regime or Community? 
Neethling (2004: 4) poses two searching questions which can help us determine whether SADC, which is the core of 
this study, is a security community or security regime. The questions are:  
 To what extent could SADC be considered as a security community, and does it, as a sub-regional organisation, 
display some of the characteristics of a functioning security community? 
 Is there a sense of mutuality and sharing within SADC, both in terms of ideas and practice, which denotes a 
different approach from the way in which security regimes operate? 
 
Booth and Vale (1995: 285) also pose useful guiding questions in the study of SADC security regional integration, 
namely: 
  Can a regional community emerge from the wars of destabilisation in Southern Africa? 
 Can a sense of regional community grow in a region in which there has been so much enmity and violence? 
 What are the possibilities for developing a shared view of the real world among actors in the region? 
 Can outsiders help to develop a sense of regional community in Southern Africa? 
 
Considering the evolution and growth of the SADC, it can be ascertained that in spite of the obstacles and the snail 
pace, the SADC has achieved some of the characteristics of a security community, and is gravitating towards this 
status in terms o f its goals and operational agenda. The SADC has ratified the OPDS (1996) and the MDP (2003) 
protocols to coordinate its regional security operations. The SADC has also pledged peaceful preventive diplomacy 
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initiatives in its founding treaty, the OPDS and MDP Protocols, in settling both intra-state and inter-state conflicts. 
This, to some extent, makes it fit in principle and spirit into the security community realm. In fact, Moller (2005: 65) 
notes that ―[w]ar among Southern African states has become increasingly unlikely, and it does not even figure as a 
contingency for national security planning. [As such] ―[t]he states of the sub-region may...constitute, or at least 
approach the status of a security community (in the classical sense of Karl Deutsch), within which interstate, war has 
become inconceivable.‖ 
 
Ngoma (2005: 10) has applied the security community theory in studying the SADC security mechanism, and 
concluded that it has prospects for a functioning security community. He also notes that ―SADC is on a democratic 
trajectory with its states at differing points and should not be excluded from the security community paradigm than 
the Western Europe states and North American states that Deustch studied.‖ Bjuner (1998) also acknowledges the 
transferability of the security community paradigm to other regions, and SADC has shown sufficient readiness to 
work towards conflict prevention through common and collective security measures. The argument is that SADC has 
a common agenda reflecting the promotion of common economic, political and security values through ―democratic, 
legitimate, and effective institutions as well as the consolidation and maintenance of democracy, peace and security‖ 
in conformity with the Security Community approach‖ (Ngoma 2005: 182). Among the SADC OPDS objectives which 
reflect movement toward a security community are as follows: 
a) Prevent, contain and resolve inter and intra-state conflict by peaceful means (objective e)  
a) ii) consider development of a collective security capacity and conclude a Mutual Defence Pact to respond to 
external military threats (objective h) 
iii) develop peacekeeping capacity of national defence forces and coordinate the participation of State Parties in 
international and regional peacekeeping operations (objective k) (SADC Treaty 1992). 
 
Article 11(a, b, and c) of the Protocol and Structure of the SADC OPDS is emphatic on the organisation‘s 
commitment to resolution of regional conflicts by peaceful means. The members pledge to ―[r]efrain from the threat or 
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, other than for the legitimate purpose 
of individual or collective self-defence against an armed attack‖ (OPDS Protocol 2001). This is in line with the 
Security Community pledge which rules out war as an option in resolving disputes among the member states. 
 
Other instances of SADC‘s wish to be a Security Community are the establishment of the Regional Peacekeeping 
Training Centre in Zimbabwe and joint multi-national military exercises such as Exercise Blue Hungwe and Blue 
Crane held in Zimbabwe (1997) and South Africa (1999) respectively, all involving troops from SADC nations and 
designed to enhance cooperation in peacekeeping operations. The SADC is credited with signing the Protocol on the 
Control of Firearms, Ammunition and other Related Materials to address the problem of proliferation of small arms 
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and precipitation of civil conflicts (Moller 2005). The SADC is also in the process of establishing a standing 
peacekeeping force for effective peacekeeping, peace-building missions and maintenance of durable peace in the 
region. The ratification of the OPDS and the MDP (2003) protocols also show commitment to a security community 
(Neethling 2000, Hammerstad 2004, Fisher and Ngoma 2005, Ngoma 2005). The then South African Minister of 
Defence, Mosiua Lekota, noted that the SADC Mutual Defence Pact aimed at ―stabilising the region…cultivating an 
atmosphere conducive to investment and long-term stability…providing a mechanism to prevent conflicts between 
SADC countries, as well as with other countries, and for SADC to act together against aggression by 
outsiders…allowing for SADC intervention in major conflicts between signatories,… and in intra-state conflicts which 
have the potential to affect the stability of the whole region‖ (cited in Ngoma 2005: 2000). Fisher and Ngoma (2005) 
note that the establishment of what they term the ―delivery tools‖ by SADC in the form of the Protocol on Politics, 
Defence and Security, the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO) and the Mutual Defence Pact (MDP) are 
indicative of the region‘s commitment to collectively deal with its political, defence and security challenges. Fisher 
and Ngoma add that the SADC OPDS objectives (a, d, e, f, g, and i) pledge resolution of regional conflicts through 
peaceful means, while article 2 (a), (g) and (i) of the ODPS protocol reflect a security mechanism which has 
embraced new security trends in which protection of people and development, promotion of democratic institutions, 
and human rights, human security, coordination of the police and other security apparatus which are pivotal to peace, 
stability and security. The inclusion of these central security issues into its operational documents is typical of an 
organisation en-route to becoming a functional security community structure. Hence, Ngoma (2005: 15) suggests that 
―the security community paradigm provides the most encompassing insights into the political and military dynamics in 
the Southern African sub-region including those relating to peacekeeping and peace enforcement.‖ Moller (2005) 
rules out the possibility of conflicts among member states owing to the spirit of cooperation prevalent among them; 
this could be viewed as a step towards the establishment of a security community which does not contemplate 
conflict among its members. 
 
However, Zacharias (1999), Isaksen and Tjonneland (2001), Vita (2001), Van Niewkerk (2003), Vale (2003), Nathan 
(2003), Neethling (2004), Ngubane (2004), Swart and du Plessis (2004) and Hammerstad (2004), argue that SADC 
does not qualify as a security community because most of its members lack democratic credentials and common 
values, are weak and poorly integrated, domestically and politically fragmented, have weak state institutions, and 
have a fragile economic basis. Nathan (2003) vehemently opposes Ngoma‘s (2005) and Van Aardt‘s (1997) 
arguments that SADC is progressing towards a security community status. Instead he regards SADC as a security 
complex as defined by Buzan (1991: 190) as ―a group of states whose primary security concerns link together 
sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another.‖ The 
conclusion that SADC is a security complex rather than a security community is shared by Oden (2001). Vita (2001) 
Swart and du Plessis (2004), and Neethling (2004) acknowledge that SADC‘s objectives are aimed at building a 
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security community in the region, and that it may be regarded as a multi-national institution that has made some 
progress in pursuing the ideals of a security community. However, they insist that the region has not yet established 
functioning and effective regional security architecture typical of a security community. Some of the problems 
hindering the SADC security co-operation from being a functioning security community are lack of democratic 
governance and gross human rights abuses by some members states‘ regimes, the lack of political will to implement 
regional security agreements, weak economies in most of the member states, members‘ adherence to protection of 
individual nation‘s sovereignties at the expense of regional integration, adherence to state security rather than human 
security, mistrust between some members as reflected in the polarisation of SADC over the interventions in the DRC, 
and the general power struggle for regional hegemony as evidenced by Zimbabwe and South Africa over the 
operational status of the SADC security OPDS (Van Niewkerk 2001, Nathan, 2003, Barengu and Landsberg 2003, 
Zacarias 2003, Vale 2003, Neethling 2004, Solomon 2004, Hammesrstad 2004, Fisher and Ngoma 2005). In the 
opinion of Vale (2003) there is very little real sense of community in Southern Africa, and the SADC is less than what 
it pretends to be: ―[t]he hard truth we have already seen is that beyond the rhetorical gestures at bonding, Southern 
African states are not prepared to share sovereignty, to become a community even a security community.[This is 
because] ―[t]he history of the SADC suggests that the organisation was conceived as a collective attempt to defend 
the sovereignty of individual states from apartheid destabilisation‖ (2003: 122). As such, the member states jealously 
guard against any attempts, through regional integration or collective security, which they deem to be tampering with 
each member‘s national sovereignty and power. 
 
 Acharya (1994: 85) is unambiguous about the absence of security communities in the Third World. In his view 
―[s]ecurity Communities are virtually non-existent in the Third World…none has succeeded in achieving a level of 
integration that would create the conditions for a security community, whether of the amalgamated or the pluralistic 
variety.‖ Duffy and Field (1980) also dismiss regional groupings in Africa and Latin America as ―founded on the reefs 
of distrust, non-cooperation and parochial nationalism‖ and therefore not applicable to the Functionalist model of 
regional integration through spill- over effects from the lower economic levels to higher political integration, security 
cooperation and community (cited in Acharya, 1994: 85). This is premised on the functionalist assumption that ―[i]f 
functional regional groupings could successfully foster economic integration, regional security would ensure that the 
actors would, over a period of time, learn to resolve their conflicts peacefully and come to cooperate on common 
security issues‖ (Acharya 1994: 84). Rugumamu (2002: 23) adds his voice to the debate by stating that ―Africa‘s 
collective security arrangements are, more often than not, an aggregation of weakness…state-building, nation-
building and democratic governance in most of Africa have not produced robust foundations on which to construct 
larger security arrangements.‖ The criticism is anchored on the fact that most of African nation-states are 
economically and politically weak and therefore cannot establish strong functional, regional organisations, let alone 
security communities.  
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However, it appears that the dismissal of the efforts made by some regional organisations on security matters in spite 
of the difficulties is grossly unfair. Regional organisations such as ECOWAS, IGAD and SADC have made 
commendable strides in economic and security cooperations and have been instrumental in management and 
peaceful resolution of conflicts in their respective regions. More noticeably, ECOWAS successfully launched 
preventive peacekeeping missions in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Despite its hurdles and shortcomings, it is worthwhile 
to acknowledge that ECOMOG succeeded to some extent in mitigating the bloodbath and humanitarian emergencies 
in the two countries (Sesay (2000). The SADC also made a mark in Lesotho as will be discussed in detail in chapter 
six, and is currently involved in resolving conflicts in Zimbabwe and Madagascar. As such, despite the hurdles, 
regional organisations in the Third World are engaged in initiatives for peace, democracy, good governance and 
security in their respective zones and globally. What is needed is material support from the UN and the Developed 
World in curbing the conflicts. 
 
Van Niewkerk (2001) and Nathan (2003) consequently recommend the regional security regime model as useful for 
the African context. Van Niewkerk (2001: 8) suggests that ―[i]nstead of developing grand and expensive security 
designs African regional communities should rather concentrate on the goal of constraining the option of military 
force in conflict management.‖ It is the view of Nathan (1995: 5) that a common security regime would have many 
advantages in the African context. ―It could provide a basis for early warning of potential crises; building military 
confidence and stability through disarmament and transparency on defence matters; engaging in joint problem-
solving and developing collaborative programmes on security issues; negotiating multi-lateral security arrangements; 
and managing conflict through peaceful means.‖ Moller, on other hand, advises SADC and ECOWAS security 
structures to emulate the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) rather than NATO, since the 
former‘s purpose is to ―consolidate respect for human rights, democracy and rule of law, to strengthen peace and to 
promote unity‖ while NATO‘s purpose is ―to provide a system of collective defence in the event of armed attack 
against any member‖ (cited in Van Niewkerk 2003: 8). The understanding is that the security organs should be 
peace-orientated rather than militaristic in their goals, principles and operations.  
 
The Security Community theory expands the role of regional organisations beyond the traditional security scope of 
security and defence of the state and the incumbent regime. It envisages security which encompasses non-military 
issues such as economic development, equitable distribution of wealth, environmental preservation, gender, human 
security and human rights, which is in line with the broadened and new security challenges of the post-Cold War 
world order (Nathan 1995, Buzan 2000, Ohlson 2001, Terriff etal. 2004, Schulz etal. 2001, Fisher and Ngoma 2004, 
Swart and du Plessis 2004, Ngoma 2005). Miall etal refer to the new security thinking as the cross-sectoral 
heterogeneous security complexes. An understanding of the contribution of non-military security factors to instability 
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and conflicts would go a long way in enhancing efficacy by regional organisations in their preventive diplomacy 
missions. 
 
The Security complex/regime or community paradigm is relevant to this study which aims to investigate SADC‘s 
security institutional capabilities and mechanism and challenges in the region. As Buzan explains, ―[a]n approach 
based on security complexes focuses attention on sets of states whose security problems are interconnected. 
Security is viewed as only partly divisible; a substantial portion of it is residing in essentially indivisible relational 
patterns among states‖ (1991: 224). Buzan (1991) further praises the security complex paradigm as a powerful tool 
which offers a systematic approach to security analysis at both the macro-level, (international), the middle level 
(regional) and the micro-level (national). There is no doubt that the formation of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence 
and Security and its supportive operational structures have been guided by these theoretical perspectives. 
 
4.8 The New Regionalism Theory 
The post-Cold War era was characterised by revitalisation and proliferation of regional bodies in terms of numbers, 
membership, diversity and operational context, goals, scope and procedures. The EU for example expanded by 
admitting former Socialist states of Eastern Europe. Regional organisations in the Third World, such as the SADC 
and the ASEAN, also expanded their membership and established security mechanisms. SADC was boosted by the 
membership of a democratic South Africa in 1994, while ASEAN was joined by former communist states such as 
Cambodia and Vietnam (Nathan 1995, Malan and Cilliers 1997, Buzan 2000, Schulz, Soderbaum and Ojendal 2001, 
Hettne 2001, Oden 2001, Moller 2004, Ngoma 2005). This emergence of revitalised regional organisations came to 
be known as the New Regionalism, and scholars devised the ―New Regionalism theory‖ for an appropriate analytical 
framework of the emerging regional organisations in a new world order. 
 
The new regionalism movement is distinguished from the Old Regionalism (Hegemonic Regionalism) of the Cold War 
bipolar politics.  The proponents of the theoretical paradigm maintain that the regional bodies which emerged were a 
spontaneous process from below and within the region itself, and more in accordance with regional histories, 
experiences, peculiarities, needs aspirations and challenges (Fawcett and Hurrell 1995, Hettne and Soderbaum 1998 
Schulz etal. 2001). In this light Ojendal (2001: 175) notes that ―ASEAN is a project well rooted in the region, taking 
place on the members‘ conditions and taking care of its members‘ problems‖ rather than the Cold War interests. The 
regional organisations became heterogeneous and multidimensional, embracing a wide range of issues from the 
military, political security to human security, human rights, democracy, good governance, gender and environmental 
security. They are also inclusive of non-state actors such as Non-governmental and Civil Society Organisations in 
their preventive diplomacy interventions (Hettne and Inotai 1994, Nathan 1995,, Fawcett and Hurrell 1999, Buzan 
2000, Schulz, Soderbaum and Ojendal 2001, Terriff etal. 2004, Ngoma 2005).  
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Therefore, the pluralism and multidimensionality of contemporary regionalisation begged for a new framework of 
analysis which ―transcends the dominant theories of regional integration such as neo-realism, functionalism, neo-
functionalism, institutionalism, market and trade integration, structuralism and development‖ (Schulz etal. 2001: 2). 
The argument raised by proponents of the new regionalism theory is that the classical theories do not capture the 
pluralism and multi-dimensional dynamics of new regionalism and the concomitant challenges of the post-Cold War 
world. The new regionalism theory therefore is an open-ended approach built on the strength and flaws of the earlier 
theoretical expositions. It is designed to capture the multi-dimensional facets and trends of contemporary regionalism 
from a historical and interdisciplinary perspective (Fawcett and Hurrell 1995, Hettne, Inotai and Sunkel 2000, Schulz, 
Soderbaum and Ojendal 2001). Hence, Mittelman (1999) posits that ―[t]he New Regionalism approach is an 
important advance on the different versions of integration theory (trade or market integration, functionalism, neo-
functionalism, institutionalism and neo-functionalism‖. All of them are deficient in as much as they understate power 
relations and fail to offer an explanation of structural transformation. In some ways a break with this tradition, the New 
Regional Approach explores contemporary forms of transnational cooperation and cross-border flows through 
comparative, historical, and multilevel perspectives (25-26).  
 
The theoretical perspective proposes to put discussions of regionalism within the current global context and also 
capture the regional peculiarities, particularities and concomitant challenges of different regional formations. Such an 
approach would capture regional dynamics from different contexts and halt the classical trend where regional 
formations were to be understood on the basis of European integration models. It would also enhance the discourse 
on regionalism by tapping into the histories and peculiarities of the different regions. Regional integration formations‘ 
operational modalities in preventive diplomacy are to a large extent determined by the contextual challenges in the 
regions (Fawcett 1995, Hettne 2001, Schulz etal. 2001).  
 
The New Regionalism Theory is well suited to accommodate the numerous regional organisations and their 
expanded operational scope and goals in view of new non-military regional security challenges as prerequisites for 
peace and stability. The theory also provides a realisation that durable peace and stability can only be achieved by 
addressing the structural sources of conflict, such as underdevelopment, undemocratic governance, unequal 
distribution of resources, access to opportunities and basic survival needs, marginalisation of minority identities, 
weak governance institutions and other non-military security challenges. In view of this, regional organisations have 
embarked on holistic pledges in their treaties and protocols to deal with the existing structural deficiencies in their 
regional spheres. 
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The SADC‘s growth from being an economic community to a security complex should be understood within the 
parameters of this theoretical paradigm. The questions to be answered are; ―[w]ill the ‗new regionalism‘ serve Africa‘s 
interests better?‖ And ―Are such arrangements effective in today‘s climate of globalisation and the concomitant 
marginalisation and exclusion?‖ (Du Pisani 2001, Van Nieuwkerk 2003). Answers to such thought-provoking 
questions will be based on the study of future operations of regional organisations and how they face the security 
challenges in their respective regions and the globalising world. The fact of the matter is that it is a daunting 
challenge to Third World regional organisations to overcome the power of globalisation and its impact. 
 
4.9 The significance of Regional Organisations in Preventive Diplomacy 
Several reasons have been advanced by different scholars as to why it has become so important for regional 
organisations to be actively involved in conflict prevention, management and resolution in their respective regions, 
especially in the post-Cold War era. In the words of Mortimer (2000: 188), ―[t]he concept of regional approaches to 
peacekeeping and conflict resolution is an attractive one to many theorists of international relations.‖ The clarion call 
for regional organisations‘ role in the maintenance of global peace has become more pronounced since the end of 
the Cold War in the 1990s. This was because during the Cold War regional organisations were tied and manipulated 
by the superpowers to accentuate their bipolar political agendas. The Cold War politics interfered with regional 
organisations‘ role in peace maintenance. The post-Cold War political climate saw a less competitive intervention by 
great powers in external regional security matters and a gradual decentralisation of security responsibility to regional 
blocs (Buzan 1991, Ghali 1992, Annan 1998, De Waal 2000, Levit 2001, Miall etal. 2001, Ngoma 2005). Therefore, 
according to Rugumamu (2002: 22), ―the recent move toward security regionalism is consistent with the post-Cold 
War concept of shared responsibility between the United Nations and regional and sub-regional organisations.‖ In 
light of this changing international political landscape Buzan (1991) contends that ―[i]ndigenous patterns of regional 
security will be increasingly important features of the international system in the twenty-first century, thus closing 
forever the…historical period in which huge differentials in technology and socio-political organisation enabled a 
handful of states to impose their control on the entire community‖ (1991: 208-209). 
 
The following are some of the key reasons why regional organisations must play a leading role in regional preventive 
diplomacy missions. Firstly, Chapter viii, articles 52-54 of the United Nations accommodate the formation of regional 
arrangements with the view of tackling regional conflicts to complement the UN in the mammoth task of maintaining 
global peace and security. It was seen by the UN founding fathers that the UN on its own could not effectively carry 
out the task of global order. Successive UN Secretary Generals Perez de Quellar, Ghali, Kofi Annan and currently 
ban-Ki-Moon, have constantly called upon regional organisations to play an active role in maintaining regional and 
global peace. In one of his reports to the UN Security Council (1 November 1995) Boutros Ghali has lamented the 
untapped potential of regional organisations in conflict prevention, management and resolution. He posits that ―[i]t is 
 170 
 
increasingly apparent that the United Nations cannot address every potential and actual conflict troubling the world. 
Regional or sub-regional organisations sometimes have a comparative advantage in taking the lead role in the 
prevention and settlement of conflicts and to assist the United Nations in containing them‖ 1995: 2). This message 
was echoed by Annan in his 1998 report entitled ―The causes of conflict and the promotion of durable and 
sustainable development in Africa”. 
 
In view of the stated positions, successive UN Secretary Generals have consistently called for efforts and measures 
to strengthen the capabilities of regional organisations in preventive action and peacemaking initiatives (Ghali (1995, 
Annan 1998). This was deemed necessary because ―wherever possible the international community should strive to 
complement rather than supplant African efforts to resolve Africa‘s problems …‖ (Annan 1998: 10). According to 
Hwang, through this newly developed interest, the Secretary Generals ―… hoped that regional organisations in Africa 
would increasingly fill in the vacuum left by the United Nations‘ reluctance to act in conflict management in the region‖ 
(2005: 182). The former OAU Secretary General Salim Ahmed Salim has added his voice that  ―while recognising the 
primary and overarching responsibility of the UN... he called on Africa to have a role to play in maintaining peace and 
security in their regions whether in support of the UN efforts or its own initiatives (in Nhara 1996). 
 
The core point is that there should be effective collaboration and partnership between the UN and regional 
organisations in security issues at both the regional and international levels. Malone (2002: vii) argues that ―[i]t is (the 
collaboration of the UN and regional organisations) widely accepted that more of it would be a very good thing, 
particularly for a world organisation sagging under strain of multiple complex peace operations supported restlessly 
by sometimes unreliable funders.‖ This is mainly because ―each in its own way, on its own issues has been reluctant 
to endow the UN Security Council with needed capacity to act decisively‖ (Jentleson 2002: 37). Faced with such 
complex and multifaceted post-Cold War conflicts, it is highly unlikely that some key objectives [for intervention] will 
be achievable through the actions of one external actor such as the UN, hence the necessity of a multi-pronged 
multi-organisational and multi-sectoral approach involving regional organisations, donors, NGOs, Civil Society 
Organisations in fighting  conflicts  (Peck 1993, Henrikson 1995, Cockell 2002). 
 
Ghali (1992: 14, notes that active participation by regional organisations in regional peace efforts would ensure 
cooperation between the UN and the regional organisations, through decentralisation, delegation and ―also contribute 
to a deeper sense of participation, consensus and democratisation of the international affairs.‖ Proponents of this 
partnership ―see greater involvement by regional organisations in preventive diplomacy and/or advocate the creation 
of new institutions at the regional level under the UN auspices that would have a specialised role to play in conflict 
resolution and preventive diplomacy‖ (Hampson 2003: 153). Thus in his report entitled ―Building Peace and 
Development‖ of 1994 Ghali alludes to a meeting held between him and the heads of regional bodies to establish 
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stronger working relationships and new modalities for collaboration among the different regional groupings and the 
UN. The agenda of the meeting was to assess the existing cooperation between the UN and regional organisations. 
It was agreed that there should be a symbiotic relationship between the UN and regional bodies for efficient 
exchange of information on emerging crises for both preventive and resolution purposes. The meeting also agreed 
on the necessity of the UN training of regional organisations peacekeeping forces and personnel for joint coordination 
and operations in peacekeeping (Henrikson 1995).  
 
Therefore, the role of regional organisations should not be construed to be taking away the cardinal and primary role 
of the UN of maintaining international peace and security, but that partnership between them would go a long way in 
resolving conflicts worldwide. The call for regional organisations‘ role in conflict resolution should be understood 
within the context of the changing global international order which needs new approaches to broadened security 
challenges. In response, the UN, through its various functional departments such as the UN Department of Political 
Affairs (DPA), the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the Office for the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, the UN Development Programme (UNDP), the UN Children‘s Fund (UNICEF), the 
UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), the Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) and the World 
Bank, is collaborating with different regional organisations and NGOs such as the Development Assistance 
Committee of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (DAC/OECD), the Conflict Prevention 
and Post-Conflict Reconstruction Network, the European Platform on Conflict Prevention,, the West African Peace-
building Network, the Southeast Asia Regional Forum on Peaceful Conflict Resolution and Good Governance and 
many others in its bid to prevent and resolve global conflicts (Dress and Rosenblum 2002). 
 
In its conflict resolution and peacekeeping missions in Liberia and Sierra Leone, ECOWAS has partnered with the 
UN in bringing peace and stability in the conflict ridden countries. Commenting on the significance of the combined 
ECOMOG-United Nations Organisation Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL), Ghali states that ―[t]he process in Liberia poses 
a special opportunity to the UN in that UNOMIL would be the first peacekeeping operation undertaken by the UN in 
cooperation with a peacekeeping mission already set up by another organisation; in this case a sub-regional 
organisation... This relationship potentially present some challenges but I am confident that with goodwill...this 
relationship will be successful and may even set a precedent for future peacekeeping missions...‖ (cited in Sessay 
2000: 235). There was extensive cooperation between the UN, the OSCE and NGOs to curb the ethnic conflicts 
which were brewing in Macedonia. ―Both organisations shared complementary objectives in the crisis. A broad 
network of international, regional and local NGOs also tried to address ethnic tensions at the local and community 
level reducing prejudice and working towards ethnic reconciliation‖ (Hampson 2002: 146). Ackerman, cited in 
Vayrynen (2003: 50) asserts that ―with the support of the regional organisations, the deployment of the UN troops in 
Macedonia has been construed as a paradigmatic case of successful preventive deployment....‖ The UN Preventive 
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Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) was bolstered by the local consent, and a sense of ownership of the peace 
operation and its outcomes was achieved. Although the overlap in the UN-OSCE mission operations in Macedonia 
bred some mutual tensions, they ultimately amicably resolved the hurdles in 1993 through an agreement on the 
principles of coordination between them (Vayrynen 2003). 
 
Although conducted under controversial circumstances, the Zimbabwe-led SADC intervention in the DRC was 
indicative of how a regional organisation has committed its meagre resources to mediate in a member‘s intra-state 
conflict. In fact, it paved the way for the UN Mission in the Congo (MONUC) which came in to bolster the peace 
initiatives laid by the SADC leading to some relative stability in the country. MONUC consistently worked with the 
SADC in guiding the peace process and democratic dispensation in the DRC. The process is on-going but there is 
hope that the collaboration will bear some positive results. 
 
Commendable as these UN and regional organisation collaborative efforts are, there is still much to be done to 
establish more coherent partnerships. Dress and Rosenblum (2002: 232) posit that ―current efforts notwithstanding, 
the United Nations and the international community have yet to achieve an integrated, collaborative long-term 
strategy for strengthening national, regional and international capacities to effectively manage conflict.‖ 
 
Secondly, the multidimensionality, pervasiveness and complex nature of current conflicts need the input of regional 
organisations. Engel (2005) observes that post-Cold War Africa experienced a new trend of wars characterised by 
opportunistic, self-serving warlords‘ extreme violence and brutality targeted more directly at the civilians than other 
armed groups. According to Van Walraven (2005: 77), in many of these complex intra-state conflicts, ―[t]he UN 
proved unable to make a difference – especially if the individual member states were pursuing their own conflicting 
interests as evidenced in the Balkans, Somalia and the DRC.‖ Most of the intra-state conflicts which ravaged the 
world, especially Africa, were historically rooted and became so regionalised in their causal factors, diffusion trends, 
dynamics and effects that they required regional solutions based on the knowledge of the historical sources of the 
conflict and the cultural, political and geographical dynamics of the regions‘ politics. The regionalised conflicts in 
West Africa, the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes regions, indeed would require an active role by the regional 
organisations and if necessary a partnership with the UN. In fact, the UN Charter ―does not assume that the Security 
Council will address all security problems or that it will necessarily be the first recourse in case of threats to 
international peace and security.‖  Article 53 (1) of the UN Charter states that ―[t]he Security Council shall, where 
appropriate, utilise such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority.‖ In other 
words, the UN advocates the possibility of coordinating the efforts of regional bodies or working in partnership with 
regional organisations in preventive missions. Annan concedes this point when he states that in order to ―address 
complex causes, we need complex, interdisciplinary solutions. Implementing preventive strategies...requires 
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cooperation across a broad range of different agencies and departments... Cross-sector cooperation...is a 
prerequisite of successful prevention‖ (cited in Cockell 2002: 186). 
 
The efforts of ECOWAS in Liberia and Sierra Leone, SADC in Lesotho and IGAD in Sudan and Somalia, albeit with 
little success, should be viewed in this context. The urgency of regional organisations‘ role in the maintenance of 
global peace is also necessitated by the expanded nature of security threats which the UN cannot successfully 
handle without partnership with regional organisations. The current security challenges are no longer limited to 
security and defence of the state. They embrace both military and non-military areas such human rights, human 
security, environmental security, immigration issues, development and economic growth issues and ethnic identity 
questions, freedoms and liberties, all of which, if not addressed, would give birth to protracted and deep-rooted 
conflicts (IPA 2001 Azar 1990a, Burton 1990b, 1990b, Buzan 1991, Thomas 1991, Benjamin 1992, Adedeji 1999, 
Barengu and Landsberg 2003, Zacarias 2003, Swart and Duplessis 2004, Terriff etal. 2004, Field 2004, Ngoma 
2005). The expanded security challenges and call for the role of regional organisations are vividly illustrated by 
Cawthra (2004: 32): ―[s]ince the end of the Cold War, there have been increasing expectations that regional and sub-
regional organisations should take on the security function…It is felt that the complexity of the conflicts, the 
multidimensionality of ‗widened‘ security issues, the erosion of sovereignty, the trans-national character of the new 
security threats and the new wars, the growing pressure on the United Nations system for peacekeeping and other 
actions, the pressure for democratisation and security sector reform, the complex effects of globalisation, all lends 
themselves to regional solutions.‖ Therefore, in view of the above, regional organisations have a vital role to play in 
the promotion and maintenance of peace and security in their respective regions, solely and/or in partnership with the 
international Community and the UN.  
 
In response to such a call, regional organisations have formed security organs for conflict prevention, management, 
and resolution, peacekeeping and peace-building missions, and have already made their marks as evidenced by 
ECOWAS in Liberia and Sierra Leone and the SADC in Lesotho. According to Sesay (2000: 196), ―West Africa put 
that concept into practical use at the opportune time in mounting ECOMOG operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone‖ in 
the 1990s.There is no doubt that the rise of preventive diplomacy discourse has markedly shaped the functioning of 
African governments‘ diplomatic interactions and relations. Due to the benign neglect by the West, African regional 
organisations have been compelled to assess their responsibility in conflict prevention, management and resolution. 
As Van Walraven (2005: 75) correctly observes, ―African policy makers, diplomats and international civil servants 
began to refer to early warning, conflict prevention and peacebuilding in their public pronouncements, their thinking 
and their search for strategies that could improve the continent‘s declining effectiveness in handling its own-
especially intra-state conflicts.‖ 
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Thirdly, after the Cold War, Africa lost its economic, political and strategic value to the West as the battle-ground for 
bipolar politics. Western powers and the United States‘ foreign policies shifted to disengagement from the continent 
in spite of the numerous civil conflicts which erupted as a result of the residues of the Cold War politics (for example, 
in the DRC, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Liberia and Somalia), and the escalation of those conflicts which were fuelled by 
superpowers‘ bipolar ideological struggles such as in Angola, Mozambique and the DRC. The Security Council, 
which is controlled by the major world powers, became indifferent to the conflicts plaguing the African continent. This 
policy of inaction has been dubbed the ―Africa fatigue‖ (Miall etal 2001), the ―Afro-pessimism‖, the ―peace fatigue‖ the 
―conflict fatigue‖ (USIP 1994), and the ―intervention fatigue‖ (Sorbo, 1999), while Martin (2002) dubbed it the policy of 
―benign neglect‖‘ Vraalsen (1999: 23) succinctly captures this attitude thus: ―Let Africa drift in her own sea of misery 
and hopelessness. It is of no concern to us.‖ 
 
The reluctance to commit UN and Western governments‘ resources in resolving conflicts in Africa mainly resulted 
from the abortive UN operation in Somalia in 1993, which saw 18 USA marines killed by the warring Somali factions 
(the Somalia/Mogadishu Syndrome). The UN peacekeeping forces withdrew, leaving Somalia to disintegrate into a 
collapsed and failed state, which it is today. The reluctance by the UN Security Council reached its peak when it 
remained passive during the Rwandan genocide in 1994. Salim, then the OAU Secretary General, denounced the 
passivity by the UN as a laissez–faire attitude in the face of a tragedy. Shockingly the UN remained passive in spite 
of the numerous warnings by the commander of the inadequate UN force in Rwanda on the impending human 
catastrophe (Annan 1998, Adebayo etal. 1999, Berman 2000, de Waal 2000, Miall etal. 2001, IPA 2001, 2002, Levit 
2003). According to Jentleson (2000c: 258), in the UN ―information from the field about extremist plans in Rwanda 
was assessed in light of what happened in Somalia. There were fears that the UN may face a scenario that made 
Somalia look pale.‖ Therefore, the new self-imposed rule in the [UN] Department of Peacekeeping Operations 
became ―Don‘t cross the Mogadishu line.‖ 
 
Sesay (2000) observes the prevalence of this indifferent attitude during the conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone. The 
gross massacres, human rights violations and the concomitant humanitarian crises in the conflict-torn countries did 
not immediately trigger UN and international community intervention to curb the bloodbath. This was within the 
parameters of the post-Cold War politics in which the West and the USA would only commit their troops in situations 
where their strategic, political, economic and security interests were under threat. Sesay asks ―[h]ow else does one 
account for the neglect of the war in Liberia and Sierra Leone by the great powers for so many years? Surely it was 
because the two countries were of lesser strategic and economic importance to the West...‖ With such established 
reluctance by the UN Security Council, peacekeeping in Africa was in jeopardy, as the international community 
feared another Somalia if they were to intervene. The situation confirmed the former USA Assistant Secretary of 
State Chester Crocker‘s observation that ―[t]he end of the Cold War created both greater opportunities for negotiated 
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peace (in the absence of Cold War competition by proxy) and simultaneously diminished international interest in 
providing the resources and political engagement necessary to secure such peace‖ (cited in Suhrke and Jones 
(2000: 263). 
 
Disengagement by the United States as the sole world power was consolidated by the passage of the Presidential 
Decision Directive (PPD 25) of May 1994 during the Clinton administration. It clearly stated that the USA will only 
commit its military resources when its national and strategic interests are threatened. This tragic u-turn in the USA 
policy on international intervention prompted Hass to describe the resourceful nation as ―a reluctant sheriff.‖ De Waal 
(2000: 49) summarised the nonchalant attitude of the Security Council and the major powers towards conflict 
mediation in Africa thus: ―the main feature of the international engagements in Africa, especially since the collapse of 
the Somali intervention, has been their lack of seriousness. Western powers, and notably the US, are simply not 
willing to risk military resources, and above all, the lives of their troops in Africa. [The] policy has been marked by 
only a ‗soft‘ engagement–verbal and symbolic commitments not backed up by resources or hard political and 
diplomatic work.‖ Ihe Western governments were either reluctant to provide substantial support or they intervened on 
their own terms or hid behind the bureaucratic UN decision-making process. 
 
The major powers have also resorted to the principle of ―African solutions to African problems‖ and have pledged to 
enhance African security and peacekeeping capabilities by providing training to African peacekeeping forces to take 
over the responsibility for peace and security in the continent. These came in the form of training of a Rapid Reaction 
Force, the African Crises Response Initiative (ACRI) by the USA; the Reinforcement of African Capabilities for 
Peacekeeping (RECAMP) by France and other security initiatives by Britain and the Nordic countries in the early 
1990s. In 1991, for example, Ethiopia, Ghana, Malawi, Mali, Senegal, Tunisia and Uganda provided battalions for 
training through the US ACRI initiative. Currently the USA intends to establish military bases in some African 
regions/countries for peacekeeping missions and mainly for its global war against terrorism. Other nations such as 
Nigeria and South Africa have their suspicions about the initiatives (IPA 2000, 2001). Herbst (2000: 311) remarks that 
―[f]or a variety of historical, tactical and relatively recent reasons, African solutions to African problems have been 
embarked across the world as the operational code for future peacekeeping operations in Africa.‖ It was in light of 
this situation that Salim was quoted as saying ―[t]he declining enthusiasm of the outside world for getting involved in 
African issues and escalating demands on the UN for peacekeeping missions should lead to a greater devolution of 
responsibility for conflict resolution on regional organisations‖ (in Joseph 1999: 11). 
 
Faced with such institutionalised neglect at a critical moment, African leaders and governments have realised the 
importance of consolidating their regional organisations and establishing security organs to tackle the emerging 
and/or recurring conflicts. They have taken it as a challenge to be more organised, coherent and bold, to face the 
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conflicts within their respective regions and the continent at large. This was evidenced by the establishment of 
ECOMOG and its Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution and Security (MCPMR) which 
intervened in Liberia and Sierra Leone while SADC established it‘s OPDS which facilitated the intervention in Lesotho 
and arguably in the DRC. IGAD has since been instrumental in trying to find lasting peace in the long-running 
conflicts in Sudan and Somalia, albeit with little success. The underlying assumption and driving motive for ECOWAS 
interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone is that the West has turned its back on Africa. As du Plessis 2000; 343) puts 
it, ―vital national interests were still a decisive determinant in international relations as the great powers in general, 
simply ignored the collapse in Liberia and Sierra Leone because their vital interests were not directly threatened. 
ECOWAS thus felt obliged to act alone.‖ The ECOWAS Secretary General Abbas Bundi was quoted as saying 
ECOWAS intervened in Liberia because of the ―realisation that there was a problem from which everyone was 
running away. ECOWAS states cannot stand by and watch a member state slide into anarchy‖ (cited in Soderbaum 
2001: 69). These sentiments were also projected by the Coordinator of the Conflict Prevention and Research in the 
OAU Division of Conflict Management, William Nhara, that Africa should brace itself for full responsibility in 
maintenance of peace and security, as the continent has been deserted by the international community and the 
United Nation Security Council (Hebrst 2000). 
 
This response by African leaders of establishing preventive diplomacy security mechanisms moved Hammerstad 
(2005) to comment that during the first few years of the 21st century there has been an immense growth in Africa‘s 
security institutions, creating the hope that the regional organisations are prepared to play a leading role in resolving 
the continent‘s political conflicts. However, it is important to note that in most cases, on their own, African regional 
organisations have not been successful in conflict resolution missions due mainly to a paucity of resources, lack of 
political will, and partisan complicity in some regional conflicts. In view of this, the partnership of regional 
organisations with the UN in preventive diplomatic interventions is crucial, because the UN would inject political 
legitimacy and operational expertise and resources to the mission. The Carnegie Commission on the Prevention of 
Deadly Conflict observed that ―regional organisations can be greatly strengthened for preventive purposes. They 
should establish means, linked to the UN to monitor circumstances of incipient violence in the regions. They should 
develop a repertoire of diplomatic political and economic measures for regional use to help prevent dangerous 
circumstances... Such a repertoire would include ways to provide advanced warning of conflict to the organisation 
members and to marshal the necessary logistics command and control efforts authorised by the UN‖ (Job 1992: 19). 
In the view of Dress and Roseblum-Kumar (2002: 230), ―[i]f prevention is framed in [such] an integrated and 
comprehensive way, governments and the international community will focus more attention and consequently a 
greater share of their budgets and resources, to the long-term aspects of peacebuilding instead of short-term crisis 
management.‖ 
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Fourthly, African leaders have always expressed and still express a keen desire for full sovereignty in the cultural, 
economic, and political and security spheres. Such sentiments were evidenced by the formation of the Organisation 
of the African Unity (OAU) in 1963 and the existence of the Pan Africanist ideology, which were geared towards a 
United States of Africa, in which the nations of the continent would pool their resources to resolve their problems. 
Pan Africanist leaders and scholars such as Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana and Ali Mazrui, advocate the principle of 
―Pax Africana‖ in which genuine independence by the African continent can only be achieved when there is self-
reliance in tackling the social, economic, political and security challenges. Although the OAU was a dismal failure in 
the maintenance of peace in the continent, it did have its Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and 
Resolution (MCPMR) which is evidence of the willingness to undertake the task, if it was not constrained by resource 
paucity and a lack of political will and commitment by some of the leaders. The organisation also maintained the ―Try 
OAU First Principle‖ in which member states were encouraged to refer their conflicts to the OAU before they could be 
sent to the UN, as happened during the border wars between Ethiopia and Somalia, Rwanda and Burundi, and 
Morocco and Algeria. The West African region called for the formation of an African Fire Brigade -- a form of a 
Standing Army to quench the conflicts which were raging in the continent. The same aspirations are embodied in the 
invigorated African Union, its Peace and Security Council and NEPAD divisions, which are geared towards ensuring 
the stability, security and economic prosperity of the continent. The establishment of the African Union Parliament 
reflects the determination of the continent in combining efforts to resolve its problems and the accompanying 
challenges. The former President of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki, spearheaded the African Renaissance, while 
Obasanjo of Nigeria proposed a conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation to empower Africa 
to confront her problems without necessarily waiting hopelessly for external support (IPA 2000, 2001, Field 2004). 
Such efforts have been evidenced by the African Union sending a peacekeeping force in Darfur (Sudan) although it is 
seriously constrained by paucity of resources. At the African Union meeting held on Saturday the 9th of September 
2008 at Sirte, Libya, the late Libyan Leader, Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, reiterated his calls for a United States of 
Africa in his rejection of the deployment of United Nations troops in the Sudanese Darfur region. He is quoted as 
having said: ―Africa could be a black giant able to solve problems like Darfur on its own if countries were united in a 
federation…rather than existing as separate states vulnerable to outside manipulation‖ (cited in the Business Day, 
Monday 11 September 2008: 6). Although this appears to be a mirage, it shows how African governments wish and 
dream to be in a position to be independent and capable of addressing their challenges without always heavily 
relying on the UN and the Developed World. 
 
The call for regional organisations to partake and play a leading role in conflict prevention, management and 
resolution should be viewed in the light of a continent still struggling for substantive economic and political 
independence. Mandela expressed these sentiments when he stated that ―the time has come for Africa to take full 
responsibility for her woes; to use the immense collective wisdom (she) possesses to make a reality of the ideal of 
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the African renaissance whose time has come‖ (cited in Green 1999: 40). Hebrst (2000: 312) recommends the 
delegation of peacekeeping to regional organisations, and views this as an important move in the history of the 
continent. He writes: ―[t]he Africanisation of peacekeeping is an important development in the international relations 
of the continent. The fact that peacekeeping is increasingly being seen as an African responsibility is part of a larger 
process that is leading to the development of much more profound and important international relations within 
Africa…the history of international relations in Africa is just beginning.‖ In response to the criticisms levelled against 
the Nigerian-led intervention in Liberia, the then military strongman Ibrahim Babangida said: ―I, as should Nigeria and 
other responsible countries in the sub-region, standby and watch the whole of Liberia turned into one mass 
graveyard?... We know that there are those who are watching to see the Liberian crisis as a concrete indicator of 
Africa in disarray and despair, purposeless and without any direction or control... In Liberia were are first and 
foremost reflecting the love we have for our respective countries, our sub-region and mankind‖ (cited in Sesay 2000: 
215-216). As a result of these insights, regional organisations have become increasingly prominent in the African 
political landscape to champion economic development, peace and stability in their respective regional zones and the 
continent at large. 
 
Finally, regional organisations are well placed to mediate in disputes in their respective regions because they have 
an immediate interest in regional peace and stability and are compelled to avert conflict spill over and their effects 
into their respective states and the region at large, or deteriorating into regional complexes. This is a security 
imperative for regional states since inaction may spell their undoing. There are living lessons of how intra-state 
conflicts can swiftly spread and become regionalised if not nipped in the bud. This was experienced in the Great 
Lakes region, West Africa and the Horn of Africa regions. Regional organisations are well suited to play key roles in 
finding durable solutions to regional conflicts because they command considerable knowledge and understanding of 
their historical, cultural, political and geographical contexts and dynamics (Ghali 1992, 1995, Job 1992, Lund 1996, 
Annan 1998, Adedeji 1999, International Peace Academy 2001, Carment and Schnabel 2003, Anthony 2003, Basupi 
2007). Job 1992: 19) summarised the reasons why regional organisations should be integrally involved as follows. 
They: 
 Have the advantages of familiarity and proximity; 
 Are likely to have direct interests in seeing tensions reduced and conflicts ended, given the likelihood of the spill 
over effects of economic uncertainty, voluntary and involuntary flows of refugees, [and] cross-over incursions; 
 Are sensitive to the nuances of regional and local political and security cultures; 
 Have first- hand knowledge of the issues at hand; 
 Are likely to be more functionally capable in terms of language and logistical matters; 
 Have incentives to stay the course and see post-conflict peacebuilding efforts satisfactorily concluded because 
they will reap the benefits of a stable environment, not suffer the consequences of further regional instability. 
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Adedeji (1999) and Rugumamu (2002) correctly note that what is primarily required in resolving a conflict is to master 
and comprehend the underlying structural causes, histories and trends of the conflicts. In fact, Adedeji (1999) and 
Toure (1999) argue that failure by the United Nations to resolve conflicts in Africa emanates from lack of 
comprehension and mastery of the history and dynamics of the conflict at hand. 
 
Therefore, it is envisaged that regional organisations can provide illuminating insights into the sources and dynamics 
of conflicts in their respective regions. It is also worth noting that regional powers can mobilise a peacekeeping force 
rapidly as compared to the United Nation Security Council which has to go through numerous bureaucratic 
procedures. There is also a belief that regional peacekeeping troops will in most cases be more acceptable in 
conflict-torn countries than forces from the UN. As Cantori and Spiegel (1970) observe, ―[i]n general the experience 
of intrusive powers has been that it is easier to impose conflict than cooperation upon members of a subordinate 
system‖ (cited in Buzan 1991: 214). However, this is questionable considering the resistance which the ECOWAS 
and SADC forces faced in Liberia and Sierra Leone, DRC and Lesotho respectively. It has also been argued that 
several African countries have participated in the UN peacekeeping missions and have acquired skills and 
experience to carry out regional peacekeeping with or without support from the UN. For example in SADC, 
Botswana, Zambia, Zimbabwe and South Africa have participated in the UN peacekeeping missions in Somalia, 
Mozambique and the DRC. In the view of Hettne (2001: 107 and 103), ―security has become a regional issue in 
Africa and will continue to be so in the years to come‖ therefore it is imperative for Africa ―to develop a structure of 
trans-national governments in all the sub-regions.‖ Hettne even envisages a future world order characterised by 
regional multilateralism, while Buzan (1991) asserts that if the consciousness of regional security dynamics was to 
grow in the minds of policy makers, it might ensure better focused efforts to deal with both regional and international 
conflicts. 
 
The call for regional organisations‘ role in maintenance of peace and security should not alienate the UN as the 
international body for international peace and security. The UN retains its central and primary role of ensuring global 
peace and security. As Doyle (1998: 10) rightly notes, ―[t]he UN holds a unique claim to legitimate authority on 
international peace and war.‖ According to Jentleson (2002: 37) ―[t]he UN brings two great strengths to preventive 
state craft. One is its unique normative role for ‗collective legitimation.‘ No other body can claim comparative 
legitimacy for establishing global norms and for authorising actions in the name of the international community, be it 
diplomatic intermediation or military intervention. The other is its network of agencies, which provide it with significant 
institutional capacity to help cope with refugee flows, help relieve starvation and perform other humanitarian tasks.‖ 
The argument is that external assistance, especially by the UN, should be built on the efforts of regional 
organisations, as in the case of Liberia, where the UN came in to boost ECOMOG‘s peacekeeping efforts. Henrikson 
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(1995) refers to this system as ―subcontracting upwards from the regional groupings to the UN‖ while the United 
States Institute of Peace (1994) calls it the ―layered response‖ (In this way the Africans would own the peace process 
and its outcomes.) After the abortive UN mission in Somalia, Mohammed Sahnoun, the special representative of the 
Secretary General, confessed that ―the priority of regional response, with the UN providing mainly substantive 
support seems so far to have been the dominant lesson learned from the Somalian catastrophe‖ (cited in Henrikson 
1995: 150).  
 
Therefore, given the ―greatly increased burden placed upon the UN since the end of the Cold War, it is logical to 
delegate a greater role to regional arrangements in the maintenance of international peace and security‖ (Mosieleng 
2001: 15). The UN should intervene at the invitation of a regional organisation following the exhaustion of regional 
peace initiatives. The organisations should be complementary in their roles. This is because there is no one 
international or regional actor that can singularly overcome the challenges posed by the incessant global conflicts. 
While most people would point to the UN actor as the optimal key player, it is important to remember that the UN has 
its own resources and institutional limitations which need to be complemented by other stakeholders such as regional 
organisations, NGOs, and CSOs (Jentleson 2002). 
 
However, despite the fact that combined UN and regional organisations‘ peace efforts have experienced difficulties; 
the international community should not and cannot relent. This is because as Jentleson (2002: 43) observes ―...in this 
post-Cold War era we need to work with the core idea of preventive statecraft; Act early to stop disputes from 
escalating or problems from worsening: Reduce tensions that if intensified could lead to war. Deal with today‘s 
conflicts before they become tomorrow‘s crises. Much more development, refinement, elaboration, modification, 
adaptation and extension are needed. For if we know one thing for sure, it is that the need for prevention is not going 
to subside at any time soon.‖  
 
4.10 Challenges faced by Regional Organisations in Preventive Diplomacy Missions 
Although there is ―reason to believe that regional actors are intrinsically equipped to deal with the dynamics of 
regional conflicts... the hopes placed on regional organisations are unduly optimistic, if not altogether misplaced‖ 
(MacFarlane and Weiss 1992: 7). This is because the efforts of regional organisations to resolve political crises and 
wars have met with varying degrees of challenges and failure (Hammerstad 2005). Regional organisations in the 
Third World, especially Africa, are faced with a myriad of challenges in the mammoth and daunting task of 
preventing, managing and resolving the recurrent and devastating conflicts bedevilling the continent. The challenges 
have, in some cases paralysed the efficiency of the organisations in implementing the good ideals in their founding 
documents. Most of the ideals have remained theoretical with little or insignificant practical implementation and 
benefits to the member states and the regions. Salim Ahmed Salim (1995) notes that ―there was a large gap between 
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assertions about African ownership and leadership and the blunt realities of African organisational weaknesses and 
external dependence‖ (in Joseph 1999: 11). According to Joseph (1999), existing evidence on African regional 
organisations in conflict resolution suggests that the gap between their aspirations and real achievements will take a 
long time to bridge. However, the experiences gained through ECOWAS operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone and 
SADC in Lesotho and the DRC provide valuable lessons and insights into the pros and cons of regional organisation 
interventions (Ero 1995, Vraalsen, 1999, Neethling 2000, International Peace Academy 2001, Nathan 2004, Ngoma 
2005, Likoti 2006). Some of the challenges encountered by regional organisations in their preventive and 
peacekeeping missions are as follows. 
 
First and foremost, the Third World countries are seriously underdeveloped owing to a wide range of factors such as 
colonial exploitation, neo- colonial economic domination, unfair and exploitative trade relations with the developed 
world, corruption and ill-advised and implemented development policies, crippling debt crises, and the 
marginalisation effects of globalisation on the already peripheral economies (Buzan 1991, Annan, 1998, Adedeji 
1999, Bedjaouni 2000, Mangu, 2003, Cilliers 2004). Economic insecurity has become an ever-prevalent threat to 
intra-state, regional and international peace. As a result, Third World regions have been gripped by numerous 
political upheavals since attaining independence. To date, some African countries such as the DRC, Uganda, Sudan, 
Somalia and Angola, have never known peace and stability. The limited economic resources have been wasted in 
sustaining the protracted conflicts instead of being used for sustainable development, economic growth, human 
development projects and service delivery. The regimes in the Third World countries have been compelled to 
channel most of their energies and efforts into national issues more than to regional matters. The leaders are more 
into nation-building, struggling with the gnawing challenges of underdevelopment, unemployment, poverty, disease, 
illiteracy and defence of the states and their regimes, than to regional development, peace and integration. As 
Nathan (2004: 19) puts it, ―[i]t is improbable that states will agree to be bound by rules and decision-making in the 
political and security spheres if they do not support the underlying norms and trust each other.‖  
 
Because of underdevelopment, regional organisations, especially in the Third World, have dismally failed to extricate 
themselves from dependence on external funding for their survival, despite the rhetoric of regional sovereignty by the 
leaders during their Head of States Summit gatherings. SADC is one such an organisation which since its inception 
has heavily relied on external funding from the developed world, individual nations, the European Community, the 
Nordic countries, Canada, USA and organisations such as the European Union and the World Bank. Bryant (1988) 
notes that right from its natal stages; SADC identified 500 projects valued at 6.5 US billion dollars of which 40% was 
to be from external donors. The International Peace Academy (2000: 20) delegates in Botswana raised concerns 
about this dependency syndrome. They noted that ―SADC‘s overwhelming financial dependence on the EU begs the 
question of whether or not a genuine partnership between donors and SADC can be forged within such a framework 
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of dependence.‖ A report on the Review of the Operations of SADC Institutions (2001) revealed the painful reality 
that SADC is dependent on the international donor community for 80% of its operations costs. The out-going 
Chairman of SADC, former President Festus Mogae of Botswana, also lamented this heavy dependence of the 
SADC operations on donor funding as crippling the sovereignty and integration integrity of the organisation. 
(Botswana Daily News 18th August 2006).  
 
 This is the same problem which polarised SADC on the issue of the status of its security organ in relation to the 
mother body. The Zimbabwe-led camp advocated for an independent security organ since the SADC was donor- 
dependent and therefore not appropriate to handle sensitive security issues (Nathan 1995, 2003, Mallan and Cilliers 
1997, Colliers 1999, International Peace Academy 2000, Ngoma 2005). Viewed objectively, this was a logical and 
sensitive argument, since regional leaders themselves were suspicious of the intentions of donors. But the question 
is, whether regional members would have been in a position to finance the organ considering the numerous socio- 
economic and political problems they were faced with in their respective countries. The paucity of resources has 
crippled regional organisations‘ efforts in the maintenance of regional peace and stability. For example, they do not 
have standing armies for deployment in crises, and logistics for early warnings and risk assessment are non-existent. 
The African Union Peacekeeping Mission in Darfur, Sudan, has been paralysed by lack of resources, and was 
characterised by dismal performance, hence their appeal for a UN peacekeeping force in the country, which the 
Sudanese government has vehemently rejected.  
 
The lack of resources and logistical support has resulted in failure by regional organisations to effectively conduct 
preventive interventions, peacekeeping and post-conflict peace building activities such as election monitoring and the 
demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration of ex-combatants, reconstruction and revival of institutions of 
governance in war torn societies. This has resulted in recurrence of conflicts, as the underlying root causal factors 
would not have been addressed. The former Secretary General of the OAU Salim Ahmed Salim (1992) lamented the 
paralysing effects of resource paucity, that ―…many times, we have looked around for the OAU to intervene 
constructively in a conflict situation only to find that it is not there, and when present, to realise that it is not 
adequately equipped to be decisively helpful‖ (Cited in Rugumamu, 2002: 14). Failure in this regard has resulted in 
recurrent conflicts in countries such as Liberia, Somalia, Sierra Leone, Sudan and the DRC (De Waal 2000, 
International Peace Academy, 2001, Soderbaum 2001, International Crisis Group Report No 62, April 2003). As such 
the former Secretary General of the UN Kofi Annan has never relented to call for provision of adequate resources, 
equipment and personnel as prerequisites for any credible and effective intervention and peacekeeping by any 
organisation. When South Africa and Botswana intervened militarily in Lesotho in 1998, there were concerns on the ill 
preparation and ill-equipped force all of which adversely affected the efficacy of the regional organisation in its 
intervention missions. South Africa is even alleged to have required the Lesotho government to pay for the damages 
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caused and the presence of its troops during the mission while Botswana paid for herself. This confirms Job‘s (1992) 
observation that regional institutions, especially in the Third World, lack adequate resources to plan, support and 
implement major peacekeeping missions. The African Union peacekeeping force in Darfur is a living example of how 
the AU failed to mobilise resources for the peace mission. The resource strapped mission has persistently appealed 
to the UN to collaborate and/or take over the mission due to the insurmountable challenges of financing the 
operation. Another example is the case of the collapsed state of Somalia since 1991. The withdrawal of the UN 
forces left the AU always making unfulfilled pledges during its summits to contribute troops to restore a legitimate 
regime and democracy in the country. Currently a poorly resourced force from Uganda and Ethiopia has been 
battling the recalcitrant and highly committed Islamic Militants. The situation on the ground suggests that the 
restoration of peace and stability in the country will remain a dream unless the AU and the regional organisations in 
partnership with the UN can take a coordinated and principled resolve to address the conflict. 
 
Secondly, regional organisations tend to confirm the realists position that nations are not interested in regional 
integration per se, but in preservation of power, sovereignty and national interests. It appears nations in regional 
integration are suspicious of each others‘ intentions and fear loss of national sovereignty to regional supranational 
institutions as predicted by the neo-functionalists (Nathan 1995, Howell 2000, Schoeman 2001, Adar 2002, Solomon 
2004, Hammerstad 2004). According to Nathan (1995: 9) ―certain members of the SADC states fear that their 
membership of multi-lateral political and security forums will entail major infringements of sovereignty. This is an 
entirely legitimate concern which has also bedevilled efforts to consolidate the European Union.‖ Such fears perhaps 
prompted the former Namibian President, Sam Nuyoma, to appeal to other SADC member states for ―the need to put 
regional considerations above national interests and the need to relinquish some national sovereignty for the interest 
of the region‖ (cited in Nathan 1995: 9). In SADC the geo-political power struggle between South Africa and 
Zimbabwe which coalesced around the status of the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security emanated from the 
struggle for domination and fear of losing regional power by the two contenders. In fact Van Nieuwkerk (2000) 
observed intentions by the Southern African ruling elite to prevent the establishment of a powerful and influential 
organ on security lest it interferes with their undemocratic regimes. It is this fear of losing national sovereignty which 
has seen the principle of respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity, sovereign equality, political independence and 
non-interference in the internal affairs of member states being integral in the founding documents of almost all 
regional organisations in the Third World. Although it is important to guard against regional hegemons using their 
might against member states for their selfish reasons, the principle of non-interference has paralysed many 
organisations in the face of regional turmoil. The Organisation of African Unity failed because of this principle (Levit 
2003, Field 2004, Ngoma 2005). The defence of national sovereignty goes hand-in-hand with the incumbent 
regimes/leaders determination to protect their regimes and personal power base against threats from regional 
organisations and institutions. Most of the leaders mainly in the Third World tend to cling to power by any means 
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even if they are despotic and endanger regional peace, stability and the freedom of their citizens. They would ratify 
regional protocols but when it suits their autocratic interests they contravene them at will and with impunity. For 
example, most of the SADC nation-states do not fully observe the Rules on the Regulation of Democratic Elections 
as agreed. Swaziland for example, remains the bulwark of autocratic dictatorship while elections in Zimbabwe have 
been an epitome of unbridled fraud and an assault on democracy. 
 
The SADC policy of ‗Quiet Diplomacy‘ seems to be born out of fear of interfering in the domestic affairs of the 
sovereign state of Zimbabwe despite the crippling effects the crisis in the country has had in the entire region. This 
attitude has given credibility to criticisms of regional organisations as clubs for regional leaders to protect each other 
and their undemocratic regimes (Nieukerk 2000, Schoeman 2002, Adar 2002, Terriff etal. 2004, Cawthra 2004, 
Solomon 2004). As Nathan notes ―states that have weak defacto sovereignty are understandably resistant to regional 
mechanisms that would dilute it further through binding rules and decision-making that heighten the possibility of 
interference in their domestic affairs‖ (2004: 19). Slinn (1984: 183) notes that it is not surprising for the Sub-Saharan 
Africa regional member states, which are still in the process of nation building to tenaciously cling to the notion of 
sovereignty rather than regional integration. He posits that ―[i]t is particularly difficult for the political leadership of 
countries which have only relatively attained national independence to abandon some element of sovereignty in the 
interest of regional solidarity.‖ The adherence to national sovereignty has seen interventions by regional 
organisations in their respective zones being accused by the one of the warring parties in the intervened country of 
violating its sovereignty and territorial integrity. These accusations were levelled against ECOWAS and the SADC in 
Liberia, Sierra Leone and Lesotho respectively. For example, the leader of the opposition in Lesotho, Qhobela 
Moloapo, lashed out that ―Lesotho is a sovereign state, not a SADC colony‖ in protest against the SADC military 
intervention on the side of the government (cited in Ngoma, 2005: 33). 
 
This adherence to national and sovereign power has killed the good intentions of regional integration and collective 
security in regional matters. This is exacerbated by the suspicions existing among powerful regional powers for 
control of the regional organisation. The strong members are often suspicious of each other as using the regional 
project to gain an upper hand as a regional hegemon. The problem has been experienced in both the ECOWAS and 
SADC. In the ECOWAS, Nigeria and Ghana are the competitors for the position of regional hegemon. According to 
Sessay (2002: 219) ―Ghana is known to have leadership aspirations in West Africa, and is highly suspicious of 
Nigeria‘s intentions in the sub-region.‖ In the ECOWAS the competition is aggravated by the historically entrenched 
Anglophone and Francophone rivalries. The Francophone countries are always suspicious of the intentions of the 
Anglophone countries and vice versa. This was experienced during the ECOWAS interventions in Sierra Leone and 
Liberia. In the SADC region, as shall be indicated in the subsequent chapters, the competition was rife between 
South Africa and Zimbabwe. Each wanted to entrench its sovereign power within the region through SADC. This 
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resulted in President Mugabe leading a questionable military operation in the DRC under the SADC name without the 
mandate of President Mandela, who then was the organisation‘s chairman. Such competition to establish national 
and sovereign power through regional organisations always dilute the efficacy of regional organisations in conflict 
prevention, management and resolution operations. As Moller (2005: 68) observed ―[g]enerally SADC is hampered 
by the apparent rivalry between South Africa and the rest based on the fact that South Africa possesses all the 
wherewithal of hegemony (in military, political, economic, demographical and geographical terms) or even regional 
unipolarity.‖ 
 
However, it is commendable for regional organisations such as ECOWAS and the SADC that although they pledged 
to respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of their members, they also pledged to intervene where gross 
violations of human rights, genocide atrocities and humanitarian emergencies and collapse of legitimate governance 
are experienced. As Wheeler (1994: 4) observes, ―the fundamental argument in favour of a right of humanitarian 
intervention is that the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention- the cornerstone of the international legal order 
cannot be sacrosanct in the face of massive human suffering caused by either the collapse of the state into civil war 
and anarchy or a government‘s oppression of its people. Those who support a right of humanitarian intervention do 
so on the ground that we all have moral obligations to do what we can to alleviate human suffering wherever it 
occurs.‖  The SADC and ECOWAS interventions in Lesotho, Liberia and Sierra Leone were justified on humanitarian 
grounds. At the World Press Conference in Lagos, the then President Babangida of Nigeria indicated that ―[w]e are in 
Liberia because events in that country have led to the massive destruction of property by all parties, the massacres 
by all parties of thousands of innocent civilians including foreign nationals, women and children some of whom had 
sought sanctuary in the churches and mosques, diplomatic missions, hospitals and under Red Cross protection, 
contrary to all recognised civilised behaviour...‖ (cited in Sesay 2000: 215). The only burning issue is that countries in 
a region will always be biased in their interpretation of what constitute a humanitarian crisis inviting a regional 
response. The situation is further complicated by regional political power plays, as regional powers will always 
intervene where their national interests are in jeopardy. In other cases, they just pretend that the situation is a 
domestic affair which needs a domestic solution, thus resorting to the principles on non-interference and respect for 
members‘ national sovereignty and territorial integrity. This has led to Neethling‘s question that: ―[g]iven the sustained 
importance of the principles of sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs, when should a situation in an 
African state be considered to have deteriorated to such an extent that an international and/or regional response is 
required on humanitarian grounds?‖ (2000: 315-316). President Museveni of Uganda, who was the OAU Chairman 
during the ECOWAS intervention in Liberia, attempted to answer this question when he justified the organisation‘s 
intervention on the grounds that ―[t]he principle of non-interference applied to the actions of a state not interfering in 
another ‗functioning state‘ and that this principle did not apply to Liberia, because there was no longer any central 
authority in the country‖ (cited in du Plessis 2000: 343). 
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Thirdly regional members‘ interventions in peace missions are more often than not determined by the national 
interests of the intervening powers than the motive for bringing peace to the conflict ridden country or region. This is 
in line with the Realists‘ perspective that nations will always intervene when their national interests whether economic 
or political are in jeopardy. As indicated earlier, the Realists are ―sceptical of the notion of the international community 
and hold that international interventions can still be best understood in terms of the power and interests of particular 
states, especially the great powers acting individually or collectively. Such states may cloak their interests in the 
language of the common good and may claim to be acting in the name of the international community‖ (Lyons and 
Mastanduno 1995: 13). It is an indisputable truism that in the international political arena ―governments have found it 
desirable to justify interventions in the name of the international community in order to build up the broadest possible 
political support‖ (Lyons and Mastanduno 1995: 12). This scenario was exercised by the USA in the Gulf (Iraq), 
Bosnia, Somalia and Kosovo. A common factor in all these interventions is that the dominant actor (USA) sought to 
―monopolise the right to interpret the laws and norms...to attain a situation in which it can invoke the entire 
international authority, behind its interpretation of the rules in support of its own interests‖ (Nye, cited in Ohlson 1993: 
239). 
 
While the international community has been accused by African leaders that the UN failed to intervene in conflict-torn 
nations like Somalia, Rwanda and others, if their interests are not jeopardised, regional organisations have also 
caught the disease. This is because ―[m]ajor powers [be they regional or international] are increasingly reluctant to 
become embroiled in military intervention beyond the confines of their geopolitical and national interests‖ (du Plessis 
2002: 19). Du Plessis (2000: 32 -33) further observes that ―[a] major problem is that the purpose and motive are 
usually equated with the proclaimed national interest of the intervener....the fact cannot be ignored that national 
interest but not necessarily the defence of national security or territorial integrity, is likely to remain paramount as 
motivation for military intervention.‖  Moreover, ―[i]t would always be difficult to distinguish the (arguably 
disproportionate) exercise of military force for selfish or predatory reasons, or for a strategic advantage, from its use 
for lawful, justified or humanitarian purposes. Since... interventions cannot be completely delinked from national 
interest, irrespective of the justification, it will always be questioned and deemed suspect by non-beneficiary actors.‖ 
 
Most, if not all regional and international organisations‘ interventions are conducted under the false rubric of 
humanitarian intervention, peace support operations, restoration of legitimate government and protection of human 
rights, concealing the deep reality that the interventions are primarily driven by national self-interest. ―Whether states 
intervene individually or regionally, leaders tend to justify their actions with many and varied arguments, ranging from 
a need to ensure stability or to alleviate suffering to a need to restore democracy‖ (du Plessis 2000: 333). When 
ECOMOG and SADC intervened in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Lesotho and the DRC respectively, they couched their 
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interventions with such humanitarian terms to gain regional and international support (du Plessis 20000). As Hedley 
observes, interveners ―almost vicariously seek some form of collective authorisation, or at least post facto 
endorsement of their policies‖ (cited in Lyons and Mastanduno 1995: 4). Thus, it should be noted that ―the publicly 
aired motives for intervention are not ipso facto evidence of the rationale of the third party actors...‖ (Van Walraven 
20005: 79-80). Examples abound where individual and/or regional organisations intervened under the pretext of 
restoring democracy, peace and stability while in actual fact, the mission serves the interests of some or all of the 
member states, especially the regional hegemons. Nigeria has been accused of sponsoring its national interests 
through ECOMOG in its interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Sesay (2000: 242) notes that ECOMOG‘s 
interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone ―partly supported the realists‘ argument that states are often driven by 
narrow national interests in their responses to situations in the international system.‖ Sesay argues that although the 
Nigerian–led ECOMOG intervention in Sierra Leone was launched on the pretext of reinstating the democratically 
elected government of Tejan Kabbar; the intervention was mainly motivated by Nigerian national interests. Sesay 
notes that the military leader Sani Abacha: 
 Wanted to divert attention from his regime which had come under increasing pressure both at home and abroad, 
especially after the hanging of Ken Saro Wiwa [and other Environmentalist activists]; 
 Expected some concessions from the EU and the USA which were not only critical of the poor human rights 
record of his regime but had also headed the crusade to isolate Nigeria, leading to imposition of sanctions; 
 Shifted attention from his dictatorial military regime to be viewed as a saviour of democracy, peace and stability in 
the region. 
 
What raised more questions regarding the Nigerian motives in the Liberian and Sierra Leonean interventions is that it 
did not make sense for a military government to pretend to be opposed to military coups in the region, as was the 
cases of Nigeria, (Ibrahim Babanginda and Sani Abacha) Ghana (Jerry Rawlings) and Burkina Faso (Blaise 
Kompaore). As such, Sesay (2000: 209) justifiably asked: ―[w]hy did an undemocratic military regime lead a crusade 
on behalf of democracy against another military regime? Why would an illegitimate military regime champion the 
cause of a democracy in a neighbouring state?‖ 
 
The SADC interventions in the DRC as launched by Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia have been viewed by numerous 
commentators as resource-based intervention. The intervening powers were accused of using SADC to propel their 
individual and politico-economic and security interests. Zimbabwe and Namibia are alleged to have had a stake in the 
rich mining sector in the DRC while Angola is alleged to have had the motive of dismantling UNITA military bases in 
the country. In Lesotho, South Africa was also accused of using the SADC to protect its economic interests at the 
Katse Dam, the Lesotho Highland Water project, which is vital for the operation of industries in South Africa (Mathee 
2000, Vale 2003, Neethling 2000, Hwang 2005, and Likoti 2006). In the light of this, Van Walraven (2005: 95) 
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observes that ―the supposed diplomatic involvement of Southern Africa‘s regional organisation thus concealed, but 
only thinly, the naked pursuit of narrow elite and personal interests.‖ 
 
These interventions, driven by national interests rather than the interests of resolving the conflict and restoring 
regional peace and security, often blemish the credibility of the organisations and their legitimacy as regional arbiters. 
Regional organisations such as the SADC and ECOWAS, in spite of the commendable efforts they have made in 
restoring order, have suffered stinging criticisms as a result of this alleged manipulation of the conflict situation for 
selfish interests mainly by the regional hegemons. In view of thus Sesay (2000: 239) maintains that ―ECOMOG has 
set a precedent that other subregional hegemons will probably want to emulate in future. South Africa‘s incursion into 
Lesotho is already proof that regional hegemons are ready to take risks and will move into neighbouring states if their 
interests are ‗threatened.‖ Realisation of such motives by other members of the regional organisations has led to 
disjointed preventive peace operations. This is because other members would be reluctant to embark on a mission 
that they suspect to be for the benefit of one or some of the members. This situation was experienced in the 2003 
USA-led invasion of Iraq, when France refused to contribute troops as it deemed the invasion as contravening the 
UN Charter and only serving the USA political and economic agenda. Other SADC member states also stayed out of 
the Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola intervention in the DRC when it became clear that they had their own national 
interests to fulfil rather than regional stability. As such ―[t]he substance of the factual rationale - or motivation for - the 
intervening parties must [always] be studied, since these impinge heavily on the character, execution and outcome of 
intervention‖ (Van Walraven 2005: 79).  
 
Because of the numerous questions which hung around the legitimacy and /or motive of the Nigerian-led ECOMOG 
interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone, Sesay (2000: 200-201) poses sharp and thought-provoking questions as 
follows: 
 To what extent were the interventions humanitarian or peace support operations? 
 Were they designed to promote a common international goal such as the maintenance of global peace and 
stability in West Africa? 
 To what extent were the operations a re-enactment of hard-nosed Real politik especially by the sub-regional 
giant, Nigeria? 
 Were the two operations contrived by the interveners to promote their parochial national interests as the realists 
would have us believe? 
 Did the interventions lead to real political, economic and political transformations and stability in the target states? 
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Perhaps research consistently guided by some of these questions may unravel the real motives of regional and 
international organisations‘ interventions in other states if they are not only motivated by the protection of national 
interests. 
 
Fourthly, there is an arguably established belief that regional organisations‘ interventions always target weak member 
states, while they remain passive when the powerful regional members threaten regional peace and stability. The 
perspective is that regional organisations‘ interventions, especially military and other coercive measures such as 
sanctions, are often led by the regional hegemons mainly against the economically and politically weak regional 
members. For example, military intervention requires an asymmetry in power between the intervening states and the 
target state. In view of this, Otte (1995:10) defines military intervention as ―[t]he planned...use of force for a transitory 
period by a state (or a group of states) against a weaker state in order to change or maintain the target state‘s 
domestic structure or to change its external policies...‖ According to du Plessis (2002: 37), ―[t]he very nature of these 
instruments and their use support the idea that military intervention is primarily the prerogative of the major powers, 
regional hegemons and intergovernmental organisations; that it is the prerogative of the more developed, influential 
and rich actors in world politics.‖ This is because they have the economic, political and military power to influence the 
regional political landscape and dictate the agenda, rules and procedures during peace missions (Sesay 2000, du 
Plessis 2000). This dovetails well with the activities of the UN‘s Security Council interventions against states which 
are deemed to be a threat to international peace. The interventions are more often than not, directed against weak 
nation-states, especially in the Third World or those which are not in the good books of the great powers politically or 
economically. Nevertheless, when the powerful and developed nations violate international law or jeopardise 
international peace and security, no action is taken. The traditional thinking, which is still prevalent, ―has always 
regarded military intervention as a tool of the powerful against the weak; of older and established states against new 
states; and of the centre or ‗inner circle‘ of world politics against those marginalised or peripheral‖ (du Plessis 2002: 
38). For example, the USA, the EU and the UN Security Council are highly critical of North Korea‘s and Iran‘s alleged 
manufacturing of weapons of mass destruction, and have even threatened military action (as happened in Iraq) but 
have no qualms about Israel‘s military arsenals. 
 
Regional organisations also apply the principle in addressing their regional conflict issues. For example, the 
ECOMOG and SADC military interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone and Lesotho respectively, were viewed within 
the framework of Nigeria and South Africa exercising their regional hegemonic powers against their weak 
neighbours. Commenting on the ECOMOG issue, du Plessis (2002: 344-345) notes that ―[w]hile stronger states have 
used military intervention to interfere in the problems of vulnerable governments, smaller states still regard the 
regional powers of West Africa, such as Nigeria or Ghana, as untouchables, immune against intervention in their own 
domestic affairs by others. It is improbable, they argue, that smaller countries will ever take steps against possible 
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renegade military governments of regional powers, such as Nigeria and Ghana.‖  In fact, in the case of Nigeria, it was 
surprising because the country was also ruled by dictatorial military regimes under Babanginda and Sani Abacha 
when they launched the interventions against what they considered to be undemocratic regimes in Liberia and Sierra 
Leone. In the 1998 Lesotho crisis, South Africa and Botswana sent troops under the auspices of SADC to restore 
order and the democratically elected regime which was under siege from the opposition protests. The two intervening 
powers suffered stinging criticism, mainly from the opposition, for invading Lesotho because of its unique 
geographical position within South Africa and because Lesotho is a small politico-economic entity which could not 
resist the military might of South Africa. The criticism could be justifiable in the sense that South Africa under 
President Mbeki, who also headed the mediation in the crisis-ridden Zimbabwe, had vehemently resisted any calls for 
coercive measures to force the renegade Mugabe regime to respect good governance and human rights principles. 
This lends credibility to arguments that South Africa and SADC could not think of military intervention in Zimbabwe 
because she is a regional power to be reckoned with. But in the case of Lesotho, military intervention was considered 
the right medicine in the case of the 1998 mission. 
 
The possibility that coercive measures are not equally applied to any renegade member but are selectively applied 
on the weaker members seriously hampers the efficacy of regional organisations in their preventive diplomacy 
missions. The legitimacy of their operations is compromised, as the weaker members will always question the motive 
of the operations. The criticism is hinged on the assumption that since national power is an important factor in 
international relations, the strong may still interpret the regional and/or international laws and justify operations to 
their advantage. This is because great powers, be they global or international, often strive to obtain multilateral 
consensus on interventions in order to achieve their hidden agenda in the target states (du Plessis 2000, Neethling 
2000, and Sesay 2000). 
 
Fifth, most regional organisations are state-centric, that is, their norms, rules, objectives and mandates are 
determined by the regimes, and more often than not, reflect the interests of the regional leaders in defending their 
regimes. Security is still narrowly defined in militaristic terms as defence of the state and the regime of the day, in 
spite of the broadened definition of security challenges in the current world order (Buzan 1991, Thomas 1991, 
Benjamin 1992, Nathan 1995, Vita 2001, Solomon 2004, Ngubane 2004, Hammerstad 2004, Swart and du Plessis 
2004, Cilliers 2004, Field 2004). Suffice it therefore, for one commentator to have posited that ―it is difficult to 
determine exactly how most African governments define their security…[it[ usually implies a rather narrow definition 
of security, based on considerations of military defence and regime stability…Some leaders confuse national security 
with government survival, or even personal power‖ (AllAfrica.com1March 2002 cited in Africa Strategic Alternatives 
2004: 129-130). For example, what some regimes are doing is in direct contravention and negation of the collective 
commitment and vision for respect of fundamental values, promotion of good governance and human rights. In the 
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SADC region, the political climate in Swaziland, Zimbabwe and Madagascar does not reflect the shared visions of the 
region as envisaged in the SADC treaty and security protocols (Schoeman 1997, Nathan 1995, 2003, Van Niewkerk 
2003, Ngoma 2005). In Zimbabwe, the SADC has consistently pursued the policy of quiet diplomacy despite its 
lingering failure to reign in the recalcitrant and autocratic Mugabe regime which violates human rights and regional 
protocols with impunity. More shocking still, the SADC seems to be unconcerned, and sees no evil in the 
undemocratic monarch autocracy in Swaziland, despite its endless lip service pledges to promote democracy, the 
rule of law and good governance in the region. 
 
Similarly, the ASEAN also has in its fold the authoritarian military regime in Burma, but has argued that they are 
pursuing a policy of ―constructive engagement‖ rather than isolation as a strategy to encourage reforms in the country 
(Ojendal 2001). The fact that regional organisations in the Third World have accommodated autocratic regimes in 
their membership, contrary to their rhetoric for promotion of good governance, democracy, human security and 
human rights, has led some critics to dub them clubs for defence of the regimes and personal grip to power, rather 
than the security of the regions and their citizens (Nieuwkerk 2000, Ojendal 2001, Schulz etal 2001, Cawthra 2004, 
Solomon 2004, Ngubane 2004, Ngoma 2005). In the view of Cawthra (2004: 38), ―[a]n inherent danger in collective 
security arrangements, and especially in collective defence arrangements, is that they secure regimes, not citizens. If 
security is isolated from issues such as democracy and human rights, then illegitimate regimes-even individual 
dictators-can effectively protect themselves not only against external interventions but also against internal 
challenges by calling on their neighbours for support.‖ In light of this, Louis xiv might have been correct when he said 
African leaders are ―the state in their respective countries. As such, even major policy decisions, could be made 
merely to satisfy their whims and caprices, no matter what the long-term consequences might be for the state and its 
citizens‖ (paraphrased in Sesay 2000: 217). 
 
The SADC member states have consistently supported Zimbabwe against international pressure for the Mugabe 
regime to embrace democratic governance and protection of human rights of the citizens. The SADC response has 
been marked by such rebuttals that the international community seeks to‖‗set the agenda for the regional states 
and/or are interfering in the domestic/regional affairs‖‘ The SADC Interstate Defence and Security Committee 
(ISDSC) ―expressed serious concern on the continued foreign interference in the internal affairs of some member 
states, especially Zimbabwe‖… while the Ministerial Committee of the Organ ―took note that those opposed to 
Zimbabwe have tried to shift the agenda from the core issue of land by selective diversion of attention on governance 
and human rights issues‖ (cited in Nathan 2003: 11). President Mbeki is said to have protested that the issue of 
―Zimbabwe had become a smokescreen for those who did not want to address Africa‘s other problems‖ (Hanekom 
2002, cited in Neethling 2004: 11). The SADC Summit of 2003 ―re-affirmed the indivisibility of SADC and solidarity 
with Zimbabwe. It was in view of this scenario that Simon Banza, remarked in an interview by Fisher and Ngoma (23 
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March, 2003) that ―SADC represents political elites and that [its] objectives, although poised to address regional 
challenges, have nevertheless been ‗privatised by the states‘…that the SADC Organ no longer protects its people as 
initially intended but protects the state from its people‖ (cited in Fisher and Ngoma 2005: 3).  
 
Nathan (2003) laments that there is visible lack of political will by the states in the SADC region to act on what are 
considered to be ‖hard‖ issues of democratic governance and human rights abuses by some member states. That 
most of the regional organisations lack the political will and commitments to implement regional economic, political 
and security functions prompted Lavergue (1997: 4) to describe their approach as ―one whereby the Heads of State 
assemble on a regular basis and pronounce ambitious declarations of what they are going to do, as a prelude to 
actually doing nothing,‖ while Solomon (2004: 195) notes that ―SADC remains all image and little substance‖ in that it 
―continues to function at the rhetorical level and continues to be a club to protect the excesses of its political elite as 
opposed to being concerned with the true emancipation of its citizens.‖ The views by Banza and Solomon as stated 
above answer Schoeman‘s question as to whether the Organ on Politics Defence and Security ―will be used by 
Heads of States and governments to protect each other, or whether in the spirit of the SADC Treaty it will be used to 
protect the people of the region‖ (2002: 20). 
 
Sixth, there are problems posed by regional hegemons in regional integration and issues of collective security. 
Almost all regional organisations have their powerful, dominant and influential members. Such a power with the 
economic, political and military might dominates and influences the regional political landscape and economic order. 
Conversely stated, security complexes, as geographical entities will always include low power states which often 
have little impact on the structure of the complex (Buzan 1991). The USA is the political hegemon in the Organisation 
of American States and NATO, Nigeria in ECOWAS and South Africa in SADC. There are two ways in which the 
presence of a regional power can affect regional integration and maintenance of regional peace and stability. One 
school of thought maintains that for regional integration to prosper there has to be a regional hegemon to resource 
the integration process and peacekeeping operations. The assumption is that regionalisation is an expensive and 
colossal task which needs enormous resources, and the regional hegemon should be ready to spend a great deal. 
As Herbst (2000: 314) observes, ―[f]or a collective good to be produced, one country may have to take on the costs 
disproportionate to the benefits it expects to reap and provide political leadership.‖ Hence, Ajulu (2004) notes that the 
absence of a hegemonic power in IGAD is responsible for its inefficiency in tackling regional challenges. The 
situation in which the dominant regional power uses its economic and political might for the benefit of regional 
integration, peace and stability is referred to as ―constructive, benign or benevolent hegemony‖ (Herbst 2000, 
Mortimer 2001, International Peace Academy 2000, 2001, Ngoma 2005). According to the proponents of this view a 
―hegemony can sometimes contribute to stabilising conflict situations and need not always be associated solely with 
bullying dominance‖ (International Peace Academy 2000: 13). Van Walraven (2005) traces the failure of the OAU to 
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undertake decisive peace operations and military interventions to the absence of an undisputed hegemonic 
leadership within the organisations. He argues that ―without a strong leadership provided either by a particular 
member state or group of powerful states, it has been difficult to generate inter-state cooperation on many issues.‖ 
Due to ―this lack of hegemonic leadership...it has always been very difficult for the Pan Africanist body to execute 
forceful strategies in conflict mediation‖ (Van Walraven 2005: 81). 
 
The immense contribution in terms of military and personnel resources by Nigeria during the ECOWAS interventions 
in Liberia and Sierra Leone and South Africa in Lesotho should be viewed in the light of this perspective. For 
example, Nigeria was instrumental in the evolution of ECOWAS and its military wing-the ECOMOG and how the 
organisation addressed the conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Sesay (2000) and du Plessis (2000) maintain that 
Nigeria played a dominant role throughout ECOMOG interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone as she provided 70% 
or more of the soldiers and the finance for the operations. In the same vein, South Africa, as a regional hegemon in 
the SADC region, is always looked upon to provide leadership in peace and security missions. Accordingly South 
Africa has led the SADC mediation and peace interventions in the DRC, Lesotho and Zimbabwe, though with limited 
success in the latter. South Africa is also conscious of its leadership role in the region, hence in justifying the South 
African military intervention in Lesotho, the government emphasised ―the fact that it was increasingly being required 
of South Africa to play a role in regional peacekeeping‖ (du Plessis 2000: 349). Other SADC member states seem to 
be conscious of South Africa‘s incontestable hegemonic status in the region. Hence, she has always been delegated 
to lead most of the mediation processes as is the case of Zimbabwe. In view of this situation, Moller (2005: 68) 
maintains that the success of the SADC ―depends on South Africa‘s continued commitment to the organisation and 
the acceptance by other members of its role as a benevolent hegemon and primus inter pares.‖ Van Nieuwkerk notes 
how the Southern African states were concerned ―[w]hether South Africa, having obtained a ‗black-led government, 
would actually undergo a complete change from one which exported violence to one which would live in harmony and 
utilise its economic dominance to improve the general economic levels of the region…as an accepted and trusted 
member of the Southern African region‖ (1999: 1). In the view of Realists, the presence of the regional hegemon is 
beneficial in terms of it strengthening and entrenching its power. On the other hand, the Neo-Liberal view is that 
―there is a symbiotic relationship between the hegemon and the lesser or middle powers, which foster cooperation 
(Fawcett and Hurrell 1995: 52).‖ However, in most cases the regional hegemon may seek to dominate the 
construction and operations of the regional organisation. This view is consistent with what is prevailing in the 
evolution and operations of almost all regional organisations. In spite of their other hidden agendas, regional 
hegemons have played instrumental roles in financing and leading peace operations in their regional zones and at 
the same time projecting their national power and interests. In fact Moller (2005) argues that it is unlikely that other 
states in the SADC and ECOWAS can be in a position to field any major military operations without the participation 
of South Africa and Nigeria. 
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The other perspective considers regional hegemons as a source of disintegration in regional integration as most of 
them use their powers to dominate the organisation and fulfil their national political agenda in the region at the 
expense of the regional project. As Rotberg asserts, ―[t]he country that dominates the region writes the rules -- 
always has and always will‖ (cited in Vale 2003: 133). Realists have observed that ―[i]f the hegemon is in an 
extremely dominant position, the very extent of that power may make institutions, and in this case institutionalised 
regionalism unnecessary, or at best marginalised‖ (Fawcett and Hurrell, 1995: 52). Its presence in an organisation 
brings with it hegemonic power and authoriy that can enact and enforce rules of operation behaviour by the 
organisation concerned (Keohane 1984). Such behaviour by regional hegemons is what Nye described as ―the 
alternative way of exercising power, namely, to set the agenda and make others feel [that] they accept this agenda‖ 
(in Ohlson 1993: 239). For example, during interventions, regional hegemons monopolise the right to interprete and 
influence the laws and norms to ―attain a situation in which it can invoke the entire authority behind its interpretation 
of the rules in support of its own interests‖ (Sesay 2000: 241). 
 
This dominant position held by a particular power has been a source of friction in many regional organisations, as 
more often than not it will be challenged by other contending relatively strong regional members. In reference to the 
United States of America in NATO, Calleo (1987) remarked that ―[a]s the net provider of security, the US certainly felt 
entitled to a greater say on alliance matters than its European allies, all of which were ‗net consumers‘ of security. 
NATO thus became a vehicle for US hegemony over Western Europe‖ (cited in Moller 2004: 125). The same problem 
existed in ECOWAS with the dominant position by Nigeria as a thorny issue in the organisation. For example, 
ECOMOG was born within the conflictual Anglophone- Francophone regional politics. Yoroma (1993: 87) observes 
that ―[t]here was no consensus between ECOWAS‘ Francophone and Anglophone members. Senegal expressed 
misgivings that Nigeria might use ECOMOG to complete an ambitious design in the sub-region.‖ In light of this 
problem, the ECOWAS Deputy Executive Secretary Cheik Diarra once observed that ―Nigeria is both the problem 
and the solution in the move towards a Pax West Africana. ECOWAS needs Nigeria, but the spectre of a bulldozing 
hegemon is still a source of concern for many states. Because Nigeria is expected to play a dominant role in West 
Africa, its actions must be responsible, accountable and transparent‖ (International Peace Academy 2001: 15). The 
competition for the position of regional hegemon between Nigeria and Ghana, and between the Anglophone and 
Francophone members, has adversely affected the efficacy of the organisation in its peace missions in Liberia and 
Sierra Leone. As Mortimer (1996: 15) notes, ―[h]owever high their moral ground, Nigeria‘s leaders had to realise that 
any operation mounted from Lagos risked exacerbating West Africa‘s fears of Nigeria‘s regional hegemon.‖ 
 
The struggle between South Africa and Zimbabwe over the status of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and 
Security was in actual fact a struggle for regional domination. This led to some critics accusing South Africa of 
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thirsting for continued domination of the region, as did its aggressive apartheid predecessor. As Barengu puts it, 
―[t]he common denominator between the apartheid and the new South African state is the quest to maintain and 
sustain the Republic‘s hegemony in regional and African affairs‖ (cited in Ngoma 2005: 152 -153). Vale (2003) 
argues that in the SADC the ―affairs of the region continue to pivot around the strongest player…South Africa as the 
first in a community of unequals‖ (2003: 123). The position is echoed by Sorbo (1999: 49) that in the SADC ―the 
region‘s peace can only be a peace which supports the peace interests of its hegemony,‖ which is South Africa in this 
case. The fears of hegemonic relations in SADC were clearly expressed by Adedeji (1996: 3-4) on the eve of South 
Africa‘s attainment of democracy in 1994 and its expected regional role. He wondered ―[w]ill due attention be given to 
restructuring hegemonic relations with South Africa‘s neighbours towards more equitable, fair and less tense ones?‖ 
These examples confirm fears noted by Buzan that ―when a complex becomes monopolar, the dominant power may 
well adopt a wider security perspective or the pattern of intervention into neighbouring regions‖ (1991: 217). This was 
experienced when the USA as the sole global hegemon invaded Iraq without UN authorisation, and President 
George W. Bush even boasted that world nations have to choose whether they are with them (USA) or the terrorists. 
In the case of the SADC, according to Vale, ―the intervention in Lesotho reinforced and reaffirmed South Africa as the 
first among a region of unequals‖ and that ―the SADC is the formalisation of the region‘s hierarchical structure, a form 
of multilateralism constructed around South Africa‘s power‖ (2003: 132). In view of the supposed South African 
dominant posture in the SADC, Santho (2000: 1) notes that ―[t]he major challenge facing these regional institutions is 
to manage the legacies of dependence and countervail the hegemonic tendencies of big states in the economic and 
security spheres.‖ The difficulty emanates from the established view that the economically, politically and militarily 
powerful regional members will always exploit the regional entity to reinforce their relatively advantageous positions 
and widen the existing disparities‖ (Mfune 1993: 289). 
 
The struggle for power within regional organisations has adversely affected their coherence and shared resolve in 
conflict prevention, management and resolution. Political differences within the regional coalitions prevent them from 
developing and implementing a unified, coherent and sustainable strategy for intervention in regional conflicts (Sorbo 
1999). This prompted Nathan (2003: 14) to remark that ―in Africa, the regional body is an arena for disputation rather 
than conflict resolution.‖  The polarisation of regional organisations over hegemonic dominance was experienced in 
SADC between the camps led by Zimbabwe (Angola and Namibia) and South Africa (Botswana, Mozambique and 
Tanzania) leading to the uncoordinated and embarrassing intervention in the DRC and Lesotho conflicts (Malan and 
Cilliers 1997, International Peace Academy 2001, Oden 2001, Vita 2001, Martin 2002, Zacarias 2003, Landsberg and 
Barengu 2003, Nathan 2003, Vale 2003, Van Nieuwkerk 2003, Bah 2004, Ngubane 2004, Neethling 2004, 
Hammerstad 2004, de Coning 2004, Ngoma 2005). In the case of ECOWAS, the friction is exacerbated by the Anglo-
Franco colonial divide between its members. During the Nigerian-led interventions in Liberia and Sierra-Leone, 
ECOWAS was immensely fractured along the Franco-phone and Anglo-phone blocs. The Francophone camp 
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resented the domination by Nigeria in the ECOAWS-ECOMOG operations. On the other hand, the Anglo-phone 
camp resents the interference of France in the economic, political and military affairs of her former colonies and 
consequently the region at large. For example, France maintains her military presence in her ex-colonies and 
continues the provision of military training and equipment to some ECOWAS members such as Senegal and Mali 
through RECAMP (Mortimer 2000, Herbst 2000, Ero 2000, International Academy 2001, and Soderbaum 2001).  
 
The struggle within regional organisations culminates in questions over the legitimacy of regional organisations‘ 
interventions in regional peacekeeping. As members are divided and the organisation is polarised, there are always 
bitter exchanges and opposition to intervention on the basis of which camp the country in which the intervention is to 
be conducted belongs. Nigeria suffered an avalanche of criticism, especially by the Francophone bloc, in her 
interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Nigeria was accused of extending her hegemonic expeditions in the region. 
Soderbaum (2001: 69) notes that ―ECOWAS interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone were Nigerian dominated 
operations; without Nigeria; there would simply be no ECOMOG.‖ Akodjoe (1997) questioned the logic of a military 
dictatorship (Nigeria) intervening in another nation to establish democracy and good governance. The Francophone 
Press, for example Sud-Quotadien in Dakar, questioned Nigeria‘s ―eternal quest for leadership‖ and discerned 
―opportunism‖ in her intervention (cited in Mortimer 2001: 199). The Nigerian government brushed the criticism aside 
and argued that ECOMOG was doing a superb job in maintaining regional peace and stability. The country‘s Foreign 
Affairs Minister, Ikimi, was quoted as saying ―[w]e have an instrument which has proved that it works. Our sub-region 
is the envy of the world‘s other regions‖ (cited in Mortimer 2001, 199-200). He lashed out at foreign countries which 
sought to weaken ECOWAS by dividing it along the Anglo-Francophone lines. 
 
South Africa also suffered scathing attacks from the Lesotho opposition during their joint SADC Operation Boleas 
with Botswana. South Africa was accused of applying ―big brother‖ tactics reminiscent of the old apartheid regime 
(Matlosa 1999, Southall 1999, Nieuwkerk 1999, Neethling 2000 and 2004, Vale 2003). The Business Day 
(Johannesburg) 25 September 1998, questioned the legality of the intervention thus; ―Its correctness is under 
dispute, as is the motive behind what is variously described as an ‗invasion‘, ‗incursion‘ or ‗intervention‘ depending 
upon to whom one speaks‖ (cited in Neethling 2000: 291). The South African-led intervention (1998) revived and 
perpetuated memories of the country‘s past military destabilisation escapades in the region, and was viewed as a 
projection of its regional supremacy (Neethling 2000, du Plessis 2000). The opposition in Lesotho were totally 
opposed to the intervention. The leader of the opposition, Evaristis Sekhonyane, lashed out that ―the government is 
there to the extent the South African government is there to secure certain individuals and calls them a government‖ 
(cited in Ngoma 2005: 167), while Molapo Qhobela of the Basotho Congress Party warned that ―[a]ny intervention 
from outside will be interpreted by our people as aggression against King Letsie and his kingdom. Therefore, 
whatever happens from now, we are ready. Lesotho is a sovereign state and not a SADC colony‖ (cited in Ngoma 
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2005: 33). Numerous commentators also argued that the South African-led military intervention in the Kingdom was 
driven by self- interest rather than the motive for regional peace. The then Presidential Spokesperson Mankahlana 
rightly concluded that ―many and varied voices had been heard on the appropriateness of SADC‘s intervention in 
Lesotho‖ (cited in Neethling 2000: 293). All these reflect questions hanging on the legitimacy of intervention by 
regional organisations. In fact, the South African-led military intervention in Lesotho was criticised as unilateral, as it 
was said to be not mandated by the SADC, the AU or the UN, therefore unjustifiable in terms of international law (du 
Plessis 2000, Neethling 2004, Matlosa 2004, Nathan 2004, Likoti 2006). The Africa Strategic Alternatives (2004: 77) 
also argues that ―[i]t was also claimed that the SADC never formulated clear guidelines for military involvement in 
SADC member states.‖ 
 
However, Habib and Selinyane (2004) argue that post-apartheid South Africa has proudly shifted its foreign relations 
from striving for regional hegemony to being a ‖pivotal state‖ that pursues non-hegemonic cooperation through 
multilateral organisations like SADC, the African Union and the United Nations for both regional and international 
peace and stability. Therefore the post-apartheid South African regime has always opted for peace making rather 
than peacekeeping in shaping the regional order, to avoid acting like a regional hegemon (Venter 2001, Ralinala and 
Saunders 2001, Alden and le Pere, 2003, Habib and Selinyane, 2004, Logde 2004). It is perhaps in view of this non-
hegemonic approach that South Africa together with SADC has adhered to the strategy of Quiet Diplomacy in 
managing and resolving the conflict in Zimbabwe in spite of the mounting pressure from the West and USA for South 
African–led action against the autocratic Mugabe regime. Hwang (2005) notes how South Africa cautiously avoided 
militaristic approaches to resolution of regional conflicts when she successfully stabilised the volatile DRC through 
consistent and tireless bilateral and multilateral cooperative approaches. Lodge summarises the South African 
regional foreign policy thus; ―[w]ithin its hinterland, in defiance of the reality of its overwhelming power in resources, 
South Africa, has maintained a tactful discourse of equality in its relations with neighbouring states… to avoid being 
perceived as a regional bully or as imperialist proxy‖ (2004: 2). But the question which emerges is why South Africa 
led a military intervention in Lesotho when she was so staunchly opposed to the same approach in the DRC and that 
coercive intervention was against its foreign policy. 
 
Questions and suspicions over the legitimacy of interventions by regional organisations are also borne out by a 
variety of other factors, some of which are given below. 
 
4.10.1 Interventions without UN Authorisation 
Most regional organisations‘ interventions have more often than not, contravened international law and the UN 
Charter. Chapter VII stipulates that regional arrangements can only intervene in regional conflicts with the authority of 
the UN Security Council. Article 53 of the UN Charter states that ―[n]o enforcement action shall be taken under 
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regional arrangement or by regional agencies without the authorisation of the Security Council‖ (United Nations, 
Charter of the United nations, San Francisco, 1945). This is because peace-keeping is essentially a UN domain and 
therefore ―it has to be endorsed by the world body and conducted in accordance with the international ethos of the 
UN Charter. This implies that any justification for military intervention on the grounds that it is in the interests of peace 
should be in line with the UN Charter‖ (Neethling 2000: 317). The UN has, in realisation of the numerous and 
multidimensional conflicts besieging the world, authorised regional interventions upon securing its authority and 
mandate. It is vital to note that the authorisation of the UN often makes available high levels of legitimacy and 
resources to the operations (Henrikson 1995, Jentleson 2003). The UN has opened up for collaboration and 
partnership with regional organisations in peacekeeping operations. It is opposed to military interventions in other 
states, as stipulated in the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the 
Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty. Through this declaration, the UN General Assembly has stated 
that ―[n]o state shall organise, assist, ferment, finance, incite or tolerate subversive, terrorist or armed activities 
directed towards the violent overthrow of the regime of another state, or interfere in civil strive in another state‖ 
(General Assembly Resolution 2131 (XX) 1965, cited in du Plessis, 2000: 336). However, ―since the correlate 
principles of sovereignty and non-intervention form the basis of contemporary international relations, military 
intervention always requires justification‖ (du Plessis 2000: 335). International law permits coercive interventions in 
another state for humanitarian purposes: namely ―state‘s right to protect its citizens abroad, self-defence, self-
determination, an existing treaty and humanitarian reasons‖ (Elias 1988, cited in du Plessis 2000: 336-337). The 
interventions authorised by the UN should employ acceptable levels of force in self-defence and should be within the 
framework of the UN mandate as provided for the conflict context. The interveners should also adhere to the 
principles of ‗just war‘ in their humanitarian interventions and peace operations. The principles of a just war are as 
follows;  
 Just cause, that is using force only to correct a grave, public evil 
 Comparative justice, meaning that where there are rights and wrongs on all sides of a conflict, the justice suffered 
by one party should significantly outweigh that suffered by the other; 
 Legitimate authority, that is using force for a just purpose and only for that purpose; 
  A probability of success, that is not using arms for a futile cause requiring disproportionate measures; 
 Last resort, using only after peaceful alternatives had been earnestly tried and exhausted; 
 Proportionality, meaning that the good achieved should outweigh the overall destruction expected from the use of 
force; 
  Non-combatant immunity, hat is excluding civilians as the objects of direct attack and minimising indirect harm 
to civilians (cited in du Plessis 45-46). 
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However, as will be indicated in the subsequent chapters, almost all the military interventions which were launched 
by ECOWAS and the SADC in Liberia, Sierra Leone, the DRC and Lesotho respectively were not mandated by the 
UN as required. As such, they were a violation of the UN Charter and international law. The regional organisations 
operated on the basis of their organisations‘ clauses that they could intervene for humanitarian reasons; when there 
were threats to democratically elected regimes, grave human rights violations, human insecurity, mass loss of life, 
and humanitarian emergencies in their various manifestations. The regional organisations also justified their 
involvement on the basis that they were invited by the legitimate regimes of the host nations as required by the UN 
and international law. But this did not remove the legitimacy debates surrounding the interventions. Because of the 
legitimacy questions, the military interventions met organised resistance that exacerbated the conflicts such that 
instead of peacemaking and peacekeeping the intervening entities engaged in peace enforcements and they became 
trapped as part of the conflict. This shows that no matter how justified the interventions were, the fact that they lacked 
the UN endorsement opened them to criticism of illegitimate operations. The intensity of the conflict and the 
concomitant destruction and loss of life which ensued after these ECOWAS and SADC interventions are clear 
indications that the operations also failed to adhere to the principles of a just war. 
 
Nevertheless, there are many who feel that regional organisations should not be burdened with the yoke of having to 
obtain UN authorisation when faced with humanitarian crises and regional complexes. For example, Neethling (2000) 
observes that the formulation of the UN mandates is generally a protracted bureaucratic process which would hinder 
swift interventions to nip in the bud horizontal and vertical conflict escalations. Therefore regional organisations 
should be permitted to act swiftly to prevent conflicts from occurring rather than await a UN endorsement and 
intervene when the conflict has escalated. At this stage ―[a] major risk is the potential escalation from an act of 
peaceful intervention to one of coercive intervention, or to a limited or even a major war... [and] the economic costs 
that such an intervention may incur‖ (du Plessis 2000: 336). In view of this, the Commander of the SADC forces 
during Operation Boleas in Lesotho, Colonel Robbie Hartslief, pleaded that ―[e]verything possible should be done to 
prevent civil war, and this can be achieved only if intervention takes place before armed conflict can occur. The 
problem is that people romanticise peace operations...firstly, they want to have an outbreak of civil war, then a 
ceasefire, then an agreement which is acknowledged by the UN and only then should the peace force move in‖ (cited 
in Neethling 2000: 317). The commander of Operation Boleas recommended that interventions such as those 
mounted by ECOWAS and SADC without prior UN authorisation ―should be accepted as a new kind of peace 
operations in Africa because such operations may prevent a massive loss of lives and enormous economic damage‖ 
(cited in Neethling 2000: 317). 
 
There are also views that the UN mandates on peace operations can be very restrictive and not in tandem with the 
conflict contextual situation. For example, it may stipulate the circumstances for the use of force and the amount of 
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force to be applied. This has often compromised the peacekeeping troops in situations where some of the warring 
parties target them as unwanted intruders. The UN, SADC and ECOWAS forces were victims of such attacks in 
Somalia, Liberia and Lesotho. Given this situations ―[t]he formulation of the UN mandates should inhibit swift 
intervention in internal crises and regional and sub-regional organisations should provide clear guidelines for military 
responses to internal conflicts‖ (Neethling 2000: 317). As such, the UN operational mandate should take into 
consideration the conflict situation, and recommend peacekeeping strategies as dictated by the conflict context. The 
UN and regional organisations‘ pledged collaboration in maintaining global peace is a step in the right direction in 
terms of mitigating conflicts and their effects. In fact it is the regional organisation, because of its proximity to the 
conflict context, and which is privileged with the knowledge of the historical causes and trend of the regional conflicts, 
which should be allowed to act swiftly without any bureaucratic hindrances from the UN. If the UN comes in, it should 
be on the terms of the regional organisation.  
 
4.10.2 The impartiality of Intervening Powers 
This has been a major problem for regional organisations when some members are known to support one of the 
belligerent parties. Van Walraven (2005) argues that in most African states foreign affairs and/or relations are 
conducted and influenced by personal relations of Heads of State centred on political and/or business relationships 
and marriage arrangements, all of which adversely affect their interactions in regional organisations when called 
upon to intervene in peace missions. Job (1992) notes that in some instances member states are directly or indirectly 
party to the dispute in question and the situation compromises their willingness to be involved or become impartial 
when conducting the peace mission. ECOWAS was faced with this problem in Liberia and Sierra Leone when Nigeria 
was accused of being sympathetic to the regimes of Samuel Doe and Kabbar. The Nigerian military ruler, Ibrahim 
Babangida, is alleged to have been a staunch supporter of Samuel Doe, while Burkina Faso and and Cote d‘Ivoire 
supported Charles Taylor (NPFL) and Foday Sankoh (RUF). In this context, when ECOMOG deployed its troops 
―there was a real danger that the operation would...open old wounds and rivalry between the Anglophone and 
francophone states, especially between Nigeria and Cote d‘Ivoire‖ (Sesay 2000: 224). There were member countries 
like Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast and Guinea which supported the rebel movements in Liberia (the National Patriotic 
Front of Liberia, ULIMO-J and ULIMO K) and this no doubt adversely affected the efficacy of the regional 
organisation in its peace mandate. The former president of Liberia, Charles Taylor, was also known for sponsoring 
regionalised conflicts in Sierra Leone, Guinea and Ivory Coast, making it difficult for ECOWAS to effectively resolve 
the conflicts, as some of its members were implicated (Ero 2000, Mortimer 2000, Sesay 2000, du Plessis 2000, 
Neethling 2000, International Peace Academy 2001, Soderbaum 2001, International Crisis Group Reports No 62, 
April 2003, No 72, November 2003).  As Van Walraven (2005: 94-95) puts it, ―[t]he attitude of certain countries on the 
ECOMOG was informed by their different interests in Liberia, many of which were of a private nature involving 
friendship and business deals (again between the embattled Doe and the Nigerian Head of state); private security 
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arrangements (between Burkina‘s president and Charles Tailor); and private liaisons (again, between Burkina‘s 
leader and a niece of the Cote d‘ Ivoire head of state who had married into Liberia‘s presidential family and been 
widowed by Doe); Much of this accounts for the apparent aberration in ECOMOG‘s deployment of troops, which 
actually concealed the pursuit of private and other interests behind a façade of multilateral intervention to an extent 
that conflict began to masquerade as conflict resolution.‖  
 
In view of the above stated problem, Mosieleng (2001: 16) posits that the ECOWAS intervention in Liberia ―is a locus 
classicus of how partisanship, rivalries...could seriously hamper well intended missions to build peace and security.‖ 
As a result of the conflicting political bonds within the ECOMOG, its intervention troops were not an impartial arbiter 
but a major party to the conflict. ―At a stage rather than act as a tool for conflict resolution, ECOMOG itself became a 
party to the conflict...the inability of the force to maintain neutrality in its endeavours created a situation in which the 
factions lost faith in the peace-keepers. Rather than serving as an organisation maintaining peace for the good of 
Liberia, ECOMOG appeared to be a mere cover for foreign exploitation. ECOMOG deteriorated into an inadequate 
peace-keeping force... which prolonged the war and weakened regional security...its intervention only delayed the 
inevitable; Taylor‘s assention to the presidency‖ (Iweze, and Yoroms and Aning cited in Sesay 2000: 227). 
 
The same problem is rife in the Horn region of Africa. IGAD faces a crisis of legitimacy in resolving the conflicts 
consuming the region because of complicity of its members in the conflicts. For example, Sudan supports the Lord 
Resistance Army of Uganda, the Union of Islamic Courts in Somalia and rebel movements in Eritrea, Ethiopia and 
Chad. On the other hand, Uganda and Ethiopia are known to be staunch supporters of the Sudanese Peoples‘ 
Liberation Army (SPLA) (Onyango, 2002, Ajulu 2004). The current protracted conflict in Somalia is exacerbated by 
Eritrea‘s support of the Union of Islamic Courts and Ethiopia‘s support of the Interim Transitional government (SABC 
Africa News 30 October 2006). In the SADC region, the crisis in Zimbabwe has been a thorn in the member states‘ 
flesh due to conflicting allegiances by members to Mugabe and the Zimbabwe government. Countries such as 
Zambia under the late Levy Mwanawasa and currently Botswana under President Ian Khama, have denounced the 
SADC policy of Quiet Diplomacy and called for a more proactive approach in resolving the deepening crisis in 
Zimbabwe. The rest of the membership, led by South Africa, has since adhered to the hopeless policy, while the 
crisis escalates. For example, instead of pushing the Mugabe regime into fulfilling the requirements of the Global 
Political Agreement (GPA) and the Government of National Unity (GNU) they call upon the West and the USA to lift 
the sanctions they imposed on Zimbabwe for its tainted human rights record and undemocratic governance. The 
SADC also experienced divisions in its intervention in the DRC when Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola launched 
military intervention in support of the Kabila senior government, while South Africa, Botswana and Tanzania were 
opposed to the coercive measures and advocated for peaceful non-coercive measures. In the Lesotho interventions 
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of 1994, 1998 and 2007, as will be shown later, the SADC was accused by the opposition of supporting the 
incumbent government, which they accused of rigging the elections and therefore being illegitimate. 
 
 4.10.3 Contravention of Peacekeeping Mandates 
In most cases, regional peacekeeping forces have been compelled by the hostile resistance of the belligerent parties, 
to drift away from the mandate and objectives of peace-keeping, to peace enforcement. In some instances confusion 
in adherence to the mandate of intervention is aggravated by lack of clear, achievable and practicable mandates 
within the capabilities of the intervening organisation (Annan 2000a). In Liberia and Sierra Leone, the Nigerian-led 
ECOWAS peacekeeping force became so entrapped in the conflicts that it was difficult to differentiate it from the 
original warring factions (Ero 1995, Sorbo 1999, Soderbaum 2001, Mortimer 2001). In view of this situation, the 
Ghanaian Foreign Minister was quoted at the ECOWAS Defence Ministers‘ Conference in Accra as calling for ―a 
clear definition of the status of ECOMOG in Sierra Leone, its objectives, its rules of engagement, its force levels, the 
necessary resources, as well as a withdrawal strategy‖ (cited in Mortimer 2001: 201). The complicity of ECOMOG 
was also described by Adibe (1997: 482) as ―ECOWAS violated the cornerstone of every successful peacekeeping 
mission – strict adherence to the principle of impartiality.‖ The operation was also deemed a contravention of 
international law as it was not sanctioned by the UN and the AU, and there were also questions as to whether it was 
unanimously mandated by ECOWAS. 
 
Neethling (2000) highlights how the South African troops became entrapped in quenching the Lesotho crisis during 
Operation Boleas in 1998. The South African troops engaged in street battles with the opposition supporters and 
military-police mutineers, resulting in some civilian casualties. This gave birth to the South African troops being 
regarded by the opposition as an invading force instead of a peacekeeping force. Neethling (2000: 292) posits that 
―[m]ilitarily, the operation was bungled due to poor intelligence about the likely level of resistance, inexperience and 
lack of coordination with the Botswana force which arrived a day late.‖ The South African troops were accused by the 
opposition of bullying Lesotho because of its weak economic and political status. The South African force was 
accused by the Basotho opposition of unprofessional conduct, as they entered Lesotho not as a mediating, but an 
invading force. For example, while the Botswana Defence Force flew the SADC flag on entrance in Lesotho, the SA 
Defence Force is alleged to have flown the South African flag. This angered the Basotho who became very hostile to 
the South African troops while relatively receptive to the Botswana Defence Force as aSADC mediation, 
peacekeeping and peacemaking force. The destruction which the South Africans visited upon central Maseru and the 
concomitant casualties appears to have gone beyond the mandate of a peacemaking intervention. (Southall 1999, 
2001, Neethling 2000, Likoti 2008)  In the case of the intervention by Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola in the DRC, De 
Coning (2004) observes that it fell outside the scope of neutral third party mediation because they sided with one of 
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the conflict parties. Worse still, it was not recognised as a SADC peacemaking force by the rebel forces and some of 
the SADC member states. As such, de Coning labels it an ―expeditionary coalition‖ engaged in ―neo-interventionism‖.  
 
The issue of complicity in the conflict is not limited to regional organisations, as the United Nations Peacekeeping 
Missions have also been trapped into the conflicts in Somalia, the DRC and Bosnia. In most cases, complicity of 
peacekeeping forces is motivated by failure by one belligerent party to honour the peace agreement, thereby forcing 
the peacekeepers to shift their mission to peace enforcement, as happened with the UN missions in Somalia and the 
DRC and ECOMOG in Liberia. Evidence abounds of some warlord groups without any ideological programmes save 
the lust to seize power, signing treaties that they had no intention of honouring, either for diplomatic or strategic 
purposes (Annan 1998, Joseph 1999, de Waal 2003). In some cases the contravention of a peace accord is 
committed by the government of the day. As a result of these ―orphaned agreements‖ as the United States Institute of 
Peace dubs them, protracted and destructive conflicts were experienced in countries such as Angola, Liberia, 
Somalia, Sudan, Sierra Leone, the DRC, Uganda and Burundi, to mention a few. In some cases, the operation 
mandates are so restrictive that it puts the safety of the peacekeeping troops in danger, especially in situations where 
they are targeted by one or other of the warring factions. 
 
 4.10.4 Engagement in Unprofessional Conduct 
In some instances, regional organisations‘ peacekeeping troops have been caught up in unprofessional conduct such 
as looting and plundering of the host country‘s resources, illegal trade, and human rights abuses in their diverse 
manifestations. Such conduct has raised serious questions about the motives of interventions by some countries. In 
such instances the prevalent thinking is that the interventions are not motivated by the desire for regional peace and 
stability, but by selfish economic and political interests by the intervening powers. South Africa‘s intervention in 
Lesotho in 1998 is said to have been driven by the need to protect her interests in the Katse Dam (Vale 2003, 
Neethling 2004, and Likoti 2006). The conduct of the South African troops also left much to be desired as they did not 
come as a SADC peacemaking force but an invading force, hoisting its flag. In the DRC, some of the intervening 
powers such as Zimbabwe, Namibia, Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda, were accused of looting and trading in the 
country‘s mineral resources (Barengu 1998, Schoeman 2000, Taylor and Williams 2001, Neethling 2003, Power 
2004, Ngoma 2005). Regarding the SADC intervention in the DRC and the accompanying plunder, the UN report of 
November 2001 cited Zimbabwe as the ―most active‖. In fact President Mugabe is quoted as having conceded that 
Zimbabwe will be rewarded economically from the DRC‘s vast resources (Neethling 2004). It was in view of this 
perhaps, that the Zimbabwean-led intervention in the DRC was described as ―profit-seeking‖ Schoeman 2000 or a 
―resource-based operation‖ (Hwang 2005). The ECOWAS peacekeeping troops fell into the same unprofessional 
conduct during their missions in Liberia and Sierra Leone. The ECOWAS forces were alleged to have been 
enmeshed in the ―political economy of Warlordism‖ involving wars over control of diamonds, gold, timber, palm oil, 
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rubber, looted goods, illegal trade and trade networks (Soderbaum, 2001). So serious was the looting and plunder by 
ECOMOG forces that they earned an unpleasant name, that the acronyms ECOMOG stands for ―Every Commodity 
and Movable Object Gone‖ (Soderbaum 2001: 70). The South African troops in Lesotho were also accused of 
professional misconduct, and there are many critics who feel that the Lesotho intervention revealed that the troops 
were not fully prepared for handling regional peacekeeping operations. 
 
These instances of unprofessional conduct have tarnished the otherwise good intentions of maintaining regional 
peace and stability by regional organisations. In view of these unpleasant incidents, the United States Institute for 
Peace posited that what the Liberian experience demonstrated is that there is a great gap between theories about 
the advantage of sub-regional organisations in regional conflicts resolution and the reality on the ground. Realisation 
of such incidents may have motivated the UN Secretary General Boutrous Ghali (1992, 1995) and Kofi Annan (1998) 
to pledge concerted efforts to assist in the training of regional peacekeeping forces in standard conduct and 
professional doctrines in peace-keeping. Kofi Annan has always maintained that ―peacekeeping must above all be 
conducted in such a manner as to uphold the legitimacy and credibility of the intervening party‖ (cited in Mortimer 
2000: 204). Salim Ahmed Salim (1995) also notes the existence of tensions created by regional members‘ 
intervention in regional conflicts and suggests that the concerns can be ameliorated by ―combining the principle of 
neighbourhood with the principle of distant impartiality‖ (cited in Joseph, 1999: 15). In order for regional collective 
security organisations in Africa to maintain their integrity and legitimise their peace-keeping operations and 
interventions, they should have clearly defined organisational structures, criteria, norms, standards, procedures and 
principles which guide and govern their decision-making mechanisms and conflict-mitigation efforts (USIP, 1994, 
Rugumamu 2002). It is hoped that regional organisations, through their security mechanisms and protocols, joint 
military exercises and mutual defence pacts, will be in a position to establish standing peacekeeping forces well 
trained and well resourced for peacekeeping operations. 
 
The last of the challenges faced by regional organisations in Africa is that most of the states in the continent are 
weak, and have undemocratic regimes which are so corrupt and underdeveloped that they are faced with pressing 
national demands of development, nation-building, service delivery and consolidation of power, than with regional 
issues. As such it is extremely difficult to expect a coherent and a powerful regional security mechanism which can 
boldly and successfully confront regional security challenges. That the regional security arrangements are built from 
weak and fragmented and autocratic nation-states will always be reflected in the regional organisations‘ dismal 
performances in their conflict prevention, management and resolution missions (Buzan 1991, Thomas 1991, 
Benjamin 1991, Acharya 1994, Zacarias 1999, Isaksen and Tjonneland 2001, Vita 2001, Rugumamu 2002, Van 
Nieuwkerk 2003, Nathan 2003, Ngubane 2004, Hammerstad 2004). The problems of poor governance, weak states‘ 
institutions, and unrepresentative governments of some countries, have been a serious challenge to regional 
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organisations in their bid to promote democracy, peace and stability in their respective zones. This situation has 
created a legitimacy crisis whenever some regional organisations have been involved in peacekeeping missions. 
ECOMOG‘s intervention in Sierra Leone to restore the toppled democratically elected regime of Tejan Kabbah 
suffered this stinging criticism. Ofuatey-Kodjoe lamented ―the notion that a group of states headed by military 
dictatorships have the right to intervene in another state in order to establish a democratic regime [as] grotesque‖ 
(cited in Adibe 1997: 485). Therefore, ―without acceptable standards of governance of the region…regional security 
mechanism is likely to degenerate into a protection of racket autocrats‖ (Rugumamu, 2002: 23). In light of this 
situation, when the SADC denounced the Rajoilina military-backed coup against the Ravalomanana regime in 
Madagascar (February 2009), Rajoilina lashed back by asking questions meant to discredit the SADC as being 
protective of despots at the expense of the suffering masses. He asked: ―Who does SADC help? Who benefits from 
being a member of the SADC? Is it the president or the people?‖ He answered that ―[i]t is the despots and tyrants 
who have run down the economies of our states that benefit from the SADC. Even in extreme cases where the 
people of a given country are forced to suffer immeasurably, the SADC does not intervene on behalf of the ordinary 
people‖ (cited in Dhalmini, Botswana Guardian, Friday 8th May 2009). In the same vein, after the controversial 2008 
presidential elections in Zimbabwe, President Mugabe attended an AU Summit in Libya. Before leaving for the 
Summit he challenged any of the AU member leaders, most of whom he knows are also despots, to the debate. The 
point is, Mugabe felt that not many in the AU had the right to criticise his despotic rule and undemocratic elections 
because most of them share the disease and some do not even hold elections in their countries. 
 
There is no doubt that the issue of legitimacy is pivotal in determining the nature, character, operational standard and 
outcomes of regional organisations‘ preventive interventions and peacekeeping missions. Most of the African 
regional organisations‘ interventions have been marred by deficiency in legitimacy due to the intervention powers‘ 
national interests, rivalries, partisanship and lack of neutrality during the interventions, as has been shown in the 
preceding discussion. 
 
Nathan (1995: 2) summarises the problems faced by several regions of Africa, posing serious challenges to regional 
organisations as ―[a]n absence of effective governance, internal political and ethnic conflict, unstable civil-military 
relations, a proliferation of small arms in private hands, a large number of demobilised soldiers who are destitute, 
chronic underdevelopment and attendant poverty, illiteracy and unemployment; countless refugees and displaced 
people; an acute debt crisis and a net outflow of capital; and rampart disease and environmental degradation, 
compounded by natural disasters like drought.‖ These issues form the core of the broadened or new security threats 
in the post-Cold War era which regional organisations should devise measures to address. 
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However, in spite of the daunting challenges, regional organisations have played a pivotal role in conflict prevention, 
management and resolution. ECOWAS to some extent succeeded in diffusing the conflicts in Liberia and Sierra 
Leone, SADC in Lesotho, the DRC and Zimbabwe, while IGAD is unrelenting in its bid to find a lasting solution to the 
protracted conflicts in Sudan and Somalia. As Hammerstad (2005: 1) notes, ―despite their chequered record regional 
organisations have been in the vanguard of a process which is slowly transforming international relations in Africa.‖ 
Great hope has been pinned by both African governments and their Western partners on improving the ability of 
regional organisations to take the lead in preventing, managing and resolving the continent‘s political crises and 
conflicts (Hammerstand 2005). 
 
4.11 Conclusion 
The chapter has dealt with definitions of regional integration, factors which influence regional co-operation and 
theories of regional integration. The evolution of regional arrangements was discussed within different theoretical 
frameworks also focusing on how conflict prevention management and resolution are tackled within each theoretical 
framework. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
The Evolution of SADC and its Preventive Diplomacy Mechanism 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the history of SADC, and how it emerged and developed through the Cold War and post-Cold 
War epochs. It describes how SADC transformed from the SADCC into the present day SADC which has broadened 
its objectives, institutions and operations from economic integration to include issues of regional security, democracy 
and good governance. The chapter also examines the merits and challenges of SADC‘s preventive diplomacy 
missions in the DRC (1998-2003) and Zimbabwe (2002) to date. 
 
5.2 History of SADC: Origin  
Southern Africa has a history of security co-operation and alliances albeit with different purposes and agendas. In the 
1950s and 1980s the white minority colonial regimes formed an alliance geared towards protecting and consolidating 
colonial rule in Southern Africa. Ngoma (2005) refers to this security alliance between apartheid South Africa and the 
colonial regimes in Mozambique, Angola and Zimbabwe as the ―Pretoria-Lisbon-Salisbury Axis‖ or the ―Unholy 
Alliance.‖ The White Co-operation bloc was cemented by a sense of common origin, history and objective of 
defending the white colonial minority regimes from the liberation movements and the independent states in the 
region, most of whom were members of the Frontline States. According to Grundy (1990), the colonial regimes saw 
their future existence as militarily, economically and politically intertwined if they were to defeat the anti-colonial 
upsurge sweeping across the region and the continent at large.  
 
The Frontline  States, on the other hand, were formed in 1974 from the Pan African Freedom Movement for East, 
Central and Southern Africa, and comprised Zambia, Botswana, Angola and Mozambique, later joined by Zimbabwe 
(1980) (Green and Thompson 1986, Du Pisani 2001, Zacarias 2003, Cilliers 2004, Bah 2004, Ngoma 2005). The aim 
of the the Frontline States was to assist in the liberation of the region from colonial rule and apartheid. As 
Maphanyane (1994: 3) puts it, the struggle was ―based on African nationalism and the twin objectives of African 
liberation and African unity, reinforced a spirit of political and cultural symbiosis whose most poignant expression was 
the Frontline States.‖ It became both the symbol and the mechanism through which the struggle to liberate the 
people of the region was coordinated and executed (Bah 2004). Regional security co-operation among the 
independent states in the region was centred on the Frontline States and its security arm, the Inter-state Defence and 
Security Committee (ISDC). The members provided logistical support and training bases to liberation movements 
such as the African National Congress (ANC), the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), and the South West African 
Peoples Organisation (SWAPO). Zacharias (2003: 34) describes the security situation thus: ―the region witnessed 
increased militarization, on the one hand by forces that viewed colonial regimes as hampering their freedom, 
independence and security, and on the other hand by colonial powers who saw their acquired benefits and interests 
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in peril.‖ For instance, the Frontline States promoted SADCC while the apartheid South African regime promoted 
CONSAS as the future regional economic, political and security order in Southern Africa.  
 
The experiences from the political and security co-operation that evolved within the Frontline States entrenched 
collective thinking among regional members which laid the foundation for the birth of the Southern African 
Development Coordinating Conference (SADCC) in 1980, and subsequently the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) and its security mechanism in the 1990s. According to Hwang (2005: 97), ―the Frontline States 
impacted on the establishment of SADCC in terms of structure, driving force and strategy‖ and continued to play a 
pivotal role in the security operations of the organisation until its dissolution in the mid 1990s. Commenting on the 
necessity of Southern Africa‘s regional integration and the expected difficulties, the Director of Queen‘s University 
Centre for International Relations, Pentland, states: ―[d]evastated and impoverished by decades of conflict, colonial, 
racial, civil and transnational crime, this part of Africa long seemed the most in need of regional cooperation for 
development and security and the least likely to experience it‖ (in Bah 2004: iii). However, Slinn (1984: 186) argues 
that ―[i]ts [SADCC] roots do not lie in the colonial past but in the response of the newly independent countries of 
Southern African to the problem of confrontation with the remaining white ruled states of the sub-region.‖ However, in 
spite of the legacy of protracted conflicts and history of suspicion and distrust which characterised the region from the 
1960s to the 1990s, Southern Africa had taken notable steps in the process of regional co-operation and integration 
(Nathan 1995, Zacarias 1999, Oden 2001, Bah 2004, Hammerstad 2004, Field 2004, Ngoma 2005). Tordoff (1994) 
hailed the birth of the SADCC as the most substantial of the regional groups to have emerged out of Africa. 
 
The Southern African Development Community (SADC) is a regional organisation mainly composed of Southern 
African states. It was formed on the 1st of April 1980 as the Southern African Development Coordination Conference 
(SADCC). The founding fathers were the former Heads of State of the independent Southern African states in the 
region which had formed the Frontline States (1974) and its military wing, the Interstate Defence and Security 
Committee (IDSC) to assist the liberation movements for independence in those countries which were still under 
settler minority regimes, namely, South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe. Its founding members were Botswana, 
Zambia, Tanzania, Mozambique, and Angola. It was later joined by Swaziland, Lesotho, Malawi, Zimbabwe (1980) 
Namibia (1989), South Africa (1994), Mauritius, Seychelles, the Democratic Republic of Congo (1998) and 
Madagascar (2005). Therefore, SADC was based on the Frontline States Alliance which was the first regional body 
for collective efforts in security and political matters. On the political front, the SADCC strove to liberate the regional 
states which were still in the grip of the repressive colonial and apartheid regimes. Apartheid South Africa 
―constituted the main focus of generalised, if not united African resistance throughout Southern Africa and beyond.‖ 
In light of this, SADCC was unrelenting in almost all its Summits in calling for the liberation of Namibia, South Africa 
and the entire region from apartheid oppression and incursions. At its Summits of 1985 and 1987 in Arusha Tanzania 
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and Lusaka Zambia, respectively the SADCC consistently called for the unconditional dismantling of apartheid and 
the independence of Namibia. At the Arusha Summit, the SADCC Communiqué noted its concern that ―[t]he 
apartheid regime continues to arrogantly occupy Namibia and to brutalise her people in complete defiance of 
international law and opinion... A new initiative is urgently called for to end the violence of apartheid, the occupation 
of Namiba and the acts of destabilisation against [regional] states‖ (SADCC Communiqués, Arusha, 9th April 1985). 
 
Like other regional organisations, the SADC was born and graduated through the periods of the Old and New 
Regionalisms. It was also mainly dominated by an economic agenda, although it had a political agenda dictated by 
the destabilising policies of apartheid South Africa. This scenario is well captured by Kapungu, stating that SADCC 
was not formed ―in unity against South Africa. It was formed as an instrument for development, for improving the 
standard of living and the quality of life of the people in its member state...But because of the destabilisation of South 
Africa [against its neighbours]...the political dimension of SADC became more pronounced‖ (cited in El-Ayanti 1994: 
45-46). Hwang (2005) notes that the politico-security regionalisation in Southern Africa manifested itself in the 
Frontline States, and evolved over time with roots of a nationalist sovereignty orientation deeply embedded in the 
colonial history of the region. In this sense, the process laid the foundations of ―a distinct Southern Africa personality 
which promoted both political solidarity and economic cooperation‖ (Maphanyane 1994: 3). 
 
The SADCC founding document, the Lusaka Declaration of 1980, established guidelines for economic co-operation, 
liberation, development and ultimate integration of Southern Africa. At its birth, the organisation was aimed at the 
reduction of economic dependence on South Africa (which made the regional member states vulnerable to its 
aggressive and manipulative apartheid policies), forging links to create genuine, equitable and coherent regional 
integration, harmonisation and mobilisation of its national, inter-state and regional policies and resources for regional 
economic development and growth and securing international cooperation within the framework of a strategy for 
economic liberation (Green and Thompson 1986, Southern African Records 1987, Ohlson 1991, Maphanyane 1993, 
1994, Zacarias 1999, Du Pisani 2001, Oden 2001). At its founding conference in Lusaka, SADCC emphasised 
economic development and independence. The first President of Botswana, the late Sir Seretse Khama, one of the 
architects of SADCC, noted that the organisation was on an evolutionary route to develop ―a new economic order in 
Southern Africa and force a united community‖ (cited in Mfune in Saddiqui 1993: 293). Mfune (in Saddiqui 1993: 288) 
summarised the 1980 Lusaka meeting as having four main objectives, namely: 
 To coordinate the reduction of dependency on the metropolitan powers especially that on the sub-regional centre 
of South Africa; 
 To create and operationalise equitable economic integration among members; 
 To muster local and foreign resources so as to effect national, interstate and regional policies utilizable in the 
reduction of dependency and the establishment of genuine cooperation among members; 
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 To secure financial and technical resources from private and governmental sources in the international arena. 
 
The SADCC Summit Communiqué of 1st April 1980 which laid the foundations for regional integration embraced the 
economic agenda driving the regional organisation. It read thus: ―[t]oday, in a historic Summit meeting, leaders and 
representatives of the nine independent countries of Southern Africa made a joint declaration of their strategy for a 
closer integration of their economies. This marks a new commitment to coordinate their economies so as to 
accelerate their development and reduce their dependence on the Republic of South Africa‖ (SADCC Summit 
Communiqué, 1st April 1980). As such, despite the Southern African states‘ argument that SADCC was not directed 
against South Africa, the organisation was clearly a co-ordinated attempt to lessen dependence on the domineering 
apartheid South Africa, and create economic alternatives for regional development and growth (Mfune 1993). 
 
The member states devised a regional division of labour in which each country was responsible for coordinating a 
specific economic sector on behalf of and for the benefit of the entire region, for example; Angola, energy; Botswana, 
crop research and animal disease control; Lesotho, soil conservation and land utilisation; Malawi, fisheries, wildlife 
and forestry; Mozambique, transport and communications; Swaziland, manpower; Zambia, mining; Tanzania, 
industrial development and Zimbabwe, food security (Glickman1987, Green and Thompson 1986, DuPisani 2001). 
The division of the economic sectors was based on the principles of comparative advantage wielded by each 
member state over others. SADCC adopted a project co-ordination approach which emphasised the need to promote 
projects in the areas of industrial production and infrastructure in order to bolster co-operation and regional 
development. In this regard, SADCC had its own unique approach to regional co-operation instead of the common 
market oriented integration model used by most organisations (Hwang 2005). The decentralised structure of SADCC 
emphasised national autonomy in the responsibility of allocated economic sectors to member states. The main goal 
of the cooperation was to form functional coordination to enhance complementarity of the production, leading to 
regional economic development and transformation (Seidman in Mfune 1993). However, Mfune finds fault with the 
integration model adopted by the SADCC. This was because the allocation of economic sectors to each member 
state did not necessarily lead to regional integration and development, as each member state‘s national and more 
often than not separate interests and development priorities took centre stage. Although it‘s political objective was to 
negate the historically entrenched economic dependency on South Africa, its main objective was to promote 
balanced economic development among its member states. The major aim of the SADCC was not reduction of 
dependence on South Africa, but regional growth and collaboration. This position was emphasised by one of the 
founding members, the late President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, when he said ―[o]ur purposes are not simply 
greater independence from South Africa. If South Africa‘s apartheid rule ended tomorrow, there would still be need 
for states of Southern Africa to cooperate‖ in regional socio-economic and political matters (cited in El Ayouti 1994: 
46). However, empirically the objective of reducing dependence on South Africa and enhancing balanced 
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development among the member states remains a mirage, as South Africa remains the dominant regional hegemon 
in the economic, political and military spheres.  
 
It is therefore vital to note that although the SADC[C] made some commendable strides in regional economic 
cooperation, practically, it was and still is difficult for the organisation‘s member states to end their dependence on 
South Africa. This is mainly because ―the entire region had been constructed around South Africa with peripheral 
states tightly integrated into the core‖ (Niemann 2000: 111). Or, as Thompson (1992: 6) puts it, the Southern African 
economic relations are products of the colonial-apartheid system in which ―the dominant economic regime in the 
region between South Africa and SADC[C] is reinforced by the dependency patterns which link the region to the 
capitalist system.‖ Worse still, the SADC[C] was and is still constrained in its goals of achieving regional integration 
and development by the paucity of funds. Several sources have reflected the miserable situation in which more than 
90% of the organisation‘s projects and operations are externally funded, which contradicts the objective of economic 
independence which formed the hub of the formation of the SADCC (Bayart 1993, Mfune 1993, Maphanyane 1993, 
1994, Ramsamy 1995, Lee 1999). ―Paradoxically, some of the biggest aid givers to SADCC were the countries most 
deeply involved in South Africa economically‖ (Mfune 1993: 297). As such, SADCC had ―become a soft option, a face 
saving commitment, [and] a dubious counter balance to their continuing involvement with South Africa‖ (Mandaza 
paraphrased in Mfune 1993: 297). In fact, at its 11 July Maputo Summit, SADCC raised concern about the support 
the Western countries accorded to the apartheid regime in spite of its undemocratic and vicious political system. The 
Summit Communiqué noted that ―South Africa can invade and occupy sovereign states, blow up vital installations, 
massacre populations at no apparent cost to its relations with its main allies. Some of these friends of South Africa 
who provide the racist regime with weapons necessary to carry out such a policy seek also to improve their relations 
with SADCC (SADCC Summit Communiqué, 11 July 1983, Maputo). 
 
The SADCC established a decentralised administrative structure in which power rested with the Heads of State 
Summit and the Council of Ministers, to maintain the sanctity of members‘ national sovereignty. In the views of Anglin 
(1983: 365), and Hwang (2005: 108), ―SADCC‘s administrative arm was deliberately kept small, weak and 
fragmented apparently in order to preserve and strengthen each member state‘s influence and authority above any 
other intervention or interference.‖ On this score, SADCC‘s decentralised structure was obviously at variance to the 
neo-functionalist regional integration model in which nation-states will ultimately surrender their national sovereignty 
to the supra-national regional institutions. The SADCC, therefore, from the onset until today has been state-centric in 
its regionalisation approach as envisaged by the realists and neo-liberal institutionalists‘ models.  Mumbengegwi 
(1987: 79-80) captured the link between SADCC‘s weak economic foundation and decentralised administrative 
structure thus: ―[d]ispite its claims for political strength and unity, the very framework of cooperation chosen indicates 
the shaky foundation on which SADCC was built…SADC is a loose arrangement from which a member can opt out 
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without any serious repercussions on its domestic economy. Thus SADCC‘s claim to political strength and unity is its 
economic weakness.‖ Abegunrin (1984: 375) also noted that ―[d]espite all the rhetoric characterisation of SADCC as 
a unique, pioneering experiment which is distinctly African, it has resolved the knotty problems associated with 
integration schemes essentially by running away from them. The much heralded flexibility attributed to SADCC is 
really a euphemism for leaving each member to pursue national interests.‖ 
 
However, Slinn (1984) saw the future of SADCC as comparative to the ASEAN and hailed it as one of the most 
effective of the development communities so far established. Slinn noted that the SADCC had the advantage of 
learning from the integration faults of its predecessors. He envisaged that ―SADCC may...learn from past mistakes 
and... devise a new formula for regional cooperation... [and] achievement of regional development goals‖ (Slinn 1984: 
183-184). 
 
5.2.1 SADC: During the Cold War 
During the Cold War, SADC suffered a wide range of subversive incursions and destabilisations which hindered 
coherence of the organisation and achievement of its goals. In the view of Bah (2004: 1) the region became ―the 
theatre of political and ideological battles between the Soviet Union and the United States with each superpower 
propping up different factions during the sub-region‘s three decades of conflicts.‖ Apartheid South Africa, with the 
support and blessings of the Western capitalist bloc, was the messenger of doom in the region. South Africa 
sponsored rebel groups such as RENAMO in Mozambique and UNITA in Angola, which launched protracted civil 
wars and acts of sabotage, adversely affecting the entire region. South Africa used its military and economic power to 
undermine the regional efforts at integration and cooperation. The South African regime, through its militaristic 
policies of ―Total National Strategy‖, ―Hot Pursuit‖, and the ―Constellation of Southern African States‖ (CONSAS), 
mobilised its political, military and economic might to disrupt the integration of SADC. The regime invaded the 
neighbouring states on the pretext that they were harbouring liberation movement activists. South Africa even sent 
troops to Mozambique and Angola to assist rebel movements to topple the legitimate regimes in the two countries on 
the pretext of the perceived communist ―total onslaught‖ against it. In the 1980‘s the South African commandos 
invaded Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Zambia and Namibia, fuelling intense regional 
insecurity. Thus, Benjamin notes that ―from much of the 1980s Southern Africa seem[ed] to be trapped in a vortex of 
conflict and anarchy‖ (1992: 1). 
 
The South African aggressive incursions, on the other hand, became a unifying and solidifying issue and factor for 
SADCC member states who never relented in their opposition to apartheid as a diabolic political system and the 
source of instability and insecurity in the region. The regional countries‘ abhorrence of South Africa‘s apartheid policy 
had a significant unifying impact on both the creation and evolution of security regionalism in Southern Africa (Mfune 
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1993, Hwang 2005). For more than three decades the regional security climate was dominated by conflict between 
apartheid South Africa and the rest of the region which formed a bulwark of resistance. The South African regime 
viewed SADCC and the Frontline States organisations as major threats and enemies to its existence as a regional 
hegemon (Green and Thompson 1986, Gibb and Vale 1996, Oden 2001, Zacharias 2003, Swart and du Plessis 
2004, Ngubane 2004, Ngoma 2005). As such, the old regionalism in Southern Africa should be understood in the 
context of the hostile conflictual climate of the Cold War and apartheid (Swatuk 1996, Landsberg and Berenug 2003). 
The apartheid regime pressurised some of the SADC member states, for example Mozambique, to sign the Nkomati 
Accord in 1984 in which the two countries pledged to prevent the use of their territories by political adversaries. While 
Mozambique abided by the terms of the treaty, the South African apartheid regime did not. Instead, it used the treaty 
as a tactic to extend its agenda for regional domination (Davies 1989).   
 
SADCC was uncompromising in its belief that security in the region could only be attained by dislodging apartheid 
and its aggressive regional stance. In spite of the hardships imposed by South Africa, the organisation soldiered on 
and through its Summits and Frontline States meetings relentlessly called on the international community to impose 
sanctions on South Africa to force political reforms for a majority, multi-racial and democratic regime in the country. 
The strong voice of SADCC against apartheid as a crime against humanity and source of regional destabilisation and 
instability, significantly contributed to the liberation of South Africa in 1994. The organisation‘s anti-apartheid stance 
became its source of unity, regional identity and strength (Mfune 1993, Maphanyane 1994, Booth and Vale 1995, 
Sawatuk 1996, Gibb and Vale 1996).  
 
However, the regional integration of SADCC during the Cold War era was hijacked by the bipolar ideological conflict 
between the East and the West whose proxy wars were battled in Angola and Mozambique. South Africa was the 
―honourable‖ messenger of the West, as it sponsored rebel movements in the two countries, all of which adversely 
affected regional integration and development in Southern Africa. As Weimer (1991: 79-80) observes, ―the material 
cost of South Africa‘s destabilisation for the period between 1980 and 1988 was estimated as high as US$60 billion; 
it is more than four times the amount the SADCC received as Official Assistance for Development over the same 
period.‖ Because of the bipolar ideological contestations, the regional organisations‘ security mechanisms were non-
existent, and if existing at all, they were hampered by the Cold War political order. For example, the Frontline states 
and the Non Aligned Movement only engaged in verbal protests against apartheid and calling for the independence 
of those countries such as South Africa and Namibia, which remained under the yoke of apartheid subjugation. The 
OAU was imprisoned in the Cold War politics such that it remained passive amid numerous conflicts brewing in the 
continent. ―Regional institutions were weak, bureaucratic, under-resourced and toothless‖ (Hammerstad 2005). The 
status of most regional organisations underwent tremendous transformation in their structures, objectives and 
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operation mandates in the post-Cold War period, and they started making some sound impacts in their respective 
regions. 
 
5.2.2 Post-Cold War SADC 
The post-Cold War era saw SADC growing in terms of membership, character, operational goals and aspirations 
within the new regionalism context provided by the end of the Cold War and the emergence of a new world order. 
The end of the Cold War and the subsequent dismantling of apartheid shifted the politics of Southern Africa from the 
battle field, destabisation and conflictual militarisation of the region to those of democratisation, multi-partyism, 
regional cooperation and integration and peaceful resolution of regional problems (Benjamin 1992). Many other 
developments in the region provided fertile grounds for the prosperity of the SADC integration. They included the 
resolution of the Mozambiquean civil war, the attainment of independence in Namibia (1990) and South Africa (1994) 
and their subsequent membership of SADC. The 1990s saw new members in SADC, some of which were the 
Seychelles, Mauritius, the DRC and Madagascar. It appeared that the storm was over since the sources of regional 
havoc had now been peacefully resolved and SADC states had an opportunity to repair the damage and re-build a 
coherent community with a shared vision and common purpose. The regional organisation had to be transformed in 
preparation for the post Cold–War era security challenges (Benjamin 1992, Nathan 1995, Malan and Cilliers 1997, 
Oden 2001, Ngoma 2005, Moller 2005, Hammestad 2005).  
 
Consequently, at the Windhoek Summit of August 1992, the SADC Treaty was signed and the regional organisation 
was transformed from a co-ordinating conference to a community. The Heads of State and Government declaration 
which accompanied the SADC Treaty noted that ―[g]ood and strengthened political relations among the countries of 
the region and peace and mutual security are critical components for regional cooperation and integration. [And that] 
The region needs therefore to establish a framework and mechanisms to strengthen regional solidarity and provide 
for mutual peace and security.‖ The members also pledged that the ―existing cultural and social affinities, common 
historical experiences, common problems and aspirations‖ will always constitute their motivation to ―promote regional 
welfare, collective self-reliance and integration in the spirit of equity and partnership‖ (SADC Treaty 1992). Among 
SADC‘s guiding principles in Article 4 of its Treaty are ―sovereign equality of all member states, solidarity, peace and 
security, human rights, democracy, and the rule of law, equity, balance and mutual benefit‖, and ―peaceful settlement 
of disputes‖. Article 5 objectives (b) and (c) are related to security of the region. The members pledged ―to evolve 
common political values, systems and institutions‖, and ―promote and defend peace and security.‖ The SADC Treaty 
reflected the inevitable and interwoven links between security, peace, justice, order, democracy and development 
and the general welfare of the regional populace (Zacarias 2003, Lansberg and Barengu 2003). Zacarias observes 
that ―[s]oon after the signing of the SADC treaty, recurrent statements by regional leaders called for a new security 
agenda that would favour peaceful resolution of conflicts, prefer conflict prevention to resolution, and be based on 
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concrete problem solving methods‖ (2003: 36). In light of this transition, Landsberg and Barengu (2003) note that 
although the SADCC was premised on the political solidarity of independent regional states to promote economic 
integration and counter white-minority-ruled South Africa, the Windhoek Treaty of 1992 also promoted a model of 
regional integration that would address the region‘s deep-seated structural political, economic and military 
challenges. In 1996, the SADC established its security wing, the OPDS, to prevent, manage and resolve regional 
conflicts and other security challenges. The signing of the Organ Protocol in 2001 and the Mutual Defence Pact 
Protocol in 2003 marked a turning point in the development of the SADC security architecture. The guidelines and 
procedures for the operationalisation of the OPDS were strengthened by the endorsement of the Strategic Indicative 
Plan at the 2003 Summit. 
 
Whether the noble goals for regional security as established in the SADC Treaty and its security protocols will be 
attained will depend on several internal and external factors and challenges. However, experience has shown 
insurmountable difficulties by nations, especially in the Third World, to effectively implement coherent security 
cooperation (Buzan 2000, Landsberg and Barengu, 2003, Hammestad 2004). The SADC region is comparatively 
calm, and is regarded by many as a beacon of hope in the troubled continent. This begs the question of whether the 
relative calm is a result of the sense of community embodied in SADC or a breathing space from a period of 
prolonged regional conflicts. However, the economic and political crises in Zimbabwe, the DRC, Madagascar and 
Lesotho remain a thorn in the flesh of SADC as they threaten regional security and stability. The efficacy of the 
regional organisation in addressing the conflicts is inherently flawed as will be shown in the next chapter. 
 
Whatever the case, Hammerstad (2005) argues that in the post-Cold War era the seeds were sown for more 
ambitious, reformed and restructured policy institutions and security mechanisms in the different regions of the world, 
as evidenced by the formation of the African Union‘s Peace and Security Council, The ASEAN Security Forum, 
ECOMOG and OPDS. The transformations were geared towards enabling the regional blocs to effectively deal with 
challenges of peace and security. More interesting about the reforms of regional organisations‘ security mechanisms 
was the broadening of the conceptualisation of security from the traditional state-centric and military bound definition 
to include factors such as democracy, good governance, human rights, human security, food security and 
environmental security, all of which are threats to peace and stability. The regional organisations‘ treaties also 
pledged to intervene in member states in cases of gross violation of human rights, genocide, military coups against 
legitimately elected regimes and any other humanitarian crises. The ECOWAS and SADC interventions in Liberia 
(1990) and Sierra Leone (1997) and Lesotho (1994, 1998 and 2007) respectively were arguably justified on these 
grounds. Although flawed in many aspects, the interventions brought some degree of peace and stability for 
negotiated settlements of the conflicts. 
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5.3 The Evolution of SADC: Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS) 
Like other regions of the world, SADC also felt the side-effects of superpower disengagement and the general 
pressures of the new post-Cold War political order. The post- Cold War era ushered in new security challenges and it 
was logical for SADC to establish its security wing to mitigate the effects of the unfolding challenges. It had also 
dawned on SADC regimes that for economic integration to be successfully forged, it is vital and essential for a stable 
and secure political environment to be established. The evidence from protracted civil wars and the disruptive 
apartheid South African aggressions provided fruitful lessons in this regard. Regional organisations in different parts 
of the world have also realised the importance of regional initiatives in conflict prevention, management and 
resolution in the post-Cold War world. This feature of international relations was also encouraged and supported by 
the UN, as reflected in the Boutrous Ghali‘s (1992, 1995) and the Annan‘s (1998) reports to the Security Council.  
There was a growing realisation that regional security challenges can best be resolved through increased 
cooperation and collective measures (Ghali 1992, Henrickson 1995, Hurrell 1995, Fawcett 1995, Van Aardt 1997, 
Annan 1998, Matlosa 2001). 
 
During this period SADC established its mechanism for collective security in preventive diplomacy (conflict 
prevention, management and resolution). The Organ was established with the goal of ―allowing more flexible and 
timely responses, at the highest level, to sensitive and potentially explosive situations‖ (SADC communiqué 1996). In 
the SADC Treaty Article 5, objectives (b) and (c), the organisation aims to ―evolve common political values, systems 
and institutions‖ and ―promote and defend peace and security‖. According to Colliers (1999), the resolutions and 
recommendations of the SADC Workshop on Democracy, Peace and Security held in Windhoek (1994: 1) ―set SADC 
on a formal involvement in security coordination, conflict mediation and military cooperation at the Heads of State 
level.‖ Thus at SADC‘s Summit in Gaborone, Botswana on 18th January 1996, the SADC Organ on Politics Defence 
and Security was formed. It constituted the security leg of SADC to deal specifically with conflict prevention, 
management and resolution (preventive diplomacy) (Ohlson and Stedman 1993, Nathan 1995, Malan and Cilliers 
1997, Colliers 1999, De Coning 1999, Schoeman 2002, Williams 2004, Ngoma 2005). The Organ replaced the 
Frontline States in the task of maintaining regional peace and security. It was created after the rejection of a proposal 
to establish an Association of Southern African States (ASAS) as the military (security) sector of SADC. According to 
Zacarias (2003), the SADC Heads of State Summit rejected the ASAS proposal because it called for a military 
alliance similar to NATO, and implied the establishment of a new secretariat to deal with security affairs and having 
one member state heading the security sector. 
 
The Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Protocol was signed by the SADC Heads of States and Governments in 
August 2001 and its structure and objectives are mainly the promotion of democracy, rule of law, solidarity, regional 
peace, security and good governance. A number of related protocols and forums such as the Protocol against 
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Corruption, the Protocol on Control of Fire arms, Ammunition and related materials and the Protocol on the Tribunal 
and Rules of Procedures and the Mutual Defence Pact, the SADC Parliamentary Forum, and the SADC Electoral 
Commissions Forum, were also subsequently signed/established to bolster the Organ in its mission of collective 
security and regional peace. Isaksen (2002) notes that substantial work needed to be undertaken before the Organ 
Protocol and objectives and principles could be operationalised as an integral part of SADC. In spite of its 
subsequent salient operational flaws, SADC member states took a commendable step in formalising and 
institutionalising its security mechanism to guard the region from sliding back into conflict. As Landsberg and 
Barengu (2003: 6) note, ―[i]f it had been properly operationalised, the OPDS would have brought about a 
revolutionary shift in peace and security thinking and practice in the region. It would have laid the foundation for a 
fully coherent regional security architecture in Southern Africa.‖  
 
 The operational institutions of the Organ are stated in Article 3 of the Protocol and Structure of the Organ and 
comprise the following structures. 
 
5.3.1 The Chairperson of the Organ 
The Organ Chairperson and the Deputy Chairperson are elected by the Summit of Heads of States on a rotational 
basis annually. The Organ Chairperson consists of the incumbent chairperson, the deputy chairperson (who will be 
the incoming chairman in the immediate subsequent next Summit) and the immediate outgoing chairperson -- 
forming the Troika. The Chairperson, in consultation with the Troika, the Ministerial Committee, the Inter-State 
Politics and Diplomacy Committee (ISPDC), the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC), is responsible 
for the overall policy direction and implementation of the Organ objectives and functions. The Chairperson reports to 
the Summit of the SADC Heads of State or Government which is the supreme policy making institution of SADC. The 
functions and operational procedures of the Organ Chairperson are outlined in article 4 of the Protocol and Structure 
of the Organ. 
 
In Ngoma‘s (2005) diagnosis of the chairpersonship of the Organ, he commends the aspect of consultation of the 
Troika by the Chairperson on security matters as a democratic principle which would mitigate dictatorial practices by 
the Chairperson. However, he questions the efficacy of the working relations between the Chairperson and the 
Ministerial Committee. In his opinion, the fact that the Chairperson can only ―request‖ reports and consideration of the 
Organ matters from the Ministerial Committee may result in inaction or delayed responses to crisis situations by the 
SADC Organ in the event of lack of cooperation between the chair and the Ministerial Committee. Article 4 of the 
Protocol and Structure of the Organ is loudly silent on the exact nature of the powers wielded by the Chairperson in 
terms of responding to regional crises and maintenance of peace and security. The chairperson‘s powers are explicit 
regarding the Ministerial, the ISPDC and the ISDSC report to him or her. This ‖powerless‖ position of the chairperson 
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of the SADC Organ which is subordinate to the SADC body may have been predicted by President Mugabe and his 
camp when they advocated for an independent SADC security Organ which will mandate the chairperson to take 
action without bureaucratic references and authorisation by the SADC chair. In the current arrangement the Summit 
wields the real power and authority on the operations of the Organ. Whether this is for the good of the Organ remains 
to be seen. The open secret is that the Organ has remained passive in the face of regional crises in Lesotho, the 
DRC and Zimbabwe, perhaps due to the power politics between the regional member states. Put differently, the role 
of the OPDS in instances where the SADC is said to have intervened, for example in the DRC and Lesotho has not 
been clear. The interventions were also marred by the fact that, for example, the 1998 military interventions in the 
DRC and Lesotho were launched before the OPDS Protocol which guides such interventions was signed and ratified 
by all the SADC member states. This has raised questions on the mandate and the efficacy of the regional security 
organ in maintaining regional peace and stability. This suggests that substantial work remains to be done before the 
organ protocol objectives and principles can be operationalised as an integral part of the SADC peace and security 
efforts (Isaksen 2002). 
 
5.3.2 The Ministerial Committee 
The Ministerial Committee comprises the ministers responsible for foreign affairs, defence, public and state security 
from each member state. The operational procedures of the Ministerial Committee are contained in Article 5 of the 
Protocol and Structure of the Organ. The Ministerial Committee is chaired by a minister from the same country as the 
chairperson of the organ for a period of a year. It reports to the chairperson of the Organ. The Committee is tasked 
with the coordination of the work of the Organ and its structures. Ngoma (2005: 19) also notes that the Committee is 
responsible for the daunting challenge of ―balancing intra-regional political dynamics and the general apprehension of 
external influence‖ over the Organ. Its meetings are convened once annually. The Committee works in conjunction 
with the Inter-State Politics and Diplomacy Committee (ISPDC) and the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee 
(ISDSC). Ngoma (2005) suggests that the inclusion of the ministers of foreign affairs in the Committee may have 
been a move to include the non-military or non-defence sector in regional defence issues. This to some extent would 
neutralise the classical view of security solely in military terms. Articles 8 (a) and (c) of the Protocol and Structure of 
the Organ (2001) stipulate that ―the quorum for all meetings shall be two thirds of the State Parties‖ and ―decisions 
shall be taken by consensus.‖ Although it is a democratic requirement for major decisions to be taken by consensus, 
some analysts view it as a serious shortcoming which can hamper effective functioning of an organisation on critical 
regional matters. For Solomon (2004: 190), ―[t]his is problematic…decisions by consensus are effectively a right to 
veto the majority decision and allows one recalcitrant member to hold the SADC Organ hostage.‖ As established 
earlier, the role of the Ministerial Committee during the SADC preventive missions in the DRC and Lesotho, like that 
of the OPDS, remains misty. 
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5.3.3 The Inter-State Politics and Diplomacy Committee (ISPDC) 
The functions of the ISDPC are outlined in Article 6 of the Organ protocol. It comprises ministers responsible for 
foreign affairs from each member state. Its functions centre on issues of politics and diplomacy to enhance 
achievement of the Organ objectives. Its objectives are to promote regional coordination and cooperation on political, 
security and defence matters. Ngoma (2005) posits that the duties of the ISDPC include promotion of political 
cooperation, cordial international relations, diplomacy and democracy and human rights, all of which are central to 
the achievement of the mission and the Organ agenda. Therefore, it is the political leg of the Organ and focuses on 
‖softer security issues‖ (Van Aardt 1997, Hammerstad 2004). The ISDPC is chaired by a minister from the same 
country as the chairperson of the Organ, and it reports to both the Ministerial Committee and the Organ chair. There 
is room in its operational procedures to ―establish such sub-structures as it deems necessary to perform its functions‖ 
which is a positive option for efficiency. For example, the plan was to have two sub-committees, one focusing on 
politics and governance, addressing issues of good governance, human rights, the rule of law and corruption, while 
the other focuses on diplomacy matters (Isaksen 2002). Similarly, as with the two mentioned SADC structures, the 
input of the ISPDC during the SADC preventive missions in Lesotho and the DRC has not been established. In fact it 
should be playing a leading role in diplomatic and non-coercive preventive missions for peaceful resolutions of 
regional conflicts as established in the organisation‘s founding treaty. 
 
5.3.4 The Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) 
The ISDSC was originally established in 1975 as the military wing of the Frontline States. During the transformation 
of SADC and the establishment of the Organ it was retained as a security structure of the organisation. It is 
composed of ministers responsible for defence, public security and state security from member states. It is chaired by 
a minister from the same country as the chairperson of the Organ on an annual and rotational basis. The chairperson 
of the ISDSC convenes meetings as he/she deems necessary or as requested by any minister in the Committee. 
Like the ISPDC, the ISDSC reports to both the Ministerial Committee and the Organ‘s chair. It specifically deals with 
the Organ issues of defence and security that is conflict prevention, management and resolution and general 
maintenance of peace and stability in the region. This suggests that it handles ―hard security‖ issues such as regional 
joint training sessions, intelligence data and logistics of peace operations (Van Aardt 1997, Matlosa 2001, 
Hammrstad 2004). The ISDSC was bolstered by the signing of the Mutual Defence Pact in June 1996 and the 
establishment of the SADC Regional Training Centre in Harare Zimbabwe responsible for joint regional security 
training and exercises. The institution reports to the Defence sub-structures of the ISDSC. The establishment of the 
training centre was a significant step in SADC‘s security cooperation and integration, as it would coordinate 
preventive and peacekeeping policies and strategies for standard and quality preventive diplomacy operations. 
However, its operational gains were stalled when the main donor to the regional institution; Denmark withdrew its 
funding in 2002 (Isaksen 2002). Currently, the ISDSC is considering the modalities for the establishment of a SADC 
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stand-by brigade for swift peace-keeping purposes (de Coning 1998). A regional standing peacekeeping force would 
be easy to mobilise for peace missions and can ensure efficiency as the troops would be trained on standard and 
professional peace missions‘ ethics. 
 
Ngoma (2005) takes issue with the fact that it seems the Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) plays a leading 
role in the regional security organ instead of the Foreign Affairs Committee (ISDPC). This scenario, according to 
Ngoma (2005: 148), counters the acceptable logic and practice in the military realms that ―security is always 
subordinate to politics.‖ Van Aardt (1997) and Hammerstad (2004) argue that the fact that the ISDSC deals with 
‖hard security‖ issues while the ISPDC is relegated to the ―‗softer security‖ matters seems to reflect the classical 
state-centric militaristic definition of security. De Coning (1999) questions the compartmentalisation of the political, 
diplomatic, public security, state security, and defence and disaster management with different committees, instead 
of an integrated approach for the Organ. It is also interesting to note that the chairpersons of the Organ, the 
Ministerial Committees, the ISPDC and the ISDSC in a particular year are from one country. This could lead to a 
situation where the nation in charge may hold the Organ at ransom and fail to act in order to satisfy its political 
interests at the expense of the region. 
 
5.3.5 The SADC Secretariat 
The SADC Secretariat is based in its Headquarters in Gaborone (Botswana). It provides the administrative and 
secretarial services to the Organ. The department of Politics, Defence and Security comprise three units, namely the 
Directorate for Politics and Diplomacy, the Directorate for Defence and Security, and the Strategic Analysis unit, all of 
which are tasked with coordinating preventive diplomacy missions, contingency and operational planning, and 
training of peacekeeping forces. It is headed by the Executive Secretary who serves for a renewable five-year term. 
Before the Organ Protocol was signed in 2001, the country holding the chairmanship provided the secretarial 
services. After the resolution of the Organ impasse, it was resolved that it should be an integral component of the 
SADC hence being operational from the organisation‘s secretariat headquarters. Within the new Secretariat SADC 
organisational structure (as approved by Council on 25th February 2005 in Mauritius) there is the Directorate on 
Politics, Defence and Security Affairs which is mandated to coordinate the security affairs of the Organ. It is headed 
by a Director under whom are the Director of the Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre in Zimbabwe, the Senior 
Operations and Training Officer, the Senior Administration and Finance Officer, the Senior Officer - Political and 
Diplomatic Affairs, Senior Officer – Defence, Senior Officer - Security, Senior Analyst – Socio-Economic Threats, and 
the Senior Analyst – Political and Security Threats. 
 
The SADC Organ was complemented by the establishment of SADC Parliamentary Forum in 1996 (approved by the 
SADC summit in 1997). One of its purposes is to ―[p]romote peace, democracy, security and stability on the basis of 
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collective responsibility and supporting the development of permanent conflict resolution mechanisms in the SADC 
sub-region‖ (cited in Van Nieuwkerk 2001: 5). The SADC Electoral Commissions Forum was created in 1998 ―to 
strengthen cooperation among the bodies managing elections in member nations, with a view to enhancing 
democratic electoral processes and democratic culture as well as developing standard electoral practices‖ 
(Landsberg and Barengu 2003: 4). However, the Secretariat appears to play a peripheral role in the evolving 
institutional structure of the Organ (Isaksen 2002). The SADC Secretariat is already over-stretched, has little power 
and implementational capacity and insufficient resources to implement its decisions. Moreover, the Organ needs a 
specialised personnel and operational secretariat on security matters, which will be responsible for planning, 
preparation, deployment and coordination of peace and security operations (Solomon 2004, Hammerstad 2004, 
Fisher and Ngoma 2004, De Coning 2004). 
 
On paper the proposed structures of the Organ sound like coherent preventive diplomacy tools which could only 
function provided there are adequate resources, political will and commitment by the regional states‘ regimes and 
leadership to implement the regional peace objectives, goals and agreements. Put differently, the security institutions 
put up by SADC ―are important steps towards deeper integration,‖ but they ―remain empty structures, waiting to be 
filled with implementation policies and actions‖ (2004: 216 and 211 respectively). The establishment of these 
structures is in line with the neo-liberal institutionalism paradigm that for efficacy, regional organisations should 
develop operational and functional institutions. The Head of the Department for Peace and Security, Joao Ndlovu, 
notes the ―reluctance for planners to disburse funds that were budgeted for the defence and security sector because 
they give preference to developmental issues‖ (cited in Fisher and Ngoma 2005). This situation will have adverse 
effects on the development of the human capacity of the SADC Organ and its operational efficacy. The Organ‘s 
implementational potentials have been paralysed by lack of operational institutions, as well as lack of political will and 
the dynamics of regional power politics on regional security matters (Colliers 1999, de Conning 1999, Neethling 
2003, Nathan 2003, Ngubane 2004, Hammerstad 2004), Fisher and Ngoma 2005, Ngoma 2005). 
 
The post-Cold War and the apartheid era were not followed by total peace, seeing that threats to regional stability 
were looming. There were fears of renewed conflicts in a region with a history of prolonged civil wars. Threats of 
regional instability were evidenced by the attempted coup in Zambia (1998) and Lesotho (1994 and 1998), 
emergence of secessionist tendencies in Tanzania, Zambia and Namibia, continued post-election disputes in some 
regional members (Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Lesotho, Malawi and Zambia), and the prevalence of undemocratic 
governments in some member states such as Swaziland and general economic challenges in most of the regional 
members that could destabilise the region (Ohlson and Stedman 1993, 1995, 2003, Vale 1999, Oden 2001, 
Schoeman 2002, and Ngoma 2005). 
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All these factors created a sense of insecurity in the region, and moved the SADC leadership to be prepared to 
intervene in case of intra-state or inter-state conflicts. In the words of Vale (1999: 44), in Southern Africa, ―decades of 
strife have bequeathed legacies of deep mistrust and crippling misunderstanding‖, deteriorating economies, 
proliferation of arms as such ―… renewed conflicts appear inevitable…‖ The security organ therefore is an instrument 
to guard against the relapse of the region into the conflicts which afflicted the region in the past decades with 
devastating effects. 
 
5.3.6 Objectives of the Organ on Politics Defence and Security 
In its general objectives, the OPDS stipulated the promotion of regional peace and security as its priority. Article 11 of 
the Protocol and Structure of the Organ deals specifically with conflict prevention, management and resolution. 
Through the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security, SADC pledges to manage and resolve intra- and inter-state 
conflicts. The instruments for amicable resolution of regional conflicts include ―preventive diplomacy, negotiations, 
conciliation, mediation, good offices, arbitration and adjudication by an international tribunal‖ (cited in Ngoma 2005: 
301). SADC also pledges  only to intervene when requested by a State Party to mediate in the conflict and will 
always seek to obtain the consent of the disputant parties to its peacemaking efforts. This is a very important factor if 
peace is to be attained and sustained. The organ (SADC) will respect the territorial integrity and political 
independence of its members. It is noted that military intervention will only be employed when all peaceful channels 
of trying to resolve the conflict are futile. If military intervention is to be employed, the United Nations‘ Security 
Council and the Peace and Security Council of the African Union will accordingly be informed as per the 
requirements of the Charter of the UN. It is important to note that when the SADC intervened in the DRC and 
Lesotho, it did not consult the AU and the UN as required by the Organisations‘ Charters and the SADC founding 
Treaty and its security protocols. This lapse deprived the missions of the legitimacy of their mandate. 
 
5.3.7 The SADC Mutual Defence Pact (MDP) 
The MDP was adopted by members at the 2003 SADC Head of States Summit in Tanzania. This was in line with one 
of the objectives of the SADC Organ Protocol ―to conclude a mutual defence pact to respond to external threats‖ 
(SADC Communiqué 1996). In its classical form a mutual defence pact entails establishment of a military alliance 
and signing of binding treaties for collective defence in cases of aggression on a member state and general 
commitments for the development of individual and collective capacity to resist armed attacks and acts of aggression 
on any member state. The commitments for collective military actions against any aggression on a member state are 
vividly stipulated in the ECOWAS Mutual Assistance on Defence (MAD) (29th May 1981). A mutual defence pact 
suggesting high security integration is found in amalgamated security communities such as NATO (Moller 2004, 
Dinstein 2004). 
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The main objective of the Mutual Defence Pact was therefore to operationalise the mechanism of the SADC Organ 
for mutual cooperation in political, defence and security matters. Article 3 of the Mutual Defence Pact dwells on 
peaceful resolution of conflicts in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. Article 9 focuses on 
Defence Cooperation. SADC member states committed themselves to defence cooperation through joint military 
exercises in each other‘s territory (as was done in Blue Hungwe and Blue Crane joint military exercises held in 
Zimbabwe (1997) and South Africa (1999) respectively) (Ngoma 2005). The joint exercises are aimed at establishing 
a common code of professional standards and doctrine required in regional security co-operation and peacekeeping 
missions. The joint military exercises ensure regional military preparedness for rapid deployment in cases of regional 
unrest and threats to regional security. The members have also pledged joint research, development and production 
of military equipment, exchanging military intelligence, and any information on security which is deemed to enhance 
or promote regional peace, stability and security.  
 
Article 7 is on Non-interference, by which members are to refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of others 
unless requested by the State party or ―where in the opinion of the SADC Summit action needs to be taken in 
accordance with the SADC Organ Protocol.‖ Although this aspect is essential in dispelling regional members from 
undue interference, and ensures members‘ respect for the territorial integrity and independence of member states, it 
has handicapped many organisations‘ efficacy in prevention, management and resolution of internal conflicts. The 
Organisation of African Unity became a toothless organisation because of the principle of non-interference 
(Nieuwkerk 2000, Zartman 1989, 2000, Levit 2003, Field 2004, Van Walraven 2005). It is argued that the principle of 
non-interference may prove to be SADC‘s undoing in its intended goals of promoting regional security, peace, good 
governance and development (Isaksen 2002, Field 2002, Solomon 2004). It gives dictatorial leaders room to ―hide 
and continue to oppress and exploit their people while claiming that no one has the right to interfere in their domestic 
affairs‖ (Adar 2002: 100-101). Currently an economic and political crisis is brewing in Zimbabwe and is adversely 
affecting the entire region. That the regional organisation remains passive save for its failed efforts through Quiet 
Diplomacy may be a result of the previously mentioned principle. This is more so because the President of 
Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe, has been unrelenting in his scathing confrontations of any critical voices against his 
repressive regime. 
 
Article 6 of the SADC Mutual Defence Pact is focused on Collective Defence. Through this Article 6 (1) ―[a]n armed 
attack against a State Party shall be considered a threat to regional security. Such an attack shall be met with 
immediate collective action by all State Parties.‖ Collective action in the case of SADC will be mandated by the 
Summit of Head of States on the recommendations of the Organ. The SADC MDP also stipulates that any armed 
attack and measure taken in response will immediately be reported to the Peace and Security Council of the AU and 
the UN Security Council for proper authorisation. However, the geo-political power struggle by the Zimbabwean and 
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South African led camps in SADC resurfacing during the discussions of the contents of the Mutual Defence Pact at 
the Blantyre (Malawi) Summit. The Zimbabwe-led camp advocated for a defence pact legally binding members to 
assist a member in internal conflict, while the South African-led group wanted the defence pact limited to assistance 
against external threats (Isaksen and Tjonneland 2004). The compromise article 6 (3) consubsequently reads ―[e]ach 
State Party shall participate in such collective action in any manner it deems appropriate‖ (SADC Mutual Defence 
Pact 2003). As such the decision to intervene or not to intervene in case of an external aggression on a SADC 
member was left to the whims of individual member states (Hammerstad (2004).  
 
This situation in which there are no clear, legal standard parameters for intervention may spell doom for the SADC in 
its bid for regional collective security cooperation. The situation which occurred when Zimbabwe, Angola and 
Namibia intervened militarily in the DRC to assist a member under external aggression, while the rest of the SADC 
member states opted for a negotiated settlement, may be repeated. Solomon (2004) and Hough (1998) describe the 
SADC Mutual Defence Pact as a complex combination of elements of a classical mutual defence pact as stated in 
article 6 (1) and elements of a non-aggression treaty as reflected in article 3 (1). With the exception of the preamble 
and articles 7 and 8 of the Mutual Defence Pact which touch on human security, the bulk of its articles focus on the 
security of the state. In this regard the pact can be viewed as the custodian of the state and regime security 
(Alagappa 1998, Adar 2002, Cawthra 2004, Solomon 2004, Swart and Duplessis 2004). This scenario seems to 
confirm Alagappa‘s assertion that ―in most developing regions, security suggests protection of the existing political 
system and the survival of the incumbent government‖ (1998: 625). Consequently, Zacharias, (2003: 40) notes that 
one major challenge facing the SADC regional security is the lack of firm ―institutional framework(s) needed to 
formulate policy in line with the new security thinking‖ The conflictual history of the region could have influenced the 
mainly state-centric view of security against the clarion call by many researchers for SADC to expand the definition of 
security to include non-military human security factors in line with the post-Cold War new security thinking (Buzan 
1991, Nathan, Zacharias 2003, Schoeman 2004, Swart and Du Plessis 2005, Ngoma 2005). 
 
Critics of the SADC security mechanism maintain that apart from being state-centric, both the Organ on Politics, 
Defence and Security Cooperation and the Mutual Defence Pact do not legally commit regional member states to 
collective resolution of regional conflicts (Hammerstad 2004, Hwang 2005). Swart and Du Plessis (2004: 35) maintain 
that the SADC defence pact is devoid of definite assurance of collective military response and therefore it ―is 
considered to be one of the weakest forms of military alliance.‖ This, according to Nathan, is because, ―very few of 
the ruling elite in Southern Africa would want to see a powerful and influential Organ on Politics, Defence and 
Security and consequently it will continue to bow to the wishes of its political master‖ (2004: 5). 
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Van Aardt (1997), Neethling (1999), Van Nieukerk (2003, Ngoma (2005) and Fisher and Ngoma (2005) regard the 
signing of a Mutual Defence Pact as signifying high-level regional cooperation on security matters and moves to 
formation of a security community by SADC. In the view of Van Nieuwkerk (2003: 3) ―[t]he significance of the pact 
can be seen to be a strengthening of the South African approach to regional affairs-…the tendency to avoid military 
in favour of diplomatic intervention.‖ The expected benefits of the defence pact were summarised by the then South 
African Minister of Defence, Mosiua Lekota. that it will provide a mechanism for prevention of intra- and inter- state 
conflicts, collective action against external threats and aggression and ensure  long-term stability conducive to 
investments and development of the region (cited in Ngoma 2005). He notes that ―[w]ithout an instrument that 
provides guidelines to protect legitimate governments in the region from foreign armed aggression, peace cannot be 
guaranteed‖ (cited in Collier 1999: 7). However, Isaksen (2002) argues that the Defence Pact may be difficult to 
implement because it requires greater supra-national authority than a mere collective security arrangement which 
exists in the SADC security cooperation. The other implementation hurdle envisaged by Isaksen is that a defence 
pact presupposes a commitment and willingness to supply mutual information on defence and security issues, which 
many SADC member countries may be reluctant to do. This may be in line with the Realists‘ position that states are 
in perpetual struggle for power and may not trust each other with such vital security information. 
 
5.3.8 The Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO) 
SADC has also drawn up a Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO) and instituted a review on the operations of 
its institutions which are geared towards reviewing and providing recommendations on how best to ensure effective 
operations of the Organ in the political, defence, state security and public security sectors (Isaksen, 2002, Ngoma 
2005, Ngoma and Fisher 2005). This followed a recommendation by the SADC extraordinary meeting in Blantyre, 
Malawi on the 14 th January 2002 for ―the SADC OPDSC to prepare the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ which 
would provide guidelines for the implementation of the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation for the 
next five years‖ (SADC SIPO on OPDSC 2004: 11). The strategic activities stipulated in the SIPO are geared towards 
guiding the implementation of the common agenda outlined in the Report on the Review of Operations of SADC 
Institutions approved by the Windhoek Extraordinary Summit in March 2001. (SADC SIPO 2004). The then 
Chairperson of the Organ Prime Minister, Pakalitha Mosisili of Lesotho, noted the core objectives of SIPO in the 
foreword as creating a peaceful and stable political and security environment through which the region would 
endeavour to realise its socio-economic, security and political objectives (SADC SIPO, 2004). 
 
All these are good intentions by SADC in conflict prevention, management and resolution. However, the critical 
question is how prepared in terms of resources, and committed, in terms of political will, are leaders in ensuring that 
the organ‘s goals are attained? As De Coning note, ―the protocol and pact set out the macro policy goals and 
objectives of a common SADC peace and security system, and define its institutions. What remains is for the protocol 
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and pact to be operationalised, including developing more detailed and direct policies and procedures that will define 
a common SADC peacekeeping system…‖ (2004: 167). Hammerstad questions the possibility of implementing the 
SIPO requirements because ―neither SADC nor its member states have the financial and human capacity to 
implement all the ambitious objectives of the strategic plan‖ (2004: 227). He further notes that ―[t]hroughout the 
1990s...cooperation within African inter-state organisations remained fraught... weak, bureaucratic, under-resourced 
and toothless. Progress in strengthening regional integration consisted mostly in worthy declarations at summits but 
with little practical follow up.‖ Several scholars on the SADC security mechanisms unanimously commend its 
visionary integration objectives and goals, but consistently lament the lack of implementation capacity for practical 
results of the security integration. Hammerstad expresses this problem thus; ―…formal integration is not only about 
agreements, but also about implementation of the agreed policies and practical pursuance of common goals. While 
SADC has many regional agreements, it has relatively weak regional institutions and has not come far in the 
implementation of the agreed protocols.‖ In theory, the SADC Organ has a strong security mandate, which includes 
the task of promoting democracy and human rights within states and which endows the regional body with the power 
to ―consider enforcement action as a last resort to prevent, contain and resolve inter-state and intra-state conflicts‖ 
(Hammerstad 2005: 14). The problem is that it is easier to sign agreements, treaties and protocols than to implement 
them. The question should be how capacitated are the regional bodies in implementing the regional agenda? (Du 
Pisani 2001, Van Nieuwkerk 2003, Moller 2005). What remains to be seen is the extent to which the defence pact will 
transform the OPDSC into a functional regional security mechanism. 
 
5.3.9 Power Struggle in the Organ 1996 -2001 
Despite its impressive intentions as outlined in its protocol, the SADC Organ on Defence and security has been 
paralysed by the geo-political power struggle between South Africa and Zimbabwe. The power struggle has invaded 
the Organ since its inception and has become a crippling factor in its functions of maintaining regional peace and 
stability. The conflict revolved around the status of the security organ in relation to the mother body - SADC. In the 
view of Zimbabwe (President Mugabe who was the first chair of the organ) and other like-minded nations such as 
Angola and Namibia, the Organ has to be an independent structure which can act without reference and consultation 
with the mother body. The Mugabe camp felt that the Organ deals with sensitive security matters which could be 
jeopardised if put under SADC which is heavily reliant on foreign donations. This camp also felt that the Organ should 
adopt the informal and flexible model of its predecessor, the Frontline States,in its operations to avoid the 
bureaucratic delays by the mother body in the resolution of regional disputes. On the other hand, the camp led by 
South Africa, comprising Botswana, Tanzania and Mozambique (then President Mandela as SADC Chairperson) felt 
that the Organ should be an integral part of the SADC in its mandate and operations. They argued that the SADC 
Treaty does not provide for an autonomous organ. This camp strongly felt that the Organ should be subordinate to 
the Head of States‘ Summit which the SADC Treaty mandated as the ―supreme policy-making institution of SADC‖ 
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(Nathan 1995, Mallan and Cilliers 1997, Colliers 1999, de Conning 1999, Mandaza 2001, Khadiagala 2001, 
Schoeman 2002, De Vries 2004, Williams 2004, Ngoma 2005). Understandably, there were fears within the South 
African-led camp that allocating such a pivotal and sensitive sector as security to one member country would be 
grossly improper as it might jeopardise regional security (Van Aardt 1997, Venter 2000, Meyns 2000, Zacarias 2003).  
 
 Some analysts and political observers maintain that the dispute was also about competition for personal recognition 
between Mugabe and Mandela. They argue that Mugabe as a senior statesman who played a prominent role in the 
politics of the region, felt eclipsed and marginalised by the increasing regional and international prominence of 
Mandela (Matlosa 2001, Sparks 2003, Fisher and Ngoma 2005). In view of this bickering, it was ―clear that there was 
no consensus among the member states with regard to the ways in which this newly created OPDS should function‖ 
(Zacharias, 2003: 38). This was more so because there was ―no institutional mechanism established to coordinate 
the operations of the OPDS and SADC mother body‖ (Zacharias 2003). It is documented that at the SADC Summit in 
Malawi (1997) Mandela threatened to resign as chairperson if the Organ were not made subordinate to the SADC 
Treaty and summit (Cilliers 1999, Colliers 1999, Nathan 2003, Zacarias 2003, Ngoma 2005). As such the organ‘s 
operations were hampered as a result of the power contests and disagreements between South Africa which saw the 
Organ as being subordinate to the SADC as a whole, and Zimbabwe which resented South Africa‘s hegemony in the 
region (Van Walraven 2005).  
 
The impasse was ultimately addressed at the Malawi Summit of Head of States in August 2001. De Coning (1999) 
suggests that two critical events in 1999 provided fertile grounds for the resolution of the Organ impasse; first the 
replacement of Mandela by Thabo Mbeki as the president of South Africa, and secondly South Africa passing the 
chairmanship of SADC to Mozambique (President Chissano). This implies that these two events may have eroded 
the grounds for friction between Zimbabwe and South Africa, and/or between Mugabe and Mandela. Thus the 
impasse was ultimately resolved at the 2001 Maputo Summit in favour of the organ being a SADC structure, 
subordinate and accountable to the SADC Summit. Solomon and Ngubane (2003) view the integration of the OPDSC 
into SADC as a step in the right direction because it prevented the abuse of the organ by one state for national 
and/or even personal reasons. The SADC Summit in Malawi August 2001 formally adopted the Organ for Politics, 
Defence and Security as a ‖SADC mechanism‖ by signing the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security 
Cooperation (Hanekom 2001, cited in Neethling 2004: 9). According to Landsberg and Barengu, ―[t]he decisions at 
[the Blantyre] Summit signalled progress towards not only collective security but also collective accountability‖ (2003: 
8).  
 
However, the resolution of the impasse was attained after several years of the Organ‘s paralysis, and was not to 
substantively transform the Organ into a functioning security machinery since to date it has remained inefficient in the 
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face of regional turmoil. The power struggle had polarised SADC into two camps (the Defence Treaty and the 
Peacemaking blocs, Schoeman 2002) as reflected by the disjointed and fragmented responses to the conflicts in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo and Lesotho in 1998. ―Far from acting as a security community where unified, 
proactive action takes place on the basis of a clear vision or strategic goal of what is to be achieved, SADC member 
states got involved in these conflicts in a dubious, ad hoc and haphazard manner‖ (Neethling, 2003: 6). The paralysis 
of SADC which culminated in the uncoordinated responses to the crises is vividly captured by Tsie (1998: 2) that 
―[t]here is presently confusion and stalemate over the respective leadership roles of the two Chairpersons. The 
vexing question is: should President Mandela as the Chair of SADC take the initiative in pre-empting and resolving 
regional conflicts or should that role be left to President Mugabe as chair of the Organ.‖ The SADC Human 
Development Report (2000: 131) indicated how the military intervention by Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia in the 
DRC and South Africa‘s insistence on a negotiated settlement highlighted tensions around ―autonomy (the 
relationship between the OPDS and the SADC summit), the legal framework in which the OPDS should be operating 
and the hegemonic power struggles in the post liberation, post apartheid era.‖ The reality is that the interventions in 
Lesotho and the DRC were not authorised by SADC or the OPDS. As Hwang notes in the case of the DRC 
intervention, ―if the Zimbabwe-led intervention was indeed an act of collective self-defence under the SADC auspices, 
one would have expected SADC to have authorised such an operation at the level of the SADC…Summit with a 
specific mandate… or have appointed the Head of Mission and force commander. But SADC took none of these 
actions associated with an authorising body‖ (2005: 171). According to some commentators, ―[t]he conflict in the DRC 
may have tolled the death-knell of diplomatic unity within the Southern African Development Community and has 
considerably darkened the future chances of this promising regional cooperation organisation‖ (cited in Ngoma 2005: 
157). This is because SADC presented an embarrassingly disjointed response position to the civil strive. It 
illuminated the lack of common principles, a shared vision, and deep rifts on how regional peace and security could 
be attained and maintained in the region (Zacharias 2003, Landsberg and Barengu 2003, Ngubane 2004, 
Hammerstad 2004, Bah 2004, Moller 2005). As Moller puts it, ―Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia became militarily 
involved in the DRC in what was formally speaking a textbook collective defence operation intended to protect a 
member state against aggression from Rwanda and Uganda. The deployment only received a SADC mandate ex 
post facto.‖ 
 
South Africa (which held the chair) and its camp advocated a peaceful negotiated settlement of the conflict (Neethling 
2003, Ngoma 2005). The Zimbabwe-led camp called for a collective military intervention to assist a fellow member 
state which was under invasion by Rwanda and Uganda (It is important to note that South Africa and Botswana used 
the same justification in their intervention in Lesotho in September 1998). They (‗SADC Alliance‘) further justified their 
intervention on the basis that Kabila had appealed for assistance from SADC. The camp proceeded to form what 
they called the SADC Alliance, and signed a Mutual Defence Pact comprising Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola. The 
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trio sent troops on a mission dubbed ―Operation Sovereign Legitimacy‖ to the DRC, and claimed to operate on the 
license of the regional organisation and in accordance with Article 4 (c) of the SADC Treaty which refers to the 
―achievement of solidarity, peace and security in the region‖ and objective (a) of the SADC Organ which pledges to 
protect the people of the region from both intra- and inter-state aggression‖ (Nathan1995, 2003, Mallan and Cilliers 
1997, Martin 2002, Ngoma 2005). Adler and le Pere (2003) posited that Mandela viewed the Zimbabwean-led military 
intervention in the DRC in the name of SADC as jeopardising the organisation and a direct challenge to South 
Africa‘s aspirations for regional leadership. When President Mandela as the Chairperson of SADC challenged the 
trio‘s authority to sent troops to the DRC on behalf of SADC, Mugabe‘s response was a stinging one, that ―[n]o one is 
compelled within SADC to go into a campaign of assisting a country beset by conflict. Those who want to keep out 
fine. Let them keep out, but let them be silent about those who want to help‖ (cited in Nathan 2003: 13). It was clear 
that the DRC conflict and the intervention of the self-styled SADC Alliance polarised SADC and strained the relations 
between the different member states. However, at the SADC Summit in Mauritius, in a bid to mend the rift in SADC, 
Mandela, the Organ Chairperson, made an about-turn and commended the Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia alliance 
for their intervention in the DRC on behalf of SADC. It appears to have dawned on the SADC leadership that 
continued denunciation of the DRC intervention would fuel and exacerbate the divisions in the organisation instead of 
having the desired effects of promoting regional solidarity and common purpose.  
 
The SADC military intervention in Lesotho in 1998 saw South Africa and Botswana sending troops to foil a military 
and royal monarch coup against a democratically elected government. Although it was regarded as a legitimate 
SADC intervention and successfully restored peace and stability in Lesotho, it had a lot of question marks. The fact 
that the Lesotho mission was carried out by only two members of SADC and that none of the members which 
intervened in the DRC participated in it raised eye brows regarding the unity of the organisation. There were a lot of 
questions on the legitimacy of Operation Boleas, as the peacekeeping mission was dubbed. The unanswered 
question is whether the two interventions were authorised by SADC or whether they were just undertaken by some 
members for their own economic and political reasons in the name of SADC (International Peace Academy 2000, 
Neethling 2000, Neethling 2003, Nathan 2003, and Ngoma 2005). 
 
This does not augur well for regional cooperation and integration, which are so pivotal in regional peace and security. 
This is also because the region has its own security challenges: the war raging in the DRC, the volatile economic and 
political crisis fermenting in Zimbabwe, and potential threats to regional peace posed by the recalcitrant and only 
undemocratic monarch regime in Southern Africa, in Swaziland. The Zimbabwean crisis has proved to be a piercing 
thorn in the flesh of the regional organisation. It has adversely affected the region in terms of the influx of 
Zimbabwean economic refugees to neighbouring countries, especially Botswana and South Africa, and has also 
dissuaded foreign investment and development in the region. SADC appears to be glued to its policy of Quiet 
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Diplomacy despite its dismal failure to resolve the crisis. The inaction of SADC in the face of a brewing civil strive 
seems to vindicate the position held by many critics of regional organisations, especially in the Third World, as mere 
clubs of dictators determined to use regional structures to protect their positions and regimes at the expense of 
democracy, human rights, human security peace and stability for the regional populace (Alagappa 1998, Zartman 
1999, Nieuwkerk 2000, Ojendal 2001, Schoeman 2002, Zacarias 2003, Terriff etal 2004, Cawthra 2004, Solomon 
2004, Ngoma 2005). The SADC Organ on Politics Defence and Security suffers from numerous implementation 
constraints such as lack of coherent institutional facilities, operational security policies and strategies, financial 
resources, regional power politics, and lack of political will, lack of clear operational framework and mandate and 
commitment by regional leaders in such areas as combating corruption, promotion of good governance, human rights 
and regional security (Malan and Cilliers 1999, Isaksen 2002, Nathan 2003, Ngubane 2004, Hammerstad 2004). In 
view of the above, Vale (1999: 48) argues that ―the states in the region are outside the core of the countries which 
may prosper and deliver security in the next century.‖ Vale strongly believes that because of their peripheral position 
in the global economic and political order, Third World regions will always be susceptible to conflicts. 
 
 This study is aimed at investigating the SADC members‘ preventive diplomacy mechanism in the face of the 
unfolding regional conflicts as evidenced in Lesotho, Zimbabwe, DRC and Madagascar (The SADC intervention in 
Madagascar is not discussed in detail). The SADC region is faced with serious challenges and cannot afford to 
remain passive in the face of conflicts which adversely affect its human, national and regional security and 
development. The SADC interventions in the DRC, Zimbabwe and Lesotho in 1994, 1998 and 2007 will be used to 
provide insights ―on how the sub-regional organisation could improve on its, so far, not very impressive record of 
promoting a comprehensive security agenda in Southern Africa‖ (Hammerstad 2005: 15). The SADC intervention in 
Lesotho (Chapter Five) will be used as a case study in examining and evaluating the efficacy of its preventive 
diplomacy machinery. 
 
5.4 The SADC Preventive Diplomacy Missions in the DRC and Zimbabwe 
5.4.1 Introduction 
From the 1990‘s, the SADC has been involved in conflict prevention, management and resolution missions in the 
DRC, Lesotho and currently in Zimbabwe and Madagascar. Each of the cases reflected different dynamics in the 
SADC security operations and regional preventive diplomacy. The DRC and the Lesotho missions in 1998 saw 
military interventions by some member states in the name of SADC, thereby reflecting the deep rift and polarisation 
which engulfed the regional organisation. The military interventions also revived fears of regional destabilisation and 
insecurity which characterised the Cold War period and the apartheid era. As Southall (1999: 30) notes ―[i]f the 
Zimbabwean operation in the DRC and that of South Africa in Lesotho are anything to go by, militarism has returned 
to the SADC security framework.‖ Conversely the SADC mission in Zimbabwe is characterised by a projection of a 
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seemingly unified front by the organisation amid criticism in the region and largely from the West and the USA. The 
SADC has consistently rejected calls for confrontational measures with the Mugabe regime and opted for a 
diplomatic, peaceful and negotiated resolution of the Zimbabwe crisis through quiet diplomacy. 
 
The SADC intervention in Lesotho will be used here as a benchmark case study to determine the experiences, 
lessons, prospects, successes, and challenges of SADC in conflict prevention, management and resolution 
(preventive diplomacy). 
 
5.4.2 SADC and the Conflict in the DRC 
The DRC, formerly Zaire, is a vast country (2,344,885 square kilometres) located in Central Africa‘s Great Lakes 
region. It shares borders with eight other nations, namely Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, Sudan, Congo Brazzaville, 
Angola, Central African Republic and Zambia. This central geographical location coupled with the countrry‘s vast 
natural resources turned the DRC into an epicentre for both regional and international contestations and conflicts 
during and after the Cold War era (Munyae 2000, Matthee 2000, Cleaver and Massey 2001, Maseti 2001, Power 
2004). Since it joined SADC in 1997, the DRC has become a thorn in the cohesion of the organisation and a test for 
the efficacy of its conflict prevention, management and resolution mechanism. 
 
5.4.3 The 1998 DRC conflict 
The overthrow of the Mobuto dictatorship and installation of the Laurent Kabila regime in 1997 did not resolve the 
institutionalised structural socio-economic and political problems which have besieged the country since its 
independence. The unresolved issues which precipitated the demise of the Mobutu regime continued haunting the 
Kabila regime, culminating in another conflict of calamitous proportions in 1998. Due to the intensity of the conflict 
and the large number of countries involved, it was variously dubbed ‖Africa‘s First World War‖, ―Africa‘s Great war‖ 
and ―Africa‘s scramble for Africa‖ (Shearer 1999, Reybtjens 2001, Ngoma 2004, Power 2004, Cleaver and Massey 
2001). The recurrence of intense conflicts which lasted from 1998 to 2003 and the continued strife in the Eastern 
DRC led by rebel leader General Nkunda, gave credence to King‘s (2008: 13) description of the DRC as a country 
―conceived in conflict and born at independence…in crisis.‖  
 
The Kabila regime inherited a country in socio-political and economic disarray. The government was immediately 
faced with the mammoth task of reviving the country‘s collapsed economic and political institutions, unifying the 
numerous and diverse rival ethnic groups, and instituting political reforms and democratic governance. Worse still, 
the new government was inextricably indebted financially and politically to the goverments of Rwanda and Uganda 
which had catapulted it to power (Matthee 2000, Munyae 2001). The government‘s administrative and military 
establishments were dominated by the Tutsi; hence it was virtually hostage to the political whims of Rwanda, Burundi 
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and Uganda. The long-established problems of politicisation of ethnicity, struggle for political power and external 
intervention in the internal affairs of the DRC became a source for recurrent friction and instability (Munyae 2000, du 
Plessis 2000, Matthee 2000, and Maseti 2001). 
 
Although Kabila had pledged democratic political and constitutional reforms and elections, he dismally failed to 
fundamentally change the political order of Mobutu‘s 32 years‘ rule. In the process of consolidating his power, he 
entrenched his own version of autocracy, replacing ‖Mobutuism‖ with ‖Kabilaism‖ (Tshyembe 1999, Munyae 2000, 
Matthee 2000, Taylor and William 2001, Mangu 2003).  A replica of his predecessor Kabila‘s power base in and 
around Kinshasa rested on military force, foreign support and a patronage network (Solomon 1997, Taylor and 
William 2001, Du Plessiss 2000, Matthee 2000, Munyae 2000, Mangu 2003). The exclusion of various groups from 
governance created fertile grounds for an anti-Kabila rebel alliance. Kabila‘s government was also dominated by 
Rwandan and Ugandan military officials. Kabila later fell out with Rwanda and Uganda when he questioned their 
domination and ultimately expelled them from the DRC (Naidoo 2000, b, Matthee 2000). 
 
Consequently, in response, the expelled Tutsi military and government officials, with the full backing of Rwanda, 
Uganda and Burundi, formed the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD) (5th August 1998) under Professor Wamba 
dia Wamba. The group established its base in the Eastern DRC among the Banyamulenge Tutsi which formed the 
core of the rebellion that assisted Kabila to overthrow Mobutu. The Kabila regime was under immense survival threat 
as the RCD advanced towards Kinshasa, capturing the towns of Kivu, Goma, Bukavu, Kisangani, Bunia and Uvira 
(Cornwall and Potgieter 1998, Matthee 2000, Munyae 2000). According to Munyae (2000), by December 1999, the 
rebels were in control of about three quarters of the country and had reached the outskirts of Kinshasa. The rebel 
advances to Kinshasa were halted and repelled by the military intervention of Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia under 
the auspices of the SADC Alliance. This marked the genesis of what came to be known as Africa‘s First World War 
with the SADC Alliance (Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola) and Sudan and Chad on the government‘s side, while 
Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi backed the rebel RCD (Shearer 1999, Munyae 2000, du Plessis 2000, Matthee 2000, 
Maseti 2001, Cleaver and Massey 2001, Power 2004, Ngoma 2004, Ngoma 2005). In the view of du Plessis (2000: 
347), the DRC conflict ―became one of the most spectacular examples in the 20th century of military intervention by 
African governments in another African country.‖  
 
The 1998 DRC conflict threw the SADC organisation into disarray and posed a serious challenge to the efficacy of its 
preventive diplomacy mechanism, its cohesion and survival as a regional organisation which had the capacity to 
prevent conflicts and maintain peace in the region. 
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5.4.4 The SADC Military Intervention in the DRC 
The DRC joined the SADC in October 1997 after the overthrow of the Mobutu dictatorship. Accordingly, to repel the 
rebel RCD military advances, Kabila appealed for assistance from SADC against what the government viewed as an 
invasion by Rwanda and Uganda. There have been dissenting views on the merits and demerits of the SADC 
decision to admit the DRC as its member. Many critics argue that it was ill-advised and a cardinal error for the SADC 
to have admitted the DRC as a member, considering the undemocratic manner in which the Kabila government 
assumed power. Others feel that the SADC should have awaited stabilisation, democratisation and meaningful 
political reforms in the DRC before admitting it into its fold (Malan 1999, Khadiagala 2001, Vale 2001, Ngoma 2004). 
In the view of Khadiagala (2001) the admission of the DRC imported the perennial insecurities of the Great Lakes 
region into the SADC region, with devastating consequences. The predicament of the SADC is articulated by Malan 
(1999: 5) that ―SADC admitted the DRC into its fold without prejudice and now the proverbial chickens have come to 
roost. Rather than benefit from the potential wealth of the DRC, SADC has virtually been torn apart by its 
membership.‖ Numerous commentators on the SADC security mechanisam unity and operations concur that the 
DRC conflict presented the most formidable challenge in its collective security agenda, mission and existence as a 
unified regional entity (Malan 1999, Ngoma 2004, Ngoma 2005. 
 
The SADC response to the invitation by the Kabila regime for assistance clearly exposed the divisions, rivalry and 
polarisation of the organisation, which had been building up since the members‘ differences on the status of the 
Organ on Politics, Defence and Security to the mother body, SADC (Neethling 2000, du Plessis 2000, Matthee 2000, 
Mosieleng 2001, Schoeman 2002, Nathan 2004, Van Nieuwkerk 2004, Bah 2004, Ngoma 2004, 2005). Schoeman 
notes that the SADC was polarised into the Defence Treaty Bloc comprising Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola, which 
formed the SADC Defence Alliance and intervened militarily in the DRC and the Peacemaking Bloc comprising South 
Africa, Botswana, Mozambique and Tanzania, which opposed military intervention and advocated dialogue and 
peaceful resolution of the conflict. Whatever the case, the fact of the matter is that the SADC presented a disjointed 
and fractured response to the DRC conflict, contrary to the expectations of a regional organisation with a shared 
collective security vision as stipulated in its founding treaty. 
 
The military block formed the SADC Alliance, signed the Mutual Defence Pact and sent troops to the DRC in the 
name of SADC to repel what they deemed an invasion of the DRC (a SADC member state) by Rwanda and Uganda 
(Cornwall and Portgieter 1998, Malan 1999, Munyae 2000, Matthee 2000, Mosieleng 2001, Neethling 2004, Ngoma 
2004). The SADC Alliance justified their intervention by claiming the following: 
 It was in accordance with the OAU [AU] Harare Declaration of 1997 calling for collective security and protection of 
legitimate regimes against military coups. 
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 It was in line with the objectives of both the SADC Treaty and the OPDS Protocol calling for solidarity and 
collective security in the region against internal and external threat and aggression to any member state. They 
also claimed that the deployment was authorised by the Organ and the ISDSC) (Cornwall and Potgieter 1998, 
Nathan 2004). 
 They were requested by the legitimate regime of the DRC, which was also a member of SADC for assistance 
against threats to the nation‘s sovereignty (the same reason used by Botswana and South Africa in Lesotho). 
Mugabe noted that the SADC Alliance ―responded to a call for assistance by the DRC government following the 
invasion by Uganda and Rwanda… Our decision was a gallant one and our response so far has prevented the 
aggressors‘ from achieving their goal‖ (cited in Ngoma 2004: 4). 
 
President Mugabe, then the Chairperson of the Organ, justified the military intervention, which was dubbed Operation 
Sovereign Legitimacy by arguing that ―[a] prolonged struggle in our region that destabilises the principle of the region 
and principles of democracy…must be resisted. What is a threat to your neighbour is a threat to you…‖ (cited in 
Ngoma 2004: 4). Mugabe further justified the military option by drawing a parallel with the European Union countries 
in the Balkans. He posed the question: ―[i]f it was right for European countries to get involved in Bosnia and to think 
of getting involved in Kosovo, why should it not be right for us?‖ (cited in Ngoma 2004: 8). In response to criticism by 
the then SADC Chairman, Mandela, that the intervention was not mandated by SADC, Mugabe retorted that no 
member was forced to assist and that those who did not wish to assist should be silent (Nathan 2004). Ngoma comes 
to the defence of the Zimbabwe-led military intervention that it was dictated by the precarious security situation faced 
by the DRC at the time. As such it is doubtful as to whether ―a more peaceful approach would have been appropriate 
considering the dire security situation the DRC was faced with…neither can it be determined that leaving the regime 
to collapse would have ensured a more stable future‖ for the country and the region (2004: 4).  
 
5.4.5 Effects of the Military Intervention 
The interventionist nations suffered stinging criticism for their militaristic posture both regionally and internationally. 
This was mainly because of the questionable intervention motives by the different powers, and the fact that the 
military approach seemed to have complicated and escalated the conflict making it catastrophic, expensive and 
difficult to win or resolve. The intervening nations were economically drained and crippled by the protracted conflict, 
thereby stirring domestic opposition and agitation. The most hit by mounting domestic opposition was Zimbabwe, 
which was lambasted for venturing on an expensive mission regardless of the deepening economic decline at home. 
The Zimbabwe economic meltdown was aggravated by the devastating land invasions and the imposition of 
sanctions by the West and the US against the Mugabe regime for what they deemed an autocratic regime 
perpetrating human rights violations against its citizens. Zimbabwe‘s military intervention was criticised as ―one big 
disaster, a case of pride, greed and political miscalculation‖ (Roftopoulos) and Mugabe was accused of letting his 
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―ego and his associate‘s business interest in the DRC‘s lucrative diamond industry‖ mire ―the country in a costly and 
unwinnable war‖ (cited in Ngoma 2004: 10).  
 
In the same vein a Namibian opposition leader, Katuure Kauri, lashed out at the Namibian involvement that ―[i]t is 
[was] inexplicable that Namibia as a democratic country could involve itself in a conflict to keep in power someone 
who is at present nothing less than a dictator who took power by means of an armed rebellion‖ (cited in Ngoma 2004: 
4). According to Cornwall and Potgieter, Angola and Zimbabwe planned a strategic exit from the war zone because 
of the strain it placed on their economies and their military establishments. They posited that ―[t]here were indications 
that the military chiefs of Angola and Zimbabwe were both seeking permission to withdraw from the DRC in light of 
the strains placed upon their countries by continued operations‖ (1998: 4). This was a reflection that the military 
intervention was neither sustainable nor tenable.  
 
Apart from lacking the political and material mandate of the regional and international organisations, the intervention 
of the SADC Alliance was not so much driven by the peace and security interests of the DRC and the region as by 
the national economic and political interests of the intervening powers. In fact, all the intervening powers in both the 
government and rebel camps intervened for self-interest as if to vindicate the Realists‘ position that nations will 
always and/or only intervene in other countries to protect their national interests or gain more power. The looting and 
plunder which Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Namibia, Angola and Zimbabwe unleashed on the DRC mineral wealth is 
evidence of their involvement for self-enrichment (Malan 1999, Matthee, 2000, Munyae 2000, Miti 2000, Maseti 2001, 
Cleaver and Massey 2001, Taylor and William 2001, Schoeman 2002, Ngoma 2004, Hwang 2005, Van Walraven 
2005). According to Miti, the involvement of foreign powers ―turned the war into a predatory war of Zaire‘s huge 
economic resources. The final outcome has been the division of the country into commercial spheres of various 
external and internal forces‖ (2000: 18). 
 
One other major motive for intervention in the DRC, especially by Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and Angola, was 
national security. The security and sovereignty of these countries were jeopardised by the different rebel groups‘ 
incursions operating from within the DRC. Rwanda and Burundi were determined to crush the Interahangwe militia 
and ex-Hutu Defence force rebels, Angola to dismantle the UNITA bases in the DRC, while Uganda also aimed at 
flushing out its numerous rebel movements in the DRC namely the Lord Resistance Army (LRA), the Ugandan Allied 
Democratic Front (ADF), the West Nile Bank Front (WNBF) and the Ugandan National Rescue Front (UNRF). This 
became the justification for the intervention of these powers as the Kabila regime failed to secure the security of his 
erstwhile backers, and worse still, recruited the rebel groups into his military structures against the Ugandan-
Rwandan- backed Rally for the Congolese Democracy (RCD) (Cornwall and Potgieter 1998, Munyae 2000, Matthee 
2000, Power 2004, Van Walraven 2005).  
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South African-led camp comprising Botswana, Mozambique and Tanzania, on the other hand, advocated dialogue 
among the warring parties as the solution to the conflict. This was in line with South Africa‗s foreign policy position to 
promote regional peace through diplomatic multilateral constructive engagements rather that military confrontation. 
The new South Africa was to avoid the military posture projected by the apartheid regime in the region prior to the 
1994 democratic dispensation. As such the South African approach was informed by its own history of apartheid 
militaristic regional destabilisation. It was from this basis that Mandela as the President of South Africa and 
Chairperson of SADC rejected outright military intervention in the DRC and dismissed the Zimbabwe-led military 
expedition as being without the SADC mandate (Malan 1999, Nathan 2004, Ngoma 2005).  
 
The South African-led diplomatic initiative culminated in two Summits in Pretoria (22-23 August 1998) attended by 
representatives of the Kabila government and presidents of Rwanda, Uganda and Kenya. Conspicuously absent 
were Kabila and the SADC Alliance group which dismissed the summit as immaterial seeing that the SADC was 
already embarked on a peace mission in the DRC (Cornwall and Potgieter 1998, Nathan 2004). Nevertheless, the 
Pretoria Summit mandated Mandela to initiate dialogue for ceasefire, withdrawal of foreign forces and subsequently a 
negotiated peaceful resolution of the conflict. South Africa maintained that the decision to intervene militarily served 
to fuel rather than solve the conflict (Breytenbach 2000, Mosieleng 2001, Meyns 2003, Ngoma 2004, Ngoma 2005, 
Hwang 2005, Van Walraven 2005). As such South Africa‘s objective was ―to secure an immediate ceasefire that 
would freeze all troop movements for a negotiated settlement of the conflict‖ (Mosieleng 2001: 365). It was also 
South Africa‘s hope that a ceasefire would ensure that all stakeholders would enter into an equal and open national 
dialogue to identify the root causes of the conflict, agree on a constitution and the building of democratic state 
institutions, and participate in internationally monitored all-inclusive elections for lasting peace and stability in the 
country and region at large (Du Plessis 2000).  
 
South Africa as the regional hegemon with economic, political and military might was expected by many to shape and 
dominate the security landscape of the SADC region. The regional hegemon‘s decision not to intervene militarily and 
opt for a multilateral diplomatic engagement was criticised by some scholars and the SADC Alliance members. The 
diplomacy and negotiation approach advocated by South Africa was also refuted by the Kabila regime which insisted 
that the country was not under attack by the rebels but by an armed invasion by Rwanda and Uganda. It was from 
this position that Kabila, with the support of the SADC Alliance refused to negotiate with the rebel groups, and 
rejected the SADC-OAU-backed former president of Botswana, Sir Ketumile Masire, as the facilitator of the Inter-
Congolese Dialogue). President Mandela‘s invitation to the Congolese Rally for Democracy‘s (RCD) Wamba Dia 
Wamba and Kagame of Rwanda was interpreted by the Kabila regime as collusion with the rebels and the invading 
powers (Cornwall and Potgieter 1998, Matthee, 2000, Munyae 2000, Maseti 2001, Ngoma 2004, 2005). However, it 
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was to be the South African-led diplomatic approach which ultimately brought peace to the DRC. South Africa 
insisted that an inclusive dialogue of all the belligerents was the answer to a lasting solution.  
 
The question whether Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola acted with the mandate of the SADC or not, is an issue that 
has dogged the debate on the DRC intervention for some time. Several commentators maintain that the intervention 
was not authorised or mandated by the SADC Summit as stipulated in the SADC Treaty and the Organ Protocol 
(Matthee, 2000, Munyae 2000, Meyns 2002, Ngoma 2004, De Coning 2004, Power 2004, 2005, Bah 2004, Nathan 
2004, Neethling 2004, Hwang 2005, Likoti 2006). The military intervention clearly exposed the political dynamics of a 
polarised and fragmented SADC. Hwang (2005: 171) contends that ―[i]f the Zimbabwe –led intervention was indeed 
an act of collective self-defence under SADC, one would have expected SADC to have authorised such an operation 
at the level of the SADC Organ or Summit, with a specific mandate and perhaps that SADC would have appointed 
the Head of Mission and Force commander. But SADC took none of these actions associated with an authorising 
body.‖ In the same vein, de Coning dismisses the Zimbabwe-led operation as ―a neo-interventionist force; an 
expeditionary coalition‖ since ―no other country, international or regional body including SADC itself recognised the 
Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia troops as SADC forces‖ (2004: 164). 
 
However, in a strange turn of events, the SADC Alliance military intervention was later recognised as legitimate and 
mandated by the SADC at the Mauritius Summit of September 1998. In a bid to mend the rift which was tearing the 
regional organisation apart, the then Chairperson, President Mandela, made a round-about turn and congratulated 
the SADC Alliance for successfully launching the operation on behalf of the organisation (Cornwall and Potgieter 
1998, Munyae 2000, Du Plessis 2000, Matthee 2000, Nathan 2004, Neethling 2004, Ngoma 2004, 2005). At a press 
conference Mandela stated that ―[i]t was quite reasonable when the legitimate Head of government of a country says 
I have been invaded by a foreign force, come and help me defend my country… for the neighbouring country to 
respond positively‖ (cited in Cornwall and Potgieter 1998: 5). This position was echoed by the Mauritius SADC 
Summit Communiqué which unequivocally ―commended the governments of Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe for 
timorously providing troops to assist the government and people of the DRC defeat the illegal attempt by the rebels 
and their allies to capture the capital city and other strategic areas…‖ (The SADC Communiqué September 13-14 
1998). According to Makoa (1998), the change of stance by South Africa (Mandela) was motivated by the fear of 
isolation and loss of the regional hegemon status to Zimbabwe (Mugabe). The fears were born by the fact that in 
1998 Mugabe was alleged to have called a meeting of Defence Ministers from nine SADC member states from which 
South Africa was excluded. Mugabe is also alleged to have exploited South Africa‘s vacillating political stance on the 
the DRC civil conflict, accusing Mandela of misconceiving the African political agenda with the intent of marginalising 
the country (South Africa) in regional affairs and leadership. As such South Africa is said to have ―been under intense 
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pressure from SADC states with close leanings towards Zimbabwe to abandon its notion of preventive diplomacy and 
adopt, a robust African policy‖ (Makoa 1998: 9). 
 
Du Plessis (2000) dismisses this retroactive approval of legitimising the intervention as a SADC mission. He argues 
that ―legitimacy is virtually always questioned when regional security structures endorse the military intervention of 
individual states only after it has started‖ (2000: 353). However, at the Mauritius Summit a compromise of the 
divergent approaches to the DRC conflict was hatched. The accommodative approach is described by Ngoma as: 
―SADC adopted a two pronged strategy. Firslty, the summit in Mauritius congratulated Angola, Namibia and 
Zimbabwe for acting on behalf of SADC – seemingly militaristic approach. Secondly, by tasking the President of 
Zambia with spearheading peace initiatives, it meant that the organisation was also pursuing a negotiated path – the 
preferred strategy by South Africa‖ (2004: 7). The spirit of compromise born at the Mauritius Summit provided fertile 
ground for cooperation and shared vision for SADC, and the ultimate resolution of DRC conflict. The peace and unity 
in purpose at SADC was sealed by the signing of the OPDS Protocol and the Mutual Defence Pact Protocol, both of 
which would guide future SADC interventions in peace missions and operations of security mechanism. 
 
5.4.6 SADC [South Africa] Multilateral Approach to the DRC Conflict 
The magnitude, complexity and impact of the DRC conflict was reflected by the numerous peace and diplomatic 
initiatives from individual nations, bilateral, regional, continental and international summits, and personal diplomatic 
efforts to resolve it (Mosieleng 2001, Naidoo 1999, Munyae 2000, Matthee 2000, Ngoma 2004, Hwang 2005, Van 
Walraven 2005). The DRC conflict attests to the significance of regional organisations‘ efforts to harness the 
cooperation and partnership of the continental (OAU-AU) and international organisations (UN) in resolving conflicts. 
Among the numerous summits held, it was the Lusaka SADC Summit of 15 January 1999, (broad based-attended by 
Angola, Botswana, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Chad, Burkina Faso, Rwanda, Gabon, Kenya, Mozambique, Libya, 
Namibia, Tanzania, the DRC and the rebel groups, OAU and UN representatives) which made significant headway 
towards the resolution of the conflict. The Lusaka Summit mandated then President of Zambia, Chiluba, to mediate 
the conflict, and this culminated in the signing of the Lusaka Peace Accord of June 11 1999, which paved the way for 
the resolution of the conflict. It has been hailed as a success of African diplomacy in that it was the SADC which 
mainly mediated the peace process (Dindelo 2006).  
 
The Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement paved the way for other peace agreements and mechanisms in the form of the 
Pretoria Agreement and Luanda Agreement (2002), the Global and Inclusive Accord (2003), the Joint Verification 
Mechanism as well as the Tripartite Plus Commission and the Memorandum of Intent on Regional Security in the 
Great lakes (2004), all of which committed the warring parties to disarming, demobilising and reintegrating all the 
armed rebel groups and militias operating in the DRC territory. In addition to the summits, personal and private 
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diplomatic efforts were launched by Mandela, meeting the RCD leader Wamba dia Wamba and Kagame of Rwanda, 
mediation between Kabila, rebel goups and Museveni (Uganda) by the Libyan leader, Gaddafi, on 8 April 1999, and 
the Mbeki Renaissance Peacekeeping Plan involving Rwanda, Uganda, Zambia, South Africa and the DRC, as well 
as the OAU delegation of Masire as the facilitator of the Inter-Congolese Dilaogue.  
 
On the 24th January 2000, the UN‘s Security Council held a Special Session on Africa as part of the UN ―Month of 
Africa‖. The UN forum accorded the Head of States of the warring parties the opportunity to address the Security 
Council on the conflict and how it should be resolved. The UN further appointed a Special Representative of the 
Secretary General to the Congo, Moustapha Niasse, to deal with the root causes of the debilitating conflict and strive 
for a lasting solution (Cornwall and Potgieter 1998, Malan 1999, Munyae 2000, Maseti 2001, Solomon and Fourie 
2002, Taylor and William 2003, Ngoma 2004). 
 
5.4.7 Factors which hampered the Resolution of the DRC Conflict 
The resolution of the DRC conflict proved a protracted, thorny and bumpy route despite the numerous regional and 
international diplomatic initiatives embarked upon to resolve it. Several factors made attaining peace in the DRC a 
very rough process. Primarily, the conflict involved a large number of nations and rebel groups with different clashing 
economic and political agendas. It became very difficult to find a solution accommodative to the diverse interests of 
the nations and belligerent groups in the DRC conflict. This made the calls for a ceasefire and withdrawal of foreign 
troops difficult to attain. Matthee aptly summarises the reluctance of the above powers to withdraw their troops from 
the DRC thus: ―[m]any of the leaders of the anti-Kabila forces link the pursuit of their interests to the removal of 
Kabila from the political scene. They do not believe that Kabila will voluntarily relinquish power after negotiations, so 
military force seems the only solution. In addition, on all sides there are militarised economic enterprises that profit 
from continued conflict and little control by the government in Kinshasa‖ (Matthee 2000: 270).  
 
Secondly, there were difficulties posed by the different definitions and interpretations of the conflict by the numerous 
warring parties involved. The matter was further complicated by denial by some parties, for example Rwanda and 
Burundi, that they were involved in the conflict. The Kabila regime and the SADC Alliance defined the conflict as a 
foreign invasion by Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi, rather than an internal rebellion by the Congolese Rally for 
Democracy (RCD) and the Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (MLC). It was from this premise that the Kabila 
regime sent Rwanda and Uganda to the International Court of Justice for challenging the sovereignty of the DRC and 
persistently resisting inclusion of the rebel groups in the DRC peace talks. Kabila entertained hopes for a military 
victory against the rebels if Rwanda and Uganda were forced to withdraw, and had no faith in a negotiated 
settlement. As such he adroitly used the ceasefire moments to prepare for new offensives (Matthee 2000). 
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On the other hand, South Africa and the rebel movements viewed the conflict as a civil war in spite of the presence of 
the external powers. Therefore, a long lasting peace could only be attained through a multilateral process which 
included all the warring parties. These differences gave birth to a volatile climate in which there was no commitment 
to peace by the different warring groups, and violations of the ceasefires became the order of the day. This was 
aggravated by the multiplicity of rebel movements and militia in the DRC. In addition, the rivalry, mistrust and 
suspicion against each other created serious differences in the choice of a suitable mediator and venue who/which 
would be trusted and accepted as non-partisan by all the warring factions. Du Plessis (2000) observes that the 
Lusaka Accord resulted from a military stalemate and the high costs of continued engagement which affected all the 
parties, which forced them to opt for dialogue. 
 
Despite its enormous prospects for peace which had eluded several other initiatives, the Lusaka Peace Accord had 
its own flaws, mainly in the implementation process. Solomon and Mngqibisa (2000) observe that ―the manner in 
which the Lusaka Agreement was reached and operationalised significantly contributed to its failure. Firstly the peace 
accord failed to include all the warring parties in the signing of the ceasefire and the subsequent peace negotiations.‖  
The peace accord was signed only by the major belligerents, namely the DRC Government, Angola, Zimbabwe, 
Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD), and the Movement for the 
Liberation of the Congo (MLC). Other warring factors such as UNITA, Front for the Liberation of of the Enclave of 
Kabinda (FLEC) (Angola), the Interahangwe and ex- Armed Forces of Rwanda (FAR), Forces for the Defence of 
Democracy (FDD), National Congress for the Defence of Democracy (CNDD) (Rwanda), the Lord Resistance Army 
(Uganda) and the numerous militia groups such as the Maimai maimai in the DRC were excluded. This gave them a 
licence to continue their attacks, as they were not bound by the ceasefire agreement and the subsequent peace 
talks. As such ―in spite of the respect of the ceasefire by the main actors, the war has continued through the actions 
of these militia‖ groups making peace more evasive in the DRC (Dindelo 2006: 76). 
 
Secondly, the Lusaka Peace accord did not substantively address the underlying security concerns of Rwanda, 
Burundi, and Uganda which consistently justified their continued presence and refusal to withdraw their troops from 
the DRC on the pretext that they were tracing the rebel groups operating from the bases in the DRC. For example, 
the MONUC failed to disarm and dismantle the rebel groups operating in the Eastern DRC, thereby giving credence 
to the presence of foreign troops for security reasons. Although the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement acknowledged that 
addressing the security concerns of the DRC and its neighbours was integral to the realisation of peace, there was a 
lack of concerted political will to implement the provision. Dindelo (2006: 77) states that ―one of the criticisms about 
the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement is the fact that it left its implementation to the good will of [the] conflicting parties.‖ 
Countries like Zimbabwe, Rwanda and Uganda and the main rebel groups such as the MLC and the RCD continued 
the conflict as it provided the opportunity to exploit the mineral resources for personal benefit as well as financing the 
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war. Such a situation created insurmountable challenges in the implementation of the Lusaka Accord. In view of this, 
Dindelo (2006) posits that the Lusaka Agreement only addressed grievance factors of the warring parties and failed 
to halt the illegal exploitation and plunder of the natural resources in the DRC. 
 
Thirdly, there was difficulty in forming a coherent and operational transitional government of national unity from the 
diverse political formations which had bitterly fought each other. They remained suspicious of each other and each 
wanted to secretly maintain its private military in case the transitional government and the electoral dispensation did 
not accommodate their interests.  
 
In spite of its recorded implementational shortcomings, the Lusaka Accord provided a solid foundation for the ultimate 
resolution of the DRC conflict. To some extent ―[i]t had the merit of ending the hostilities among the main conflicting 
parties, therefore creating an environment of unstable peace for the use of preventive diplomacy, to address the 
underlying causes of the conflict‖ (Dindelo: 2006: 77). Chapter five of the Modalities for the Implementation of the 
Ceasefire Agreement in the DRC called on the warring parties to do their utmost to facilitate the inter-Congolese 
political negotiation to attain a new political dispensation in the country. Thus accordingly from 1998 to 2005, 34 
resolutions were adopted by the United Nations Security Council and four peace agreements were signed, namely 
the Pretoria Agreement (2002), the Luanda Agreement (2002), the Global and All inclusive Accord (2003), and the 
Memorandum of Intent on Regional Security in the Great lakes. Numerous mechanisms such as the Joint Verification 
Mechanisms and the Tripartite Plus Commission embracing the DRC, Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi were put in 
place to address the security concerns of the neighbouring states (Dindelo 2006). The Lusaka accord also facilitated 
the partnership of the United Nations, regional organisations, Civil Society Organisations and individual member 
states in finding a durable solution and peace in the DRC. The multilateral approach to the resolution of the DRC 
made commendable overtures for relative peace and stability in the DRC and the region at large. 
 
The facts that the conflict seemed to be impossible to win militarily, the assassination of Laurent Kabila on the 17th of 
January 2001 and the ascension of his son Joseph Kabila, created fertile grounds for the peaceful resolution of the 
crisis (Solomon and Fourie 2002). Indeed the demise of Kabila senior was followed by profound changes in the 
approach to the resolution of the conflict. This was evidenced by the opening of an inclusive dialogue, acceptance of 
Masire as the facilitator, the numerous peace summits hosted by South Africa, the OAU and the UN which 
culminated in the implementation of the Lusaka Peace Accord, the establishment of an inclusive government of 
national unity, the deployment of a multilateral UN peacekeeping force (MONUC), and the holding of elections and 
creation of a democratically elected, representative government in 2006. The elections were won by the Kabila 
(junior)-led party which formed the government and shouldered the mammoth task of leading the country to 
democracy and economic recovery. 
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Unfortunately, the subsequent elections to transform the country from war to democracy, peace and stability, were 
marred by violence, accusations of vote rigging, and post-election clashes between the government forces and rebel 
militias of Bemba and General Nkunda. Several political commentators are pessimistic about realisation of durable 
and lasting peace in the DRC. Fourie and Solomon (2002) note that effective preventive diplomacy in the DRC 
conflict would have been realised ―before August 1998 when comprehensive structural changes could truly have 
prevented the second rebellion,‖ but ―unfortunately, most of the International community was so relieved that Mobutu 
was on his way out that it did not notice the impending crisis.‖  
 
Jan Van Eck warns the peace facilitators in the DRC of the risks of pursuing a military solution to the conflict. He 
posits that ―[t]he only solution people are trying is the use of military force. There is no military solution to this [the 
Eastern DRC] whatsoever. It is clear that unless a new strategy is formulated–one that will focus on addressing the 
real root causes of the conflict–the region will move irrevocably towards a major new crisis. In such an event, not only 
the Eastern DRC will be drawn in, but also its Eastern neighbours, Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi, since the present 
ethnically based conflict in eastern DRC has its origin in these countries‖ (cited in King 2008: 14). On the basis of the 
continuously unfolding and recurrent conflicts in the DRC, one is compelled to concur with du Plessis‘s (2000: 349) 
assessment that it was logical that ―when foreign military exit the DRC intense political struggles will continue to 
feature strongly in the patch work of power zones.‖ Such assumptions are motivated by the belief that addressing the 
structural and deep-rooted sources of the conflict will ensure attainment of lasting peace as envisaged by the Basic 
Human Needs theorists such as Burton and Azar. As Burton (1987) observes ―[a]ny situation of conflict has many 
components, and in conflict resolution it is necessary to break down the whole into its separate parts and issues‖ 
(cited in Dindelo 2006: 74). 
 
The SADC through the South African multilateral diplomatic approach to conflict resolution got the credit for regional 
peace and security. South Africa has also sent troops to assist in the maintenance of peace and reconstruction of the 
DRC. However, it is not clear whether South Africa sent its troops under the auspices of the SADC or the UN. There 
are questions on the efficacy of the organisation‘s measures to prevent the recurrence of conflict and post-conflict 
building mechanisms considering the fact that war is still raging in the DRC. As Mills notes ―South Africa and its 
regional supporters were guilty of appeasement, and should have been tougher on enforcing compliance in 
agreements. The Kabila supporters in SADC, in contrast used the regional organisation as an alliance through which 
they could extend their influence at the price of peace.‖ (Fourie and Solomon 2002: 14). Currently it is difficult to 
establish any substantive role SADC is playing in the unfolding conflict in the DRC save verbal pledges during its 
Head of States Summits for dialogue and peace among the warring groups in the country.  
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It appears that the SADC has surrendered its regional conflict prevention, management and resolution task to the UN 
peacekeeping Force (MONUC) instead of being in practical collaboration with it. The conflict in the DRC continues to 
rage. However, its intensity and scope have been dramatically reduced, with collaboration of MONUC and 
government forces gradually crushing the pockets of instability by rebel groups and militias in the Eastern parts of the 
country. Whether lasting peace will ever be realised in the DRC remains to be seen. The fact of the matter is that the 
efficacy of the SADC preventive diplomacy in the DRC remains questionable, and calls for concerted revamping and 
revitalisation. 
 
5.5 The SADC and the Crisis in Zimbabwe 
The economic and political crisis in Zimbabwe has had adverse effects on the SADC individual member states and 
the region, and has become one of its main preoccupations. The success or failure of the SADC as an organisation 
for regional economic and political stability will be tested in Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe became independent on the 18th 
April 1980 after a protracted liberation war by the Zimbabwean African National Union (ZANU-PF) and the 
Zimbabwean African Peoples‘ Union (ZAPU) against the British colonial rule (Ian Smith‘s Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence). Independence was ultimately attained after the signing of the Lancaster House Agreement between 
the British government and the liberation movements on September 10th 1979 (Gregory 1992, Goldman 2003, Lee 
2003). The terms of the Lancaster House Agreement are viewed by many analysts as the root source of the present 
crisis in Zimbabwe as ―Britain and the United States of America insisted that the whites‘ political and economic 
privileges be maintained‖ (Lee, 2003: 4) which the Robert Mugabe regime violently challenged in the mid-1990s.  
 
In the 1980 first democratic elections ZANU-PF won a resounding majority (63% of the national vote) and Robert 
Mugabe became the Prime Minister and later the President of Zimbabwe (1987), the position he has held until today. 
In the first years of governance the ZANU government preached national reconciliation and creation of a democratic 
and a non-racial Zimbabwe. The government‘s commitment to reconciliation was evidenced by moves to integrate 
the liberation forces with the former Rhodesian army to form a united Zimbabwean National Army headed by the 
former Rhodesian commander, General Peter Walls. A government of national unity was also put in place, which was 
inclusive of cabinet ministers and parliamentarians from all political parties (Gregory 1992, Meredith 2007).  
 
Zimbabwe was regarded as a credible member of the international community with membership of SADC, the 
Commonwealth of Nations and the United Nations. Its economy flourished and the country was regarded as the 
―bread basket of Africa‖. As the then US Deputy Secretary of State for Africa Frank Wisner stated before a House 
subcommittee hearing in 1984, ―Zimbabwe remained an important model for the rest of Southern Africa, both 
politically and economically… other states in the region could learn from Zimbabwe‘s example‖ (De Rouche 2001: 
323-324). The British government also credited Zimbabwe as a functioning democracy compared to many other 
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African states (Lee 2003). These positive tags were replaced by negative references to the Mugabe regime as being 
a dictatorship, and Zimbabwe as a ―post of tyranny‖ by the West and the US when Mugabe started forceful 
expropriation of land from the white farmers, which marked the genesis of the economic and political decline of the 
country with catastrophic effects in the SADC region. 
 
5.5.1 The Zimbabwean Crisis 2000 to the Present 
There is no question that Zimbabwe is in a state of deepening crisis. The term ―crisis‖ is often employed to describe 
the profound and complex political and economic conditions in Zimbabwe since 2000 (Goldman, 2003, Lee 2003, 
Sachikonye 2003, Areseb and Kibble 2005, Townsend 2005). The political and economic crisis manifested itself in 
the mid-1990s and 2000 when the Mugabe regime implemented its controversial policies of land seizure to resolve 
the thorny issue of land redistribution to the landless black Zimbabweans. The Lancaster House Agreement which 
paved the way for Zimbabwe‘s independence included clauses (the Sunset Clause) which protected land rights of the 
white farmers. The British government pledged a land resettlement grant of $75 million while the USA pledged 
$200million (Moyo, interview in Lee 2003: 5). However, the British government is said to have provided only $44 
million of the pledged land reform fund, and withheld the rest after accusing the Mugabe regime of misusing the 
funds and allocating the purchased land to ZANU-PF government officials and cronies instead of the needy masses 
(Goldman 2003, Lee 2003, Meredith 2007, and Boateng 2011). The then British Secretary of State for International 
Development, Claire Short, is said to have written to the Zimbabwe Minister of Agriculture and Lands, stating her 
government‗s decision to halt the land fund pledge: ―we do not accept that Britain has a special responsibility to meet 
the costs of land purchase in Zimbabwe‖ (Internet; assessed; 30 September 2007). This was to mark the beginning 
of acrimonious relations between the Mugabe regime and the Labour government of Prime Minister Tony Blair.  
 
It is a truism that the liberation war against white settler regime was propelled and coalesced around the issue of 
land. Fearing to be accused of a failed revolution, the Mugabe regime embarked on a land reform programme as a 
political tool to retain its nationalist status and support base among, mainly, the rural population and the war 
veterans, and hold on to power. After the expiry of the Lancaster House restrictions on land redistribution, the 
Mugabe regime passed the Land Acquisition Act of 1992. This marked the genesis of a period of institutionalised 
land seizure and political violence which culminated in the current economic meltdown inflicting Zimbabwe (Gregory 
1992, Lee 2003, Meredith 2007). The Mugabe regime fuelled racial divisions around the land issue, portraying it as a 
contestation between the land–hungry black majority and a greedy few white settler farmers unwilling to share the 
national resource -- land (Meredith 2007).  
 
The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank‗s decision to withhold loans and grants for the violent land 
seizure was dismissed by Mugabe as a tool used by the West and the USA to stifle development in the Third World.  
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The Zimbabwean regime was not going to ―dance to the whims and caprices of the World Bank and the IMF‖ 
(Meredith 2007: 129). This was to usher in a period of hostile political bickering between the Zimbabwean 
government, the European Union and the USA, and the consequent collapse of the economy of Zimbabwe with dire 
economic and political consequences in the SADC region. 
 
The volatile political situation in Zimbabwe was aggravated by the formation of an opposition party, the Movement for 
Democratic Change (MDC) in 1999. The party, led by the former General Secretary of the Zimbabwe Congress of 
Trade Union (ZCTU), Morgan Tsvangirai, posed the first organised challenge to Mugabe‘s ZANU PF which has 
dominated the political landscape since independence in 1980 (Lee 2003, Goldman 2003). The Mugabe regime 
denounced the MDC as a counter-revolutionary imperialist proxy party sponsored by the West and the USA to topple 
his regime or to orchestrate their ‖regime change‖ agenda. To counter the opposition and increase its popularity with 
the suffering mass electorate, the government instituted a referendum in February 2000 for constitutional 
amendments which would have increased Mugabe‘s presidential powers and mandated the government to 
expropriate white commercial farms without compensation (Moyo 1995, Lee 2003, Goldman 2003, Mereith 2007). 
 
The defeat of the government in the referendum marked the genesis of the Zimbabwe crisis, when the government 
institutionalised violence as a weapon to crush the opposition and retain power in the 2000 and 2002 parliamentary 
and presidential elections. The security apparatus became Mugabe‗s primary source of power and instrument of 
violence during the land redistribution period dubbed the ―Third Chimurenga‖. The aggressive and violent campaign 
targeted the opposition strongholds and the white commercial farmers who were regarded as the financial and the 
economic backbone of the opposition, which resulted in the government defeat in the referendum. It was from this 
basis of accusing the white farmers of sabotaging the economy, supporting the opposition with the aim of regime 
change, and installing a puppet regime, that the revolutionary clarion call for the Third Chimurenga and accelerated 
land expropriation and redistribution, was born and institutionalised.  
 
Thus the 2000 and 2002 parliamentary and presidential elections took place in an atmosphere of regime-sponsored 
and institutionalised violence, lawlessness, assaults, arson, abductions, arbitrary arrests, torture, intimidation, 
escalating violence and murder of members of the opposition. As the International Crisis Group put it, ―[t]he 
widespread use of violence, intimidation and coercion formed the backbone of the government‘s strategy to cow the 
electorate into supporting ZANU-PF, not supporting the MDC or staying away from polling places‖ (cited in Goldman 
2003: 35).  
 
It goes without saying that having been subjected to such intense violence by the state machinery, the MDC 
justifiably rejected the results and the legitimacy of the emergent ZANU-PF government. They called for the 
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annulment of the elections and holding credible elections conducted in a democratic and transparent manne; calls 
which the Mugabe regime simply ignored. The international community, especially the European Union, the USA and 
the Commonwealth Observer Teams as well as the SADC Parliamentary Forum Observer Mission, rejected the 
elections as fraudulent and incredible due to the high level of violence which prevailed during the campaign period. 
The Commonwealth Observer Mission denounced the election results as reflective of a ―climate of fear and 
suspicions and a systematic campaign of intimidation‖ visited upon the opposition by the ZANU-PF militia and 
security forces (Meredith 2007: 229). The MDC leader Tsvangirai dismissed the elections as ―daylight robbery‖ by 
ZANU-PF (Meredith 2007).  
 
Perhaps for political expediency and solidarity reasons, the South African, Nigerian, African Union and SADC 
Observer Missions endorsed the elections as fair, free and a legitimate representation of the will of the people of 
Zimbabwe (Isaksen 2002, Alden and Garth 2003, Sachikonye 2004, Lodge 2004, Areseb and Kibble 2005, 
Townsend 2005). Commenting on this regional support of the Mugabe regime, USA Senator Russell Feingold 
indicated that it ―raise[d] real doubts about the commitment of these regional leaders to democracy, and over the long 
term, these failures threaten the prospects for stability and prosperity throughout the region‖ (cited in Kibble 2005: 7).  
 
The 2000 and 2002 parliamentary and presidential elections escalated and exacerbated the economic and political 
crisis in Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe, a country once referred to as ―Africa‘s bread basket‖, experienced total economic 
collapse, with catastrophic consequences in the region (Benjamin 1992, Gregory 1992, Goldman 2003, Lee 2003, 
Dell 2005, ICG 2007). The economic and political crisis ―has turned the country from extremely prosperous by African 
standards into one of the most impoverished places on earth‖ (Goldman 2003: 31). This was because the 
international community, the European Union and the USA, imposed economic sanctions on the ZANU-PF for stolen 
elections, human rights abuses, poor governance, and breakdown of the rule of law in the country. These sanctions, 
coupled with the disruptions in the agricultural production sector resulting from the farm invasions, led to the total 
collapse of the economy and institutions of democratic governance. The developed world‘s imposition of economic 
sanctions lends credibility to accusations that they are a tool to facilitate regime change in the country. The perceived 
Western ―orchestrated plot‖ to collapse the economy of Zimbabwe and effect their goal of regime change was 
confirmed by the passage of the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act in December 2001, in which the 
USA government pledged to put economic and political pressure on the ZANU-PF regime by de-campaigning it in the 
international front, and sponsoring the opposition ―democratic‖ forces in Zimbabwe.  
 
It is with such evidence that the Mugabe regime has successfully garnered the support of the continent and the 
SADC region, to counter what they perceive as a Western imperialist plot to re-colonise Zimbabwe and the entire 
continent. For example, in his speech after his presidential ―victory‖ in the 2002 elections Mugabe was quoted as 
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stating that he had dealt a ―stunning blow to imperialism...That ugly head that we thought we had smashed through 
our anti-colonial struggle, no, we left it alive and it is rearing it again, perhaps calling for a much more devastating 
blow to the head, no longer to the body of that monster‖ (cited in Meredith 2007: 229). 
 
On the other hand, the Western governments and the USA, the godfathers of the targeted sanctions, have 
categorically denied that the economic turmoil in Zimbabwe resulted from the sanctions. Instead they lay the genesis 
and escalation of the economic and political meltdown at the door of the dictatorial ZANU-PF regime and its 
institutionalised misrule, gross mismanagement of the economy, and the chaotic and disastrous land reform 
programme which disrupted the once productive commercial ultimately turning Zimbabwe from being a ‖bread 
basket‖ to a ‖basket case‖ (Boateng 2011).  
 
Attempts by the SADC organisation and individual member states to help revive and reconstruct the collapsed 
economy remain elusive Calls by Tsvangirai, who joined the Mugabe regime as Prime Minister to form a government 
of national unity following the signing of the Global Political Agreement (GPA) in 2008, for the West and the USA to 
lift sanctions on the Mugabe ruling elite have not borne any significant fruits. The EU and the USA have instead 
renewed the sanctions, as in their view the government of national unity has not shown any meaningful and 
identifiable moves towards economic reconstruction and democratic governance. 
 
5.5.2 Political Effects of the Crisis 
Politically, Zimbabwe is on the brink of becoming a failed and collapsed state. The dictatorship of the Mugabe regime 
has turned the country into a militarised and criminalised state. The formation of the Joint Military Command (JMC) 
evidenced the militarisation of the country governance and state instituions. The Mugabe regime now relies on the 
security establishment to safeguard its power base by means of political repression (ICG 2007). Key ministries, 
institutions and diplomatic missions of the government are headed by the regime‘s loyalists, mainly from the security 
services, symbolising Mugabe‘s power networks (Meredith (2007). 
 
The political crisis in Zimbabwe has become an established source of regional insecurity, violating the pledge by 
SADC for promotion of democracy, good governance, peace and stability, human rights protection and development. 
The economic and political meltdown in Zimbabwe was aggravated by the brutalities of the ZANU-PF regime, as 
evidenced by the violent crushing of any democratic demonstration. 
 
The repressive nature of the regime was reflected on the 11th of March 2007, when the security forces violently 
crushed a prayer meeting organised by the Save Zimbabwe Campaign, a coalition of the opposition, the church and 
civil society, and brutally assaulting Morgan Tsvangirai. In response to the international outcry against the regime‘s 
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brutalities against the opposition, democracy and human rights, the ever-defiant Mugabe told the international 
community to ‖go hang‖ as the opposition was an instrument of the West, sponsored to orchestrate regime change in 
Zimbabwe. The Mugabe regime remains obstinate and confrontational in both its domestic and foreign policy posture 
in spite of the enormous crises the country is deeply sinking into. The regime‘s brutalisation of the opposition has 
crippled the latter‘s capacity to mobilise the masses for an open rebellion against it. The opposition mobilisation 
capacity was further eroded by its split into two antagonistic and competing factions led by Morgan Tsvangirai and 
Arthur Mutambara (Ncube 2007, International Crisis Group September 2007, Meredith 2007). 
 
Through its propaganda machinery, the Zimbabwean government has consistently denied the existence of any 
political crisis in the country. The regime‘s propaganda dismisses any reports, especially by the Western media, as 
an imperialist engineered plot for regime change. In its characteristic combative fashion, the Mugabe regime has 
consistently accused the West and the USA sanctions for causing the current economic and political situation in 
Zimbabwe. This is in spite of the fact that the regime‘s misconstrued economic policies and political decay are largely 
responsible for the destruction of the country‘s once prosperous and functioning economy and government. The 
position of the Zimbabwe government is that the country has been subjected to such vicious vilifications because 
they have dared taken back land from the minority white commercial farmers in order to attain economic 
independence. The Mugabe regime has always argued, convincingly in some quarters, that the West will always use 
their economic and political might to crush any attempts by developing countries to achieve economic liberation. 
 
The brutal will and determination of the Mugabe-led ZANU-PF government to cling to power was reflected in the 
March 2008 Presidential elections, which, as has become customary, were characterised by state-sponsored 
violence perpetrated by the war veterans, ZANU-PF militia, and the security apparatus against the opposition MDC, 
especially Tsvangirai‘ s faction. When the Electoral Commission was expected to release the results, they delayed 
for a month for unexplained circumstances, which obviously fomented suspicions that the regime was rigging the 
results. As expected, when the results were released, neither of the major contestants Mugabe and Tsvangirai had 
won the required 50 +% of the vote. The re- run, which was set for June 2008, saw ZANU-PF unleashing its violent 
machinery against the MDC, thus forcing Tsvangirai to withdraw from the race as many of his supporters were 
arrested, tortured and killed by the ZANU-PF militia and state security apparatus. Although Mugabe claimed victory 
and was declared and inaugurated as the legitimately elected Head of State, many nations, especially in the 
European Union and the USA, rejected the elections as a joke, and did not recognise his government. Some states in 
the SADC region like Botswana under President Lieutenant General Seretse Khama Ian Khama, also refused to 
recognise Mugabe as the legitimate President of Zimbabwe.  
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In a bid to remedy the politically soiled climate, the SADC mandated the then president of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki, 
to facilitate dialogue between Mugabe and Tsvangirai, which after protracted tribulation and bickering, resulted in the 
signing of the Global Political Agreement (GPA) and formation of a government of national unity in February 2009. 
The GPA called for the formation of a unity government between the ZANU-PF and the Tsvangirai and Mutambara 
MDC factions. In the government of national unity Mugabe remained the President, while Tsvangirai and 
Mutamabara became the Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister respectively. It is important to note that the GPA 
and the resultant government of national unity were seriously flawed in that they granted Mugabe, who had allegedly 
lost in the 2008 polls, full executive powers, while Tsvingirai, who won the elections, and Mutambara are just 
powerless figureheads with little influence on governance policy and operations. This has created fault lines in the 
government of national unity as President Mugabe started violating the agreements of the GPA and the government 
of national unity, much to the dismay of the MDC and the SADC. 
 
President Mugabe has deliberately stalled the development of a new constitution which will govern the elections and 
governance in Zimbabwe beyond the government of national unity. ZANU-PF has been pushing for the holding of 
elections in 2011 despite the fact that the preparatory measures such as the availability of a new constitution as 
required by the GPA are not in place. Objections by the MDC and reference of the matter to the SADC for mediation 
have been met with indifferent obstinacy by the Mugabe regime. As a result the MDC (Tsvangirai) has threatened to 
pull out of the unity government if Mugabe does not adhere to the provisions of the GPA and the government of 
national unity. Jacob Zuma, who has replaced Thabo Mbeki as the president of South Africa and mediator in the 
Zimbabwean political impasse, has frequently visited Zimbabwe to save the government of national unity which has 
always been on the brink of collapse since its birth. The painful reality is that ZANU-PF has never been interested in 
sharing power with MDC, and therefore they have devised measures to make them uncomfortable partners in the 
government of national unity. On many occasions Mugabe has made unilateral decisions without consulting 
Tsvangirai as the Prime Minister in the unity government.  
 
The opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), who are accused by the Mugabe regime of being puppets 
of the West in its mission to effect regime change, has been unrelenting in its position that the economic and political 
situation in Zimbabwe has resulted from the ZANU-PF economic mismanagement and repressive political system. 
The MDC has called on the international community and the regional organisation (SADC) to impose sanctions on 
the Mugabe regime, which it regards as illegitimate because of the fraudulent and violence-packed elections of 2000, 
2002 and 2008.  
 
Whatever the truth is, the reality is that the Mugabe regime seems to be obsessed with defence of the state and the 
regime at the expense of human security, development and service delivery, as evidenced by the regime‘s 
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indifference to the suffering of impoverished Zimbabweans in Zimbabwe and those who have escaped economic 
pangs and political repression to other parts of the world. Because of the instability and dysfunctional situation in the 
unity government, there is talk of holding elections in 2011 as none of the GNU partners are comfortable with the 
partnership. The mention of elections revives fears of electoral violence, arrests, torture, and intimidation and 
massacres among the Zimbabwean voters (mainly opposition supporters) as experienced before and during the 2002 
and 2008 elections.  
 
5.6 The Response of the International Community and SADC to the Zimbabwe crisis 
SADC has been confronted by a number of grave security problems threatening the region‘s stability and 
development. The wars in Angola and the DRC, the violent conflicts in Lesotho and the deepening political crises in 
Zimbabwe and Madagascar, have been addressed in different ways, mainly through adhoc interventions due to lack 
of a functioning security mechanism and also due to the unique peculiarities and complexities of each case (Isaksen 
2002, Barengu and Landsberg 2003, Neethling 2004). Of all the security threats facing Southern Africa, the 
Zimbabwean economic and political meltdown remains a persistently gnawing thorn in the regional organisation‘s 
flesh. Bound by geography, history, economic and political links and the pledges of regional integration, the SADC 
cannot afford to ignore the calamitous effects of the turmoil in Zimbabwe. Several analysts and observers are 
concerned that the difficulties confronting Zimbabwe are damaging to the consolidation of democratic governance, 
the regional integration project and the fragile economies of the region (Alden and Garth 2003, Lee 2003 Sachikonye 
2004, Ngoma 2005). 
 
The effects of the Zimbabwean crisis on the SADC region and the continent‘s development potentials and initiatives  
are also persistently projected by the West and the USA. These global centres of economic and political power have 
tied development financial aid and assistance to the return of democracy, good governance, protection of human 
rights, free, fair and transparent elections, freedom of speech, independence of the judiciary, the media and 
prevalence of the rule of law in Zimbabwe and other nations of the Third World in general (Goldman 2003, Lee 2003). 
It is in this framework that Zimbabwe has become a subject of both regional and international debate. The 
Zimbabwean issue has become a dividing matter between and among the European, African and regional nations. 
 
5.6.1 The Response of the European Union and USA to Zimbabwe Crisis 
Subsequent to the 2000 and 2002 parliamentary and presidential elections, the Western nations and organisations 
and the USA have adopted a confrontational policy of isolation and containment towards Zimbabwe to pressurise it 
against what they perceive to be a dictatorial regime, characterised by state repression, gross human rights abuse, 
abrogation of the rule of law and suppression of the freedom of speech and the media, and crimes against humanity, 
especially after the controversial land reform programme in 2000. The European Union (EU), the white 
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Commonwealth nations (Australia, Canada and New Zealand) and the USA consistently launch diplomatic assaults 
on the Mugabe regime as an international outcast and a post of tyranny. The confrontational posture by the West and 
USA was evidenced by the enactment and signing into law of the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act 
on the 21 December 2001 by George W Bush. The law forbade any American business entity and international 
financial institution to engage in any business ventures with the Mugabe regime. 
 
The immediate post-Blair British Prime Minister Gordon Brown wrote in The Independent Newspaper (20 September 
2007) calling for the EU to tighten the sanctions against the Mugabe regime: ―[w]e will ensure that the EU maintains 
sanctions against the 131 individuals in the ruling elite including President Mugabe who have committed human 
rights abuses.‖ Brown further threatened to boycott the 2007 EU-Africa Conference in Portugal if Mugabe was 
invited. The confrontational stance was further reflected by statements by the representatives of the West and USA 
governments such as ―formation of a coalition of the willing‖ to deal with Zimbabwe (Frazer, USA ambassador to 
South Africa), condemnation of the Robert Mugabe regime and Zimbabwe as a ―post of tyranny‖ (US Secretary for 
State Condollessa Rice), a regime ―whose time has come and gone‖ (Collin Powell, 2003). 
 
The sanctions imposed by the European Union and the United States of America and the suspension of Zimbabwe 
from the Commonwealth were also part of the pressure to force the Mugabe regime to democratic governance and 
reversal of the controversial land reform programme. The Developed countries persistently called upon SADC, 
especially South Africa, to use its political and economic might to force Zimbabwe on to the route to democracy. They 
dismiss the regional organisation‘s policy of quiet diplomacy as a monumental failure (Goldman 2003, Lee 2003, 
Townsend 2005, Areseb and Kibble 2005).  
 
If the confrontational approach by the West and the USA was intended to cow the Mugabe regime into submission, it 
failed dismally; instead the regime exploited it to reinforce its repressive apparatus and resolve under the pretext of 
defending the nation‘s sovereignty against the Western and opposition plot for regime change. President Mugabe 
successfully turned it into a nationalist rallying point for the defence of Zimbabwe against re-colonisation by the West.  
 
Many questions were raised against the real intention of the European Union and the USA against Zimbabwe. 
Several analysts smelled some sinister agenda on this Western and USA foreign policy obsession with Zimbabwe. 
Many felt the real issue was that Zimbabwe has expropriated land from the minority white commercial farmers, hence 
the vilification. Questions were raised why the obsession with Zimbabwe about their contested elections when there 
are other countries with similarly contested elections. Mawere (2007) posits that ―[w]hile many argue that there is no 
causal link between the economic crisis and the land issue, no one has been able to explain why the international 
community would be so angry with Zimbabwe and not with Nigeria, Pakistan or Ivory Coast if democracy was the real 
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concern‖ (Internet ; 02.07.07). Weir (2007) also notes that ―[t]he behaviour of the West and the so - called 
‘international community‘ has been strange and disproportionate. Presidents in most of the developing world are 
dictators in a similar mould to Robert Mugabe, and yet the West loves them or at least makes little noise about their 
misbehaviour (in financial and/or human rights terms‖ (New African October 2007: 60). Such perceptions have 
boosted Mugabe‘s status as an anti-imperialist hero struggling for the economic independence of Zimbabwe and 
Africa as a whole (Lee 2003, Ncube 2007, Sasa 2007 ICG September 2007). 
 
There are suspicions from many critics that the land question is the bone of contention and it is a signal to other 
countries such as South Africa and Namibia in which the explosive land question remains untouched, that if they 
employ the Zimbabwean style they will suffer the same punitive measures (Kgwete 2007, Boateng 2011).  
 
Some analysts argue that the ambivalent and disproportionate attitudes by the West towards Zimbabwe may have 
consolidated the SADC cohesive solidarity behind Zimbabwe. Kgwete (2007) brilliantly captures this thinking that 
―[c]learly SADC is not convinced that the mounting pressure to punish Mugabe and his government is worth heeding. 
In fact (and rightly so), the SADC leaders are doing the opposite of what some pressure groups, international 
organisations and certain Western countries want them to do in Zimbabwe. They are helping Zimbabwe instead of 
punishing it‖ (New African October 2007: 59). Indeed the SADC has called upon its members to invest capital in the 
reconstruction of the collapsed Zimbabwean economy and institutions of governance. In August 2009 Botswana has 
negotiated a loan of P500 million with the local banks to rescue the economy of Zimbabwe. The government of 
Botswana has gone to the extent of sending a delegation of economic experts and business people to Zimbabwe to 
identify the business sectors in which the government and the private business individuals can invest with the aim of 
reviving the economy of Zimbabwe. The government of Botswana under President Ian Khama which broke ranks 
with other SADC member states on Zimbabwe after the chaotic 2008 elections. changed course late in 2010 after a 
visit to South Africa. In a dramatic change of foreign policy stance, Khama, who has all along called for the tightening 
of sanctions on the errant tyrant regime and refused to recognise and sit in any SADC conference attended by 
Mugabe, called for the lifting of sanctions on Zimbabwe to give it a chance, since there were signs of progress. The 
Botswana government seemed to have sensed regional isolation due to its unpopular stance on Zimbabwe. This 
shows how it seems difficult for any SADC member state to sustain an anti-Mugabe stance. 
 
However, the West and the USA have at last surrendered, and pledged their support to the SADC-led initiative to 
resolve the crisis. This in a way is a clear admission that their megaphone diplomacy, policy of isolation, sanctions 
and persistent demonisation of Mugabe has been ineffective, and has even driven prospects for a peaceful 
constructive engagement with the regime further down the drain. The targeted sanctions have not achieved any 
meaningful objective since their imposition; instead they have escalated the economic and political meltdown and the 
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suffering of the ordinary masses of Zimbabwe. The best way would be for the international community to change 
strategy by collaborating with SADC for a constructive engagement with the Mugabe regime. The stand-off continues 
at present with the EU and the USA renewal of their targeted sanctions against Zimbabwe in view of the fact that the 
ZANU-PF Mugabe regime has done very little if anything in economic and political reforms in spite of being in the 
government of national unity with the MDC. The fault lines in the government of national unity are getting wider, with 
the Mugabe government accusing the MDC of failure to convince the EU and the USA to lift the sanctions which it 
helped to impose on Zimbabwe. The Mugabe regime has vowed that it will not fulfil some of the pertinent 
requirements of the Global Political Agreement (GPA) until the MDC has convinced their friends in the West to lift the 
sanctions. Calls by both Tsvangirai and the SADC for the lifting of sanctions as a gesture which would facilitate the 
speedy recovery of Zimbabwe from its economic and political malady have been ignored by the EU and the USA. 
 
5.6.2 SADC and Quiet Diplomacy in Zimbabwe 
It was in this hostile regional and international climate that SADC adopted the policy of Quiet Diplomacy as a 
diplomatic and political tool to address the crisis in Zimbabwe. The SADC resisted sustained pressure from the West 
and the USA for a confrontational approach and instead opted for a constructive non-coercive diplomatic 
engagement with the Zimbabwe government. That is, SADC chose quiet diplomacy as opposed to the megaphone or 
shouting diplomacy pursued by the West and the USA. Quiet Diplomacy as the policy employed by SADC to resolve 
the crisis in Zimbabwe is characterised by silence and sometimes mild statements by the organisation and individual 
member states against the Zimbabwean regime‘s violation of human rights and autocratic governance. It is also 
defined by solidarity with Zimbabwe against what some SADC member states perceive to be an onslaught by the 
West and the USA against the sovereignty of the nation (Sachikonye 2004).  
 
Virulent and vicious statements were levelled by some SADC leaders against the West for imposition of sanctions 
and suspension of Zimbabwe from the Commonwealth. At the March 28-29 2007 Head of States‘ and Governments‘ 
Extraordinary Summit, the SADC members called upon the West and the USA to lift all sanctions on Zimbabwe. This 
solidarity posture was more shocking as it was not altered by the brutal crushing of an opposition gathering by the 
Zimbabwean regime on March 11 2007, in which the MDC leader Tsvangirai was arrested with scores of his 
supporters and brutally assaulted by the police. The regional organisation‘s support for Zimbabwe was further 
evidenced by the SADC Observer Mission and individual member states‘ endorsement of the fraudulent 2000 and 
2002 elections as free, fair and a representation of the will of the people of Zimbabwe (International Crisis Group 
2002, Isaksen 2002, Goldman 2003, Lee 2003, Kibble 2005, and Townsend 2005). This was so in spite of the fact 
that the elections were marred by state-sponsored political violence and institutionalised rigging, and openly 
contravened the SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections (Isaksen 2002, Sachikonye 2004, 
Kibble 2005, and Townsend 2005). The SADC states further recognised the ZANU-PF government as legitimately 
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elected, a position they restated at the Extraordinary Summit in Tanzania in the 28-29 March 2007 (SADC 
Communique March 2007). 
 
Some analysts have provided reasons why the SADC opted for quiet diplomacy rather than the confrontational 
diplomatic avenues. Firstly, SADC was compelled by the need to project a sense of solidarity and a common policy 
approach to the Zimbabwean issue. Although individual SADC member states entertained different views regarding 
the crisis in Zimbabwe, they adopted quiet diplomacy to keep SADC united and maintain regional solidarity as 
expressed in the SADC founding treaty. This was essential given the polarisation which ravaged the organisation 
during the formative discourse on the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security; interventions in the DRC and Lesotho 
and during the suspension of Zimbabwe from the Commonwealth. There are indications that some SADC member 
states, Botswana and Mauritius, voted in support of the suspension at the Commonwealth Conference in Abuja 
(Logde 2003). The SADC member states reiterated their solidarity with the Mugabe regime at their Summits in 
Tanzania and Zambia in March and August 2007 respectively) (SADC Communiqués March and August 2007). At 
the Lusaka Summit, the SADC members, for example, noted that ―we feel that the problems in Zimbabwe have been 
exaggerated.‖ The International Crisis Group (September 2007) argued that some SADC member states‘ solidarity 
with Zimbabwe was borne by the fact that they were as guilty in the violation of human rights as Zimbabwe. Most of 
them were embraced by legitimacy crises themselves, and as such it became difficult to take objective positions on 
the autocratic nature of one of their counterparts without opening themselves for scrutiny. Unanimously, save for few 
isolated voices like Botswana, recognised Mugabe as the legitimate leader in Zimbabwe while at the same time 
mandating the regional organisation (SADC) to initiate dialogue between the warring parties. The SADC regional 
group has always entertained the false hope that Mugabe might change his dictatorial tendencies if they pursued a 
policy of appeasement towards him. 
 
Secondly, the Mugabe regime adroitly exploited the Western calls for regime change to drum up solidarity from 
SADC member states and the rest of the continent. He projected a conspiracy by the West against ex-liberation 
movements‘ regimes in Southern Africa; that; ―[t]here is a Western, and especially Anglo–American plot to destroy 
ZANU-PF and evict it from power because it was a liberation movement. If this plot succeeded in Zimbabwe, it would 
then be applied against all other ruling liberation movements in Southern Africa‖ (in Johnson 2002: 8).  
 
Thirdly, SADC did not want to appear under pressure from the West and the USA to act against Mugabe. The 
arrogance of the West and their calls for regime change placed SADC countries in a difficult position. The SADC 
region recognised the legitimacy and sovereignty of Zimbabwe and the necessity of engaging it through constructive 
diplomacy. Some SADC member states questioned the double standards in the West‘s and the USA‘s calls for 
regime change in Zimbabwe while they fully recognised other regimes/countries where there were also flawed 
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elections and undemocratic governance. These perceptions tended to project President Mugabe as a hero who has 
stood up against the West‘s imperialist machinations (lodge 2003, Townsend 2005, Ncube 2007, International Crisis 
Group September 2007). Quiet diplomacy is mainly in tune with the regional and international foreign policy of the 
SADC regional hegemon, South Africa. As the economic and political power house of the region, South Africa‘s 
foreign policy framework was central to the SADC development and application of the policy of quiet diplomacy. The 
South African government‘s foreign policy is geared towards shedding the unilateral and confrontational approach of 
the apartheid regime, to embrace a policy of constructively engaging regional and international organisations in 
resolving conflicts.  
 
5.6.3 Reasons for South Africa‟s Adherence to the Policy of Quiet Diplomacy in Zimbabwe 
Although South Africa has both the economic, political and military might to pressurise Zimbabwe (individually or 
collectively as SADC) to engage in political reforms, she has adhered to the policy of non-coercive diplomacy through 
which the region would constructively engage the Mugabe regime in peaceful dialogue for a lasting resolution of the 
crisis. Analysts have advanced various reasons for South Africa‘s adherence to quiet diplomacy in spite of the fact 
that it has not produced any concrete results since its inception.  
 
Firstly, South Africa pursued the policy of quiet diplomacy to maintain regional unity and avoid isolation. The aim was 
mainly to adhere to the principles of multilateral, cooperative and constructive engagement of both regional and 
international stakeholders in the resolution of conflicts. The key goal was to avoid confrontations with the 
government, and promote multilateralism in resolving the Zimbabwean political impasse and regional conflicts in 
general. In this policy framework South Africa would dispel negative labels such as ―regional big brother‖ ―regional 
superpower‖ or ―regional bully‖ which formed the negative tags during the apartheid era (Lodge 2003, Sachikonye 
2004, Kibble 2005, Townsend 2005). As articulated by the International Crisis Group, ―Pretoria was reluctant to move 
beyond SADC lest it fatally divides an organisation which is a foundation of its security policy‖ (September 2007: 13). 
In the same vein South Africa may have been compelled by fears of a recurrence of the acrimonious geo-political 
rivalry which existed between it and Zimbabwe during the discussions on the operational status of the SADC security 
Organ and the Zimbabwean-led military intervention in the DRC. Moreover, the South African government was 
conscious of the existence of strong regional sympathies with the Mugabe regime. Regional members such as 
Namibia, Angola, and the DRC have maintained a bond of loyalty with Zimbabwe since the days of liberation and 
their military intervention the DRC. Makoa (1998) noted that when Mandela changed tone against the Zimbabwe-led 
operation in the DRC, it was in fear of regional isolation and the usurpation of the status of regional hegemon by 
Zimbabwe whose President adroitly exploited its (South Africa) vacillating foreign policy on the DRC.   
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Secondly, the South African government employed quiet diplomacy especially in the face of the ZANU-PF-sponsored 
forced land expropriation and occupation because it was fully conscious of its vulnerability on the land question 
(Lodge 2003, Knapp 2004, Sasa 2007). Just as it was in Zimbabwe, the bulk of the commercial farms in South Africa 
and Namibia are still in the hands of a minority of white farmers. In the view of Sasa (2007), ―South Africa also sees 
the issues which Zimbabwe is tackling as, in fact, a menu of matters it has to attend to within its own territory. The 
land question is as much South African as it is Zimbabwean. In fact, it is a thousand-fold bigger in South Africa than it 
is in Zimbabwe‖ (in New African August/September 2007: 138). Moreover, the South African position on the 
Zimbabwe land reform was aggravated by the West‘s governments and media obsession with the issue, making it 
appear a racial debate. The International Crisis Group (October 2002: 1), observed that ―[t]he international media‘s 
over-concentration on the plight of white commercial farmers has given Mugabe‘s liberation rhetoric greater 
resonance in many African quarters, reinforcing the belief that the West cares about Zimbabwe only because whites 
suffer.‖  
 
Thirdly, South Africa resisted confrontation with Zimbabwe because ―a policy based on force will aggravate an 
already unimaginable situation and hasten a melt down‖ (Landsberg cited in Lodge 2003: 8). A collapsed 
Zimbabwean state would have ―rebounded on Pretoria with disastrous effects via a mass influx of refugees, disrupted 
trade links…and generalised chaos on the borders‖ (Mckinly 2004: 358-359). In spite of the economic and political 
meltdown in Zimbabwe South Africa still has prosperous trade links with Zimbabwe. Sasa (2007) cites statistics from 
the Department of Trade and Industry and Zimbabwe Central Statistic Office that for example, in 2006, Zimbabwe‘s 
total imports of US$1.966bn, US$1.094bn came from South Africa. Zimbabwe remains one of the biggest importers 
of South African goods. Lastly, South Africa feared escalating the crisis if it were to project a confrontational stance 
against the Mugabe regime. It was, arguably, within this context that South Africa and the SADC member states 
insisted on Quiet Diplomacy as opposed to ‖noise or shouting‖ or coercive diplomacy. 
 
5.6.4 The SADC Diplomatic Initiatives in Zimbabwe 
Since 2000, several diplomatic initiatives have been launched by SADC, mainly championed by South Africa, to 
mediate in the crisis between the ZANU-PF government and the opposition MDC, and almost all of them (save the 
2008/2009 which led to the formation of a government of national unity) were abortive. From 2000 to the present, 
facilitation of constructive dialogue between the government and the opposition has become the main focus and 
preoccupation of the SADC and the South African official engagement with Zimbabwe (Lodge 2003, Sachikonye 
2004).  
 
Guided by this situation, South Africa has taken protective positions against Zimbabwe in the international podium. In 
April 2003, a South African motion at the UN Human rights Commission blocked an effort by the European Union to 
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obtain a UN condemnation of Zimbabwe for human rights abuses and violation (Lodge, 2003). In April 2007, as the 
Chair of the UN Security Council, South Africa voted against a motion by the British ambassador to the UN to put the 
Zimbabwe crisis and human rights violation on the Security Council agenda (SABC Africa, 180 Degrees, 2007). In 
line with the South African foreign policy framework, South Africa believes and encourages peaceful resolution of the 
crisis in Zimbabwe through dialogue and without alienating any of the stakeholders in the process. Moreover, in 
Zimbabwe, South Africa (SADC) cherishes a regional approach and solution to the crisis, hence the continued 
resistance to outside interference. A South African-facilitated peaceful transition was achieved in the DRC when they 
held their first democratic elections in decades in 2006.  
 
The SADC Extraordinary Summit of March 2007 in Tanzania mandated President Mbeki to facilitate dialogue in 
Zimbabwe. After the volatile March and June 2008 Presidential elections, Mbeki, after numerous abortive attempts, 
successfully convinced ZANU-PF and the two MDC factions to sign the Global Political Agreement (GPA) in 2008, 
which led to the formation of the Government of National Unity (GNU) (February 2009) in which Mugabe remained 
President, Tsvangirai Prime Minister, and Mutambara Deputy Prime Minister. Although the operation of the GNU has 
been beset by numerous difficulties and challenges, the fact that SADC managed to bring the hostile political 
formations together under one government should be viewed as a success to some degree. 
 
At its April 2000 Victoria Falls Summit, and the subsequent Summit of August 2001, the SADC leaders 
acknowledged their support for land reform in Zimbabwe and disapproved the land invasions, forced expropriation 
and the resultant violence. The Summit also emphasised the significance of respect for human rights, good 
governance and the rule of law in Zimbabwe. SADC leaders appealed to the British government to honour its 
Lancaster House pledge of funding the land redistribution programme. President Mbeki made efforts to talk to the 
British government and the International Monetary Fund to solicit funds for the land reform programme, but in vain 
(Lodge 2003, Goldman 2003, Lee 2003, Townsend 2005, Kibble 2005). However, none of these Summits‘ 
resolutions changed the Mugabe regime‘s position on forceful land expropriation.  
 
The January 2002 Blantyre SADC Summit mandated establishment of a task force on Zimbabwe comprising Malawi, 
Tanzania, South Africa, Botswana and Mozambique (Isaksen 2002, Field 2002, Barengu and Landsberg 2003). The 
task of the task team was to facilitate dialogue between ZANU-PF, the MDC and civil society to resolve the land crisis 
and restore a democratic dispensation in the country (Field 2002). The SADC summit acknowledged that the 
economic and political situation which was unfolding in Zimbabwe was adversely affecting the entire region. Isaksen 
(2002: iv) stated that ―for the first time in the history of the SADC‖ the task team publicly criticised Zimbabwe on the 
crisis which bred lawlessness and political violence; human rights abuses and economic collapse while the 
government passively watched. This passivity by the government amid political mayhem gave credence to the 
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accusations of its (government) complicity in the turmoil. However, the intervention, like the others before it, failed to 
achieve its intended goals. It ―had little impact and there was virtually no diplomatic follow-up‖ (Isaksen 2002: iv). 
President Mugabe remained defiant, to the chagrin of SADC member states that nevertheless firmly stood on his side 
against international criticisms and vilifications. Even with the two MDC factions in a government of national unity 
President Mugabe has consistently violated the regulations governing the GPA which ushered in the unity 
government. The current SADC facilitator for the dialogue in Zimbabwe, President Jacob Zuma of South Africa (who 
replaced Mbeki) bas been in Zimbabwe on numerous occasions to quench the fires consuming the functioning of the 
government of national unity. There seems to be no light at the end of the tunnel regarding political stabilisation in 
Zimbabwe. Currently there are talks of elections in 2011, which has revived fears of the state-sponsored violence 
against the opposition akin to the 2000 and 2008 period. 
 
In its multilateral approach to resolution of conflicts, SADC embraced the Organisation of African Unity (African 
Union) in its initiatives for the resolution of the Zimbabwean crisis. According to Alden and Garth, ―[w]here SADC as 
an institution has been unable to muster a strongly articulated position on a conflict because of the involvement of its 
constituent members, the South African government has been able to participate in other multilateral initiatives that 
actively promote its concern to bring about peaceful resolution‖ (2003: 41). 
 
SADC, the organisation and individual member states, were disturbed by the deteriorating situation and repression in 
one of their member states. In fact signs of divisions and disintegration of the solidarity wall in both the African Union 
and SADC were beginning to show with the then AU Chairman President John Kuffor of Ghana and the late Zambian 
President Levy Mwanawasa breaking the silence. Kuffour described the incident as an ―embarrassment to Africa‖ 
while Mwanawasa was quoted as saying ―SADC has failed to make progress in Zimbabwe; quiet diplomacy has 
failed to help solve the political meltdown in Zimbabwe‖ (in The Business Day (Johannesburg) Thursday, 22 March 
2007: 1). However, surprisingly the, SADC emerged from the Summit a united force in solidarity with the 
Zimbabwean government which they acknowledged as legitimately constituted through the ―free, fair and democratic‖ 
presidential elections held in 2002‖  
 
South Africa has started the difficult journey of mediating in the Zimbabwe crisis. A Mediation Team has been 
established to kickstart the mediation process. However, although the process is at its natal stages, there are 
obstacles projected by the rival camps. The ZANU-PF government has persistently advanced conditions for 
negotiations as the opposition‘s recognition of the legitimacy of the Mugabe regime, respect for the country‘s 
sovereignty and laws, the irreversibility of the expropriated land, an end to promotion of violence, a stop to urging 
external interference in the domestic affairs of the country, and a call for the lifting of the sanctions imposed on 
Zimbabwe which the MDC advocated. The opposition, on the other hand, has called for a new constitution and the 
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levelling of the political space as the conditions for their participation in the talks and elections in 2008. There have 
been calls by different Zimbabwean Civic Groups for the Mbeki-led mediation initiatives to involve Civil Society 
Organisations such as political and labour pressure groups, the business community, church groups and trade 
unions to ensure full participation of all stakeholders and a broad-based ownership of the process -- an arrangement 
reminiscent of the South African Congress for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) forum (Association of Zimbabwe 
Journalists: Internet, 21 June 2007). 
 
At the SADC Summit in Zambia held on the 17th and 18th of August 2007, President Mbeki is said to have reported on 
progress in his mediation on the Zimbabwean political crisis that the parties had agreed on substantive issues and 
were ready for dialogue. The SADC Executive Secretary, Tomas Salamao‘s report on the economic rescue package 
for Zimbabwe was referred to the regional organisation‘s ministers of finance for further discussions (The Herald 21 
August 2007). The International Crisis Group (September 2007) noted the Salamao rescue package 
recommendations obtained from the confidential report as calling for the liberalisation of the exchange rate, 
elimination of the government-sponsored price control, privatisation of parastatals, civil service reforms, budget deficit 
reductions and a predictable policy environment. The SADC solidarity with Mugabe was reiterated by the incoming 
chairperson, the late Zambian President Levy Mwanawasa. He called on Zimbabweans to retain unity and safeguard 
their hard-won independence and assured them that ―in the mean time the SADC is there for you. This organisation 
is always ready to assist where it can to resolve the problems affecting member states‖ (The Herald 17 August 2007). 
Akin to the Dares Salaam Summit, the regional organisation‘s Head of States noted that the problems in Zimbabwe 
were ―exaggerated‖. This solidarity is shocking as it is entrenched in the middle of the deepening economic and 
political crisis in Zimbabwe with devastating effects on the region as a whole. This solidarity amid deepening crisis 
prompted Melber (2007) to label the regional leaders ―Zimbabwe regime cronies and professional denialists.‖  
 
5.7 The 2008 Elections and the Government of National Unity in Zimbabwe 
In spite of all these proposals, the March 2008 Presidential elections were held in a hostile climate, with the ZANU-
PF militia and the security establishments unleashing violence on the opposition MDC. The latter had difficulties 
holding political rallies to commend itself and its candidates to the electorates. There was a total media blackout for 
opposition parties, and only state-sponsored propaganda to boost the position of the government, Mugabe and 
ZANU-PF. ZANU-PF were projected as the liberation vanguard and the nationalist movement which is the only hope 
to protect the interests of Zimbabwe and the Zimbabwean people. The MDC was negatively presented to the 
electorates as a Western sponsored party bent on giving back the country to the colonialists. The Electoral 
Commission whose representatives were hand-picked by the President, was viewed by many especially the 
opposition, as not independent but a partisan stooge institution of the ruling party. The Mugabe regime has also 
blocked almost all the European-based election observers from coming in to monitor the elections because of their 
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persistent criticisms of the government and denounciation of the 2002 elections as fraudulent. Only election 
observers from organisations deemed to be sympathetic to the government, such as the AU Observer Mission and 
the SADC Observer Mission, were granted permission to observe the polls. The election process was characterised 
by violence, intimidations, detentions, torture and murder of opposition supporters and candidates by the state agents 
and ZANU-PF militia. The election results were viewed by many election observers as fraudulent in light of the above 
scenario. These intimidatory machinations, bolstered by the pro-government state media, adversely affected the 
MDC performance in the elections. When the results were ultimately released the MDC had won a majority in 
parliament while none of the presidential contenders had won the required 51+%. As a result there was need for a re-
run in June 2008. There are suspicions from many quarters that the MDC had acquired the required percentage but 
the ZANU-PF government and its partisan Electoral Commission rigged the results to create room for the ZANU-PF 
to prepare its killing squads on the eve of the re-run. Indeed this was to be the case. In its bid to disrupt the 
opposition MDC led by Tsvangirai which in the March polls garnered 47% of the votes above the Mugabe ZANU-PF 
43% the government intensified its state sponsored violence through its security apparatus. Tvangirai was constantly 
arrested and detained whenever he was to address political rallies and his rallies were more often than not disrupted 
by ZANU- PF thugs who would beat, torture and kill the supporters. During the campaigns for the re-run an 
estimation of about one hundred opposition supporters were killed, while many more were detained or forced to flee 
the country. Due to this hostile political climate Tsvangirai pulled out of the race. The elections went ahead, and 
Mugabe retained the presidency and was sworn in as the legitimately elected head of state, to the shock of all 
credible observers of the election. 
 
Consequently the European Union and the USA denounced the elections as fraudulent and not representative of the 
will of the people of Zimbabwe. Some SADC nations, especially Botswana under President Lieutenant General Ian 
Khama Seretse Khama, rejected the election results and refused to recognise the resultant regime as legitimate. In a 
move which was interpreted by many as recognition of Tsvangirai as the winner of the election, the government of 
Botswana granted him refuge after he had fled the country amid state- orchestrated threats to his life. The Botswana 
government clearly stated that it does not recognise Mugabe as the President of Zimbabwe, as the elections 
contravened all known ethics for democratic elections. The Botswana government and the European Union called for 
new polls which would be conducted in a fair and free climate and monitored by credible international Observers and 
the UN. Surprisingly the AU and SADC Observer Missions remained uncritical of the undemocratic manner in which 
the elections were conducted. More surprising was the passivity of the SADC in spite of the fact that the Zimbabwe 
elections contravened the SADC guidelines for the conduct of elections in its member states.  
 
Immediately after inauguration the elated Mugabe attended an AU Summit in Libya. The African Union, much to the 
dismay of the European Union, recognised Mugabe as the legitimate President of Zimbabwe. However as an 
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acknowledgement that the elections were not fair, free and representative of the Zimbabwean populace, the AU 
mandated the SADC to facilitate dialogue between the government and the MDC formations. Within this fold Mbeki 
was requested to continue his facilitation role despite the fact that the opposition Tsvangirai-led MDC and many other 
political commentators had lost confidence in Mbeki and his quiet diplomacy approach to the Zimbabwe impasse. 
There are many commentators who rightly or wrongly felt that Mbeki was being too mild or sympathetic to Mugabe 
(ZANU-PF) due to the life-long political friendship between their political parties (the ANC and ZANU-PF).  
 
However, after several diplomatic engagements, the Mbeki-led Task Team managed to bring the warring ZANU-PF 
and MDC formations to the table for a negotiated settlement of the Zimbabwean political crisis. In 2008, the Mbeki 
Task Team secured the signing of the watershed Global Political Agreement (GPA) agreement between the political 
groupings. By February 2009 the ZANU-PF and the MDC factions formed the government of national unity in which 
Mugabe retained the Presidency with all executive powers, while Tsangirai and Mutambara became the Prime 
Minister and Deputy Prime Minister respectively. To date the GNU has been besieged by numerous implementation 
problems and challenges which threaten its existence and survival. The ZANU-PF is accused by the Tsvangirai MDC 
for taking unilateral decisions on important national issues without involving them as required by the GPA and the 
GNU. The GNU has become stillborn as Mugabe and ZANU-PF continue to frustrate its operations.  
 
In the view of Zuma, who has replaced Mbeki as the President of South Africa and facilitator in Zimbabwe, the 
government of national unity has made tremendous progress, and the EU should reciprocate by lifting the sanctions. 
The Botswana government which had in 2008 broken rank with other SADC member states and called for the 
tightening of sanctions and holding of fresh elections, changed after the president visited South Africa in October 
2010. Perhaps in fear of isolation in the region and the continenent, the Botswana regime changed course and 
recognised Mugabe as president in the government of national unity. The government has now joined the SADC 
chorus calling for the lifting of sanctions against Zimbabwe as there have been indications of progress in the country. 
This change of tone by the lone voice and possibly the only hope for a SADC objective stance against injustice must 
have placated the Mugabe regime, much to the chagrin of the MDC and the international community. This, to some 
extent, shows how difficult it seems for any SADC member state to sustain an anti-Mugabe stance. The EU and the 
USA maintain that the GNU has not done much to warrant the lifting of sanctions. The Mugabe regime on the other 
hand has turned the screws on the MDC to convince the West to lift the sanctions (which it accuses of advocating) as 
a condition for fulfilling the requirements of the ZPA and the GNU. This standoff has paralysed the functioning of the 
GNU and the SADC efforts at finding a lasting solution to the Zimbabwean political turmoil. The GNU remains 
paralysed mainly on the political front. The rival parties are so burdened by each other that none enjoy the political 
marriage and partnership. Hence, in spite of the fact that no considerable preparations have been made, they all 
seem to be in favour of elections in 2011. Whether this will provide a solution to the impasse remains to be seen. 
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5.8 Quiet Diplomacy: A success or failure in Zimbabwe? 
Quiet diplomacy as a SADC tool for the resolution of the Zimbabwe crisis has generated heated controversy both 
within and outside the region. According to Sachikonye, ―perspectives on quiet diplomacy range from the sceptical to 
the critical, to those that are supportive and passionately defensive about this approach; a very few hold a neutral 
position on this issue‖ (2004: 581). An objective exposition on the success or failure of the policy of quiet diplomacy 
can perhaps be justly done by provision of answers to the following questions; 
 What have been the motivations and considerations behind this form of diplomacy? 
 What are its strengths and weaknesses? 
 How has this brand of diplomacy been assessed by the international community and within Zimbabwe? 
(Sachikonye 2004: 570). 
 
If there is any success in quiet diplomacy, it can be the fact that SADC has managed to maintain solidarity with the 
repressive Zimbabwe government, and that the regional organisation has constructively engaged with the Mugabe 
regime rather than isolate it, as did the West and the USA through their megaphone diplomacy. In the view of one 
human rights lawyer, Molokele, ―[n]owhere in the past... years has anyone demonstrated to the suffering 
Zimbabweans that ‗shouting‘ diplomacy is more effective than quiet diplomacy. At least Mbeki [SADC] has left the 
door open for dialogue with the Mugabe regime‖ (Zimbabwe Independent, Internet 08 06, 2007). Given this scenario 
the SADC position of engagement appears to be the only effective tool which the international community should 
support in resolving the crisis in Zimbabwe (Ncube 2007, ICG September 2007). At the Extraordinary Summit of 
Head of States and Government held on the 17th - 18th August 2007, Mbeki and the SADC Executive Secretary 
Salmao reported on progress regarding the political mediation and plans for economic rescue in Zimbabwe 
respectively. 
 
It can be argued that the SADC secured some degree of success in the Zimbabwean crisis. The military interventions 
in the DRC and Lesotho by the polarised SADC faction members may have provided invaluable lessons to the 
organisation to maintain a principled commitment to politically negotiated conflict resolution as opposed to military 
confrontations. To some extent the SADC mediation brought the once bitter rivals together in a government of 
national unity to say they need each other in resolving the country‘s economic and political challenges. The fact that 
there is collective dialogue over the constitutional amendments, economic and political reforms and preparations for 
elections in 2012 should be a plus for the SADC in its mission for regional peace and security.  
 
Those who hold sceptical and critical views point to the fact that there has not been any change or improvement in 
the economic and political situation in Zimbabwe since the inception and implementation of quiet diplomacy. The 
opposition Movement for Democratic Change in Zimbabwe, the Democratic Alliance in South Africa, COSATU, the 
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West, the USA and media both from inside and outside, have criticised the regional organisation for its passivity in 
the face of mounting economic and political crisis in one of its members as tantamount to open support or quiet 
approval.  
 
It appears SADC has caught the disease suffered by the rest of the regional organisations mainly in the Third World, 
where the incumbent regime parties use regional organisations to protect each other at the expense of the citizens‘ 
personal security. The inaction by SADC opens itself to the criticism that the leaders are protecting the security of the 
Mugabe regime. In view of this situation Isaksen posits that ―[i]t is difficult to escape the conclusion that SADC has 
not sufficiently pursued the issue of good governance and human rights since it began to address the Zimbabwean 
situation. Instead…the existence of solidarity bonds between some of the regions leaders has prevailed‖ (2002: v). 
The SADC delegation of Mbeki as the peace facilitator in Zimbabwe threw South Africa into the centre of the 
controversy that it had failed as a regional hegemon to provide constructive leadership in the region. Many critics felt 
that instead of simply relying on non-coercive diplomacy, South Africa (SADC) should have employed its economic, 
political and military might in the form of the carrot and stick diplomatic manoeuvres to pressurise Mugabe into 
accepting a compromise for the timely resolution of the crisis. 
 
It can also be argued that SADC has dismally failed to implement effective preventive diplomacy in Zimbabwe in spite 
of the signs that the country was sliding into a political abyss and economic malaise. This failure raises questions as 
to whether the organisation has any established and functioning early warning and risk assessment structures to 
detect impending conflicts and security threats to the region, for effective preventative measures. One need not be a 
security expert to see the unfolding warning signs in Zimbabwe as reflected by the increased militarisation of the 
state, enactment of draconian media laws, suppression of freedom of the press and speech, gross violation of human 
rights, electoral violence and malpractices, economic collapse, growing political despotism and deterioration of 
democratic governance and the resultant mass migrations. These are warning signs of the total collapse of a nation-
state which in its founding treaty the SADC stated would be justifiable reasons for intervention in a member state to 
restore law and order. Surprisingly in the case of Zimbabwe, the factors did not move the regional organisation to 
take coercive or a combination of coercive and non-coercive diplomacy measures to enforce normality in the country. 
Instead of taking concrete and consistent preventive and conflict resolution measures, SADC has presided over the 
collapse of one of its member states and only engages in reactive adhoc measures such as the Extraordinary 
Summit in Tanzania when Zimbabwe has provided them with an agenda item to meet and discuss. This lack of a 
consistent framework approach to the Zimbabwe crisis plays into the hands of the Mugabe regime. Seemingly 
concerned by the SADC inertia towards the deepening crisis in Zimbabwe, Cross (2007) wars that ―they will have to 
deal with a real failed state when finally the political implosion takes place or see Zimbabwe spiral downwards into a 
Somalia style situation of lawlessness and poverty‖ (Internet, 29 September 2007). 
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Failure by SADC to substantively intervene or mediate in the Zimbabwe crisis is in contravention of its Organ‘s 
pledge: 
 To use preventive diplomacy to pre-empt conflict in the region both within and between states, through early 
warning systems. 
 To protect the people and safeguard the development of the region against problems arising from the breakdown 
of law and order… 
In a paper presented at the Africa University Annual Conference on the Commemoration of the Legacy of Dag 
Hammarskaad held in Mutare (Zimbabwe) (24-26 September 2007), Melber clearly summarised the SADC fiasco in 
the Zimbabwean crisis. He noted that ―[i]t is fair to assume that Zimbabwe has posed fundamental questions about 
the extent to which SADC members can and should intervene in the internal affairs of other countries for the sake of 
regional interests….SADC has been slow to respond to the crisis. It has failed to replicate the positive solidarity that 
SADCC members once levelled against apartheid South Africa‖ (Internet; 28 September 2007). 
 
In the context of the Basic Human Needs theory on which this study is also premised, SADC (quiet diplomacy) is a 
dismal failure in the management and resolution of the crisis in Zimbabwe. The regional organisation has failed to 
define the crisis in terms of the consistent deprivation and frustration of basic human needs and human security of 
the people of Zimbabwe by the Mugabe regime. This is in spite of its pledge to advance human security as stated in 
its preamble to the Mutual Defence Pact; that it is ―determined to defend and safeguard the freedom of their peoples 
and civilisations, as well as their individual liberties and the rule of law.‖ The organisation has failed to launch any 
substantive interventions in spite of the pledge in Article 13 (b, i), of the Organ Protocol that it will intervene in cases 
of large-scale violence between sections of the population and/or the state, and gross violations of human rights. The 
organisation operates in the orthodox realist power politics paradigm in which the concern is with the security of the 
state and the governing elite, not human security. Given this scenario, Solomon was justified to dismiss SADC as 
―…a club to protect the excesses of its political elite as opposed to being concerned with the true emancipation of its 
citizens‖ (2004: 195). As the basic human needs theorists observe, attempting to resolve the conflict through 
classical high politics strategies such as negotiations and bargaining does not work in needs-based conflicts. Thus 
one commentator pointed out that ―when issues at stake are fundamental …affecting issues of human freedom or the 
whole future development of the society, negotiations do not provide a way of reaching a mutually satisfactory 
solution. On basic issues, there should be no compromise‖ (Sharp; internet, 03 .7. 2007). 
 
Instead of finding a lasting solution to the crisis, the SADC initiatives will only achieve a settlement of the Zimbabwe 
crisis rather than a resolution. Unless and until SADC embarks on mediation measures which address the core 
issues of needs deprivations and frustrations of the masses in Zimbabwe, the crisis will continue, with devastating 
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spill-over effects on the region. In a situation where people‘s basic needs are frustrated, conflict will not be deterred 
by coercion (Burton, 1988, 1990a, 1990b, 1990c, Azar 1990a). The resilience of people struggling for satisfaction of 
their basic human needs in Zimbabwe was vividly expressed by the Crisis on Zimbabwe Non-Governmental Coalition 
that: ―Slurs, verbal abuse and intimidation may win arguments, but they can never reconstruct, heal or rehabilitate 
societies. NGO may be closed, elections rigged, newspapers may be bombed and millions starved, but it will never 
kill the peoples‘ love for liberty‖ (cited in Kibble, 2005: 18). The same courage and spirit of resistance amid state-
sponsored violence in Zimbabwe was noted by the MDC leader Morgan Tsvangirai in his address to the 
Mashonaland East Province. He categorically stated that ―violence, no matter how intense, can never stop the people 
from wishing for change and transformation. All it does is achieve a temporary dislocation of our organisational 
capacity but the spirit of the people remain unshaken‖ (Tsvangirai; Internet, 3 July 2007. 
 
The crisis in Zimbabwe is mounting, and it is also becoming difficult to facilitate a resolution process. This is mainly 
because both the regional organisation and the international community are partisan to the rival parties in the 
country, as reflected earlier in this chapter. While Mbeki appeared acceptable to the ZANU-PF regime, the MDC had 
serious reservations about his neutrality. Tsvangirai consistently accused him (Mbeki) of colluding with Mugabe in 
frustrating initiatives for the resolution of the Zimbabwe crisis. For example, the GPA and the resultant GNU which is 
the brain-child of the Mbeki Task Team tended to give more powers and authority to Mugabe and little to the Prime 
Minister. On several occasions, Tsvangirai has dismissed the SADC and its quite diplomacy as a failure in resolving 
the Zimbabwean impasse. On the other hand, the ZANU-PF viewed the West and the USA as evil powers intent on 
bolstering the MDC for ultimate regime change. As such, their efforts at mediation were deemed as imperialist 
encroachments in the domestic affairs of Zimbabwe. In light of this situation it will be difficult to find a neutral or 
impartial mediator acceptable to both camps. Moreover, both the regional organisation and the international 
community (the EU and the USA), have failed to impress upon the Mugabe regime the need to institute substantive 
reforms through their different diplomatic tools (quiet diplomacy and megaphone diplomacy respectively). 
 
There are many analysts who feel that the international Community‘s policy of containment, isolation, persistent 
demonisation of Mugabe and sanctions have been ineffectual and counter-productive as they have only bolstered 
Mugabe‘s claims that he is a victim of neo-colonial assault to orchestrate regime change. The international 
community should accept that they have lost the battle against Mugabe and should therefore support the regional 
initiative for a diplomatic, collaborative and constructive engagement of Zimbabwe for a peaceful negotiated 
resolution of the deepening crisis (Ncube 2007, ICG 2007, and Kagwanja 2007). Sensing defeat, the international 
community has ultimately returned to its position of ―African solutions to African problems‖. However, they remain 
steadfast on the targeted sanctions which both the EU and the USA renewed in 2010 on the basis that no positive 
changes have been realised on economic revival and good governance by the unity government as Mugabe runs 
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amok in destroying the country. This was evidenced by George W Bush‘s reference to Mbeki as the ‖point man‖ in 
the resolution of the Zimbabwe crisis in 2003. Tony Blair during his last visit to South Africa as Prime Minister also 
endorsed the SADC initiative and delegation of Mbeki to facilitate dialogue in Zimbabwe. This prompted one human 
rights lawyer, Daniel Molokele, to pose the question that ―[i]f both ‗isolation‘ and ‗engagement‘ have produced the 
same results, shouldn‘t both sides be revising their strategies and tactics instead of making Mbeki a scapegoat for 
Mugabe‘s repression?‘ (Internet, 8 June 2007). 
 
The above stated view is mainly because a large section of the Zimbabwean society and civil organisation have no 
faith in SADC and Mbeki as far as the resolution of the Zimbabwean crisis is concerned. The problem emanates from 
the attitude of the SADC member states towards the despotic Mugabe regime. The regional organisation, according 
to several critics, has shown solidarity with the autocratic regime despite its effects on the masses of suffering 
Zimbabweans and the region at large. For example, the SADC Electoral Observer Team declared the fraudulent 
2002 elections in Zimbabwe to be fair and free, have always shown resolute solidarity with the regime during their 
summits, and have dismally failed to openly and objectively denounce the political repression unfolding in Zimbabwe. 
In the fraudulent and violence-packed March and June 2008 elections the SADC remained passive even when 
Mugabe trampled on its regional electoral guidelines and rules which all member states including Zimbabwe ratified. 
The SADC has consistently appeased Mugabe by linking the Socio-economic and political crises in the country to the 
EU and USA sanctions. Even the President of Botswana, Ian Khama, who upon attaining the reins of power, broke 
ranks with other SADC member states, has, in 2010 after an official visit to South Africa joined the chorus calling on 
the West and the USA to lift the sanctions to give the government of national unity a chance. 
 
However, critics fail to understand how fair negotiations can take place when the government continues with its state-
sponsored violence against the opposition. In October 2007 the Tsvangirai MDC faction wrote to the SADC 
threatening to pull out of the talks in protest against government-orchestrated violence against its members. They 
cited a series of coordinated attacks as ―a total of 103 rallies and marches crushed, 7 murders, 18 rapes, 69 
abductions, 459 cases of torture, 2323 cases of interference or intimidation,1141 cases of assault and 152 cases of 
unlawful detention.‖ The party further contended that ―while MDC and ZANU-PF are engaged in dialogue in Pretoria, 
the regime has continued to hound our supporters, brutally assaulting and attacking them against the spirit of the 
dialogue process. There is no use being in talks in Pretoria and at war here at home‖ (cited in The Mail and 
Guardian, 19 October 2007). It was within this scenario that Makuni asks the following questions which beg for 
answers regarding the SADC preventive diplomacy in Zimbabwe. ―What will SADC do this time to ensure that the 
ruling party will keep its word? How can ZANU-PF be said to be negotiating in good faith when state violence and 
repression are escalating?‖ (Internet 30 September 2007). In a comment which can be interpreted as questioning the 
validity of the current ZANU-PF and MDC cooperation in the negotiations, Makuni (2007) also points out that ―[t]he 
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governance problems at the core of the crisis must be solved so that every Zimbabwean can live in dignity, peace 
and security. The negotiation should not be a process for the leaders to extract what they want as individuals in terms 
of positions they can get or appointments they can make, but about the national interests and to end the suffering of 
the masses of Zimbabweans‖ (Internet, 30 September 2007). 
 
Although the talks between the ZANU-PF and the Movement for Democratic Change mediated by President Mbeki 
were veiled in secrecy, there were reports that there is progress towards resolving the deepening crisis in the 
country. At the SADC Summit held on the 18th -19th   August 2007 in Zambia President Mbeki and the Executive 
Secretary, Thomas Salmao, reported positive progress in their political and economic assignments regarding the 
Zimbawean crisis. President Mbeki noted progress in bringing the ZANU-PF and MDC factions to a negotiation 
forum, while Salamao presented a regional economic rescue package for the country. The Herald (South Africa), 
reported that there are signs of agreement towards granting suffrage to Zimbabwean citizens in the diaspora, reforms 
to the Zimbabwean Electoral Commission to be genuinely independent, the election of the electoral Commission by 
parliament instead of the president, and abolition of the Public Order and Security Act (POSA). In theory these were 
positive steps towards fair and free polls in March 2008. But, as indicated earlier, this was not to be. 
 
The Morgan Tsvangerai MDC faction that has always accused the SADC of inaction and dismissed it as a failure in 
mediating the Zimbabwean crisis, has ultimately regained faith in the regional organisation. This must have 
emanated from the fact that in spite of its differences with SADC, the regional organisation is integral in the resolution 
of the impasse. In view of this, Tsvangirai stayed the mediation course to its logical conclusion with the signing of the 
GPA and being part of the unity government. Repelling criticism that the mediation is flawed since it is basically a 
South African instead of the SADC venture, Tsvangerai was quoted as saying ―[t]he ongoing dialogue and mediation 
process is not just a South African initiative but a SADC initiative. SADC will guarantee that no one is going to walk 
from the negotiation. Why should we doubt SADC when we are committed to the negotiations taking place?‖ (Makuni 
2007). Furthermore the International Crisis Group report of September 2007, also recommended that ―the regionally 
negotiated solution would be the most feasible option for Zimbabwe‖ (Internet, 30 September 2007).  
 
It is very difficult at this stage to draw a substantiated conclusion as to whether the SADC quiet diplomacy would be a 
success or failure in resolving the Zimbabwe crisis. This is mainly because seemingly irreconcilable differences 
between the ZANU-PF and MDC (Tsvangirai) are still fermenting within the unity government, and the SADC appears 
to have run short of any meaningful alternative strategies to address the impasse. The friction between the ZANU-PF 
and the MDC within the GNU has been grinding on such issues as reform and command of the partisan security 
sector (Rupiya, 2011).  
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The MDC formations of Tsvangirai and Mutambara are in an embarrassing dilemma. The failures of the GNU, mainly 
orchestrated by the ZANU-PF, also reflect badly on them as they are supposedly an integral part of the government. 
Conciliatory overtures by Prime Minister Tsvangirai in his interaction with the West, to the effect that the GNU was 
functional, have not moved the recalcitrant Mugabe regime to also be reconciliatory in its approach. Faced with such 
a hostile political situation, the MDC (Tsvangirai) has consistently appealed to SADC to rein in Mugabe to respect the 
GPA and the GNU.  
 
Despite the hurdles, the Zimbabwe crisis provides the litmus test for SADC‘s capabilities in conflict prevention, 
management and resolution through constructive engagement as the only option, as military intervention is out of the 
question. The Zimbabwean crisis will also test the regional organisation‘s political will and resolve in implementing 
African solutions to African problems which African leaders have often championed in international forums. As The 
International Crisis Group correctly observes, ―[t]here are absolutely no easy solutions to the Zimbabwe crisis. But if 
they act decisively, SADC leaders can prove that ‗African solutions to African problems‘ is indeed a viable concept 
not merely rhetoric with which to forestall unwanted Western interference‖ (September 2007: 20). The SADC appears 
determined that this time around, a credible election which would return the country to democracy, peace and 
stability should be realised. The question is how they are going to ensure this in the face of the uncooperative ZANU-
PF government. This is more so because, the SADC has adhered to the policy of appeasement in spite of Mugabe‘s 
total disregard of the regional organisation‘s efforts to assist the democratisation project in the country. The SADC 
has, in the case of Zimbabwe, a mammoth and thorny task in its bid to promote regional peace and security. 
Zimbabwe will be a test to gauge the efficacy of the regional organisation‘s security mechanism. 
 
5.9 Conclusion 
This chapter has dealt with the origins of the SADC and its evolution from a coordinating conference to a community. 
It has also dwelt on how the SADC evolved through both the Cold and post-Cold War eras and expanded its 
objectives from economic growth to embrace regional political and security matters. The chapter has also discussed 
the SADC preventive diplomacy missions in the DRC and Zimbabwe to highlight the successes and challenges of its 
security mechanism. The next chapter deals with the SADC preventive missions in Lesotho (1994, 1998 and 2007) 
as the main thrust of this study. 
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CHAPTER SIX  
The SADC Preventive Diplomacy Missions in the Kingdom of Lesotho 
6.0 Introduction 
This chapter constitutes the case study of this thesis. The main objective of this chapter is to provide a broad 
overview of the conflictual history of the Kingdom of Lesotho since independence, and how these incessant conflicts 
consequently precipitated the SADC preventive interventions in 1994, 1998 and 2007 respectively. The chapter also 
focuses on the role of the various stakeholders, mainly the political organisations and/or leaders, the military, the 
monarchy and civil society organisations (CSOs) in the Lesotho crises of 1994, 1998 and 2007 with a view to 
establishing the contribution each had in the preservation of democracy and peace or in undermining of democracy in 
Lesotho. The specific circumstances that triggered the SADC interventions, the dilemma, successes and challenges 
of the SADC preventive missions in Lesotho will be systematically explored. General observations on some lessons 
learned and insights gained from these interventions on the efficacy and flaws of the SADC preventive diplomacy 
mechanism will be highlighted with the intent to determine what improvements could be made to the SADC 
preventive diplomacy mechanism and its operation modalities and strategies. 
 
6.2 Background to the Lesotho Conflict and the SADC Intervention 
Lesotho is a small landlocked mountainous kingdom in Southern Africa. Almost the size of Belgium, it has a 
population of about 1.3 million. Lesotho is surrounded by the Republic of South Africa or as Davidson (1983) puts it 
―Lesotho is right inside South Africa‖ (in Pherudi 2000: 4). The modern state of Lesotho emerged under the capable 
nation building and leadership of King Moshoeshoe I amid the Difaqane/Mfecane conflicts in the early 19th century. 
Moshoeshoe, the founding father and builder of the Basotho nation, successfully amalgamated heterogeneous 
groups such as the Basia, Bamonaheng, Baphaleng, the Bapedi, the Batlokwa, the Bakubung, the Bamokotele, the 
Bakgatla, the Baphuting and the Nguni refugees fleeing from the Zulu (Shaka) expansionist military aggressions into 
a united homogeneous federation. Unlike the Zulu kingdom and other nations which emerged during that time, 
Moshoeshoe‘s kingdom did not emerge through conquests but through diplomatic and peaceful means of embracing 
people of different backgrounds into a unified kingdom that was economically viable. Maundeni (2010: 129) notes 
that Moshoeshoe ―rose to dominate the federation, not by defeating the others, but by occupying a strategic mountain 
(Thaba Bosiu) that provided superior defences and whose surroundings consisted of fertile soils and rich water 
resources.‖ It was from Thaba Bosiu that Moshoeshoe I consolidated Lesotho. Consequently, through his leadership, 
all the constituent parts of the Basotho nation which shared a common language, culture, and desire for socio-
political unity, identity, security, protection and economic development, prevailed within the kingdom until this 
tranquillity was disrupted by the British and Afrikaner colonial encroachments (Eldridge 1993, Pherudi 2000). During 
the colonial era, Lesotho together with Botswana and Swaziland constituted what was called the three High 
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Commission Territories under British Protectorate rule. Lesotho attained independence on October 4th, 1966 and was 
one of the founding members of the SADC in 1980. 
 
Lesotho became a British Protectorate on March 28th 1868 on Moshoeshoe‘s request under immense threats of 
annexation by the Afrikaner republics which resulted in numerous anti-colonial wars. The Basotho had also engaged 
on numerous wars with the British colonial expansionists from the Cape colony before submitting to protectorate 
status. The protectorate proclamation stated that ―…the said tribe of the Basotho shall be, and be taken to be, for all 
intents and purposes British subjects, and the territory of the said tribe shall be, and shall be taken to be the British 
Territory (Institute of Southern African Studies, Annexation Proclamation No 14 of 1868, cited in Pherudi 2000:6). 
Lesotho was a British Protectorate until 1966 when she attained independence. 
 
Lesotho attained her independence under Chief Leabua Jonathan of the Basotholand National Party (BNP). In 
Pherudi‘s view, ―[i]t was the end of colonialism and the beginning of the new political complications‖ (2000:10) in 
Lesotho. Of the three former British High Commission Territories‘ post-independence Lesotho became the most 
vulnerable and dependent on South Africa both politically and economically due its unique geographical location. The 
geographical position of Lesotho adversely affected the country‘s economic and political sovereignty and sense of 
nationhood. The country‘s survival, access to the outside world and political agenda is dominated by issues of 
economic survival and political independence from South Africa. Santho vividly captures this geographical tragedy of 
Lesotho thus: ―[s]ince its independence in 1966, Lesotho, a small state with a peculiar geopolitical position and 
features of structural dependence in relation to South Africa-has had to exercise its self-determination and 
sovereignty within this constraining environment. In this context, Lesotho has faced and continues to face dilemmas 
of economic and political survival‖ (2000: 1). Due to its unique geographical situation, Lesotho has been dubbed ―the 
Switzerland of Africa" (Martin 1994), "the kingdom in the sky" (Bulpin 1970 in Pherudi 2000) and also regarded by 
some as a "hostage state" (Shaw and Heard 1979). During apartheid rule in South Africa Lesotho was described as a 
nation ‗in the belly of the beast" (Naidoo in Pherudi 2000:4). On the other hand, as it provided refuge to many anti-
apartheid political activists, it was viewed as an ―island of freedom" (Maylam in Pherudi 2000). 
 
However, in spite of its insignificance in terms of size, vulnerable geographical, economic and political status in the 
region, the country has been a political hot spot in the SADC region. The Lesotho Network for Conflict Management 
(LNCM) aptly captured the tumultuous history of Lesotho‘s politics thus: ―Lesotho has been engulfed in various forms 
of conflict, open and hidden, violent and non-violent, short-lived and protracted since its political independence from 
Britain in 1966. The critical highlights of Lesotho‘s conflict map include the 1970 forceful seizure of power by the 
incumbent party, the 1986 military takeover of government, the 1994 temporary seizure of power by the King, the 
1994 and 1995 military scuffles and police mutiny and the 1998 violent encounter between the ruling party and 
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opposition parties‖ (cited in Santho 2000: 3). According to Maundeni (2010), it is surprising that Lesotho has suffered 
incessant political turmoil and state dysfunctionality despite the fact that it is territorially small (30,355sq km), has a 
largely homogeneous Sotho ethnic group (99, 5%) and a small population (2.2 million) compared to most of the 
African nation-states. 
 
Scholars of Lesotho‘s conflictual history have summarised the major sources of the conflict as: the problem of its 
geographical peculiarity, a weak and dependent economy, unequal resources distribution, a flawed electoral system, 
restrictive political participation and representation, fragile political institutions, lack of a democratic culture in 
governance, existence of an intolerant and rebellious political culture, questions on the legitimacy of the government, 
the politicisation of the monarchy and the security apparatus, a history of armed conflict and political violence, poor 
service delivery and external interference and influence especially from South Africa mainly during apartheid rule. 
The political contestations and conflicts in Lesotho were further exacerbated and complicated by the winner-takes all 
electoral system which has resulted in the opposition contesting the election results, the representativeness and 
legitimacy of the government. Consequently, almost all the national elections in the Kingdom have been followed by 
violent protests which in 1994, 1998 and 2007 led to preventive interventions by the regional organisation SADC to 
restore peace and stability. The involvement of the politicised security and the monarchy and the external influences 
of South Africa especially during apartheid further complicated the conflicts in Lesotho making it very difficult to find a 
durable and lasting peace in the country.  
 
6.2.1 Lesotho Political Contestations and Conflicts 1965 to 1998 
The winds of change which swept across Africa championing calls for self-rule and independence from colonial rule 
were also actively heeded by the Basotho populace which had suffered under British imperialism since 1868. This 
resulted in the formation of political groupings to coalesce the Basotho demands for independence. The first of such 
formations was the Basotho Progressive Association (BPA) in 1907. Its membership was primarily teachers, writers, 
traders and clerical workers in the colonial civil service. The BPA advocated peaceful resistance to the colonial 
government. It called for parliamentary democracy and preached peaceful resistance to the abuse of powers by the 
chiefs in courts and on issues of land allocation. Although it crumbled in 1950, it had laid the foundation for Basotho‘s 
call for independence. The other group was the Lekhotla La Bafo (LLB) led by Joel Lefela. It was mainly composed of 
uneducated commoners and was entrenched in the Basotho traditional culture. As such, it pledged to represent the 
mostly rural and non-Christian populations. The LLB was more radical than the BPA which it accused of being 
―suspiciously soft and inevitably condemned some of it leaders as pawns of the British colonialism‖ (Weisfelder 1974: 
400). In its radical posture, it vehemently questioned the legitimacy of British colonial rule in Lesotho. For example, it 
opposed the spread of Christianity and mission schools which undermined the indigenous Sotho traditions and the 
participation of Basotho in World War 2. Its politics were bolstered by its association with the South Africa Communist 
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Party. As such, it was the Lekhotla La Bafo which presented the first formidable anti-colonial challenge to British rule. 
In response, the colonial government in conjunction with the paramount chiefs and the National Council, banned and 
violently crushed its gatherings. Despite the harsh response, the LLB ―had displayed the legendary uncompromising 
character of Basotho political elites, thus making it very popular‖ (Maundeni 2010: 132). It can be argued that the LLB 
and its radical politics paved the way for the birth of more organised nationalist political parties such as the Basotho 
Congress Party (BPC), the Basotho National Party (BNP) and the Marematlou Freedom Party (MFP) all of which 
ultimately projected the country to full self–determination in 1965. According to Pherudi (2004: 7), the LLB ―pressed 
hard for the emancipation of the Basotho. [And] self-rule became desirable and that became evidence through the 
birth of various political parties.‖ 
 
Consequently, the Basotho African Congress which later became the Basotho Congress Party (BCP) was formed in 
1952 under the leadership of Ntsu Mokhehle and Mohau Mokitimi. It was a radical organisation which had links with 
the Pan Africanist Congress and the Communist Party of South Africa (Strom 1986, Weisfelder 1974). As a result, 
the apartheid regime supported the Basotho National Party (BNP) to deter the BCP from attaining state power in 
Lesotho after winning the national elections in 1970. The BCP‘s politics were hinged against ―the established power 
blocks such as chieftaincy, foreign owned commercial establishments, churches ([the] Roman Catholic Church 
(RCC) in particular) and the colonial administration‖ (Pherudi 2004: 7). It was the BCP posture, mainly its association 
with the Communist Party, which triggered hostilities with the RCC) and the South African regime whose major aim 
was to crush the spread of communism in Southern Africa. The BCP‘s radical politics and anti-chieftaincy stance also 
led to the fission of the party and formation of the Marematlou Party (1957) led by Chief S.S Matete and the Basotho 
Freedom Party (1960) led by B.M Khaketla. The two break-away factions later merged to form the Marematlou 
Freedom Party (MFP) in 1963 (Pherudi 2004). To date the MFP has its roots and support base within the monarchy. 
 
The other nationalist political party which emerged and became a major player in the Lesotho body politics was the 
Basotho National Party (BNP) (1958) led by Chief Leabua Jonathan and G.A Manyeli. Initially known as the Christian 
Democratic Party, the BNP had its support base from the RCC, and the Chiefs and Traders‘ Organisations (Strom 
1986, Pherudi 2004). The RCC backed the BNP on the basis that it was anti-Communist as such it would assist to 
repel the BCP which was considered a communist and anti-religious grouping. To confirm that the party rode on the 
support from the Christian denominations, it was the only organisation which reflected cognisance of the Christian 
faith in its constitution (Pherudi. 2004). The anti-communist posture of the BNP also invited moral and material 
support from South Africa. Moreover, only the BNP was allowed to campaign in South Africa in the large Lesotho 
mine migrant labour electorate. It was the South African financial and material backing which bolstered the BNP to 
win the 1965 elections and to launch a coup after the 1970 elections, which the BCP had won (Cockram 1970, in 
Pherudi 2004). However, Leabua was to later make a turn around and adopt an anti-apartheid position after the 
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1970s which triggered the South African regime to shift its support to the BCP and its military wing-the Lesotho 
Liberation Army (LLA) and later in 1986 to sponsor a military coup led by General Lekhanya against his government. 
 
6.2.2 The 1965 Elections and Lesotho Independence 
It was the above-mentioned political parties, the BCP, the BNP and the MFP which contested the 27th January1965 
elections. As stated earlier, the BNP with the support of the RCC and South Africa won the elections with 31 seats 
(41.6% of votes), the BCP obtained 25 seats (39.6% of the votes) and the MFP got 4 seats (16.5% of the votes). The 
Lesotho First Past the Post (FPTP) electoral system assisted the BNP to a landslide victory. For example, the British 
Westminster form of government and the British FPTP electoral system was inherited in totality without any 
consideration of the emergent political uniqueness and peculiarities of the Lesotho context. The system is seriously 
flawed as it permits the winner-takes-all posture in parliamentary distribution of seats and representation in 
governance. This has become a source of conflict in the Lesotho political elections as reflected in the 1970, 1984, 
1994, 1998 and 2007 post-election conflicts. The FPTP electoral system ensured that the percentage of seats won 
by the winning party became greater than the votes they won and so enabled them to form a majority while 
marginalising other contending parties with lower vote percentages from governance.  
 
It was within this electoral context that the first independence elections in 1965 were contested by the Basutoland 
Congress Party (BCP) of Ntsu Mokhehle and the Basutho National Party (BNP) under Chief Leabua Jonathan which 
won and formed the first post-independence government. The combined vote of the BCP and the Marematlou 
Freedom Party (MFP) was 58 percent but had fewer seats in parliament due to the functioning of the first past-the-
post electoral system (Southall and Petlane 1995). The central outcome of the majoritarian (plurality) FPTP electoral 
system is that it produces a single party majority in both parliament and government. Simultaneously, the system 
creates tensions with the losing parties which feel marginalised. This is because the FPTP electoral system has an 
in-built and intentional tendency to produce a result where the winner‘s share of the seats is higher than its share of 
the votes (Elklit: Internet: 12 May 2010). Matlosa and Calleb (2000: 30) argue that ―such a system was inappropriate 
for the country and more than once it resulted in [one] party receiving all parliamentary seats even though opposition 
parties had won a large percentage of the vote.‖  It was this flawed electoral system which became a source of 
incessant post-election violence. Because of the discontentment with the system it was replaced by the Mixed 
Member Proportional (MMP) system after the post- election conflict of 1998.  
 
Following the 1965 victory, Leabua Jonathan stressed his anti-communist stance to the delight of South Africa 
(Pherudi 2004). However, Moshoshoe resented the BNP victory and power as he felt sidelined. Rather than be 
designated a ceremonial Head of State, the King ―wanted both executive and legislative powers which could enable 
him to control the army, finances, foreign and internal affairs‖ (Pherudi 2000: 11). Consequently, Leabua Jonathan‘s 
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government faced resistance from King Moshoehoe II and his royal supporters. For example in 1966 Chief Lerothodi 
led a rebellion intended to oust Chief Jonathan and replace him with the King as executive head of state. In 1967 
Moshoeshoe II, in defiance of a government order held a massive rally with the intention of marching to Maseru to 
depose the government. Both of these agitations were crushed by the security forces (the Police Mobile Unit (PMU), 
and the King was placed under house arrest (Pherudi 2004). This marked the genesis of strained political relations 
between successive Lesotho governments and the monarchy culminating in the banishment of the King from political 
involvement by the Leabua and General Lekhanya dictatorial regimes. This also created fertile ground for the role 
which the Lesotho monarchy played in both the 1994 and 1998 crises in the country. The BCP collaborated with the 
Monarch in denouncing the 1965 elections as fraudulent. This also marked the birth of hostile politics between the 
two political formations (BCP and BNP) which still dominate the Lesotho political arena.  
 
Leabua Jonathan‘s BNP regime presided over a brutal and repressive regime which killed the prospects for 
democracy. Its monopoly of state power and resources helped the BNP government to entrench an authoritarian 
political culture in the country. Lesotho became a defacto one party dictatorship with a highly politicised security 
establishment. In the words of Berger ―‘Lesotho went Africa‘… and declared a… holiday from democratic rule‖ (in 
Pherudi 2000: 12). For example in 1969 the Local Government Repeal Act was passed and District Councils were 
abolished ―primarily because the ruling BNP controlled only one while the BCP controlled nine‖ (Shale; cited in 
Maundeni 2010: 133). As such it was the ruling BNP which killed democracy in Lesotho at its embryonic stages and 
replaced it with repressive politics as evidenced during and after the 1970 and subsequent elections in the country. 
 
It is important to note that like most of the post-colonial states in Africa, post-independent Lesotho was engulfed by 
socio-economic and political adversities and defects inherited from the colonial administration (Mandaza 1992, 
Sejanamane 1996).  
 
6.2.3 The 1970 Elections and the BNP Coup 
The 1970 elections took place in a hostile political climate. The police gathered evidence of gross electoral 
intimidation and irregularities which would no doubt taint the credibility of the election results. For example ―[a]t one 
polling station the entire staff had been kidnapped and all their equipment stolen, including the special stamp used to 
validate the ballot papers‖ (Pherudi 2004: 11).  Indications were that the BCP would win the elections and this was 
unpleasant to the BNP and the apartheid regime in South Africa. Indeed when the results were announced, the BCP 
had trounced the BNP with 33 seats to its 23 seats. The MFP won only one seat (Ajulu 1995, Southall 1995, Petlane 
1995, MCartney in Pherudi 2004). According to Pherudi Jonathan had announced his intention to resign and hand 
over power to the BCP which was vehemently opposed by some of his cabinet and security officers. Oliver (1986) in 
Pherudi 2004: 11) indicated that the Police Commissioner J.J Hindmarsh warned Jonathan that ―[d]uring the election 
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campaign, the Basotho Congress Party declared quite openly that if they won the elections, they would hang 
Jonathan in the streets of Maseru and that they would shoot all his officers of the Mounted Police Unit.‖ It was on the 
basis of this advice and pledge of support by the security apparatus that Jonathan declared a state of emergency for 
fourteen days and suspended the constitution. The BNP Youth League was trained into a powerful para-military 
instrument to bolster the highly politicised and partisan police and the military to defend the illegitimate BNP power 
(Molomo 1999). 
 
The appetite to cling to power by the BNP was evidenced by its seizure of power with the assistance of the security 
apparatus after losing power to the BCP in the 1970 elections. The BNP‘s abrogation of the 1970 election inflicted a 
blow to Lesotho‘s fragile electoral democracy and ushered in the politics of suppression and confrontation (Pherudi 
2004, Maundeni 2010). The opposition-led resistance to the government‘s arrest of the democratic dispensation was 
brutally crushed and followed by imprisonment of opposition leaders, banning of political parties, suspension of the 
constitution, declaration of a state of emergency, banishment of King Moshoeshoe II to the Netherlands (who was 
accused of political interference) and institutionalised politicisation of the military as a BNP instrument to keep it in 
power and defend its illegitimate rule (Mills 1992, Matlosa 1995, Petlane 1995, Ajulu 1995, Southall 1998, 1999a, 
Santho 1998, 1999, Mahao 1999, Vale 1999, 2000). Pherudi observed that as a result of the 1970 coup ―[t]he BNP 
became a de facto one party dictatorship in which decrees and outright repression became synonymous with that 
government‖ (Pherudi 2000: 13). The coup was followed by popular resistance and the unmitigated state repression 
both of which had adverse effects on the cohesion of the Kingdom. Consequently, the government was ―increasingly 
confronted with a legitimation crisis‖ (Ajulu 1995: 10). The coup was denounced by the OAU, the Commonwealth, 
and the UN as a travesty to democracy. Not surprisingly the dictatorial Leabua regime was supported by South Africa 
under John Vorster who stated that ―[d]espite the 1970 coup, I am prepared to continue good relations with 
Leabua…‖  (Pherudi 2000: 14). 
 
Faced with such a hostile and repressive political environment the opposition leader, Mokhehle went into exile in 
1974 where he established the Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA) to fight the illegitimate and undemocratic BNP 
government. The LLA was sponsored by the apartheid South African regime against the government after it had 
shifted its support from the apartheid regime to the African National Congress, providing it with refuge and bases for 
guerrilla operations against South Africa (Ajulu 1995, Southall 1995, Matlosa 1995, Petlane 1995). The shift in foreign 
policy by the BNP government against South Africa emanated from the economic and political predicaments faced by 
the government as a result of the domestic resistance which followed the 1970 power grab and its awkward 
diplomatic relations with apartheid South Africa. In spite of its collaborationist policy, the government did not get 
sufficient economic assistance to create a sustainable economic growth. As Ajulu puts it: ―[t]he collaborationsit policy 
despite maintaining the BNP in government had not yielded sufficient economic resources to enable the party to 
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enlarge its social base. Moreover, the pro-South African policy was very unpopular with the majority of Basotho. The 
anti-Boer sentiment-very much a historical tradition…was further fuelled by the fact that there was not much to show 
for the five years of collaboration with South Africa. … It was in these circumstances that the regime decided to 
multilaterise the country‘s dependency [by]…adopting policies which would ingratiate Lesotho to international donors‖ 
(Ajulu 1995: 11 and 12). 
 
The Lesotho government started distancing itself from apartheid South Africa, accommodating South African 
refugees and political activists and establishing diplomatic ties with the Eastern Socialist world. For example, Leabua 
Jonathan issued a strongly worded criticism of apartheid following the 1976 Soweto uprisings, stating that its 
domestic policies were ―bound to lead to tragic consequences for both black and white and unforeseeable 
consequences for Southern Africa‖ (Ajulu and Cammack 1986 cited in Ajulu 1995: 12). The apartheid regime was 
irked by the shift in Lesotho‘s foreign policy which would undermine its regional hegemony and legitimacy. It thus 
responded by sponsoring the BCP proxy army-the LLA and a right wing group within the BNP to topple Jonathan 
from power. The ultimate consequences of the South African destabilisation policies in Lesotho were the 1982 and 
1985 South African National Defence Force raids on the ANC houses in Maseru and the 1986 military coup by the 
Lesotho Defence Force led by General Lekhanya (Ajulu 1995, Matlosa 1995, Petlane 1995, Southall 1995).  
 
6.2.4 The Lesotho Security Establishment and Lesotho Politics 
The politicisation of the state apparatus, especially the security forces (Lesotho Defence Force) sowed seeds of 
discord in the Lesotho political field. This largely defined the limits within which brute force could be relied upon as an 
instrument of retaining political power and the cohesion of the Lesotho nation characterised by weak institutions of 
governance (Ajulu 1995, Petlane 1995, Matlosa 1995, 1999, Santho 1999, Nathan 1999, Vale 1999, Mahao 1999). 
This politicisation of the military had devastating effects on the political landscape of Lesotho and resulted in the 1986 
military coup and the military- led attempted coups of 1994 and 1998 as the military opposed demilitarisation of the 
Lesotho politics and undermined democratisation of the government and the country under the leadership of Ntsu 
Mokhehle (Mills 1992, Matlosa 1995, Petlane 1995, Southall 1998, 1999a, 1999b, Santho 2000,). Since helping the 
BNP to seize power in 1970, ―the armed forces have over the years tended to assume a special status as a 
politicised political constituency‖ (Petlane 1995: 145). Commentators at the Crisis in Lesotho (1999: 33) also 
observed that ―the Lesotho army is a very partisan institution… The BCP and LCD governments have also tried to 
win the allegiance of the military but have failed to do so.‖ This clearly accounts for the military being involved in 
almost all the political turmoil in Lesotho including the 1994 and 1998 crises which precipitated the SADC 
intervention. As Weisfelder (1982) observed, ―[t]he disregard for constitutional norms (evidenced by the 1970 coup 
de‘etat, the 1994 military revolts)…meant that Basotho leaders vying for power in the future will be tempted either to 
mobilise the requisite force to strike a bargain with (or indeed to depose) incumbents instead of trusting the ballot 
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box‖ (cited in Petlane 1995: 150). The military has been and continues to be used as a political tool, representing a 
resource available to politicians to mobilise in partisan struggles for power‖ [and]… as a political constituency and an 
actor in national politics with their own political interest, autonomous from political parties per se‖ (Petlane 1995: 
151). Thus the BCP government was faced ―with the military which it neither trusted nor could constitutionally control‖ 
(Sejanamane 1996: 66). Consequently when the BCP and the LCD attained office in 1993 and 1998 respectively, 
they were faced with a hostile military which was still engrained in the BNP politicisation allegiance and the politics of 
military rule (1986 to 1993). 
 
In this case the military junta was reluctant to relinquish power to a democratically elected civilian government in 
1994 and 1998, confirming Hutchful‘s (1993) assertion that ―there are significant differences in the way military issues 
are posed, centering around whether or not the regime intends to withdraw altogether or succeed itself‖ (in Matlosa 
1995: 120). Put differently, ―[o]nce having tasted state power, the military tends to become addicted to it. This 
inevitably has a bearing upon the degree to which a new civilian government can have effective control and authority 
over its armed forces‖ (Matlosa 1995: 119). Makoa (1995: 10) argues that the political instability in post-military 
Lesotho should be viewed against the backdrop of the historical role of the armed forces. He observed that ―[o]ne of 
the most serious dilemmas confronting the BCP regime since April 1993 has been how to impose its authority over 
the country‘s politicised army which had ruled the Kingdom for over 6 years. Apart from protecting Jonathan‘s 
unconstitutional government between 1970 and 1985, Lesotho‘s army had ruled the country for 7 years between 
1986 and 1993 before it relinquished power to an elected government.‖ During the democratisation process and 
preparations for elections the military instituted amendments and provisions to the constitution which would provide 
indemnity to the armed forces from prosecution for crimes committed during military rule (Lesotho Constitution Order 
No 5, 1993), and inclusion of restrictions, checks and balances in the powers of the in-coming civilian government, all 
of which posed severe threats to effective control of the state. The central purpose was continued military influence 
and control in the national political arena to advance its sectarian interests and powers (Southall 1995, 1998, 1999a, 
Matlosa 1995, Fox 1995, Petlane 1995, Sejanamane 1996). It is within this context that Matlosa (1995: 119-120) 
laments the flawed transition to democracy as it was wholly managed ―by the very military which is supposed to be 
subjected to civilian authority after the transition. As such the rules of the transition are set and defined by the military 
which often would like to create a protected political space for itself under the post-transition political dispensation.‖ 
The tense political climate raised questions such as ―[w]ould the elections be allowed to run its course? Would the 
results be accepted? Known to favour the BNP, would the military permit the BCP to claim its anticipated victory?‖ 
(Fox 1995: 98). All these are indications of how the military were bent on hijacking the democratisation process in 
Lesotho as evidenced by the 1994 and 1998 crises in which they were the primary actors. According to Sejanamane 
(1996: 69) as evidenced by most coups in Africa, ―the military has acted in order to pre-empt what they consider 
adverse action being contemplated by their civilian bosses against the institution as a whole.‖ 
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However Sejanamane (1996) maintains that both political entities (BNP and BCP) in Lesotho were guilty of colluding 
with the army against each other for political survival. He argues that ―[t]he contesting forces seemed oblivious of the 
danger of their ‗game‘ of using and/or involving the army directly in politics. It is not surprising therefore that both the 
government and the BNP were blamed for complicity in the factional fighting that took place within the army in 
January 1994.‖ (1996: 66). Such political manipulations and manoeuvres strengthened the military resolve in 
undermining democracy, peace and stability in the Kingdom of Lesotho. The BCP government blundered by 
maintaining a hostile attitude against both the military and the monarchy and inadvertently enhanced their solidarity 
as both read the government‘s intent to facilitate their demise in the Lesotho political theatre. 
 
6.2.5 The Monarchy and the Lesotho Politics  
One other situation which complicated the Lesotho politics was the position of the King and the government of the 
day. Traditionally and historically, the monarchy was a very pivotal institution in the Kingdom of Lesotho. Present day 
Lesotho emerged around Moshoeshoe I‘s monarchical rule. Therefore the monarchy has ever since been highly 
revered as a ―symbol of unity, oneness and brotherhood. It was a sign of national identity and pride…hence most 
Basotho in their praises refer to themselves as ‗Bana ba Moshoeshoe‖ (Children of Moshoeshoe) (Pherudi 2000: 
109). Because of this historical and cultural foundation there were expectations among the Basotho that post-
independence governments should give the monarchy substantive power and respectable status in the government. 
However, this was not to be and this bred unbridled mistrust, rivalry and hostilities between the successive regimes 
and the monarchy culminating in the disruptions which have dominated the Lesotho politics since independence in 
1966. As stated earlier, the King was unhappy with the powers he wielded in the new post-independence political 
dispensation. Within the constitutional Monarch and the Westminster type of parliamentary democracy, Lesotho 
experienced the struggle for supremacy and state power between the Monarch and the regime creating intense 
hostility which saw the monarchy in most cases colluding with the opposition against the government of the day. The 
relationship between both the BNP and the military governments has been characterised by hostilities resulting in the 
dethronement and banishment of King Moshoeshoe II (Southall 1995, Petlane 1995, Ajulu 1995, Sejanamane 1996).  
 
As will be indicated in subsequent sections, the monarchy was to play a central role in the politics of Lesotho. 
According to Sejanamane (1996: 64) ―[w]hich ever faction was in power was automatically challenged by a 
combination of the monarchy and those in opposition. Thus for most of Lesotho‘s independence, the monarchy has 
acted as either an opposition instrument or at best as a counter balancing force to the successive cliques that have 
emerged by force or election.‖ This was evidenced by the Monarch‘s cooperation with its erstwhile enemy the BNP 
against the BCP and LCD electoral victories in 1994 and 1998, respectively throwing the country into turmoil.  
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Pherudi observes that, in both the 1994 and the 1998 crises, the newly elected BCP regime ―found itself in a difficult 
situation, because it had to deal with the monarchical problem which was not of its own making‖ (2000: 167). That is 
―the controversy surrounding the dethronement of King Moshoeshoe II and enthronement of his son King Letsie III…‖ 
(Sejanamane 1996: 66). However, it is important to note that in its formative years, the BCP held a radical socialist-
oriented and anti-monarchy ideology. The party regarded the said institution as a conservative and reactionary entity 
working in collaboration with the colonial administration for the oppression of Basotho. At an Organisation of African 
Unity (OAU) Conference in Accra (Ghana) the BCP leader Ntsu Mokhhle was quoted as having stated that the ―… 
Basotho Congress Party would endeavour to destroy the chieftaincy hierarchy and get rid of the position of the 
paramount chiefs because both the chiefs and the church identify themselves with colonial oppression‖ (cited in 
Pherudi 2000: 171). It was this deep-rooted hostility between the monarchy and the BCP which led to the 1994 and 
1998 monarchy-cum-military coups in Lesotho. Although the BCP had watered down its stance against the royalty 
after its victory in the 1994 elections, it blundered by its failure to reinstate Moshoeshoe II. Sejanamane (1996: 78) 
notes that ―for most observers of the Lesotho political scene, the dissolution of the government by the King in August 
1994 was directly connected to the bigger debate on the position of the monarchy in general and the reinstatement of 
Moshoeshoe II in particular.‖ Hence a few months after the elections, Moshoeshoe II wrote a letter to the Prime 
Minister Mokhehle seeking reinstatement to the throne from which ―the military regime illegally and unjustly removed 
him …‖ (Sejanamane 1996: 67). In the letter, the King stated that ―the issue of the monarchy, and in particular the 
reinstatement of His Majesty King Moshoeshoe II, is an issue of great national importance and significance, and one 
which directly affects and concerns me, and as a result it has been in the forefront of our discussions since you 
assumed office in April 1993‖ (Letter from His Majesty King Letsie III, 4th August 1994, in Sejanamane 1996: 78). 
Rather than take the opportunity to reconcile with the monarchy Mokhehle dismissed it on the basis that he was not 
party to ―the circumstances that brought about the rapture of the relationship between the monarchy and the 
military…‖ The Prime Minister further advised the King to ―seek redress in the court of law if he felt that injustice has 
been done to him‖ (Sejanamane 1996: 67). 
 
Instead of a negotiated solution to the problem, the party instituted a commission of inquiry into the operations and 
status of the institution in the politics of Lesotho since independence (Matlosa 1995, Sejanamane 1996). 
Consequently instead of reconciling the two erstwhile rivals, the commission further drifted them apart and inflamed 
the rivalry between the two entities. Sejanamane (1996: 67) observed that the ―Commission became an extremely 
divisive issue and it virtually terminated whatever relationship [that] had existed between the King and the Prime 
Minister.‖ The King and the pro-monarchists perceived the Commission of inquiry not as a reconciliatory gesture but 
as a vindictive move to further marginalise the royalty (Matlosa 1995, Sejanamane 1996). Furthermore, some 
opportunistic anti-BCP political parties such as the BNP exploited the divisions and agitated the King to denounce the 
Commission, its intent, terms and findings. According to Sejanamane (1996) the Commission‘s terms of reference 
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were biased against the King and geared towards finding fault with the monarchy. To add insult to injury, the 
composition of the Commission raised a lot of questions as it comprised known anti-monarchists. As such in his letter 
to Mokhehle regarding the Commission of inquiry Letsie III wrote: ―[b]y its composition, the commission can hardly be 
taken and accepted as neutral, impartial and without prejudice, especially when some members of the commission 
are self-professed anti-monarchists who have on many occasions made public utterances which directly attack and 
besmirch both the person of His Majesty and the institution of the monarchy itself. While they are of course free to 
hold views and opinions of their choice, their membership to a tribunal or commission of this nature is bound to reflect 
bias and prejudice … I can only conclude by expressing my concern and fears to the effect that this Commission –as 
it presently stands –is not intended to establish the truth and do justice to the wronged. On the contrary, it has been 
created to provide an arena for conducting a political vendetta against His Majesty King Moshoeshoe II. A 
commission of this nature will not be seen as having the required and necessary integrity by the public whose 
interests it is supposed to serve. Therefore, it will be virtually impossible for me to accept the results of its work and 
its findings as being objective, fair, impartial and just…‖ (cited in Sejanamane 1996: 68). Consequently, the King in 
collusion with the military and some opposition political parties launched a coup which brewed the 1994 crisis and the 
ultimate SADC intervention.  
 
Sejanamane (1996) argues that the marriage between the monarchy and the military against the BCP government 
was borne by the party‘s consistent attacks on both institutions for their past cooperative relationships with the 
oppressive BNP regime. The BCP government‘s discomfort with the two institutions was evidenced by the 
establishment of commissions of inquiry against the said entities, which they both interpreted as an orchestrated 
government strategy of undermining and victimising them. The intervening powers had since called for the definition 
of the role of the monarchy in the politics of Lesotho as one factor which could lead to long-term peace in the country 
(Matlosa 1995, Sejanamane 1996, Southall 1995, 1999a). The 1994 SADC Task Force recognised the centrality of 
the monarchy in the Lesotho political arena and it duly recommended that ―…the monarchy should…be tackled from 
the standpoint of…seeking to confirm or possibly restore legitimacy of the institution of and minds of the people of 
Lesotho…‖ (Report on the Presidential Visit to the Kingdom of Lesotho; 11-12 February 1994; in Pherudi 2000: 173). 
The volatile rivalry between the government, the military and the monarchy was aggravated by the weak economic 
situation of Lesotho which was inescapably dependent on South Africa and the outside world. 
 
6.2.6 The Lesotho Economy and the Kingdom‟s Conflictual Politics 
The dependent nature of the Lesotho economy on South Africa has had a negative impact on the survival of the 
country as a sovereign state. According to Ajulu (1995: 9) ―[t]he post-colonial state in Lesotho was, and remains 
relatively weak in comparison with other post-colonial states in Africa. It inherited neither a manufacturing, 
commercial, nor a secure agricultural base. It was therefore a dependent state par excellence. This dependent nature 
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placed restrictions on what the state was capable of achieving, irrespective of which ever class or alliance of classes 
secured control of state power.‖ The British Colonial Administration left the country with virtually no infrastructure 
upon which economic development could depend. …Lesotho had no reserves and depended on annual British 
grants –in-aids to balance its recurrent budget‖ (Sejanamane 1996: 61). Mills (1992: 64) notes that ―Lesotho is 
possibly the most economically vulnerable of all South Africa‘s neighbours. About 90% of its exports go to South 
Africa which supplies more than 95% of its imports, most of which are routed on South Africa‘s surface and transport 
facilities.‖ This economic vulnerability was exacerbated by Lesotho‘s geo-political location within the then-hostile 
apartheid South Africa. This led to the continuation of the post-independence status as a reservoir of cheap migrant 
labour for the South African mines as designed by the colonial administration (Mills 1992, Matlosa 1993, Ajulu 1995, 
1998, Southall 1998, 1999a, 2001, Santho 1999, 2000).  
 
Ajulu (1995) notes that by the 1970‘s the economy of Lesotho remained essentially remittance and subsistence, as 
only 6% of the labour force was engaged in formal employment in Lesotho, while over 70% of the rural household 
income was made up of remittances from the migrant labour and 3% sustaining itself from subsistence farming. 
Matlosa (1993) also notes the ubiquitous unemployment in Lesotho was a matter of concern which exacerbated 
dependence on South Africa to date. He posited that of its 1.5 million and a total labour force of 600,000, Lesotho 
has about 40,000 of its labour unemployed, or at least under-employed. With such a weak industrial and agricultural 
base Lesotho is possibly the most economically vulnerable of all South Africa‘s neighbours (Mills 1992, Matlosa 
1993, 1995, Ajulu 1995, Sejanamane 1996). Makoa (2002) notes that only 9% of Lesotho‘s land is suitable for crop 
production which means that the country  falls far below in terms of food security to its around two million citizens. 
Worse still, Mills (1992) observes that about 90% of its exports go to South Africa while more than 95% of its imports 
are from South Africa. Through these structural economic problems, Lesotho and its citizens are intractably tied into 
a hyper-dependent relationship to external forces which casts doubts on the country‘s sovereignty (Matlosa 1993, 
Makoa, 2002).  
 
Post-independent economic growth in Lesotho was further constrained by paucity of resources, a weak economic 
base, lack of job creation and income generating industries, high domestic unemployment, dependance on migrant 
remittances and foreign aid, its awkward geo-political position visa-vis South Africa and its complete integration into 
the South African dominant economy through the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) and the Common 
Monetory Area (CMA) and limited local markets (Matlosa 1993, Sejanamane 1996, Makoa 2002). Sejanamne (1996: 
60) observes that ironically the country‘s dependence is ―fuelled by even those institutions and structures which in 
theory are supposed to be engines of domestic growth like the Custom Union and the Common Monetary 
Agreement‖… which in practice have turned ―successive regimes in Lesotho‖... into ―mere tax collectors…or ― a mere 
bureaucratic contrivance.‖ In this sense ―[t]he intricate dialectic of this dependency…is that Lesotho survives on this 
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dependence, feeds on this dependence, and grows within this dependence, hence her deformed economic growth‖ 
(Matlosa 1993: 127). In such a captive economic status Lesotho projects a bleak economic future in which she does 
not have any substantive prospects for an independent development trajectory and domestic generation of wealth 
(Sejanamane 1996, Matlosa and Calleb 2005). 
 
With such an umbilical dependence on foreign sources of funds, it becomes difficult, if not impossible for the Lesotho 
nation-state to effectively and legitimately influence the economic activity of its citizens let alone their political 
allegiance. In the words of Makoa (2002: 16-17) ―with this tenuous economic base, the state in Lesotho has been 
unable to assume a dominant political role in society. It neither can create a most basic ‗welfare state‘ covering every 
adult citizen nor exert control or influence over the country‘s politically conscious migrant workers, whose earnings 
support over 80% of the rural households and whose remittances finance nearly 57% of merchandise imports.‖ Such 
a situation spells doom for peace and stability in the Kingdom as the Basotho political parties are spurred to contest 
for attainment of political power as the vehicle for control of the nation‘s meagre wealth (Matlosa 1993, Makoa 2002). 
As history has proved, since 1970, every election in Lesotho has been followed by political discord and contestations 
of election results with the losing parties rejecting the elections outcome. On the other hand, the winning party would 
not want to yield to opposition election contests as they also want to hold on to power for economic survival. With 
such a weak economic base, Lesotho lacked the resource and institutional capacity to resolve its own political 
turmoil, hence the SADC interventions of 1994, 1998 and 2007. Santho argues that Lesotho‘s weak state institutions 
and political processes resulted from the legacies of authoritarian and military rule and lacked ―the capacity to 
manage and contain the pressure and stress of transition to multiparty democracy and the virulent political 
contestation between rival parties‖ (2000:1). 
 
As a result of this inherently weak economic status and surrounded geographical position, the immediate post-
independence administration was thrown into the dilemma of having to collaborate with the apartheid regime for 
survival. The lack of an autonomous economy has always raised the stakes for the country‘s political survival as an 
independent entity (Mills 1992, Matlosa 1993, Sejanamane 1996, Ajulu 1995, Southall 1995, 1999a, Matlosa and 
Calleb 2005). The apartheid regime has consistently called for the incorporation of the economically dependent 
Kingdom into South Africa. The South African apartheid Prime Minister Verwoerd was quoted as having said an 
independent Lesotho ―could well become a danger to South Africa‖ (Lord Bailey, cited in Makoa, 2002: 3). Ajulu 
(1995: 10) argues that ―between 1966 and 1970 the BNP opted for a collaborationist policy because it was perceived 
as the best way of enabling those it represented to retain control of state power as well as reproducing themselves as 
a political and social force.‖ The government‘s pro-apartheid stance helped maintain the repressive regime in power 
as indicated by the South African regime‘s backing of the 1970 coup after the BNP lost to the BCP although it was 
opposed by the majority of Basotho (Ajulu 1995, Southall 1995, Sejanamane 1996).  
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Within this political position Lesotho became a hostage nation to the machinations of the apartheid regime which 
used its economic and political might to coerce her into submission. Matlosa (1993: 132) states that the apartheid 
state ―used labour migration strategically in congruence with its regional carrot and stick policy.‖ For example, after 
the BNP regime‘s shift from collaboration with the apartheid regime to support the South African liberation 
movements in the 1980s, South Africa threatened to reduce Lesotho‘s migrant labour inflow if the government does 
not expel ANC activists and sign a non-aggression pact with her. It also sponsored the BCP military wing (the LLA)  
to de-stabilise the Leabua Jonathan government. In 1982 and 1985 the South African military raided Maseru and the 
government ultimately imposed an economic blockade and sponsored a military coup under Major General Lekhanya 
in the country. The military government was to fully cooperate with the apartheid regime for both economic and 
political survival (Mills 1992, Ajulu 1995, Matlosa 1995, Petlane 1995 Southall 1995). For example, the military 
government closed the military camps and expelled the ANC and PAC activists from Lesotho to placate the apartheid 
regime (Mills 1992). The historical over-lordship of South Africa on the independent Lesotho has raised questions 
concerning the sovereignty of the nation. The fact that the government had appealed to South Africa for a rescue 
mission in 1994 and 1998 revived the debate about whether the country should remain an independent entity or be 
incorporated into the democratic South Africa. Cynical comments were heard in the wake of the South African-led 
intervention that Lesotho was in effect becoming South Africa‘s tenth province (Southall 1999a). Politicians from the 
opposition argued that South Africa‘s ―real agenda for intervening was to prepare the way for the eventual political 
integration of Lesotho‖ (Southall 1999b: 7). 
 
Various scholars agree that most of the conflicts which ravaged post-independence Lesotho emanated from 
economic underdevelopment and dependence, weak state institutions, political and electoral contestations and 
disputes. In almost all the crises, the primary adversaries were the Lesotho government of the day, and the main 
opposition parties-the BNP the BCP the MFP the All Basotho Congress (ABC), the Lesotho Congress for Democracy 
(LCD) depending on which one is in power and in the opposition. The political crises in Lesotho were further 
aggravated by the involvement of the security establishment and the monarchy, all of which were highly politicised 
institutions (Van Nieuwkerk 1999). The ―fragility of this post-colonial coalition made accountability almost non-existent 
resulting in the state becoming virtually privatised by any of the factions that assumed power‖ (Sejanamane 1996: 
60). 
 
The political-security problematique in Lesotho has become structurally institutionalised and entrenched with each of 
the contending parties gunning for political dominance and access to resources through undemocratic marches to 
political power. The structurally institutionalised challenges culminated in the 1986 military coup, the 1994 attempted 
military/monarchy coup, the 1998 civil turmoil and the strives which gripped the country after the 2007 elections 
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(Ajulu 1995, Sejanamane 1996). Santho (2000, 2) argues that the 1994 and 1998 crises reflected an ―intense rivalry 
between elites dominated political parties over access to state power and state resources within a worsening 
environment of poverty, unemployment and limited economic options.‖ These adverse socio-economic and political 
characteristics provided the environment that made the transition to, and consolidation of, multi-party democracy 
extremely problematic culminating in the 1994, 1998 and 2007 crises which brought the SADC interventions. 
 
It was in this context that the regional organisation SADC intervened in the 1994, 1998 and 2007 turbulence to 
restore stability and order to the country. Given the crisis situation in the country ―[t]he region has had to play a fire 
brigade role lest the crisis spills over into other states‖ especially South Africa within which Lesotho is engulfed 
(Sejanamane 1996: 60). As the South African Director General of Foreign Affairs L.H Evans stated in an interview 
―Lesotho [is] totally surrounded by South Africa, any instability in that small country has repercussions for us‖ (cited in 
Sejanamane 1996: 70-71). The question that needs to be answered, however, is whether it was SADC or South 
Africa in collaboration with Botswana as an individual member which militarily intervened and facilitated the peace in 
Lesotho. Sejanamane (1996: 61) raised crucial questions which also need to be addressed in evaluating the SADC 
preventive diplomacy in Lesotho. The questions are as follows: 
 Has the Lesotho experience yielded a coherent regional security in Southern Africa? 
 Can it be reproduced in similar situations? 
 How sustainable is this approach as a peace mechanism? 
 
It is hoped that the findings of this study will provide answers to these insightful questions. 
 
6.2.7 The 1993 Elections and the SADC Intervention 
The end of the Cold War and its conflictual politics ushered in a new world order which promoted democratisation, 
good governance, human rights, and multi-party elections and shunned any form of authoritarian rule. It was within 
this political context that the military regime in Lesotho found itself under immense pressure to demilitarise and 
democratise governance in the country. Apart from the incessant domestic calls for democratisation by different 
Lesotho political formations and Civil Society Organisations, the process of democratisation in Lesotho was also 
dictated by the politics of multi-party democratic transition which were sweeping across the region including the 
moves towards the eradication of apartheid in South Africa. Southall and Petlane (1995: xi) state: ―[t]his shift to 
democracy within Lesotho, a tiny impoverished state encircled by South Africa, was very much a by-product of the 
end of the Cold War, a decreased international tolerance of authoritarian regimes, and crucially, the outbreak of 
negotiations among contending forces in South Africa, which heralded the demise of apartheid and progress towards 
democracy in that long-benighted country.‖ It was in this context that Southall (1999a: 20) states: the ―South African 
transition to democracy in 1994 constituted a paradox for Lesotho – a welcome crisis.‖ The regional organisation-
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SADC which has been transformed in content, character and objectives and was on the verge of embracing a 
democratic regional power-South Africa would not condone de-stabilisation of its economic and political integration 
project by a tiny insignificant Lesotho. Among other things, ―the donors cracked down and suspended the economic 
aid upon which the regime was heavily reliant.  Begrudgingly, the military were drawn into a democratisation process‖ 
(Daniel 1995: 97).  
 
Faced with a combination of internal and external pressure, the military regime had no alternative but to initiate 
political reforms towards a democratic dispensation (Mills 1992, Matlosa 1995, Sejanamane 1996, Southall 1999a). 
As Southall (1999a: 2) notes ―a combination of both internal and external pressures after 1990 saw the military 
government reluctantly accede to a return to the barracks.‖ This was reflected by the military regime‘s lifting of 
political restrictions imposed after the 1986 coup and opening up  political space through the acceptance of the return 
of BCP political exiles, including its leader Ntsu Mokhehle and granting them full amnesty from prosecution in 1988, 
the return of King Moshoeshoe II from exile, revision of the independence constitution of 1966 and nomination of a 
National Constitutional Assembly with representatives from all political groupings to prepare for national elections 
which would steer the country back to democracy. Although the military pushed through amendments which would 
protect the military from prosecution for crimes committed during military rule, and instituted clauses which were 
geared towards curtailing the powers of the incoming civilian government, and to maintain certain powers in the 
government, it ultimately acceded to elections on the 27th of March 1993 (Southall 1995, Petlane 1995). It is crucial to 
note that the electoral preparation and the prevailing atmosphere was tense as there were fears and suspicions that 
the 1970 electoral drama may recur especially as the military had indicated reluctance to relinquish power. Numerous 
questions were raised among the electorates, among others: ―would polling go peacefully and smoothly? Would the 
military accept the results? Would the election really be free and fair? (Southall 1995: 42). The apprehensive 
atmosphere was borne by the conflictual election history of post-independence Lesotho. As Petlane (1995: 150) 
posits: ―Lesotho‘s post-independence history has particularly lacked trust and confidence in elections as a legitimate 
democratic process. Starting in 1970, the seeds were sown for the mistrust and contestations that have characterised 
the reactions of political leaders (and the general public) to electoral processes and results since.‖ That the Lesotho 
military reluctantly relinquished power and allowed the democratic dispensation was evidenced by the way in which 
they became central to the disruptions to democratic governance after the 1993 and 1998 elections. 
 
However, in spite of minor organisational and logistical hurdles such as shortages of electoral materials and 
incomplete voter lists, the general elections took place in a peaceful atmosphere. The elections were contested by 
the BNP, the BCP and the MFP. The 27th March 1993 elections granted the Basotho the opportune moment to freely 
elect their leaders - a right which they had been denied for almost two decades. Petlane (1995: 140) asserts that 
―[t]he 1993 general elections in Lesotho marked an important milestone in the country‘s recent political history. 
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Ending more than 20 years of political domination by the BNP, it gave Basotho their first opportunity since 
independence to articulate their collective will and have a say in the composition of their government.‖ The elections 
became a liberation moment for the Basotho electorate who voted en-masse to impose a heavy punishment for the 
BNP which had subjected them to years of brutal dictatorship (Daniel 1995, Fox 1995, Southall 1995, 1999a). The 
BNP‘s predicaments were also aggravated by its internal leadership wrangles and an umbilical association with the 
military which brutalised the citizens from 1986 to 1993 (Southall 1995, Matlosa 1995, Petlane 1995, 1999a). The 
BCP, on the other hand, entered the elections with an image of a liberating force with a rich history of nationalist 
struggles against colonial rule, the BNP and military dictatorships. ―This granted the BCP a clean bill and it swept all 
the 65 parliamentary seats and about 74% of the total votes cast culminating in the transfer of power by the military 
regime to the democratically elected government. The result registered a massive popular protest against nearly 
three decades of authoritarian rule (both civilian and military) and a demand for the nation‘s politics to be 
reconstituted on a basis of popular accountability and good governance‖ (Southall 1995: 18). Fox (1995) notes that 
the BCP support vote increased from 39.84 percent in 1965 and 49.8 percent in 1970 to 74.7 percent in 1993 while 
the BNP‘s vote declined from 41.73 percent in 1965 and 42.2 percent in 1970 to 22.6 percent in 1993. On the basis 
of the winner-takes-all (FPTP) electoral system employed, it meant that the BCP forms the government and the BNP 
had no parliamentary seat which would have been the case in a Proportional Representation model.  
 
Nevertheless, the elections were declared fair and free and representative of the will of the electorates by all the 
international election monitors involved (Ajulu 1995, Daniel 1995, Petlane 1995, Southall 1995, 1998, 1999a, 1999b). 
The Commonwealth Observer Mission in Lesotho credited itself as having played a pivotal role in shaping the 
country‘s road to democracy. ―Not only did it ensure that the election – its technical flaws not withstanding – actually 
took place but the collective judgement of the observer groups as to its freeness and fairness was also crucial in 
ensuring that the transfer of power to the winning party came about‖ (Daniel 1995: 94-95). In her electoral report, 
Lewis (1994) noted that ―the observer teams made a positive contribution by (i) helping defuse tension arising from 
the problems and delays of the day; (ii) strengthening the confidence of voters and the electoral officials; and (iii) by 
going beyond the official UN brief by becoming involved in dispute resolution, communication and on behalf of 
electoral officials… transporting election materials and ballot boxes…‖ (cited in Daniel 1995: 99). All in all, the 1993 
elections were declared free and fair and the defects were inherent in the FPTP electoral system which consequently 
produced a de facto one party state. This was exacerbated by the BNP‘s rejection of Mokhehle‘s offer to have two 
representatives in the Senate. The conflictual history of Lesotho repeated itself as a result. The rejection of the 
election outcome and the resultant turmoil led by the BNP demonstrated the existence of deepening political 
intolerance which thwarted the smooth transition to democratic rule in Lesotho. This was a replica of the 1970 
political crisis (Matlosa 1995, Ajulu 1995, Pherudi 2000). In spite of the fact that the BNP had thrived on the flawed 
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electoral system from 1965, it cried foul and bitterly protested the BCP victory through the same system which had 
sustained them in power. 
 
Consequently what had appeared to be a peaceful and open route to democracy was to be marred when the losing 
party - the BNP - contested the result of the elections as fraudulent and unfair and called for its nullification (Sekatle 
1995, Petlane 1995, Southall 1998, 1999b). Despite the seemingly democratic and peaceful elections, the BNP 
contested its outcome and this was a clear indication that ―democracy had not and has not yet come about‖ in 
Lesotho (Sejanamane 1996: 65). It also reflected that ―the unusual election results did not allow Basotho politicians to 
learn anew the normal compromises in a democracy‖ (Sejanamane 1996: 66). Instead of embracing the democratic 
dispensation, the BNP solicited and mobilised the support of the monarchy and the military against the recognition of 
the BCP and Prime Minister Ntsu Mokhehle‘s administration. In fact during the campaign, the leader of the BNP had 
shown his established hostilities to the BCP and its leader Ntsu Mokhehle. He was quoted as saying: ―[i]n no 
circumstances will the BNP allow Mokhehle to rule if the BCP wins the elections‖ (Roman Catholic Weekly in Pherudi 
2000: 123). To their dismay, the BNP‘s allegations of electoral irregularities were dismissed by the High Court as 
unfounded. The court ruled that ―they were founded more upon a pervasive lack of trust which existed between 
politicians in Lesotho than upon any firmly grounded evidence‖ (Sekatle 1995: 105). Also dismissing the BNP 
contestations to the elections, the BCP Secretary Mphanya stated that ―[t]hey [BNP] have no guts for defeat‖ (New 
Nation (1997) in Pherudi 2000: 124).  
 
However, the BNP relied on its long-time politicised partisan military which had kept it in power since independence 
in 1966 to bolster its resistance to the democratically elected BCP government. It can be argued that the military 
found a golden opportunity to regain the political power which they had reluctantly relinquished. Apart from being a 
partisan instrument and constituent of the BNP, the military had its own suspicions and mistrust of the BCP 
government. The issues which unsettled the military under a BCP government included fears of losing their jobs (job 
security) as punishment for having been a BNP force, and proposals for the integration of the BCP military wing (the 
Lesotho Liberation Army or LLA) into the national army (the Royal Lesotho Defence Force or RLDF) (Matlosa 1995, 
Petlane 1995). According to Petlane, ―it is not immediately clear to what extent this tension has roots in the history of 
the RLDF as a BNP force vis-a-vis the LLA as a BCP force; or the degree to which it is a purely internal and technical 
problem of integrating a guerrilla force with a controversial army‖ (1995: 153). The fact of the matter was that 
―[i]mmediately after the announcement of the BCP victory…fears reigned within the armed forces. This fear was 
related to the possibility of the LLA being imposed over the established officer corps which could also translate into 
retrenchment of some officers. This fears instigated some fraction of the army to contemplate a military coup so as to 
nip the new BCP government in the bud…‖ (Matlosa 1995: 122). This volatile and suspicious atmosphere was 
aggravated by comments by the BCP Minister of Agriculture and Cooperatives, Marketing and Youth Affairs - 
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Ntsunyane Mphanya - who stated that the LLA will be integrated into the country‘s armed forces, regardless of 
whether or not the opponents of the regime like it…‖ (Mo-Africa cited in Pherudi 2000: 138). This statement starkly 
contradicted an earlier announcement by the Prime Minister Mokhehle that the LLA had been disbanded and if there 
were any intentions to integrate it into the national defence force it would be an issue for discussion between the 
government and all the stakeholders in the Lesotho political landscape (Pherudi 2000). 
 
Exploiting these contradictory positions from the BCP government officials, the leader of the BNP at the time, 
Retselisitsoe Sekonyane, fuelled military suspicions and divisions. In a rally held on the 13th November 1993 he was 
quoted as saying ―[b]ecause of the political crisis in Lesotho peace has been threatened particularly by government 
failure to bring the Lesotho Liberation Army under control. The LLA are allegedly being armed with AK 47 automatic 
machine guns. …It is surprising that Prime Minister Mokhehle earlier announced publicly that the LLA has been 
disbanded, yet the same LLA is very much alive and it constitute a serious threat to peace. …When the LLA is busy 
arming itself to the teeth, the government watches with folded arms. If the Lesotho Defence Force is afraid of the 
LLA, we, the BNP members will fight the LLA until we are killed if need be…‖ (cited in Pherudi 2000: 136). Worse still, 
the military was divided into pro-BNP and pro-BCP factions, further threatening the security of the transition to 
democracy. There were allegations that the military high-ranking officers supported the BNP while the lower-ranking 
soldiers supported the BCP (Petlane 1995, Sejanamane 1996). Matlosa (1995: 124) notes that ―instability and 
tension within the army had reached a boiling point by December 1993. [And] neither the government nor the 
Defence Commission, possessed effective control over an increasingly restive and divided officer corps.‖ The 
government‘s response while appealing for calm also further aggravated the already hostile and explosive 
atmosphere. The Minister of Information at that time, Mpho Malie, countered by saying ―[g]overnment would like to 
strongly advise political parties which are bent on sowing seeds of confusion which threaten peace and stability to 
refrain from such. The aim of these people is mainly to instil fear on Basotho in order to disrupt peace. 
…Government‘s patience is unfortunately sometimes interpreted as weakness. These people, we know, were bitter 
with the BCP landslide victory during the elections and were defeated in court while contesting the election outcome. 
Government therefore appeals to Basotho people to stay calm and dissuade themselves from instigation by 
opportunists‖ (cited in Pherudi 2000: 141).  
 
The apex of political rivalry and divisions in the army took the form of clashes between soldiers from the two 
politically partisan factions of the Makoanyane and Ratjomore barracks on the 13 th and 23 rd of January 1994 
(Matlosa 1995, Sejanamane 1996). The BNP, other political parties and the monarchy exploited the divisions within 
the army to further sow seeds of confusion and undermine the authority of the BCP government. Consequently, 
―national political life was paralysed for the first four months (and more) of 1994 because of the army fracas‖ (Petlane 
1995: 153). Given such a confused political climate and suspicions of the reluctance of the military to hand over 
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power, there was a 7-day delay in the swearing-in of the BCP Prime Minister until the 2nd April 1993. This was 
confirmed by Mokhehle himself: ―[t]hough it has not been publictly announced, it is common knowledge that my 
swearing in as Prime Minister was delayed unnecessarily because of disagreements within the army. This only 
happened on the 2nd April, yet the elections were held on the 27th March - a week earlier‖ (cited in Matlosa 1995: 
120). The challenge to the BCP government was ―to seek to resolve the continuing crisis in the civil-military relations 
by negotiating a lasting domestic solution with its rebellious army‖ (Matlosa 1995: 127). Mokhehle had to be ―careful 
not to offend 2000 men who had a tendency to storm out of the barracks and assume power at gunpoint‖ (Pherudi 
2000: 131). It was in this context that during inauguration he stated: ―[t]he BCP has no intention, whatsoever to 
dismiss public servants from their jobs (including army personnel) upon taking over the administration of the country‖ 
(Lesotho Today, in Pherudi 2000: 129). However, the BCP government conceded that it was powerless to control the 
armed forces warring factions confirming Stephan‘s (1988) assertion that ―[t]o the extent that the military has a 
monopoly of physical power, the capacity of a democratic government to exercise effective control and command 
over the management of force within the state apparatus is extremely limited‖ (paraphrased in Matlosa 1995: 119). At 
this stage the government viewed the army as an enemy of democracy as it appeared to be supportive of those who 
called for the nullification of the election results and dissolution of the BCP-led government. 
 
By November 1993 the military intensified its disruptive action resulting in the capturing of 4 senior military officers 
and some cabinet ministers while some fled in fear for their life after the military killed the Deputy Prime Minister and 
Minister of Finance, Selemetse Baholo, who was opposed to the pay rise demanded by the army (Matlosa 1995, 
Pherudi 2000). The disgruntled LDF further complicated issues for the Mokhehle government by demanding a 100% 
pay rise. They wrote: ―…we are making this request in order to meet our daily needs in view of the high cost of living. 
We had stated in our request that we would like the salary increase to take effect from 1st January 1994. We 
therefore request a clear response to our request before the 24th January 1994. We wish to assure you Sir, that we 
as members of the Armed Forces of Lesotho remain committed to the maintenance of peace and stability at all times‖ 
(cited in Pherdui 2000: 143). While the Mokhehle regime noted its preparedness to meet and resolve the pay rise 
issue with the military, it had reservations about the tone of the letter, the setting of deadlines and thus to the military 
commitment to peace and stability in Lesotho as they claimed in their letter. Attempts by the representatives of Non-
Governmental Organisations, the Business People of Lesotho and the Lesotho Council of Churhes and Trade Unions 
for an amicable resolution of the crisis were abortive (Matlosa 1995, Pherudi 2000). 
 
The peak of the crisis was also evidenced by the military-cum-King‘s coup which followed a BNP procession on the 
15th August 1994 (led by its leaders Sekhonyane and Lekhanya) to petition King Letsie III calling for the re-
instatement of King Moshoeshoe II, the dissolution of the BCP government and formation of a government of national 
unity and fresh elections supervised by an independent electoral commission and based on the proportional 
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representation to ensure equitable parliamentary representation system (Matlosa 1995, Sekatle 1995). With the full 
backing of the military, the BNP and MFP, Letsie III dissolved the government, suspended the constitution, granted 
himself legislative powers and installed a 6-person Provisional Council (an interim government) composed mainly of 
appointees from the defeated minority parties to administer the country for an interim period of 8-9 months. The King 
together with the Provisional Council Chairperson, Hae Phoofolo, denounced the BCP government for lack of 
transparency and accountability and mishandling of the monarchy issue and the post-election military disturbances 
(Southall 1999a, Matlosa 1995, 1997, 1999, Vale 2003, Ngoma 2005).  
 
This was a treacherous reversal of democracy, akin to the BNP seizure of power after the BCP victory in the 1970 
elections and the 1986 military coup. In the view of Matlosa (1995: 135), ―[b]y combining the forces of the monarchy 
with those of the military, Letsie‘s intervention replaced the coup of 1986. However, whereas the father [Moshoeshoe 
II] had to combine with the army to topple an unpopular and illegitimate regime, the son had now acted with politically 
discredited forces to remove a government whose democratic credentials were without parallel in the modern history 
of Lesotho.‖ The BCP government denounced the King‘s actions as unconstitutional. The Prime Minister and the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs released strongly worded statements denouncing the coup. Addressing the nation, 
Mokhehle stated: ―I, Ntsu Mokhehle, Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Lesotho exercising my responsibilities and 
function as de jure Head of the Lesotho Government, declare to you all my country man that the purported statement 
issued this morning by His Majesty King Letsie III is unconstitutional and ultra vires his power. It came as a total 
surprise to my democratically elected government (The Citizen 18th August 1994 cited in Pherudi 2000: 184). In the 
same vein Qhobela Molapo (Foreign Affairs) echoed: ―[t]he BCP government was elected by the people and King 
Letsie III does not have the power to dissolve it. There is no way in any democratic setting whereby the constitutional 
monarchy, not even the monarchical oligarchy of the 14th century Louis XIV of France who used to say, 'at the end of 
the day I am France'…could simply dissolve a democratically elected government" (cited in Pherudi 2000: 185). 
 
Consequently, in solidarity with the BCP, its supporters staged a mass demonstration against the Royal-Military 
coup.  The demonstration was violently crushed culminating in the death of 5 protesters and 16 injured. The Lesotho 
National Council of Non-Governmental Organisations, joined by the National University of Lesotho students, 
teachers, the Lesotho Law Society, and Trade Unions organised a 2-day stay-away, called for a national conference 
to discuss the political crisis and threatened more mass actions as a way of pressurising the King for the restoration 
of democracy, but in vain. Although the coup lacked legitimacy as evidenced by popular opposition, Letsie‘s 
administration was fully backed by the military which imposed curfews and heavily guarded all the strategic 
government institutions (Matlosa 1995). At this stage the then Minister of Justice, Law and Human Rights, Kelebone 
Maope, conceded that ―the government is incapable of implementing its policy nor can it stop nor investigate violence 
because it is not in control of the police and the armed forces‖ (cited in Pherdui 2000: 149). The crisis had resulted in 
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immense damage to property and the casualties stood at 5 soldiers and 11 civilians wounded (The Citizen 1994 in 
Pherudi 2000: 155). 
 
The nation had experienced a coup and the government appealed for assistance in the form of a peace-keeping 
force from South Africa, the OAU, UN, the Commonwealth and the regional body SADC. The South African 
government which was fully engaged in the demanding political transition from apartheid to democracy was unwilling 
to intervene militarily although the Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time, Pik Botha, emphasised the government 
opposition to the coup. He noted that ―…the government will not tolerate any government that came to power by a 
military coup in Lesotho. We will make it impossible for such a government to survive‖ (The Citizen 1994 in Pherudi 
2000: 145). On the 19th and 25th January 1994, the UN and the Commonwealth respectively, responded by sending 
representatives to Lesotho to meet all the stakeholders to negotiate a peaceful resolution of the political turmoil 
engulfing the Kingdom, but in vain (Pherudi 2000). The regional organisation - the SADC - accordingly responded 
and established a Task Force to manage and resolve the crisis. The government‘s request for external assistance 
was considered mainly by the opposition and other stakeholders as inappropriate, unconstitutional and a reflection of 
the country‘s dependency syndrome which has characterised its socio-economic and political agenda since 
independence. In their letter to the Prime Minister the opposition objected that the sovereign parliament of Lesotho 
had not been consulted on the decision to call for outside intervention. And moreover, the internal options to resolve 
the conflict had not been exhaustively explored. They also sent a stern warning statement to the SADC against its 
interference in the domestic affairs of Lesotho. It read thus: ―[w]e urge all outside military interventionsists whose 
interests are not affected at this stage to know that should they be tempted with intention to, they would be doing so 
against a unified political expression of an entire nation. Their action will be understood by Basotho and the 
sovereign Lesotho as a naked interference and a rape against our nationhood‖ (Statement by Political Parties on the 
Crisis in Lesotho 1994, in Pherudi 2000: 152). However, in spite of the objections by the Lesotho opposition parties, 
the SADC intervened in the form of a Troika of Masire, Mugabe and Mandela who were mandated to restore law, 
order and democracy in the troubled Kingdom. 
 
6.2.8 The SADC intervention in Lesotho 1994 
In spite of the intense opposition to external intervention, the SADC heeded the government‘s appeal for assistance 
to reverse ―a coup that was in progress‖ (Matlosa 1995: 129). In any case the SADC was deeply concerned about 
regional stability and their resolution to avert the emergence of an undemocratic government in the small 
mountainous Kingdom which had embarked on multiparty elections after a prolonged period of autocratic civilian and 
military regimes. As such, at its summit in Gaborone (Botswana) the SADC unequivocally called for the reinstatement 
of the democratically elected regime. Its communiqué read: ―[t]he Summit expressed strong objections to the 
…decision by His Majesty King Letsie III to unlawfully dissolve parliament and disband the democratically elected 
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government in gross violation of the constitution of the Kingdom. The Summit advised His Majesty to act in the best 
interest of his country and the region at large by immediately and unconditionally reinstating the legitimate 
government of Prime Minister Mokhehle‖ (SADC Communique 29th August 1994). The Summit also appointed a 
Tripartite Task Force comprising of Botswana (Masire-the Chairperson of SADC), Mugabe (Zimbabwe-Chairperson 
of the Front Line States) and South Africa (Mandela) charged with resolving the crisis and restoring order to Lesotho 
(Matlosa 1995, 1997, Petlane 1995, Southall 1998, 1999b, Vale 2003, Ngoma 2005). The Troika was tasked to 
provide a rapid assessment of the situation as a basis for determining the root causes of the crisis and ―to seek a 
solution as well as to examine ways to prevent similar incidents in future‖ (Matlosa 1995: 127). 
 
In line with the SADC Treaty (1992) and Harare Declaration of 1991, the region was determined to avert any military 
coups against democratically elected regimes in Southern Africa. The SADC Treaty of 1992 pledged commitments to 
democratic governance, regional cooperation, peace and stability and peaceful resolution of regional conflicts. 
According to Matlosa (1995: 135) the regional organisation did not want ―to see the reputation of the new SADC – 
now inclusive of South Africa - besmirched by its inclusion of unelected governments as it sought to re-jig its appeal 
to investors and international donor countries in the increasingly competitive post-Cold War era.‖ As such the SADC 
was duty bound to restore the democratically elected government and ensure regional peace and stability. The 
SADC Harare Declaration of 1991 on the other hand, had unequivocally pledged ―protection of the fundamental 
political values of the Commonwealth; democracy, democratic processes and institutions which reflect national 
circumstances, the rule of law and the independence of the judiciary, just and honest government‖ (cited in Ngoma 
2005: 165). It was in this context that the Chairman of the SADC security Organ pointed out that ―a task force would 
be sent to knock sense into those elements causing lawlessness in the country" (Africa Today in Pherudi 2000: 152). 
 
In fulfilment of these commitments, the regional organisation refused to recognise Letsie‘s government and 
persistently called for the restoration of the democratically elected BCP government. The SADC clarion call was also 
boosted by the OAU, the Commonwealth, the USA, the European Union, the Council of Churches and the South 
African National Union of Mine Workers (Matlosa 1995, Southall and Petlane 1995). In its assessment of the 
situation, the Troika submitted that the crisis was broader than a struggle between the BCP government and the 
Lesotho Defence Force. In their view, ―discontent was but symptomatic of a much broader, more deep-rooted 
malaise within Lesotho, a malaise which was essentially political in nature‖ (Report on the Presidential visit to the 
Kingdom of Lesotho 13; in Pherudi 2000: 158). They recommended calling an all-inclusive national dialogue to 
discuss the problems engulfing the nation and how best they could be resolved. The Troika also found that the BCP 
government was faced with thorny and immense challenges. Matlosa observed that ―…the BCP …found itself in 
contradiction with both a civil service and an army that had been recruited and trained to serve the BNP government. 
The manifest mistake of the BCP was to assume that its massive majority in the elections, which accorded it 
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legitimacy, did not thereby nullify opposing centres of power in the society. …Its ultimatum was to forge an alliance 
between unruly military in which discipline had sadly broken down and the monarchy…‖ (Matlosa 1995: 160). To that 
extent, it failed to implement an effective and transparent national reconciliation and integration programme. As the 
Troika asserted ―…it was and remains our very clear impression that, notwithstanding a recognised need for 
reconciliation, little if any progress has been made towards the implementation of such policy towards the promotion 
of a truly national dialogue…‖ (Report on the Presidential visit to the Kindgom of Lesotho in Pherudi 2000: 154). The 
Troika further emphasised development of a comprehensive programme to build a non-partisan national army to 
maintain law and order, defend the citizens, democracy, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lesotho (Matlosa 1995, 
Petlane 1995, Pherudi 2000). 
 
To resolve the quagmire, the Troika summoned all the political protagonists to a meeting in Pretoria. In the view of 
Sejanamane, ―[t]he Pretoria meeting was important in that it set in motion a process of resolving the political crisis in 
Lesotho under the auspices of the regional states‖ (1996: 71). The negotiation document for the BCP government 
called upon the SADC to: 
 With one voice denounce the so-called Council of Ministers imposed on the People of Lesotho. 
 Impose immediate economic sanctions and travel embargo and isolate the imposed regime in Lesotho. (It called 
upon South Africa to play a leading role) 
 Help disarm the present army which was set up and continues to serve partisan political interests and help set up 
a national army. 
 Support a referendum on the issue of the monarchy in Lesotho. (Request for support of the democratically 
elected government of Lesotho in Sejanamane 1996: 75). 
 
Sejanamane (1996) argues that the government‘s bargaining position was boosted by the mass opposition to the 
King‘s coup as evidenced by the successful 2-day stay away in protest, and the immense regional and international 
condemnation of the coup and persistent calls for the reinstatement of the democratically elected government. 
Among other things, the King‘s coup had "limited objectives", namely, to halt the government‘s commission of inquiry 
on the monarchy and reinstatement of his father Moshoeshoe II to the throne. Bolstered by these assurances, 
Mokhehle called for the unconditional and immediate restoration of his government. He posited that ―[i]t is the first 
step that His majesty must take and at the latest by Monday 5th September 1994‖ (cited in Sejanamane 1996: 76). It 
is important to note that although the government had the massive internal and external support, its shortcoming was 
that it was too dependent on foreign support for its restoration in the face of Letsie III who had a firm grip on the 
security apparatus (Sejanamane 1996). 
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On the other hand, the King‘s bargaining position was buttressed by the control of the security apparatus, the 
Provisional Council and other political parties such as the BNP and Hareeng Basotho (Sejanamane 1996). Although 
his coup was largely denounced by the regional and international community, the King did not capitulate without a 
fight. According to the South African Director General of Foreign Affairs of the time who was centrally involved in the 
negotiations ―…the King didn‘t want to say, 'well, I‘m just rescinding the order, I did the wrong thing and I now put it 
right'…‖ (in Sejanamane 1996: 76). The Palacy‘s bargaining position was framed around the King‘s acquisition of an 
"honorable exit". As such he bargained for the: 
 Abolition of the commission of inquiry on the monarchy and the reinstatement of Moshoeshoe II 
 Immunities for himself and those who acted on his behalf in the period under discussion 
 Agreement on holding a National Forum and other constitutional guarantees for the civil service and the military 
(cited in Sejanamane 1996: 79). 
In the view of Sejanamane (1996), the King‘s negotiation position was protective of the monarchy to the detriment of 
the interests of the other constituencies which backed his coup. Sejanamane posits that ―[t]he constituencies which 
had joined Letsie III found themselves losing everything as a result of the agreement while his primary objectives 
were fully met‖ (1996: 78). While the fundamental issue for the government was its unconditional restoration, the King 
dug in his heels on the reinstatement of Moshoehoe II, amnesty to the coup proponents and cancellation of the 
commission of inquiry against the monarchy (Matlosa 1995, Sejanamane 1996). In spite of the difficulties involved, a 
diplomatic solution was ultimately reached and the dispute was amicably settled.  
 
During the 1998 intervention, the SADC employed both diplomatic and coercive measures to compel both parties in 
the conflict to a negotiated settlement. On the 25 th of August 1994, the SADC Tripartite task Force and the OAU 
Secretary General Salim Ahmed Salim, invited Mokhehle and King Letsie III for dialogue. The Task Force called 
upon the King to reverse his coup and restore the democratically elected government of Mokhehle. He was 
subsequently required to draw up a time-table for the handover of power and was given 7 days to resolve the crisis 
(Southall and Petlane 1995, Matlosa 1995, Sejanamane 1996). The Troika‘s uncompromising message to the King 
was that the coup was totally unacceptable in the region. King Letsie and the Provisional Council embarked on 
delaying tactics and made numerous conditions for handing over power, such as indemnity to all those who 
supported the fall of the BCP government, the restoration of King Moshoeshoe II to the throne, creation of reserve 
powers for the King and establishment of a national forum to discuss reconciliation and national unity. The BCP 
government rejected the demands and threatened mass action if the provisional government did not step down 
(Matlosa 1995). To pressurise the King for a speedy resolution of the crisis, the Tripartite Task Force and the EU 
threatened economic and other strategic sanctions against the illegitimate regime. 
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In a letter to King Letsie III, dated 30th August 1994, President Mugabe (Zimbabwe) unambiguosly stated: ―I wish on 
behalf of my colleagues and myself, to draw your Majesty‘s attention to the need for the restoration of constitutionality 
in Lesotho within a 7-day period following the Pretoria meeting. As we explained to your Majesty, it clearly meant the 
reinstatement of the Government of Dr Ntsu Mokhehle without reservations. It also meant the withdrawal of the 
unconstitutional orders and other measures that your Majesty enacted following your Majesty‘s assumption of 
executive powers. … Your majesty, we would be pleased if your response to our appeal could indicate a forward 
movement towards the establishment of a constitutional and legal order. The absence of such a forward movement 
would leave the region with no other alternative but to join the rest of the world in imposing economic sanctions. In 
the event of no progress being made, we would have no alternative but to consider the imposition of such specific 
measures as members of our region would agree upon‖ (cited in Sejanamane 1996: 71-72).  
 
South Africa, as the regional powerhouse, used its military and economic power to persuade and pressurise the 
adversaries to dialogue. For example, there are allegations that South Africa (on which Lesotho is inextricably 
dependent) threatened economic sanctions on Lesotho. Power politics and threats of military strikes were evidenced 
by constant fighter flights hovering over the Lesotho air space (Matlosa 1995, Southall 1998, Vale 2003, Ngoma 
2005, Likoti 2006). Ngoma points out that ―[t]he constant flights by fighter aircrafts over the Lesotho air space and 
parachute drops in full sight of the citizens of Lesotho‘s capital were designed to instill apprehension and 
consequently intensify pressure on the political leadership to give in to the pressure by SADC‖ (2005: 166). In this 
way ―[d]emocratic South Africa cajoled a reversal of the King‘s coup… with a mixture of arm twisting and negotiation‖ 
(Southall 1998: 5). This was in line with Reagan‘s Secretary of State Henry Kissinger‘s assertion that ―historically 
negotiations were aided by the military capabilities a nation could bring to bear if diplomacy failed‖ (cited in 
Doughterty and Pfaltzgraff 1990: 109). It has also been established that ―for success to be achieved in diplomatic 
negotiations, the victim has to know clearly what is wanted and also how he can avoid adverse consequences‖ 
(Sejanamane 1996: 72). Threats of coercive measures coupled with dialogue (non-coercive) compelled the King to 
restore the democratic and constitutional government in Lesotho. 
 
Consequently, the monarchy succumbed to regional pressure and restored the deposed Basotholand Congress 
Party government (Sejanamane 1996, Matlosa 1995, Southall 1999a, Vale 2003, Ngoma 2005). The agreement 
overseen by the SADC Troika Task Force was signed on the 14th of September 1994 and it restored the BCP 
democratically elected regime, annulled the Commission of Inquiry into the position of the monarchy, pledged 
consultations with a view to widen the democratic process [in Lesotho], established modalities for cordial relations 
between the Head of State and other central institutions of governance and called for the neutrality, independence 
and loyalty of the armed forces (Matlosa 1995, Sejanamane 1996). The resolution of the crisis was followed by the 
SADC establishment of a Commission of Inquiry comprising military personnel from South Africa and Zimbabwe to 
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investigate the sources of the unrest. The BCP government also established a commission of inquiry to embark on 
an in-depth examination of the history of the Lesotho Defence Force, its recruitment and training processes and its 
role in the entire crisis of 1994 and how to curb future military instigated turbulences (Legal Notice No 61 of 1994; in 
Pherudi 2000). As a reconciliatory gesture, the government announced an across-the-board salary increment of 10% 
for all civil servants and 66% for the military (Pherudi 2000).  
 
Vale attributes the successful resolution of the conflict to the outstanding international personality and stature of 
President Mandela. He asserts that ―…international legitimacy, not to mention credence, was delivered to the 
intervention by the active role played by Nelson Mandela. This personalisation of regional multi-lateralism was, 
however, largely missed by those who hailed the Troika‘s intervention as an important development in the making of 
regional order‖ (2003: 120). Determined to influence the regional political climate and reflect the peacekeeping role of 
a new democratic South Africa Mandela had stated that ―Southern Africa cannot sit back and allow the subversion of 
democracy in any country‖ (Cape Times 15 September 1994, cited in Vale 2003: 121). However, it is crucial to note 
that Mandela and the South African government were not solely keen on the military option which Mugabe seemed to 
imply in the case of non-compliance by the King. According to Sejanamane, ―President Mandela was keen to 
disassociate himself from the hawkish stand taken by President Mugabe.…Instead he also concentrated on the 
incentive that could be derived from cooperation‖ (1996: 73). This was evidenced by President Mandela‘s peace 
delegation of Bishop Tutu and the Foreign Affairs Director General Evans to Lesotho to discuss the peaceful 
resolution of the conflict. Sejanamane further indicates that the position of President Masire regarding the option to 
resolve the crisis remains unclear. In spite of this lack of clarity Sejanamane maintains that ―whatever his [Masire] 
position was, it is clear that there was no consensus on the use of force which seemed to have been President 
Mugabe‘s preferred option‖ (1996: 73). Mandaza reasons that the military option in the absence of a regional 
consensus ―might give rise to problems which may undermine political cooperation and create conditions for 
insecurity in the region‖ (paraphrased in Sejanamane 1996: 73). The military option was also opposed by the U.S 
government. It cautioned the regional bloc that ―[a] military intervention should only be undertaken as a last resort 
when all other options have been exhausted. In addition, a military intervention should have a clear political/military 
goal and an end point… We are also concerned about the threat of a military intervention and a probable armed 
resistance to such an intervention…‖ (cited in Mandaza 1994: 27).  
 
Of paramount importance is that a combination of both the "stick and carrots" resulted in a peaceful diplomatic 
resolution of the crisis. The peaceful resolution of the Lesotho political conflict was hailed as ―the first litmus test for 
the sub-region to truly act as a community of states…‖ (Ngoma 2005: 166).  It also marked the SADC‘s success in 
―using preventive diplomacy rather than peace-keeping as the point of intervention‖ (South Scan 16 September 1996, 
cited in Ngoma 2005: 166). In its recommendations for a long lasting peace in Lesotho, the Tripartite Task Force 
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called for a depoliticised neutral and loyal military in which the BCP military wing (the LLA) would be incorporated, 
and for the resolution of the controversial status of the Lesotho monarchy vis-a-vis the political establishment. It 
posited that ―Lesotho needed a monarch who, while standing above party politics, could be an all-important symbol 
and a rallying point around which a troubled nation could unite‖ (cited in Matlosa 1995: 128). The government 
vehemently resisted this clause, calling the reinstatement of Moshoeshoe II unconstitutional. However, the Troika 
was determined that the reinstatement of Moshoehoe II was central to the lasting solution of the crisis. As such, they 
rejected the government‘s legal arguments as flawed. They argued that ―no known constitution can be above the 
sovereign power of its people to amend it‖ (Sejanamane 1996: 80. Inter-alia, they rejected the ―argument as logically 
and legally untenable‖ since ―the act of parliament which we have suggested, is empowered by section 154 (1) of the 
constitution itself and does not amend or change the constitution‖ (Report on the visit by three Presidential 
emissaries and Legal experts to Maseru, cited in Sejanamane 1996: 81).  
 
The Tripartite Task Force also called for concerted attention to the structural sources of conflict in Lesotho. It 
concluded that ―[i]t is clear that until or unless the broader underlying political issues are addressed, there can be no 
guarantee that such confrontation will not erupt again‖ (cited in Matlosa 1995: 128). In the true spirit of diplomatic 
settlements, both the government and the monarchy were beneficiaries through negotiation and compromise. As 
Sejanamane correctly asserts: ―… negotiations tend to succeed in situations where the parties have calculated both 
their strengths and weaknesses. A balance of the two tends to bring about compromises particularly where failure to 
agree could hurt. …‖ As such ―… diplomacy seeks outcomes that though not ideal for either party, are better for both 
than some other alternatives…‖ (1996: 75). For example, while the government attained its reinstatement, the 
monarchy achieved its objectives for the cancellation of the commission of inquiry into the institution and the 
reinstatement of Moshoeshoe II to the throne. Furthermore, peaceful resolution of the conflict prevented a 
degeneration of the country into a full-blown destructive civil war in which all would be losers (Sejanamane 1996). 
 
Although Sejanamane acknowledges the success of the SADC diplomatic resolution of the crisis, he is also 
concerned that ―it signalled the end of an era where Lesotho could even remotely claim to be a sovereign state in 
Southern Africa‖ due to the overdependence of the country for its survival on external forces. (1996: 60). In practice, 
the country had been converted from a sovereign state ―to some sort of 'trust colony' of Botswana, South Africa and 
Zimbabwe‖ (Sejanamane, 1996: 60-61). This is because in the settlement accord, the SADC Troika Presidents were 
designated as guarantors of the Lesotho future peace and democracy prospects. In the view of Sejanamane, ―that 
could mean that the guardianship of role over Lesotho by the 3 Presidents and their successors is guaranteed in 
perpetuity‖ (1996: 80). As if the government was conscious of its weakened position as a result of the accord, Prime 
Minister Mokhehle assured the Basotho that the nation‘s sovereignty was safe and intact. Sejanamane insists that 
―[b]ut through whatever lens one looks at the agreement signed by the King and Prime Minister in 1994, it will be 
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found to have severely restricted the scope of the operation of the present and future governments in Lesotho‖ 
(Sejanamane 1996: 81). It is this fragile sovereignty of Lesotho coupled with its structurally weak political and 
electoral institutions and a rapidly declining economy which are the sources of the current and potential future turmoil 
in the country (Sejanamane 1996). Indeed Sejanamane‘s prophecy became a truism as the history of political 
conflicts was replicated after the 1998 elections. 
 
Evidently, peace and stability in Lesotho was short-lived as political turmoil erupted again in 1998. This could be 
interpreted as a sign that the 1994 non-coercive preventive intervention did not address the core underlying structural 
socio-economic and political issues surrounding the strife. According to Vale, ―it was the nature of the intervention 
that effectively sowed the seeds of further conflict because it reinstated the Basotholand Congress Party as the 
country‘s government; a move that made the three intervening powers-South Africa, Zimbabwe and Botswana-the 
guarantors of the country‘s democracy and its orderly behaviour in the region…‖ (2003: 120). Put differently, it 
implied that ―…Lesotho‘s continuing independence is in a very large measure dependent upon its adherence to newly 
regionally endorsed democratic norms‖ (Southall and Petlane 1995: xvi). The recurrence of conflict in 1998 was 
indicative of the fragility of the foundations on which the country‘s democracy was built. It raised the question of how 
deep the commitment to democracy ran amongst the various actors (parties), pressure groups, the military and the 
monarchy in the Lesotho political landscape (Southall and Petlane 1995, Petlane 1995, Matlosa 1995). It also 
reflected that ―democracy constitutes more than the mere holding of multiparty elections, more than the simple 
replacement of an old, hated party and the righting of the '1970 travesty', [and] more than the substitution of military 
politicians with civilian politicians…‖ (Petlane 1995: 156-157). The challenge to the Lesotho political actors remained 
―the development of a culture of political tolerance… a recognition by all major political actors that their opponents 
cannot be eliminated and a movement beyond the view of politics which sees the winners as taking all‖ (Southall and 
Petlane 1995: xvi). Lack of political commitment to the above-mentioned principles resulted in the 1998 post-electoral 
crisis which necessitated another SADC intervention in the form of military action. 
 
6.2.9 The 1998 Lesotho Crisis and the „SADC‟ Military Intervention 
In August 1998, Lesotho was gripped by another more devastating civil commotion following the disputed May 23rd 
1998 elections. The elections took place in a highly charged political climate following Prime Minister Mokhehle‘s 
break-away from the governing BCP and formation of the Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD) after irreconcilable 
internal differences. According to Southall (1999a) the ruling Party (BCP) was torn apart by a power wrangle for 
succession of the ageing and ailing Ntsu Mokhehle, between Molapo Qhobela who controlled the party executive and 
Phakalitha Mosisili who was favoured by Mokhehle as successor. During the BCP‘s summit held between the 28 th 
February and 2nd March 1997, the summit passed a vote of no confidence on Mokhehle and called for his removal 
from the leadership of the party. The matter was ultimately taken to court which ruled in favour of Mokhehle. Despite 
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the court ruling, the rivalry of the BCP's warring factions continued with adverse effects on the party‘s ability to 
govern efficiently. Consequently, the failure by the 2 factions to reach a compromise resulted in the Mokhehle-
Mosisili faction forming the LCD on the 10th of June 1997. The new party became the majority in parliament and thus 
formed the government as 41 Members of Parliament out of 61 crossed the floor to the LCD (Pherudi and Barnard 
1999). The BCP was turned into an opposition party and it consequently protested the Prime Minister‘s move as a 
parliamentary coup, a travesty to democracy and in contravention of the constitution of Lesotho. The BCP appealed 
to King Letsie III to prevail upon Mokhehle to resign. The opposition parties also called, in vain, for the dissolution of 
the government, and postponement of the 1998 elections. These high political tensions created fertile ground for the 
political fermentations which followed the 1998 elections. In the words of the SADC Parliamentary Forum: ―[a]s the 
May 1998 election drew closer, the bitterness among the contestants became increasingly pronounced. The 
animosity and the rivalry were real as the opposition parties planned to either dislodge or destabilise the LCD 
government through both parliamentary and extra-parliamentary means‖ (SADC Parliamentary Forum, 2003: 7). 
 
The 1998 polls, according to Pherudi and Barnard (1999: 39) were, unlike the previous ones, ―driven by real issues, 
like policies rather than personality cults.‖ Moreover, ―[i]t appeared that the political muscle of the principal parties 
would be fairly and genuinely tested because of the partial completeness of the governing circle of Lesotho.‖ Another 
fascinating aspect of the 1998 polls was the increased number of contesting political parties namely the MFP, BNP, 
Sefhate Democratic Party (SDP), the BCP, the National Progressive Party (NPP), the Popular Front for Democracy 
(PFD), Kopanang Basotho Party (KBP), Lesotho Labour Party (LLP), the United Democratic Party (UDP), Christian 
Democratic Party (CDP), the National Independent Party (NIP) and the independents candidates. Such an expanded 
political landscape was indicative of ―political dynamism and diversism among the Basotho, and provided a broader 
choice for the electorate" (Pherudi and Barnard 1999: 39). The elections were held on the 23rd of May 1998 and were 
closely monitored by the Independent Electoral Commission of Lesotho (IEC) and election observers from the African 
Union, the SADC and the Commonwealth, the Europeean Union, the United Nations Development Programme, a 
wide range of local Non-Governmental Organisations such as the Christian Council of Lesotho (CCL), Lesotho Trade 
Union Congress, Lesotho Council of Non-Governmental Organisation (LCNGO), Lesotho Federation of Women 
Lawyers, and Lesotho Catholic Bishops the elections and government representatives from Canada, South Africa, 
the United States of America and China. 
 
When the overall results were announced the Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD) had overwhelmingly won 60.5 
percent of the vote and 79 out of the 80 parliamentary seats. Commenting on the results Southall, 2001: 154) 
demonstrated that ―as in 1993, the mechanics of the plurality system had worked to deliver one party a virtual clean 
sweep.‖ The opposition got an insignificant share of the vote, the BNP (24.4%), BCP (10.4%) while the remaining 
parties only garnered 4.7% of the national vote (Southall 1998, Southall 2001, Likoti 2006). The landslide victory of 
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the LCD was unexpected because the party was a newly formed entrant into the Lesotho political arena. Inter-alia the 
emergence of the party had ―triggered an unprecedented bitterness among political elite and the electorate alike 
which had a cumulative effect of casting a thick cloud of doubt over its performance in the elections race‖ (Pherudi 
and Barnard, 2003: 123). The Chairperson of the Independent Electoral Commission declared the election results as 
free and fair and Phakalitha Mosisili of the LCD was sworn in as the Prime Minister of Lesotho. The declaration of the 
election results as a true reflection of the wishes of the Lesotho electorate was supported by all the election 
observers as listed above. On the other hand, the opposition parties protested the results and labelled the elections 
fraudulent and rigged by the ruling LCD. The election results and the representation of the opposition political parties 
in parliament were further distorted by the FPTP electoral system. As the Ace Electoral Knowledge Network 
observed, ―[t]he result in terms of the number of seats won was yet another example of how the FPTP electoral 
system can lead to remarkable discrepancies between the share of the vote and the share of the seats won by 
political parties‖ (Internet 12 May 2010). This lack of proportional participation in government in spite of the sizeable 
number of electorates who voted for them incensed the opposition parties which fermented disorder in the country. 
 
Dissatisfied with the electoral outcome, the opposition parties (mainly the BCP, BNP and MFP) formed the 
Opposition Alliance and unanimously rejected the election results as fraudulent and not representative of the wishes 
of the Basotho. They read a conspiracy between the LCD and the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC). The 
opposition alliance formed a Task Force of 16 members which embarked on the physical recounting and verification 
of the ballot papers from the different constituencies. According to Pherudi and Barnard (1999: 40), ―[i]n 31 
constituencies made available to the Task Force, there were without exception large differences between the 
physical counting of those who voted and were cancelled on the voter‘s roll and counting by the IEC at the exit polls.‖ 
As such, ―[w]ith the noted pattern of enormous differences between [the] IEC figures and [the] actual count of votes 
cast, it became even more imperative that the ‗ghost‘ voters...should be firmly established as they have explicitly 
affected the outcome of the elections‖ (Pherudi and Barnard 1999: 43). Other irregularities unearthed by the Task 
Force were: 
 All supplementary voters‘ lists were not certified but were used for voting as reflected by the cancellation of some 
voters‘ names on the lists. (Their validity and authenticity were therefore highly suspect by the Opposition 
Alliance).  
 ―A large number of sheets/pages containing names of persons entered in ball pen and marked as having voted 
show up on the voters‘ lists of several polling stations in all constituencies processed by the Task Force. [And] [i]n 
some polling stations these penned lists went into more than one page‖ (Pherudi and Barnard 1999: 44). 
 In one constituency (Makhaleng) ―two A45 forms were completed for one polling station, with the same result but 
different dates‖ (This irregularity heightened suspicions that ―there was a deliberate act of manipulation of 
 301 
 
electoral documents weeks after the announcements of the election results‖ (Transformation Resource Centre 
(TRC) cited in Pherudi and Barnard 1999: 44- 45). 
 
Bolstered by the revelation of such grave irregularities which, if true could have affected the election outcome, the 
Opposition Alliance organised its position front to dismiss the pronouncements of the IEC regarding the election 
outcome as null and void. In their protest they unanimously called for the: 
 Checking [ of the] registered voters per constituency; 
 Matching [of] the above with the outcome; 
 Checking [of] the total printed ballot papers; 
 Checking [of] the unused ballot papers; 
 Checking [of] the spoiled papers; 
 Checking [of] the sample of the polling station documents; 
 Sampling [of] some election results; 
 Performing any test which the auditors would find necessary for their audit (Mphene 1998; cited in Pherudi and 
Barnard 1999: 45). 
 
As expected, the government remained unmoved thus triggering a violent response from the Opposition Alliance and 
other discontented sections of the society. This polarity in positions between the contesting political blocs threw 
Lesotho on the brink of total civil war as each maintained a confrontational and uncompromising position. 
 
In collaboration reminiscent of the 1994 crisis, the opposition, the military and the monarchy colluded to depose the 
newly elected government. The Opposition Alliance mobilised their supporters to camp at the Royal Palace in 
Maseru from August 1998. They also handed a petition to King Letsie III agitating for a coalition interim government 
to lead the country and called for fresh, transparent and democratic elections. The protesters who camped at the 
Royal Palace vowed never to decamp until the King had addressed their demands and the political impasse 
besetting the nation. The crisis and the gathering of the opposition supporters at the Royal palace put the King into a 
very precarious position. This was mainly because by allowing the protestors to camp at the Palace, the King gave 
an impression that he was supporting the opposition. Such an eventuality would be in gross contravention of the 
constitution of Lesotho which barred the King from active political involvement (Pherudi and Barnard 1999). The 
Lesotho FPTP electoral system which entails winner-takes-all did not help the situation as it gave an unfair 
advantage to the dominant party and the marginalisation of the others (Matlosa 1995, 1999, Southall 1998, Pherudi 
1999, 2003, Santho 2000, Likoti 2006). Southall (1998) observes that the elections were generally fair and free as 
indicated by both the local and international observers. He locates the source of the problem as the flawed FPTP 
electoral system which deprived the 41% opposition electorate of democratic representation in parliament. He 
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reasons that ―as in 1993 what was wrong with the election was not the result but the electoral system which deprived 
opposition voters of representation‖ (Southall 1998: 4). The political elite failed to reach a consensus on dialogue for 
a peaceful resolution of the crisis. Attempts to resolve the conflict through the Lesotho Crisis Committee - a Non–
governmental organisation mediation structure comprising the Lesotho Chamber of Commerce and Industry (LCCI)  
and the Lesotho Network for Conflict Management (LNCM) - were abortive as the government deemed it as pro-
opposition. This shattered an opportune moment for Track Two diplomacy which could have ensured a domestic 
dialogue and peaceful resolution of the impasse (Likoti 2006). 
 
Thus, the country was rapidly gravitating towards a full-scale civil war as the government had lost control and the 
ability to govern the country. On the 8th of August 1998, the opposition parties organised a protest march to the Royal 
Palace to present a memorandum calling for the dissolution of the government. The protest became more violent 
when it was subsequently joined by the mutinous junior officers from the military (after dismissing 28 of their 
commanding officers for colluding with the LCD to rig the elections) and the country became virtually ungovernable 
and was on the brink of a coup (Matlosa 1999, Khabele 1999, Southall 1998, 1999a, Vale 2003, Pherudi 2003, 
Neethling 2000, 2004 Santho 2000, Ngoma 2005, Likoti 2006). In the view of Santho (2000: 2): ―[t]he 1998 political 
crisis over the administration and outcome of the election was the most violent manifestation of a multifaceted 
political crisis with socio-economic roots in a stressed socio-political environment.‖ Despite the intensity of the 
protests, the LCD government refused to step down arguing that they were democratically voted into power by the 
Basotho and that, among other things, the legally constituted Langa Commission did not find anything fraudulent 
about the polls to warrant their nullification. In a bid to arrest the chaos and maintain order, the government declared 
a national curfew. However, the curfew failed to stem the violent agitation by the opposition protestors triggering the 
government invitation of the SADC to rescue the situation. 
 
The regional organisation (SADC) was alarmed by the unfolding violence and disorder in Lesotho and prevailed over 
the political adversaries for the appointment of a Commission of Inquiry led by the South African High Court Judge 
Pius Langa to review the election process and its outcome. The Commission‘s terms of reference were to inquire into 
all the alleged irregularities in respect of the 1998 national elections in Lesotho and make recommendations to the 
SADC within 14 days on a possible solution to the political impasse. Focus was on the alleged: 
 Fraudulent acts in the compilation of the voters‘ roll; 
 Acts of vandalism in respect of the electoral materials; 
 Irregularities in the demarcation process; 
 Irregularities in the reconciliation of votes cast with the voters‘ roll; 
 Irregularities in the counting of votes (Transformation Resource Centre cited in Pherudi and Barnard 1999: 46). 
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The commission report submitted on the 17th of September noted numerous administrative flaws and irregularities in 
the electoral process, but surprisingly concluded that the discrepancies do not warrant the nullification of the election 
results (Matlosa 1995, Southall 1995, 1998, 1999a, Mosieleng 2001, Likoti 2006). The Commission stated: ―[w]e are 
unable to state that the invalidity of the elections has been conclusively established. We point out however, that some 
of the apparent irregularities and discrepancies are of sufficiently serious concern. We cannot, however, postulate 
that the result does not reflect the will of Lesotho electorates‖ (The Commission of Inquiry cited in Likoti 2006: 161). 
As if that was not enough, the report could not be released on the 10th of September as initially promised as it had to 
be discussed at the SADC Mauritius Summit of 13th-14th September 1998 in Mauritius. The Summit denounced the 
post-electoral crisis in Lesotho and embraced the SADC-led mediation initiatives upon receipt of the Commission 
report on the Lesotho crisis. The ambiguous position of the Langa Commission further agitated protesters who were 
already infuriated by the delay in the release of the commission report, giving credibility to the brewing suspicions 
that the report was doctored by the SADC in favour of the government (LCD) (Matlosa 1999, Southall 1999, 
Mosieleng 2001, Vale 2003, Likoti 2006). Thetela notes that ―[t]he vague and contradictory conclusion fuelled 
allegations that the report had been re-written at the Mauritius SADC Summit‖ to save the LCD government (in Likoti 
2006: 162). Consequently the opposition protestors became more agitated. As the Star (Johanesburg), cited in 
Makoa; 1998: 8 puts it, ―people have generally been disappointed by this latest delay on the Langa report, and 
tension has heightened as there is belief that underhand tactics are in play to shield the LCD regime.‖ There were 
allegations that indeed the government had prevailed against the presentation of the report to the Lesotho disputing 
parties before it was discussed at the SADC Summit of Head of States in Mauritius (12 th - 13 th September 1998). 
The South African Deputy Prime Minister at the time, Thabo Mbeki, bowed to pressure from the LCD government 
much to the dismay of the opposition parties. Emboldened by the sequence of events, the Foreign Minister, Tom 
Thabane, stated that since the Langa Commission could not establish any substantive electoral fraud to warrant its 
nullity, the dispute had been resolved and the LCD remained a legitimately elected government (Makoa 1998). This 
added more fuel to already raging fires of opposition protests. The opposition rejected the "doctored" findings of the 
Langa Commission and unwaveringly demanded the resignation of the LCD government and the formation of a 
government of national unity to organise fresh polls. Attitudes were hardened as the LCD government responded that 
it would neither resign to give way for fresh elections, nor form a government of national unity (Southall 2001). 
 
The protests took a more violent and precarious twist when some sections of the security forces mutinied and joined 
the protestors against the government. For example, the junior officers forced the Head of the Armed Forces, 
Commander Lieutenant-General Makhula Mosakeng who was suspected of collusion with the LCD government, to 
step down and be replaced by Brigadier Anton Thibeli who it could be logically concluded was aligned with the 
mutineers‘ cause in support of the opposition. The fission of the military into the pro-government and pro-opposition 
camps marked a dreadful threat to peaceful transformation to democracy in Lesotho (Pherudi and Barnard 1999). 
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Neethling vividly captures the soldiers‘ mutiny thus: ―[t]he mutinous Lesotho Defence Force (LDF) seized arms and 
ammunition and expelled or imprisoned their commanding officers. Government vehicles were hijacked, the 
broadcasting station was closed, the Prime Minister and other ministers were virtually held hostage and the Lesotho 
police had lost control of the situation‖ (Neethling 2000: 287-288). Justifying their involvement, the mutinous military 
stated that they were not staging a coup but were engaged in a mission ―to create a non-partisan defence force by 
ridding the army of a top structure loyal to the ruling Lesotho Congress for Democracy‖ (Sunday Independent 13 
September 1998, in Mosieleng: 361). By August 1998, the escalating unrest compelled the Prime Minister Phakalitha 
Mosisili to request intervention of the SADC to restore order in the country. The request was made without the 
knowledge of the King, whom the Prime Minister considered part of the problem. There were also questions as to 
whether the King had the authority and power in the constitution of the Kingdom to dissolve a democratically elected 
government (Southall 19898, 1999a). According to Matlosa (2001: 96), the Prime Minister‘s letters ―graphically 
painted a picture of an impending civil war in Lesotho and a covert coup in the making.‖ In the first letter dated 16th 
September 1998 addressed to Mandela, the SADC Chairperson Mosisili vividly presented a situation in which his 
government was powerless to maintain law and order and was appealing for military intervention. He stated: ―I wish 
to urgently request your Excellency to come to the rescue of my government and the people of Lesotho. The 
intervention I do request urgently is of military nature... This morning the situation has worsened... further serious 
threats being made included abducting ministers, killing the Prime Minister and foreign Affairs Minister at any time. 
The most serious tragedy is that the police, in particular, the army are, at best spectators... We have a coup on our 
hands...‖ (Mail and Guardian 18-24 September 1998 cited in Pherudi and Barnard 1999: 47-48).  
 
In spite of the gravity of the situation, the SADC delayed responding with the intention of addressing the matter at the 
20th September 1998 SADC Summit in Mozambique. Sensing the imminent collapse of his government, Mosisili 
wrote a second letter projecting a more serious picture in which the country was descending into armed conflict which 
threatened the lives of the citizenry in general. Mosisili noted that ―...This morning we have received reports of a 
shooting attack at night on the house of a local member of parliament...extensive damage of property has been 
occasioned. For three days running, life in Maseru has been grounded as rampaging hordes of armed opposition 
party protestors, and some soldiers continue to terrorise the city... a sniper shot has been taken at a cabinet 
minister‘s car, as a result ministers of government are confined to their residences... The situation is so desperate 
that some of us may not see the planned meeting of Sunday 20th...  (September 1998)". This may have projected an 
ugly situation of an imminent full-scale civil war as it moved the acting President of South Africa Mangosuthu 
Buthelezi (then Minister of Home Affairs in the Mandela government mandated to act while the President Mandela 
and his Deputy Thabo Mbeki were out on diplomatic missions) to authorise military intervention in the Kingdom as the 
turmoil in Lesotho would no doubt permeate into South Africa due to the intertwined geographical positions of the two 
countries. It is important to note that the Opposition Alliance was vehemently opposed to the government‘s invitation 
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for the SADC intervention. In response the BCP leader, Molapo Qobela, issued a stern warning that any military 
intervention by SADC in Lesotho would be deemed an invasion against which the Basotho citizens would gallantly 
resist and defend themselves. Because of the volatile situation in which battle lines for confrontation appeared to be 
drawn, the SADC forces from South Africa and Botswana moved in to restore order in Lesotho. The military 
intervention was launched despite the fact that not all stakeholders such as the Opposition Alliance, church 
organisations, the business community and the Lesotho Council of Non-Governmental Organisations were consulted 
nor did they accede to the intervention. This became one of the major flaws of the SADC mission as it was labelled 
an invasion instead of a peace-keeping force by the opposition forces. 
 
On the 22nd and 23rd September 1998 respectively, South Africa and Botswana, supposedly acting under the 
authority and mandate of the SADC, deployed troops in Lesotho. The intervention force which launched the mission 
dubbed "Operation Boleas" comprised 600 South African and 200 Botswana soldiers. The main goal of the 
Combined Task Force was to thwart further anarchy, disarm the dissident LDF elements to deter further deterioration 
of security in Lesotho and restore order in the security establishment and government operations, create a stable 
environment for the restoration of law and order, revive operations of institutions of governance, protect the 
democratisation process in Lesotho and facilitate negotiations for the peaceful resolution of the crisis (Neethling 
2000, 2004, Mosieleng 2001, Likoti 2006). The SADC argued that its intervention was precipitated by the unfolding 
situation of chaos and anarchy in the Kingdom which, if not nipped in the bud, would jeopardise regional peace, 
democracy and stability. The intervention and mainly the presence of the South African military triggered a violent 
resistance in Lesotho against what the citizen protestors and the opposition viewed as an invasion of their sovereign 
state to save the incumbent LCD government. One spokesperson of the opposition, Mamello Morrison, lashed out: 
―South Africa acted dishonourably, by failing to discharge its moral duty, failing in protecting the people and instead it 
decided to protect the government...‖ (SABC-CCV: TV 24th September 1998 cited in Pherudi and Barnard 1999: 49). 
There were grounded suspicions that the main motive for the South African military invasion was to protect its 
economic interests specifically the Lesotho Highlands Water Project (Katse Dam) rather than for the protection of 
democracy as officially justified. The leader of the opposition BCP captured the mood of the citizens when he stated 
that ―South Africa was looking for an excuse to flex its military muscle ...in the region‖ (African Bulletin 1998, cited in 
Ngoma 2005: 168). He further warned that ―[a]ny intervention from outside will be interpreted by our people (the 
Basotho) as aggression against King Letsie and his kingdom. So whatever happens from now, we are ready. Lesotho 
is a sovereign state and not a SADC colony‖ (The Mail and Guardian 24th September 1998 cited in Ngoma 2005: 33). 
 
Indeed the South African intervention force met formidable and protracted resistance from the LDF and protestors in 
the capital Maseru which culminated in massive loss of life, forced displacement of people and immeasurable 
damage to property. The bitter clashes culminated in huge casualties, for which different observers give different 
 306 
 
figures as follows: 66 deaths, (Neethling 2000), 8 South African soldiers, 158 Lesotho soldiers and 47 civilians, (Vale 
2003), 11 South African soldiers and 113 Lesotho civilians (Matlosa 1999). The intervention also led to mass influx of 
refuges into South Africa estimated to be about 1300, and sharpened anti-South African sentiments in Lesotho 
(Pherudi and Barnard 1999). Infuriated by the South Africa-led SADC invasion, the opposition protestors attacked 
and burnt down government buildings and private properties, mainly South African-owned shops (Metro Cash and 
Carry, Pep Stores, Shoprite, Ok Bazaars, Jet Stores and other outlets) causing untold damage. Du Plessis observes 
that the initial stages of the intervention triggered massive destruction and looting by the rebel faction in central 
Maseru which became economically paralysed. On the other hand, the Opposition Alliance spokesperson, Mamello 
Morrison, held the South African–led forces responsible for the mass destruction. She lamented that ―we protested 
here for several days, for almost a week without a single window being broken, but now look at our city - it has been 
destroyed‖ (Mail and Guardian 25 September 1998 cited in Pherudi and Barnard 1999: 51). This ugly trail of 
destruction is vividly captured by Southall (1998: 5) as: ―the burnt out shell of Maseru‘s main street says it all.‖ The 
intervention resulted in massive destruction estimated at R3 million by Matlosa (1999) and R10 million by Vale 
(2003). According to Van Nieuwkerk (1999: 13), ―the intervention was accompanied by an orgy of destruction and 
looting‖ which saw 246 businesses burnt down, 3000 workers laid off (Matlosa 1999, Southall 1999a). The LCM 
estimated that the damage caused by the 1998 conflict amounted to R160 million, with a reconstruction and 
rehabilitation cost of R300 million while about 4000 people were left unemployed. The South African Bishops‘ 
Conference expressed shock at the massive loss of life and destruction of property perpetrated by the South African 
troops. In their view, the bombing of military barracks, their hospitals and the killing of civilians were not signs of 
peaceful intervention but of an invasion. They launched a scathing attack on Operation Boleas as ―ill-advised and ill-
prepared‖ and stated that ―South Africa‘s participation is in stark contrast to the hospitality offered by Lesotho during 
the apartheid era‖ (Mail and Guardian 25 September 1998 in Pherudi 2003: 127). The South African Council of 
Churches also joined the condemnation of the South African-led military intervention noting that the political impasse 
could have been solved amicably through all inclusive non-coercive diplomacy. 
 
6.2.9.1 The Media Criticisms on Operation Boleas 
Many analysts maintain that Operation Boleas was bungled due to the under-resourced and ill-equipped intervention 
force, lack of substantive early warning and risk assessment process on the nature and extent of crisis, poor and 
defective intelligence on the magnitude of the crisis and the possible level of resistance, poor planning and flawed 
execution, lack of clear intervention doctrine, the illegality of the intervention, inexperience, and lack of operational 
coordination between the South African and Botswana troops (Santho 1998, Nathan 1999, Southall 1999a, 1999b, 
2001 Du Plessis 2000, Neethling 2000, 2004, Vale 2003, Ngoma 2005, Likoti 2006). Nathan (1999: 40) summarises 
the shortcomings of the SADC military intervention. He reasons that the operation failed because it ―ignored the 
seven rules of successful peace-keeping: clarity and consensus among decision makers, adequate resources, 
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political resolve, effective command and control, adequate financial backing, a clear intelligence picture and an 
accurate estimate of casualty tolerance.‖ The media in its diverse forms was awash with headlines such as ―the 
incursion that went wrong‖ (Pretoria News, 26 September 1998) ―the South African National Defence blunder‖ (Janes 
Defence Weekly, 30 September 1998, (in Neethling 2000: 291), ―Lesotho invasion back fires‖ (The Cape Times), ―the 
SADC was running chaotic in Lesotho‖ (The Sowetan, 25 September 1999, cited in Vale 2003), "fearful milestone for 
South Africa", "‗Lesotho tarnishes South Africa‘s peacemakers image" and many others. One other fascinating factor 
about the intervention was that the mighty South African Defence Forces (SANDF) underestimated the degree of 
resistance which they would encounter from the supposedly feeble Lesotho Defence Forces. As one commentator 
observed, ―[t]he South African forces were also dangerously under strength, more than likely because of poor 
intelligence about the level of resistance anticipated and entered the country prepared for the best case rather than a 
worst-case scenario. So instead of securing the capital and preserving peace and stability, as was the mission‘s 
intention, SANDF troops became tied up in a protracted battle with mutineers, giving opposition supporters the 
opportunity to plunder, loot and burn the city centre‖ (Business Day 25th September 1998, in Pherudi 2003: 130). This 
reality was also revealed by the mission Commander, Colonel Hartslief, and the South African Defence Minister of 
the time, Joe Modise, in that they did not expect to encounter such an intense resistance from the Lesotho Defence 
Force and the opposition protestors. The military intervention did not augur well for the democratic South African 
regime.  
 
The new democratic government also suffered stinging criticism that it was, just like the apartheid regime, pursuing 
an aggressive policy towards its powerless neighbours. Among the many critical commentators on the military 
intervention was one Stan Maher who concluded: ―[i]t seems to me a totally pointless and amateur decision to send 
troops into a situation where the generals have run away, and the military backing the opposition... the only thing we 
could do was to become the jam in the sandwich. It seems an extremely ill-conceived and amateur operation... I don‘t 
know what they hoped to achieve‖ (ISAS-NUL cited in Pherudi 2003: 128). The opposition political parties in 
Botswana (which also sent troops into Lesotho) namely the Botswana National Front (BNF), the Botswana Congress 
Party (BCP), the United Action Party (UAP) and the People‘s United Socialist Organisation (PUSO) also voiced their 
reservation about the efficacy of coercive diplomacy in resolving regional conflicts. They felt that the military actions 
of South Africa and Botswana (SADC) were an embarrassment as they went into Lesotho to defend a government 
which had rigged elections. 
 
However, the problem of inadequate and defective intelligence information on the reality of the situation on the 
ground and the operational landscape in Lesotho should not only be viewed as a consequence of the South African 
military shortcomings. It also resulted from the rapidity with which the chaos erupted and spread into the Kingdom 
giving the intervening powers limited time for adequate operational preparations (Pherudi 2003). Among other things, 
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the South African intervening troops were made to believe that they would have full support of the Basotho in their 
peace mission hence the decision to send only 600 troops. Worse still, they did not await the arrival of the Botswana 
contingent for a collective operation. As such, the South African and Botswana intervening forces seemed to operate 
as different entities which gave credence to those questioning whether the mission was in reality mandated by the 
SADC or was an adventure by the individual nation-states. For example, there were reports that the intervention 
approaches of the 2 forces differed. The South African force is alleged to have maintained a confrontational posture 
hoisting the South African flag; the Botswana Defence Force (BDF) is said to have entered Lesotho as a 
peacemaking force hoisting the SADC flag. That the two intervening powers raised two different flags upon entering 
Lesotho further raised controversy on the "SADC-ness" and legality of the mission. 
 
As expected, the South African government vigorously repulsed the criticisms of the operation. Through its 
spokesperson, Parks Mankahlana, the government hailed the intervention as a success and criticised the media for 
biased and inaccurate reporting, oblivious of the values and sacrifices behind the Lesotho intervention. He pointed 
out that ―[t]he candidness of our government does not deserve to be rewarded with verbal abuse and disingenuous 
disregard... We all depend on the media to know what is happening in the country and the world. There is therefore 
an obligation on the part of the media not only to report accurately, but to offer informed comments as well...‖ (The 
Star 14th October 1998 in Pherudi 2003: 131). The cabinet endorsed the intervention as ―principled and correct‖ and 
commended the South African forces for the ―firm manner in which they conducted themselves‖ (The Star September 
1998 in Vale 2003: 128). The South African government also praised its fallen soldiers as heroes. Its statement in 
acknowledgement of their role in the restoration of democracy in Lesotho read: ―the South African government 
recognises members of the SANDF who have laid down their live as heroes in defence of stability and democracy in 
South Africa and Southern Africa. They will be given their honour in tribute to their loyalty...‖ (The Citizen 24 th 
September 1998 cited in Pherudi 2003: 126). Worth noting is that all the opposition parties in South Africa (with the 
exception of Inkatha Freedom party whose acting President Buthelezi sanctioned the military operation) criticised the 
military mission in Lesotho as an invasion which undermined the sovereignty of the Kingdom of Lesotho. For 
example Tony Leon, (then leader of the Democratic Alliance) and the United Democratic Movement's Bantu 
Holomisa noted that the military mission was dispatched without consultation with both Cabinet and Parliament. 
Therefore it violated the Constitution of South Africa. In the same vein the President of the Azanian People‘s 
Organisation, Mosibudi Mangena, held that the ―military intervention suggests that the actions of these countries 
(South Africa and Botswana) [were] directed more by wish than principle‖ (Sowetan 23 September 1998 cited in 
Pherudi 2003: 127). The opposition parties in Botswana also criticised the Botswana government for committing the 
BDF into an external military operation without approval from parliament (Likoti 2006). 
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6.2.9.2 General Criticisms of the Military Intervention 
Right from its embryonic stages, the military intervention by South Africa and Botswana was subjected to a wide 
range of criticism from different quarters. First and foremost, there were several questions as to whether the 
intervention was mandated by SADC. Critics argued that the intervention in Lesotho was a reflection of the deep 
polarisation which gripped the regional organisation due to disagreements over the status of the Organ on Politics, 
Defence and Security (OPDS) to the mother body (Southall 1999, Schoeman 2002, Neethling 2000, 2004, Vale 
2003, Bah 2004, Hammerstad 2004, Nathan 2004, Ngoma 2005). This is because there was no authorisation of the 
intervention by either the SADC Summit or the OPDS. Therefore, ―in the absence of summit approval, the 
deployment did not comply with SADC‘s decision making rules‖ (Nathan 2004: 12). Schoeman (2002: 20) vividly 
captures the situation as follows: ―[t]he extent to which one can in all honesty refer to either the Lesotho intervention 
or the regional involvement in the DRC as SADC operations is doubtful.‖  
 
Two issues were put into question regarding whether the 1998 intervention in Lesotho was mandated by SADC. 
Firstly, in 1998, the SADC Protocol establishing the Organ on Politics Defence and Security had not yet been ratified. 
As such, it could not have been the Organ which authorised the intervention. As the SADC Secretariat stated, ―SADC 
had not yet ratified the protocol establishing the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security‖ (cited in Likoti 2006: 
178). Secondly, there was controversy over the payment of the operation costs. The costs were not footed by the 
SADC as they should have been, had it been the authorising institution. Instead, the Botswana government settled its 
own operational costs while the former South African President Mandela was on record as saying that the Lesotho 
government will shoulder the costs of the South African National Defence Force operations (Santho 2000, Likoti 
2006). The organisation was divided into two opposing camps and this adversely affected its coherence, shared 
visions and collaborative actions. The SADC became an organisation through which individual member states 
justified interventions for their selfish national interests. As the discussants at the African Dialogue observed, ―[t]he 
intervention of South Africa in Lesotho was a typical case where countries use the pretext of international 
organisations to further their own interests‖ (1999: 26). Mashishi (2003: 78) maintains that in the case of Lesotho, the 
―South African government realised that the conflict…was an opportune moment to establish its hegemonic role.‖ Du 
Plessis (2000: 333) observes a trend world-wide that whenever states intervene militarily in other states, they will 
always legitimise their actions by resorting to principles of defending sovereignty, democracy and human rights. This 
ambiguity has more often than not raised questions around the credibility and legality of the operation and its 
outcomes as was the case in the Lesotho intervention. On the basis of these unanswered questions on the legality of 
the operation, one of the Opposition Alliance leaders dismissed the SADCintervention as devoid of transparency and 
credibility. He stated that ―the so-called mediators from SADC have displayed dishonest brokering starting with the 
treatment of the Langa report‖ (cited in Likoti 2006: 162). Given the questions hovering around the legality of the 
 310 
 
mission, Southall (2001: 159) summed it up as ―having been hastily conceived, haphazardly executed and of doubtful 
international legality.‖ 
 
Secondly, the intervention was launched without the authorisation of the United Nations Security Council, hence in 
contravention of article 53 (1) of the United Nations Charter that ―…no enforcement action shall be taken under 
regional agencies without the authorisation of the Security Council…‖ Neither was the intervention authorised by the 
OAU in accordance with its charter. It is within this context that Southall (2001) posits that ―[i]t is unclear through 
which legal procedure the South African and Botswana decision to intervene in Lesotho was taken and whether it 
was sanctioned by the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security; the Organisation of African Unity or the 
United Nations Charter…‖ (Southall 2001: 29). The fact that the intervention lacked both the regional and 
international mandate further discredited the operation. With these shortcomings inherent in the intervention, Berman 
and Sam (1998: 9) posit that ―labelling the intervention of the South African armed forces in Lesotho a regional SADC 
venture after only a series of telephone calls had been made between some Heads of States‖ makes a joke of the 
legality of the mission. This is because, as De Coning puts it, ―it was unclear who took the decision? When the 
decision was taken? And what that decision was? It is unclear if there was any formal SADC decision that authorised 
the Lesotho intervention. If such a decision was taken by SADC it is unclear if it was authorised at the SADC Summit 
in Mauritius, at the Ministerial meeting or at a meeting of of Chiefs of Staff. Assuming that SADC did approve the 
intervention, what was the mandate… for the mission?" (in Likoti 2006: 174).  
 
Likoti maintains that since there are no records of a SADC Summit to deliberate on the Lesotho crises and a 
communiqué authorising military intervention, the decision to intervene could only have been taken at a meeting of 
Defence Ministers held in Gaborone on the 15th of September 1998 which was only attended by South Africa and 
Botswana. If that is true the intervention begs answers to pertinent questions regarding why the decision to intervene 
was taken at a Ministerial rather than at a Summit level? And to add insult to injury, why was it taken in the 
attendance of only South Africa and Botswana, when they did not constitute a SADC forum? Further more, if the 
Task Force which was designated as the guarantor of the Lesotho democracy after the 1994 diplomatic intervention 
included Zimbabwe, why was Zimbabwe not part of the equation during the 1998 intervention? Such a move 
contravened the SADC Treaty of 1992 which called for consensus on deciding and implementing collective actions. 
Therefore in the absence of a SADC Heads of States Summit to approve the intervention and mandate of the 
mission, it was illegal (Southall 2001, Hwang 2005, Likoti 2006). More questions on the legality of the operation as a 
SADC mission were stirred by the fact that it was launched on the 22nd of September 1998 before the member states 
had resolved the impasse on how the Organ should relate to the SADC and to issues on its operation mandate. 
Worse still, the SADC member states had not, by 1998, ratified the Organ Protocol. A statement from the SADC 
Secretariat was unequivocal on this matter: ―SADC had not yet ratified the protocol establishing the SADC Organ on 
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Politics, Defence and Security‖ (cited in Likoti 2006: 178). Moreover, another controversy denouncing the legality of 
the intervention as a SADC mission concerned the payment of the operation costs. Surprisingly and contrary to the 
norm, the costs of the mission were not footed by the SADC but by the government of Botswana which settled its 
intervention bill while the South African government burdened the Lesotho government with its operation expenses 
(Molomo 1999, Likoti 2006). The lack of clarity on who authorised the intervention gave credit to criticisms that it was 
a South African intervention geared to safeguard her national interests, bolster the LCD government and enforce her 
regional hegemony rather than a SADC peace mission. If these suspicions are anything to go by, then the 1998 
South African-led military intervention in Lesotho was a unilateral intervention (as opposed to collective intervention) 
which contravened international law (Laund 1984, Du Plessis 2000).  
 
Thirdly, it has been argued that the intervening powers held different approaches to the intervention thus opening it 
up for further questions regarding its "SADC-ness and legality". According to Makoa (in Likoti 2006: 175), ―the two 
countries had differing interpretations of their mission and its source of legitimacy. For example, on entering Lesotho, 
the Botswana Defence Force flew a white flag, indicating that it saw itself as a peace-keeping force. The BDF 
behaviour contrasted sharply with that of the SANDF which entered Lesotho at dawn as an invasion force, pounding 
the Royal Palace, the two main army barracks in Maseru and the small LDF garrison at Ha Katse.‖ As if that was not 
enough, the BDF stated that it had sent troops to Lesotho at the behest of the SADC Troika (South Africa, Botswana 
and Zimbabwe) which were declared guarantors of political order in Lesotho after the 1994 post-election conflict. This 
was in contrast to the South African troops which on entrance waved the SADC emblem as the source of its mission 
mandate and legitimacy (Makoa 1998, Pherudi 2003). Furher confusion was fuelled by the South African and 
Botswana troops coming on different dates and times. There are allegations that the BDF came late because they 
were not allowed immediate entry into Lesotho by the South African authorities (Pherudi 2003). This gave the 
impression of an uncoordinated mission with no coherent agenda as would be expected from a mission driven by a 
regional organisation of the calibre of the SADC. 
 
Among other things, according to Likoti (2006: 177) the SADC military intervention failed to adhere to the principle of 
the use of minimum force as authorised by the UN mandate. He notes that ―judging by the scale of war that ensued 
and the casualty levels among soldiers and civilians at the Makoanyane barracks, the Royal Palace gate and 
elsewhere, the force used was severe.‖ In the view of Nathan (1999: 40), ―the Lesotho operation suggested that the 
South African National Defence Force was not adequately trained and equipped for a peace-keeping operation‖ as 
the operation ―rapidly changed to peace enforcement mission.‖ In any case, as Du Plessis (2000: 335-336) observes, 
military intervention by its nature is a dangerous risk since ―it is easier to initiate than to terminate. A major risk is the 
potential escalation from an act of peaceful intervention to one of coercive intervention or to a limited or even a major 
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war.‖ The bitter confrontations which occurred between the rebel LDF and SANDF constituted a coercive intervention 
which had bordered on full-scale warfare. 
 
Fourthly, the operation was not in accordance with the core principles of mediation and conflict resolution which 
demand coordinated consultations and consensus of all the belligerent parties. The conflicting parties, Civil Society 
Organisations (CSOs) and the local population should be involved in all stages, agree to the mediator, the mediation 
approach and agenda. Such a process would ensure the ownership of the peace process, its implementation and 
outcomes hence lasting peace. As De Brito correctly observes, ―[t]he deployment of peace forces of all kinds 
demands a delicate and critical relationship with the host government and other parties to the conflict such as the 
local population. Any third party intervention requires a sensitive approach in situations of internal conflict as it is 
suggestive of the deployment of a ruling force from outside‖ (cited in Neethling 2000: 310). However, in the case of 
the 1998 Lesotho intervention, the mission was a purely South African-led military affair which totally marginalised 
and denied the Opposition Alliance, the monarchy, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and the civil society any 
meaningful role in the resolution of the conflict. This concern was voiced by the NGOs and the South African Council 
of Churches as ―the act denied the basic premise upon which our own democratic nation was founded; the principle 
of negotiated settlement and peaceful resolution of differences by the parties concerned without any dominating 
intrusion of outside forces… (Khadalie in Likoti 2006: 177). The hostility which the intervention force, especially the 
South African troops, encountered attest to the absence of this domestic initiated and driven peace process. The 
intervention was deemed as an invasion of the sovereign state of Lesotho akin to the apartheid destabilisation 
policies of the 1980s. Similarly the NGOs and the South African Council of Churches, the Justice and Peace 
Department of the Lesotho Catholic Bishop‘s Conference denounced the intervention as an invasion (rather than a 
peace-keeping operation) which undermined the statehood of Lesotho as an independent entity mainly because of its 
weak and vulnerable position in the region. The late BNP leader, Evaristus Sekonyane, sarcastically asserted that 
―one evening SADC drank political Viagra and woke up the following morning feeling stronger than others...‖ (SABC-
CCV: TV News, (Lesotho) cited in Pherudi and Barnard 1999: 49).  
 
Because the intervention was not a result of consensus by all the adversaries in the conflict, it turned into peace 
enforcement rather than a peace-keeping mission. This is because there was no peace agreement and therefore no 
peace to keep. What happened in Lesotho fits well into Nathan‘s observation that ―peace enforcement only deals with 
the symptoms and not the causes of the crisis and is more likely to exacerbate rather than resolve or diffuse the 
situation‖ (1999: 5). To show that the operation and its outcomes would not be acceptable and owned by the 
opposition, Molapo Qobela, then the BCP leader, pointed out that ―[t]he allied forces were betrayed by the battle-shy 
ruling LCD which had lost touch with what is happening in the country. He (President Mandela) is honestly deceiving 
himself. As soon as SADC leaves we [will] go back to square one. I am not going to disclose what we are going to 
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do‖ (ISUS-NUL in Pherudi 2003: 129). This is so because the political and electoral defects which triggered the 1994 
and 1998 crises had not been adequately addressed considering the political disturbances which followed the 2007 
elections in Lesotho. In other words, to the opposition, the coercive preventive diplomacy measures were bound to 
fail as they did not effectively address the deep-rooted structural problems of the country‘s economy and political set-
up. 
 
Fifthly, because of lack of both the regional and international authorisation, the intervention was denounced as a 
South African invasion to protect its economic interests especially the Katse Dam Water project in Lesotho (Matlosa 
1999, Southall 1999a, Van Nieuwkerk 1999, Mashishi 2003, Neethling 2000, 2004, Nathan 2004). In an interview 
with Vale in 2002, Matlosa stated that protection of economic interests ―…was part of the grand scheme and probably 
at the heart of the entire South African National Defence Force intervention;…and the fact that the project was the 
very first target of the entire military operation makes perfect sense in terms of the hierarchy of South African 
interests in Lesotho‖ (Vale 2003: 127-128).  
 
Moreover, there are arguments that the intervention in Lesotho was a fully South African driven affair as evidenced 
by the commission led by a South African judge, negotiations led by the South African Defence Minister and the 
South African Officers leading the intervention. Mashishi (2003) pointed out that South Africa also intervened to 
defend its newly established democracy by showing solidarity to a democratically elected government to deter a 
trend where ―small irregularities‖ become ―a route for ambitious elements in the military forces in the sub-region to 
pursue their (narrow and undemocratic) political aspirations‖ (Mashishi 2003: 80). Such views give credence to the 
position that the involvement of Botswana troops ―only served to legitimise what otherwise would have been dubbed 
a South African invasion of Lesotho to pass as a SADC intervention‖ (Molomo cited in Vale 2003: 128). One is 
compelled to agree with Tuathail and Agnew‘s (1998: 83), assessment that in Lesotho, South Africa was the ―dean, 
administrator, regulator and geographer‖ of the intervention. Likoti (2006) noted that the visit of the SADC forces in 
Lesotho by the Minister of Defence and the South African Defence Force commander General Siphiwe Nyanda, both 
of whom held press conferences with Operation Boleas commander Colonel Hartslief, further added credibility to the 
impression that it was a South African mission rather than a SADC regional operation. 
 
The fact of the matter is that military interventions in the international arena have mostly been driven by defence of 
national interests and seldom occur where the intervening nation‘s self-interests are involved. In light of this, Van 
Walraven (2005: 79) argues that ―the third party will intervene principally in pursuit of his own interests, in whatever 
way these are formulated…‖ It is also important to note that political explanations and publicly stated justifications for 
interventions do not always advance the real motives and agenda of the intervening powers (Du Plessis 2000, Van 
Walraven 2005). In view of the above positions the realsits‘ hypothesis that peace interventions are more likely when 
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the national interests of the hegemon are at stake, fits well in the case of the Lesotho military intervention by South 
Africa. There is no doubt that any destabilisation in the region (more so in the Kingdom of Lesotho situated in the 
belly of South Africa) would adversely affect the latter‘s security, political stability and economic growth as the 
regional powerhouse both in the economic and political realms. In the view of Mashishi (2003: 83,) South Africa‘s 
intervention in Lesotho resonates with the arguments that a ―sub-regional organisation is only effective when a 
hegemon wants to utilise it for its own purposes…‖  
 
The South Africa Military White Paper on military interventions stipulated that the country will only militarily intervene 
where its economic and political interests are in jeopardy. This could only confirm the speed with which the South 
African government recommended military action in Lesotho while she was so consistently opposed to the same 
action in the case of the DRC conflict. This position was vividly projected by the Pan Africanist Secretary-General 
Muendane as indicative of the inconsistency in South African foreign policy. He posited that ―they are people who 
said no [military] intervention in Congo, no intervention in Nigeria, but now are sending troops in Lesotho. It just does 
not make sense‖ (Sowetan 23 September 1998 cited in Pherudi and Barnard 1999: 49- 50). 
 
On the basis of the above-stated reasons, opposition parties reasoned that the intervention was a ―military invasion 
and occupation of a vulnerable neighbouring country in support of the government‖ (Du Plessis 2000: 350-351). They 
further read South Africa‘s real agenda for the intervention as the eventual political integration of Lesotho into South 
Africa as the tenth province (Southall 1999b, Du Plessis 2000). This position is in tandem with Santho‖s (2000: 10) 
assertion that ―it is generally accepted that small states are susceptible to risks and threats, both internal and external 
sources. Such states have relatively lower threshold than larger states, given the interaction between size and 
vulnerability…‖ The orthodox thinking ―has always viewed military intervention as a tool of the powerful against the 
weak and older established states against weak states‖ (Du Plessis 2000: 335). In this sense the South African–led 
military operation in Lesotho dovetails well with Otte‘s definition of military intervention as ―the planned and limited 
use of force for a transitory period by a state in order to change or maintain the target state‘s domestic structure or 
change its external policies‖ (Otte 1995: 3). 
 
Finally, there were criticisms that the military intervention as an option in Lesotho was rapidly taken before efforts for 
a peaceful negotiated settlement were exhausted. The military intervention starkly violated the SADC principles of 
non-interference into the internal affairs of member states in pursuit of respect for each other‘s sovereignty and 
territorial integrity. Among other things, a hastily launched military intervention deviates from the internationally 
established norms of peaceful existence and embarking on military coercion as a last resort. This raised questions of 
whether ―the SADC intervention was not facilitated by the size of the country-relatively small and engulfed by a larger 
country…‖ (Ngoma 2005, 168). Surprisingly, the military intervention in Lesotho followed the categorical opposition of 
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the same approach by Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola in the DRC. Why South Africa and Botswana felt it was 
appropriate to use military measures in Lesotho and peaceful diplomatic means in the DRC remains a secret within 
the political dynamics of the two intervening powers‘ foreign policies. The inconsistency in how to maintain regional 
peace and order reflected lack of a clear intervention policy and doctrine within SADC (Southall 1999a, Vale 2003, 
Mashishi 2003, Likoti 2006).  
 
To some commentators, the military interventions in the DRC and Lesotho revived fears of militaristic destabilisation, 
domination by the powerful and insecurity of the weak which characterised the SADC region in the 1980s (Southall 
1999a, 1999b, Matlosa 1999, Neethling 2000, 2004, Vale 2003). Vale notes that ―[i]n the search for quick policy 
responses to the unfolding regional challenges, the idea of peace - its making, its keeping, [and] its ordering‖ through 
peaceful means were sacrificed for coercive power politics and tactics (Vale 2003: 133). Du Plessis (2000: 335) also 
argues that the advent of military intervention has politicised warfare to the extent that ―it has become extremely 
difficult to distinguish between coercive diplomacy, military intervention and limited war.‘ 
 
However, the intervening powers justified their action on the basis that: 
 The regional organisation had an obligatory duty ―to contain the emerging situation of chaos, anarchy and a 
creeping coup‖ which threatened regional peace (Santho 2000: 2). 
 The 1992 SADC Treaty obliges the regional organisation to collectively assist member states in situation of coups 
against legitimately elected regimes and gross human right violations. As the then Senior Permanent Secretary in 
the Office of the President (Mogae) observed ―...The situation in Lesotho has reached a high state of anarchy. 
The government of Lesotho has been reduced to a position where it is unable to govern. ... [Our troops] ―will 
remain there until the situation is stabilised‖ (Mail and Guardian 23 September 1998 in Pherudi 2003: 124). 
  The 1994 Memorandum of Understanding which resolved the 1994 crisis mandated the SADC through the Troika 
of Mandela (SA), Mugabe (Zimbabwe) and Masire (Botswana) as the guarantors of Lesotho‘s democracy. 
 They were invited by the Prime Minister Mosisili and the government of Lesotho to stabilise the domestic crisis 
and restore a democratically elected government. (This tended to confirm the internationally accepted principles 
that before any intervention could be executed ―the government under attack must specifically request military 
intervention from a potential intervener‖ (Du Plessis 2000: 335). 
 It is in line with the SADC treaty to prevent coup detats and unconstitutional regime changes in Southern Africa. 
 Military intervention was the last resort to avert the coup and full-scale civil war after all attempts at peacefully 
resolving the conflicts were abortive.  
 South Africa also noted that it was within its foreign policy framework to play a constructive role in regional peace-
keeping, development, security and order. 
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 The intervention was to deter a coup and a full scale civil war, create a conducive climate for a negotiated 
settlement, lasting peace and democracy all of which were positive aspects for the region (Santho 2000, 
Mosieleng 2001, Neethling 2000, 2004, Vale 2003, Pherudi 2003, Ngoma 2005). 
 
6.2.9.3 Merits of the SADC Miltary Intervention in Lesotho 
However, despite the gnawing criticisms and questions surrounding its legality and subsequent operational blunders, 
Operation Boleas succeeded in crushing the rebellion, averting the impending coup and full scale civil war and 
restored law and order in the country and the region at large. Van Nieuwkerk argued that ―[u]nike the impression 
created by some media reports, Lesotho was not a country in a state of peace and harmony thrown into chaos as a 
result of the South African-led military intervention‖ (1999: 14). Therefore the intervention brought stability, created a 
climate for negotiations around issues of governance, electoral reforms and establishment of a Civil-Military 
Operation Centre (CMOC) and an Interim Political Authority (IPA) in which all political parties which participated in 
the 1998 election were represented. The CMOC was composed of the South African High Commissioner 
(Chairperson), a representative of the High Commission of South Africa (Vice Chairperson), the Chief of the LDF, the 
Director-General of the Lesotho National Security Services, one representative each from the BDF and the SANDF 
and a Humanitarian Adviser. The overall task of the CMOC was to bring the civil society and military institutions 
together for an inclusive dialogue on the normalisation of the politico-security situation in the country (Pherudi 2003). 
After the restoration of order the SADC met the LCD, the opposition leaders and other stakeholders in October 1998 
to dialogue on how best to find a durable solution to the country‘s political woes. The participants agreed on 
reforming the electoral system and the security forces for stable democracy and a climate for reconstruction and 
development to be created in the Kingdom. The Memorandum of Understanding agreement was signed on 2 October 
1998 at the United Nations House in Maseru. The parties agreed: 
 To review the electoral system with a view of ensuring greater and inclusive participation in the political affairs of 
Lesotho; 
 To restructure and establish a genuinely Independent Election Commission for fair and free elections; 
 To hold fresh elections within a time frame of 15 to 18 months (2002); 
 To abide by and respect the outcome of the elections; 
 To establish an Interim Political Authority (IPA) in which all political stakeholders are represented to steer the 
country to the next elections of 2002 (Mololi 14 October 1998: cited in Pherudi and Bardnard 1999). 
 
The Combined Task Force representation remained in the country for post–conflict building purposes and also 
played a pivotal role in the rebuilding of the Lesotho Defence Force. For example by the 24th of September 1998, the 
Lesotho army chief Lieutenant General Mosakeng and 60 senior officers had resumed command of the Lesotho 
Defence Force. A training team comprising the SANDF and BDF embarked on Operation Maluti whose task was the 
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retraining and restructuring of the Lesotho Defenece Force in line with the principles and professional standards of 
defence and security in a democracy (Pherudi 2003). In this sense the SADC conducted a meaningful post-conflict 
peacebuilding to mitigate the recurrence of conflict in Lesotho (Southall 1999a, Matlosa 1999, Nieuwkerk 1999, 
Neethling 2000, Vale 2003, Likoti 2006). The late South African Foreign Affairs Minister, Alfred Nzo, congratulated 
the South African and Botswana contingents for a successful collective military operation in Lesotho. He noted that 
―this concept of joint operations is likely to be the pattern for the future and will be a key part of SANDF training from 
now on...‖ (SALUT July in Pherudi 2003: 136). 
 
However, Sejanamane casts doubts on the Lesotho interventions as reflective of coherent and efficient SADC 
security and preventive diplomacy machinery. Sejanamane dismisses the hyped success of the SADC diplomatic 
solution on the grounds that the mechanism was only possible because of the diminutive and hostage position of 
Lesotho in the region.  In his view what the SADC carried out in Lesotho cannot be reproduced in other powerful 
regional members. He concluded that ―those…, who are looking at the Lesotho situation as a model, must perhaps 
focus their attention somewhere else‖ (1996: 83). Southall (19998, 1999a, 1999b, 2001) also argues that the peace 
process in Lesotho as championed by the SADC remained faulty while efforts to establish democratic and peaceful 
government were marred by uncertainties. For example, as Southall (1999a; 6) observes: ―[t]he LCD government did 
not recognise the legitimacy of the IPA as it felt it was imposed on its moral electoral victory by SADC rather than 
forged by a genuine agreement between the parties themselves.‖ The structure of the IPA in which each party was 
represented by 2 members created tensions between the governing LCD party and the IPA. This was mainly 
because the 11 opposition parties had 22 representatives while the ruling party which dominated the national 
Assembly had only 2 representatives. As such ―it can be no surprise that the opposition‘s overwhelming majority on 
the IPA - by 22 to 2 against the government of the day was not conducive to a constructive climate of negotiation‖ 
(Ace Electoral Knowledge Network: Internet 12 May 2010). As a result, the LCD resented the IPA as a SADC 
imposition to undermine its legitimate authority in the country. Southall (2000: 6) notes that ―the relationship between 
the government and the IPA has been highly contentious. In particular the LCD has proved reluctant to participate 
fully in the deliberations of a body it has viewed as competitive to parliament (which it dominates).‖  
 
Moreover, ―no system was put in place to ensure a smooth and constructive relationship between the IPA majority 
and the government, which commanded a strong majority in the legislature, through all legislation, including that 
emanating from the IPA, had to pass‖ (Elklit: Internet, 12 May 2010). This lack of mutually constructed democratic 
dispensation was to be evidenced by the post-2007 electoral violence over the allocation of seats to the different 
parties in the proportional representation government formation as the opposition parties cried foul. There were fears 
of violent protests reminiscent of the post-1994 and 1998 elections. However, the 2002 elections which were 
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organised by the IPA through the newly agreed Mixed Member Proportion (MMP) electoral model, granted a credible 
election and a representative government in Lesotho. 
 
6.2.10 The 2002 Elections in Lesotho 
One of the successes of the post-conflict peace-building measures in Lesotho was the establishment of the 24 
member Interim Political Authority (IPA) as an interim government of national unity in which each of the political 
parties in the country were represented by 2 members (Ace Electoral Knowledge Network, Elklit, Fox and Southall; 
Internet 12 May 2010). The mandate of the IPA was to review and reform the Lesotho electoral FPTP system which 
had been a source of electoral disputes, and organise credible, democratic and representative elections in 2002. Its 
objective was ―[t]o facilitate and promote, in conjunction with the Legislative and Executive structures in Lesotho, the 
preparation for the holding of elections within a period of 18 months from the date of the commencement of this Act 
by (a) creating and promoting conditions conducive to the holding of free and fair elections, (b) levelling the playing 
field for all political parties and candidates that seek to participate in the elections...‖ (Interim Political Authority Act 
1998, cited in Elklit: Internet 12 May 2010). 
 
Discussions surrounding the review of the election system were tense with the opposition parties advocating the 
MMP model because of its proportional representation component. This is because, as observed by Likoti (2009: 
Internet 12 May 2010) ―[t]he major political aim of the principle of proportional representation is an accurate reflection 
of social and political groups in parliament.‖ As such the opposition parties in the IPA ―were eager to suggest an 
electoral system which would keep the single-member constituencies and at the same time provide for a much more 
proportional outcome...than had been the case in 1998‖ (Ace Electoral Knowledge Network: Internet 12 May 2010). 
In other words the MMP system would benefit from the merits of both the FPTP and proportional representation 
(Likoti 2009). The governing LCD party on the other hand argued for a parallel electoral system (the Mixed Member 
Majoritarian (MMM) in which the majority party would have the advantage of winner-takes-all principle. For example 
while the opposition parties‘ representatives in the IPA called for maintaining the 80 seats constituencies and 50 
seats for the compensatory proportional representation, the governing LCD argued for 40 proportional representation 
seats. Logically, its ―reasoning was apparently that if they (LCD) did as well in the coming election (2002 election) in 
the constituencies as in 1998, LCD candidates might sweep the country, giving all constituency seats (or at least 
most of them) to the government side, and with their preferred parallel system, also a ‗fair‘ share of the PR seats. 
This would give the government more than two thirds of all seats, enough to change the constitution....‖ (Elklit: 
Internet 12 May 2010). The compromise model was that the MMP system should be modelled on a National 
Assembly of 120 seats with 80 constituency seats and 40 proportional representation seats in which the interests of 
both the opposition and the government were catered for. The constitutional amendment was formally adopted in 
May 2001 upon acceptance by both the National Assembly and the Senate. 
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Consequently, after protracted and intense disagreements between the opposition parties and the ruling LCD 
government, the FPTP electoral system inherited from Britain upon attaining independence, was replaced by the 
MMP representation system in which the representation of the contesting parties in parliament will be proportional to 
the percentage of votes cast for each. The MMP model ―allowed adherence to the FPTP electoral system in single 
constituencies, at the same time providing for a strong proportional component in the overall seat allocation 
procedures‖ (Elklit: Internet 12 May 2010). The IPA electoral review outcome and how the MMP electoral system was 
to be implemented is vividly articulated by Fox and Southall: ―all [the] existing 80 constituency seats [were] to be 
elected by the plurality system and 40 compensatory seats [were] to be elected by a national list system of 
proportional representation. Hence voters had 2 votes: 1 for a constituency Member of Parliament (MP), [and] 1 for a 
party in the Proportional Representation (PR) election. For the PR seats, the total national list vote cast was to be 
divided by 120 (that is the total number of seats in the national Assembly) to determine the quota per seat...‖ 
(Internet: 12 May 2010). 
 
The system was hailed as a significant shift from the FPTP system which had always resulted in a winner-takes-all 
result thus giving an unfair advantage to the majority party. Lesotho was the first country in Africa to adopt and 
implement the MMP electoral system amid continent-wide clarion calls for electoral reforms for transparent, credible 
and representative elections (Fox and Southall, Elklit, Internet 12 May 2010). The 2002 elections were conducted 
through the new electoral system and there were questions regarding whether the Lesotho voters would clearly 
comprehend the new system and what it entails, or whether the country was to drift into another post-election turmoil 
as experienced in 1994 and 1998 in the event the political parties challenge the operationalisation of the allocation of 
seats in parliament. The pertinent questions according to Fox and Southall were how to present the new system to 
the voters and how the voters would respond to the system of casting 2 votes rather than 1. 
 
On 25 May 2002 Lesotho went into an election within the framework of the MMP with the optimistic hope of 
promoting democratic elections and inclusivity in governance. As a result, the poll attracted considerable international 
focus, material and logistical support mainly from the European Union, the Commonwealth, Britain, the USA and 
South Africa (Fox and Southall: Internet 12 May 2010). Concerted efforts were taken by the IEC during the 
preparations for the elections to minimise transgressions which might compromise the credibility of the polls and give 
any contesting party grounds for protesting the results. The registrations for the election were conducted in August 
and September of 2001 and citizens were efficiently trained to guide the election process. Fox and Southall clearly 
summarise the voting procedure and all the required processes: ―[f]irst based on a registration programme...a 
computerised voters‘ list was completed by January 2002. Voters were required to dip their fingers in indelible ink 
when registering, and would be able to vote only on presenting a voter‘s registration card that displayed their 
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photograph, fingerprint, and signature (with indelible ink again being used at the poll stations). Second, immense 
care was taken to involve the parties at all stages of the process; for example, party representatives sat on eight 
committees concerning the electoral law, security, and such matters. In particular, the parties were employed 
alongside IEC officials in explaining the dual voting process. Third, ballot boxes were transparent. Fourth, immense 
care was taken at the polling booths to explain and to separate the casting of the two votes....Finally, after the results 
had been announced locally, they were dispatched to an Election Results‘ Centre (financed by the EU), which was 
open to the party leaders and registered election monitors and journalists‖ (Internet; 12 May 2010). More important, 
election observers drawn from various entities such as the SADC, the Commonwealth, and the EU and from local 
non-governmental organisations were spread all over the country to monitor the poll. Given the enormous effort put 
in, the preparations for the poll according to the description stated above, one would expect credible elections. 
 
Apart from the low voter turn out (64% compared to 71% in 1998 and 72% in 1993), the elections were declared 
transparent, free and fair. The BNP‘s attempts to cry foul that the elections were rigged were vehemently dismissed 
by all the election observers. In view of this Fox and Southall note that ―Lesotho had completed what was by far the 
most widely accepted general election in its tumultuous post-colonial history‖ (Internet 12 May 2010). The results 
were that once again the LCD obtained an overwhelming number of seats in the constituency votes (77 out of the 78 
seats with 57.7 percent of the vote. The Lesotho People‘s Congress (LPC) bagged the single constituency seat while 
the BNP  Basotho African Congress (BAC), BCP (BCP), LWP MFP Patriotic Front for Democracy (PFD), NIP  and 
the National Progressive  Party (NPP) obtained zero seats. However, the losing parties had an advantage of 
representation in parliament under the new MMP electoral system while the majority party (LCD) was disadvantaged. 
In the proportional representation votes, the results of the proportional allocation of seats were as follows: the BNP 
21, the LCP 4, BAC 3, BCP 3, LWP 1, MFP 1, PFD 1, NIP 5, and the NPP 1. It is important to note that under the 
MMP PR electoral system, the LCD had already exceeded its quota of PR seats by virtue of overwhelming majority in 
the constituency votes. The 40% PR seats were only allocated to the opposition parties to ensure proportionality in 
parliamentary representation (Fox and Southall: Internet 12 May 2010). 
 
According to Fox and Southall the electoral process and outcome showed that there was immense voter education 
before and during the polls. As such, the voters did not experience any serious difficulties in voting within the new 
system. For example, ―[t]the small proportion of invalid votes (17,618[3.2%] and 12,063 [2.1%] for the constituency 
and proportional representation votes respectively) testifies to the care taken by the authorities in the voter education 
process, both before and during the polls‖ (Fox and Southall; Internet 12 May 2010). Inter-alia through the MMP 
system ―the level of disproportionality between vote and seat shares declined dramatically compared to the previous 
elections‖ in which only the FPTP system was employed (Elklit: Internet 12 May 2010). The success of the MMP 
electoral system in Lesotho has been hailed as a triumph of electoral reforms and a triumph for democracy which 
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other African countries can emulate (Elklit, Fox and Southall, Internet 12 May 2010). As Fox and Southall put it: ―[t]iny 
Lesotho may have set the ball rolling towards the wider adoption of mixed electoral systems throughout the region‖ 
(Internet, 12 May 2010). According to Elklit the MMP model has already been discussed in South Africa, Tanzania, 
Zimbabwe and Mauritius. Given the success of the MMP electoral model in the 2002 election Elklit recommended 
that ―it would be a good idea to keep the electoral system as it is for at least three consecutive elections, in order to 
allow all stakeholders - political parties, the media, the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) and the ordinary 
voters - a chance to fully understand the mechanics of the system before changes are considered‖ (Internet, 12 May 
2010). It can be concluded that on the basis of the May 2002 elections which were conducted peacefully and a 
government in which all the participant political parties were represented, that the SADC preventive diplomacy was a 
success. 
 
However, in spite of its successful implementation in the 2002 elections, the MMP system created problems in the 
2007 general elections when the opposition challenged the allocation of the proportional representation seats by the 
ruling LCD. This led to further turbulence in which the SADC once again had to mandate the former President of 
Botswana, Sir Ketumile Masire, to facilitate dialogue between the political parties for a negotiated settlement. The 
Masire-led facilitation mission encountered insurmountable challenges from the LCD government, resulting in him 
retiring the mission before its completion. 
 
6.2.11  The 2007 Elections in Lesotho  
On the 17th of February, Lesotho held its second election within the framework of the MMP electoral system. The 
political climate prior to the 2007 election was characterised by a major split in the ruling party (the LCD) when 17 of 
its members of parliament led by Thomas Thabane (former Minister of Communications) broke away to form the All 
Basotho Convention (ABC) in October 2006. For political expedience and survival both the LCD and its breakaway 
formation (the ABC) formed alliances with each of the smaller parties. The LCD formed an alliance with the NIP while 
the ABC joined forces with the Lesotho Workers Party (LWP). It was this formation of alliances with other parties 
whose implications were never envisaged in the MMP system, which was to later lead to contests over the allocation 
of proportional representation seats after the 2007 polls (Likoti 2009). A total of 13 political parties contested the 
elections, and as in the 1998 and 2002 elections, the LCD led by Prime Minister Phakalitha Mosisili, emerged the 
winner with 61 of the 79 seats contested. Other contesting political parties obtained as follows; the ABC 17, NIP 21, 
LWP 10, Alliance of Congress (ACP) comprising the LPC, BAC, and BCP 3, the BNP 3, Basotho Batho Democratic 
Party (BBDP) 1, PFD 1, and MFP 1. The MMP system combined the best aspects of the FPTP and proportional 
representation models improved diversity and led to wider inclusiveness of different political parties in the national 
assembly. Compared to the 2002 elections, the 2007 election saw an increase in the number of parties represented 
in parliament from 10 to 12 (United Nations Development Programme [UNDP] News: Internet 8 April 2010). The 
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elections were declared credible, peaceful and free by both the international and local observer missions such as the 
Transformation Resource Centre, the Lesotho Council of NGOs, the Electoral Institute of Southern Africa (EISA) and 
the SADC Electoral Observer Mission. The ABC party‗s stance was that the elections were free but not fair and it 
intended to take legal action to challenge some of the results. The opposition parties also objected the allocation of 
the Proportional representation (PR) seats. They felt that the LCD has violated the MMP electoral system through its 
coalition with the NIP. The LCD, which was advantaged by the alliance arrangement stood firm that it did not in any 
way contravene the constitution. This position was bolstered by the High court ruling after the MFP took the matter to 
court to consideration. 
 
However, some of the challenges of the MMP electoral system became more pronounced during the 2007 election. 
One of the complications was brought about by the formation of alliances by the bigger parties, namely the LCD and 
the ABC with smaller formations of the NIP and LWP respectively. The problem was further compounded by the fact 
that the LCD and ABC only contested 80 FPTP seats on their respective parties‘ tickets and teamed up with 2 
smaller parties for the proportional representation seats. This scenario was not envisaged in the constitutional 
reforms which introduced the MMP system as it complicated the proportional representation allocation of seats 
formula (Likoti 2009, UNDP News). As such, ―[a]ccording to experts of the MMP electoral model in countries such as 
New Zealand, which provided inspiration for Lesotho‘s adoption of this model, the Lesotho political party alliances of 
2007 undermined the purpose of the MMP, which aimed at maximising party participation in parliament within the 
spirit of the law‖ (UNDP News: Internet; 8 April 2010). Maundeni (2010: 136) observes that ―[t]he whole idea of 
coalition politics in Lesotho in 2007 was to defraud rather than to comply with the MMP electoral system.‖ The point 
of the LCD-NIP alliance ―was to render the compensatory MMP system inoperable by preventing it from excluding the 
winning party as happened in the 2002 election.‖ This created controversy and questions regarding the legitimacy of 
the government which emerged from the polls. 
 
Given this scenario, the MFP which obtained a single PR seat took the matter to court arguing that the formation of 
alliances and participation in the 2007 election as alliance partners by the LCD and ABC distorted the MMP formula 
for allocation of PR seats and disadvantaged it in its share of the seats. The Lesotho High Court dismissed the MFP 
case and maintained that there was nothing unlawful about the alliance formation and the way the proportional 
representation seats were allocated. Part of paragraph 53 of the judgment read thus: ―...a political party is not 
prohibited under law to form any alliance pact with any other political party or parties and the Independent Electoral 
Commission is not enjoined to treat – for purposes of PR allocation-any alliance as a single entity unless such 
alliance contested the constituency seats as a single entity. This must be clear to all concerned in these proceedings. 
If the I.E.C treated any unregistered alliance as a single entity-it would be acting so ultra vires and its allocation would 
have been illegal outright‖ (Cited in the Lesotho Government Response to the Masire Report: 2009: 4). 
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In spite of the High Court ruling, the ABC leader (Thabane) in collaboration with other opposition parties - although 
acknowledging that the LCD won the election - contended that the proportional representation seats were not 
properly allocated. The reluctance by the LCD government to engage the opposition in talks regarding the issue of 
PR seat allocation prompted Thabane and other opposition parties to threaten street protests to pressure the 
government into holding fresh elections. Consequently, post-electoral violence reminiscent of 1994 and 1998 was 
triggered, with residential places of some ruling party Members of Parliament bombed. The peak of the simmering 
violence was the aborted assassination attempt of the Prime Minister Phakalitha Mosisili in 2008. The eruption of the 
2007 post-election violence may be correctly read to suggest that the combination of the FPTP and MMP electoral 
systems to thwart the historical protests which have dominated the Lesotho political arena since the 1970s, failed to 
defuse post-election conflicts and move Lesotho to democratic dispensation (Maundeni 2010). The LCD, which had 
benefitted from the FPTP electoral system and was notably opposed to the new electoral system, adroitly 
manipulated the new system to its advantage through coalition pacts. This constitutional loophole was not envisaged 
by the architects of the MMP system in the Lesotho context. 
 
6.2.11.1 The SADC Preventive Diplomacy: Post-2007 Election 
Fearing a repeat of the 1993 and 1998 post-election conflicts, the SADC mandated the former President of Boswana, 
Sir Ketumile Masire, to mediate between the government and the opposition parties in the allocation of seats as per 
the functions of the proportional representation electoral system which replaced the problematic FPTP system in the 
country. The main objective of the SADC-initiated Eminent Person Mission for the Facilitation of the Post- Electoral 
Political Dialogue in Lesotho was to undertake an assessment of the post-electoral situation, bring the ruling party, 
the opposition and other stakeholders to a negotiated settlement of the dispute and submit a report to the SADC 
Organ on the way forward. The SADC worked jointly with the Christian Council of Lesotho (CCL) to facilitate the 
resolution of the political impasse. Subsequently the SADC Organ Troika Summits emphasised the need for dialogue 
and called upon all the political parties and the Basotho people to commit themselves to resolving the impasse 
peacefully. Addressing the media after one such summit, the President of Mozambique, Armando Guebuza, stated: 
―[w]e assure the Basotho complete support of SADC with a team of facilitators that will be appointed with immediate 
effect to work jointly with the Christian Council of Lesotho in mediation‖ (Tlali: Internet: 14; April 2010). The SADC 
Executive Secretary also assured the Basotho political stakeholders that the dialogue will be an inclusive 
participatory process to find a lasting solution to all the contentious issues regarding the elections, the allocation of 
seats and how the political parties should handle their political differences. 
 
Worth noting is that initially both the governing LCD government and the opposition parties embraced the choice of 
Masire as the mediator. The leader of the ABC Thabane welcomed the SADC mediation when he stated: ―[w]e have 
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not planned a revolutionary change of government where the government is expected to be unseated by force. We 
will remove the LCD from power through peaceful means....There is hope because SADC at the Heads of State level 
is guaranteeing to help Lesotho solve the problem‖ (Tlali; Internet 14 April 2010). All in all, the Masire-led dialogue 
facilitation mission embarked on 6 interactions with the Lesotho political stakeholders from June 2007 to July 2009 
(Masire Briefing to the SADC Organ Troika: 13 July 2009). 
 
However, the mediation process led by Sir Ketumile Masire commenced in 2007 and carried on into 2008 without any 
success in breaking the impasse, mainly due to the contentious issues which gave birth to the dispute. One such 
issue was the invitation of the MMP experts to hold a seminar on the operations of the electoral model and to give 
recommendations on how best to operationalise it in Lesotho. According to Masire the government objected to the 
inclusion on Prof Elklit in the Committee of Experts due to an article which he wrote on the Lesotho 2007 elections 
entitled ―[t]he 2007 General Election in Lesotho: Abuse of MMP System?‖ The government felt Elklit has already 
expressed a biased and partisan view on the application of the MMP system in Lesotho. The other area of difference 
was that the opposition parties felt that if the Committee of Experts identified any anomalies in the Lesotho MMP 
system, immediate corrective action should be taken. The government, on the other hand, argued that the question 
of whether or not the PR seats were properly allocated had been finalised by the IEC and any recommendations by 
the Committee of Experts could only be used for future electoral reforms. Furthermore, the Lesotho government 
rejected the dates for the Experts seminar (25th - 29th November 2008) as proposed by the opposition. The 
government further held that the seminar would not take place in Lesotho without its permission. Ultimately, the 
Memorandum of Understanding which was expected from the outcome of the Committee of Experts to propel the 
resolution of the dispute never materialised, further jeopardising the peace process. (Masire Briefing to the SADC 
Organ Troika: 13 July 2009). 
 
By July 2009, the dialogue between the government and the opposition over the allocation of proportional 
representation seats in parliament had reached a deadlock. In an attempt to break the impasse Masire proposed: 
 Acceptance of the status quo with the seat allocation even when experts pronounce it flawed, and to work 
towards a transition for holding proper elections in a period as determined by the parties involved; 
 Compensating the Opposition with some form of recognition, particularly for  the Leader of the Opposition and 
implementation of the Roadmap as agreed;  
 Seat reallocation by increasing the size of Parliament; 
 Experts not to dictate what Lesotho should have done, but rather advice on the seat allocation. It was up to 
Basotho to take it... in line with the provisions in the Lesotho Constitution. (Masire Brief to the SADC Organ 
Troika: 13 July 2009: 5). 
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The stakeholders, especially the government, rejected Masire‘s proposals and that compounded prospects for the 
failure of the SADC-initiated preventive diplomacy mission in the Kingdom. 
 
Consequently, the LCD government through the Communications Minister, Mothetjoa Metsing, informed the mediator 
that the talks over allocation of proportional representation seats had been settled and closed after the 2008 Lesotho 
High Court judgement that the allocation as conducted by the IEC was legitimate. In a press conference, the 
mediator also confirmed that the dialogue had hit a deadlock due to irreconcilable differences between the 
contending political blocs in Lesotho. In his report entitled ―Talking Notes: Closing of Dialogue‖ Masire slammed the 
LCD government in particular for lack of cooperation which ultimately stalled the talks. On the basis of the lack of 
progress, Masire stepped down as the facilitator. Pronouncing the termination of the mission, Masire stated: 
―[f]ollowing many attempts to continue with my assignment in the Kingdom of Lesotho which all failed due to the 
Government‘s reluctance to allow the holding of the MMP Experts Seminar, I found it fruitless to push for further 
dialogue in Lesotho and decided to end my engagement in the country‖ (Masire Brief to the SADC Organ Troika: 13 
July 2009: 6). The Head of the Facilitation Team reflected on his mission‘s views on the sources of the dispute and 
the dialogue process as follows: 
 The MMP Electoral Model was not applied appropriately during the February 2007 elections in Lesotho. 
 The 2 main political parties, the LCD and the ABC, were wrongly allowed by the IEC to form alliances with smaller 
parties without merging which undermined and rendered the rationale of the MMP electoral model ineffectual and 
distorted the allocation of seats in parliament. 
 The electoral laws of the Kingdom of Lesotho should be reformed; for example ―...to limit the amount of time for 
an election petition to be brought, and the period during which the petition must be heard and determined‖ 
(Masire‘s Brief to the SADC Organ Troika: 13 July 2009: 7). 
 That jurisdiction and authority of Lesotho Courts to hear and determine election petitions should be placed 
beyond doubt. (For example in Masire‘s view the High Court of Lesotho ‗s determination on the Marema Tlou 
Freedom Party‘s contention regarding the allocation of the PR seats was flawed and unhelpful as far as resolving 
the dispute was concerned). 
 The Leader of the Opposition should be legally recognised and duly allowed to assume that office as there were 
no reasonable legal impediments involved. 
 
Masire concluded by appealing to all political parties in Lesotho to always place the interest of the Basotho people 
first in order to curb the recurrence of conflict after every election in the Kingdom. He stated: ―[i[n this spirit, I would 
urge all political parties in Lesotho to continue dialogue in terms of the the Roadmap, and to periodically interact in 
the best interests of the people of the Kingdom of Lesotho‖ (Masire Brief to the SADC Organ Troika: 13 July 2009: 9). 
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The collapse of the dialogue sparked fearful responses from the leaders of some opposition parties. The Leader of 
the BNP, former military junta General Metsing Lekhanya, posited that ―Masire‘s report falls right within our concerns. 
We are committed to making a peaceful dialogue with all concerned regarding seats reallocation. If push comes to 
shove, we will resort to some means which might cause instability. It won‘t be good for the country if there is no 
stability‖ (Internet; 14 May 2010). The ABC leader also lashed out: ―[W]e will fight for our rights. ... Masire is gone but 
we will sort out this problem. We will not allow other citizens of this country to bully us. We all belong here. The 
constitution is for all of us. It does not protect only people in power. We have rights too. The government want 
blood... They said that the army is on their side. Why do they need to say such things especially when they are 
talking to an opposition that does not have an army‖ (Lesotho Times: 16 July 2009). With such heated comments 
from the already grieved opposition, there were fears that an ugly political climate was imminent.  
 
The LCD government was incensed by the Masire report which traced the abortive talks to its doorstep. In a strongly-
worded response, the government accused Masire of having been pro-opposition throughout the mediation process. 
The government stated: ―as the process unfolded, serious difficulties began to show and there was a perception, 
rightly or wrongly, that the Eminent Person‘s Mission was not conducting its business in an open and transparent 
manner, which induced a sense of bias and partiality on the part of the mission. ...Notwithstanding this, the 
Government never tired or ceased to cooperate with and assist the Mission. But the dynamics of the process took a 
turn for a complete deadlock: and certainly, in our view, this cannot, in all fairness, be put solely at the doorstep of the 
Government and the ruling party as being responsible for lack of progress‖ (Lesotho Government response to 
Masire‘s Report: 2009: 2). The government justified its position on the dialogue as premised on respecting the 
judgement of the Lesotho courts of law and institutions of democracy such as the IEC. The government also pledged 
support for the continuation of the dialogue between the political parties and the government by the CCL. It stated: 
―[o]n the way forward, I can happily report that the CCL has picked up the baton of dialogue which fell from Sir 
Ketumile Masire‘s hand. They are currently supervising dialogue by Lesotho‘s political parties and promoting a 
culture of peaceful resolution of conflicts without sacrificing basic principles of good governance and respect for the 
rule of law in the process‖ (Lesotho Government Response to Masire Report: 2009: 11). 
 
The failure of the SADC-sponsored dialogue to resolve the post-2007 election disputes in Lesotho are indicative of 
the failure of the SADC preventive diplomacy in the country. It is very doubtful if the CCL will come up with a credible 
and lasting solution to the crisis besieging the Lesotho political arena. This means that the root sources of the conflict 
in Lesotho remain intact and conflict may be sparked by any dissatisfactory eventuality. In Southall‘s (1999: 2) 
assessment, the ―prevailing indications are that the conditions for maximising democratic possibilities in Lesotho are 
not yet in place… What is needed is not just more time…but a more concerted peacebuilding effort designed to 
establish a reasonable degree of consensus between the conflicting political parties.‖ This is because ―[t]he 
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persistent questioning of the legitimacy of the government fuels hatred and rivalry, and prevents Lesotho from 
moving forward‖ (Maundeni 2010: 135). The 2007 post-election violence which was hinged on protesting the 
allocation of PR seats under the MMP electoral system which replaced the often faulted FPTP system prompted 
Maundeni (2010: 136) to pose this rhetorical question: ―[c]an any electoral system defuse political tensions in 
Lesotho...?‖ 
 
Lessons from the DRC and Lesotho interventions may have been very central in determining the approach to the 
unfolding crisis in Zimbabwe where the SADC maintained a seemingly and arguably unified position against coercive 
measures and adherence to constructive engagement through "quiet diplomacy". The structural defects in the 
Lesotho political arena remain intact and the cumulative political grievances from the 2007 elections may erupt after 
the 2012 elections. Friction is reportedly building up in the preparations for the elections and the SADC should brace 
itself for another preventive diplomacy mission. Lesotho should provide invaluable lessons for the SADC preventive 
diplomacy mechanism on the basis that it is the only nation in the region where the regional organisation has 
employed both coercive and non-coercive strategies and a combination of both during the 1994, 1998 and 2007 
intervention missions. Whether the SADC will make good use of the lessons provided by the Lesotho interventions in 
its future regional peace efforts remains to be seen. 
 
6.3 Conclusion 
The chapter discussed the sources of incessant conflict in the Kingdom of Lesotho, these being its weak and 
dependent economy, fragile political institutions and flawed electoral process. This has resulted in post-election 
disputes since the 1970s. The cyclical conflicts invited the interventions of the SADC in 1994, 1998 and 2007 with 
differing degrees of success and challenges. The chapter also indicated that the SADC missions revealed lack of a 
clear regional policy on interventions. The next chapter focuses on the methodology used in this study. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
Methodology 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the methodology employed in the gathering and presentation of data. Methodology denotes 
the study of particular methods, techniques or procedures employed in the process of implementing the research 
design for reaching a desired end, an objective or solving a problem (Leedy 1993, Babbie and Mouton 2006). The 
description embraces the research design, study population and selection procedures, data collection instruments 
(interviews and documentary analysis) and data analysis approaches. It is vital that the group of methods selected for 
research be coherent, consistent, appropriate and effective, to deliver data and findings which answer the stated 
research questions (Henning, Van Rensberg and Smit, 2004). The chapter also considers justifications for the use of 
selected techniques, their strengths and limitations, and discusses ways of ensuring data quality and authenticity of 
the research findings, as well as ethical issues. It further briefly discusses the modes of data interpretation and 
analysis during fieldwork and post-fieldwork phases. 
 
7.2 Research Design 
A research design entails a plan or strategy for conducting research. It is a framework for research activities that 
generates evidence to answer the stated research question(s) (Yin 1984, Maykut and Morehouse 1994, Mertens 
1997, Wiersma 2000, Bryman 2001, Babbie and Mouton 2006). Yin defines a research design as ―an action plan for 
getting from ‗here‘ to ‗there‘ where here may be defined as the initial set of questions to be answered, and ‗there‘ is 
some set of conclusions (answers) about these questions. Between ‗here‘ and ‗there‘ may be found a number of 
major steps including the collection and analysis of relevant data‖ (cited in Naoum (2006: 37).  
 
This study employs the qualitative research design of the SADC preventive diplomacy missions in the Kingdom of 
Lesotho. Qualitative researches design ―is an umbrella term which incorporates a number of research strategies that 
share certain common characteristics‖ (Schurik 1998: 239). ―It is a collection of methods and techniques which share 
a certain set of principles or logic‖ for the study of social action (Babbie and Mouton 2006: 270). Qualitative designs 
comprise ethnographic studies, case studies and life histories, and the common methods of data collection are in 
depth interviews, participant observations and use of personal documents (Manion and Cohen 1994, Cresswell 1994, 
Bryman 2001, Babbie and Mouton 2006). In this study, the case study research approach is applied.  
 
Several characteristics distinguish qualitative research from a quantitative research paradigm. First, qualitative 
research is conducted in the natural setting of the phenomenon under study. It focuses on the natural setting of the 
actors and their activities and actions hence it has also been dubbed the "naturalistic inquiry, the field research, the 
contextualist or holistic research strategy" (Cresswell 1994, Cohen and Manion 1994, Bryman 2001, Babbie and 
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Mouton 2006). In qualitative research, the ―natural setting is the direct source of the data…the researcher goes into 
the field to interview and observe the participants in their own environment‖ (Denzin and Lincoln 1994: 4). 
Epistemologically, qualitative research is intepratist. As Potter puts it, ―[t]he world … is constituted in one way or the 
other as people talk it, write it and argue it‖ (1996: 98). In this study the natural setting is the SADC and its preventive 
diplomacy institutions and operations in relation to preventive diplomacy missions of 1994, 1998 and 2007 in 
Lesotho. Lesotho as the context in which the SADC conducted its preventive diplomacy missions, is another natural 
setting on which the study was based. The study was conducted at the SADC headquarters in Gaborone which is the 
administrative operational centre of the organisation and in Lesotho as the case study in order to get the insiders‘ 
perspective on the operations and challenges of the organisation during the interventions. Interviews were conducted 
in the SADC security organ (the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security) and with various Lesotho political parties, 
the monarchy, non-governmental organisations and other expert organisations on security issues to get their views 
and insights. 
 
Secondly, qualitative research is premised on the insiders' views and perspectives. The researcher‘s focus is on the 
actors' perceptions, beliefs, context, history, experiences and the way they make sense and meaning about their 
world (Bogdan and Taylor 1992, Creswell 1994, Bryman 2001, Babbie and Mouton 2006). Taylor and Bodgan locate 
the emic roots experienced in qualitative research to phenomenological research. They posit that ―[t]he 
phenomenologist views human behaviour as a product of how they interpret their world. …In order to grasp the 
meanings of a person‘s behaviour, the phenomenologist attempts to see things from that person‘s point of view 
(Bogdan and Taylor 1975 cited in Babbie and Mouton 2006: 271). Similarly, in qualitative research, ―meanings and 
interpretations are negotiated with human data sources because it is the subjects‘ realities that the researcher 
attempts to reconstruct‖ (Creswell 1994: 192). Qualitative research is therefore mainly interested in deep 
understanding of the particular event or case under study within its own context and through the eyes of the actors 
(Bryman 2001, Babbie and Mouton 2006). In this study, the views, opinions, perceptions and experiences of the 
respondents form the focus of the data collection, analysis and presentation. 
 
Thirdly, the researcher is the primary instrument in the data collection, interpretation and analysis processes (Guba 
and Lincoln 1985, Merriam 1988, Fraenkel and Wallen 1990, Eisner 1991, Stringer 1999, Babbie and Merriam 2006). 
Stringer (1999: 15) posits that ―…the researcher is both the participant in the action and inquirer into the same 
action.‖ That is, the researcher as the key instrument has to be enmeshed in an in-depth investigative and 
exploratory inquiry into the everyday life of the setting chosen for the study, searching for the respondents‘ world, 
perspectives and meanings through a systematic inquiry interaction (Marshall and Rossman 1989, Creswell 1994, 
Bryman 2001). As Psathas puts it, the qualitative researcher‘s questions to the respondents are meant to discover 
―what they are experiencing, how they interpret their experiences and…how they structure the social world in which 
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they live‖ (in Bogdan and Biklen 1992: 32). The goal of the interaction is to obtain data which has to be interpreted 
and understood within the world and perspectives of the insiders. The researcher‘s focus is on the process as it is 
experienced within the study phenomenon and the inquiry product and outcome (Merriam 1988, Fraenkel and Wallen 
1990, Bogdan and Biklen 1992, Taylor and Bogdan 1998). It is this centrality of the researcher in the research 
process which has earned qualitative research the criticism that it is biased and less scientific, that its end product is 
flawed in validity, reliability, objectivity and generalisability as compared to the quantitative paradigm. 
 
However, as indicated below, there are measures introduced in qualitative research to ensure credibility, 
trustworthiness, authenticity and objectivity of the research product. Among other things, qualitative research is 
premised on the ontological and epistemological assumptions that knowledge and reality are subjective and 
multidimensional as interpreted by the participants in the study. It acknowledges that the research process and 
product will to some extent be influenced by the researcher‘s world view, perspectives, value judgements and 
experiences (Creswell 1994, Stringer 1999, Coffey 1999, Schofield 2000, Bryman 2001, Mehra 2001, Babbie and 
Mouton 2006). Some proponents of the qualitative research design argue that the merging of data from the diverse 
sources of evidence and the researcher‘s input enhances the fertility of research knowledge, cross-fertilisation and 
complementarity of ideas, multiple and informed understanding of the social world of research (Locke etal. 1987, 
Mehra 2002).  
 
 A cross-fertilisation of data from the SADC and Lesotho respondents; documentary studies, literature review and 
interpretations by various experts and the researcher is regarded as vital considering the multidisciplinary nature of 
conflicts, conflict prevention, management, resolution and the diversity of preventive measures which form the hub of 
this study. 
 
Fourthly, qualitative research is an inductive approach. In most qualitative research, unlike quantitative research, the 
researcher does not have apriori established theory or hypothesis which the inquiry product has to approve or 
disapprove. The researcher commences with an in-depth investigation of the selected natural setting, describing 
events as they occur and subsequently developing and generating theory and hypothesis from the patterns, themes 
and issues emerging from data collection, compilation, analysis, and presentation (Cohen and Manion 1994, 
Creswell 1994, Rossman and Rallis 1998, Taylor and Bogdan 1998, Bryman 2001, Babbie and Mouton 2006). In this 
study, numerous theories on conflict, conflict resolution (preventive diplomacy) and regional integration provided the 
theoretical framework and guidelines on the interpretations and presentations of the research data. The aim is not to 
approve or disapprove the theories but to show how the theories can complement each other in the prevention, 
management and resolution of conflicts for lasting peace and security to be sustained. 
 
 331 
 
Fifth, the qualitative study is an emergent design. The research design is flexible and continuous in nature and 
therefore allows the researcher to alter the research plan, adapt the research methodology, use multiple sources of 
evidence, and accommodate emerging issues or conditions as dictated by the research environment and process. 
Inter-alia, the researcher does not assume any prior knowledge on the research topic before conducting the research 
(Bogdan and Biklen 1992, Creswell 1994, Rubin and Rubin 1995, Taylor and Bogdan 1998, Babbie and Mouton 
2006). The process of data collection, compilation, comparing and contrasting, categorising, patterning, synthesising 
and analysing is a journey in building an emergent comprehensive picture of the phenomenon under study.  
 
Finally, a qualitative research design inquiry product is characterised by "thick" detailed descriptions of the research 
environment, subjects, events and actions within the research context, research methodology and data analysis 
strategies. The qualitative research is interpretive and descriptive and the inquiry product is more often than not 
presented in the form of words rather than statistical data and numbers. It entails detailed discussions and 
interpretative accounts of events as opposed to the quantitatively measured variables as experienced in the 
quantitative paradigm (Creswell 1994, Golden-Biddle and Loke 1997, Holliday 2001, Henning etal 2004, Rossman 
1998, Bryman 2001, Babbie and Mouton 2006).  
 
Thus, the qualitative design is consistent with the case study approach as employed in this study. The purpose is to 
get information on the SADC security institutions, strategies, prospects and challenges in conflict prevention, 
management and resolution through in-depth interviews with the SADC officials at the SADC Headquarters (the 
Secretariat and the Directorate on Politics, Defence and Security), the Lesotho political organisations, non-
governmental organisations, the monarchy and experts on security issues such as academics, researchers and 
conflict mediators. Babbie and Mouton (2006: 309) commend the qualitative research design as ―appropriate to the 
study of attitudes and behaviours best understood within their natural setting as opposed to the somewhat artificial 
settings of experiments and surveys‖ characteristic of quantitative research. 
 
7.3 The Case Study Approach 
The case study method is essential in qualitative research. The origins of the research approach are associated with 
Malinowski in anthropology. Babbie and Mouton (2006) outline some of the defining features of the case study 
approach as the emphasis on an individual unit, significance of conceptualisation around the research unit, 
contextual detail and in-depth description, use of multiple sources of data and analytical strategies. The case study 
method accommodates a variety of research techniques such as participant observation, interviews, questionnaires, 
and documentary studies (triangulation). A case study entails a detailed, in-depth and intensive exploration and 
analysis of a specific case (which could be a person, a family, community, social group, institution, organisation, a 
country, an event, a programme) in its natural setting and from the perspective of the insiders (social actors). Hence, 
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it is also known as the naturalistic inquiry, the field research or the interpretive paradigm. It focuses on the process, 
complexity and particular nature of the case in question (Bogdan and Biklen 1992, Cresswell 1994, Stake 1995, 
2000, 2002, Taylor and Bogdan 1998, Merrian 1998, Bryman 2001, Babbie and Mouton 2006, Naoum 2006, Stake 
2008).  
 
There are 3 types of case study approaches: the descriptive, the analytical and explanatory case studies (Naoum 
2006). The case study approach explains theory and causality and ―tries to show linkages among the objects of the 
study. It asks why things happen the way they do. The researcher collects facts and studies the relationship of one 
set of facts to another, with the hope of finding some causal relationship between them‖ (Naoum 2006: 46). A case is 
also crucial for an in-depth analysis which provides a framework for understanding issues in other similar settings or 
units. Cohen and Manion (1994: 102) define it as an ―investigation of an individual unit to probe deeply and analyse 
all characteristics of the unit to establish generalisations about the wider community to which it belongs.‖ However, 
the crucial factor is not whether the findings can be generalised to a wider universe, but how well the researcher 
interprets and analyses data and generates theory from the findings. Case studies can be used in both theory 
generation and theory testing research studies (Mitchell 1983, Yin 1984, Merriam 1999, Bryman 2001). It is flexible, 
emergent and allows diverse interpretations, thick and comprehensive explorations of different aspects of the 
phenomenon under study (Cresswwell 1994, Babbie and Mouton 2006, Stake 2008). The stipulated merits provide 
the justification for the choice of the qualitative research design in this study. 
 
7.3.1 Merits of the Case Study Approach 
Like any other approach, the case study has its pros and cons. There are several advantages associated with the 
case study research approach. Firstly, it allows for an intensive, holistic and thick description, analysis and 
understanding of the single unit of study within its context or natural setting (Cresswell 1994, Cohen and Manion 
1994, Merriam 1999, Babbie and Mouton 2006). Goode and Hart point out that the case study approach is ―a way of 
organising social data to preserve the unitary character of the social object being studied…always this means of 
approach includes the development of that unit…‖ (in Gomm, Hammesley and Foster 2000: 169). 
 
Secondly it facilitates creation of meaning and understanding of the unit of study from both the insiders‘ and the 
researcher's views. Through interviews and observations the researcher experiences the world of the research unit 
from the emic perspective and through his or her own perspective, resulting in deep interpretation and rich research 
findings. It is an interpretative approach in which the researcher gains understanding of perceptions, values, actions 
and processes of the institution and/or situation studied (Trauth 2001, Babbie and Mouton 2006, Snodgrass 2006).  
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Thirdly, it has been noted that case studies have a great potential for theory generation and development (Cohen and 
Manion 1994, Babbie and Mouton 2006). Cohen and Manion observe that in most qualitative case studies, ―theory is 
emergent and must rise from particular situations. It should be ‗grounded‘ on data generated by [the] research act…‖ 
(1994: 37). Fourthly it can be argued that the thick data emanating from the case study research can form the basis 
for credibility, trustworthiness, dependability, and transferability of the findings to other similar situations (Guba and 
Lincoln 1985, Erlandson etal 1993, Cresswell 1994, Babbie and Mouton 2006). According to Cohen and Manion the 
case study data is ―strong in reality. …This strength in reality is because case studies are down to earth and 
attention-holding…and thus provide a ‗natural‘ basis for generalisation‖ (1994: 123). 
 
Fifth, data and findings from case study research can be instrumental for future improvements of the case studied. As 
Cohen and Manion (1994: 123) put it, it can be used ―for staff or individual self-development, for within-institutional 
feedback, for formative evaluation and in policy making‖ and implementation. It is for this reason that the authors 
refer to case studies as ―a step to action‖ beginning in a world of action and contributing to it. Finally, case studies are 
―capable of offering some support to alternative interpretations.‖ This is because they accommodate diverse 
interpretations which ensure ―democratisation‖ of knowledge and research. That is ―they allow readers to judge the 
implications of a study for themselves‖ (Cohen and Manion 1994: 123). 
 
In this study, the SADC preventive diplomacy missions of 1994, 1998 and 2007 in Lesotho are used as the case for 
an in-depth qualitative investigation of the SADC's role as a regional organisation in conflict prevention, management 
and resolution. It is also used for insights into a variety of theories on conflicts, conflict resolutions and theories of 
regional integration. The case study approach is relevant for this study as its goal is to provide an in-depth 
exploration of SADC‘s perceptions on regional conflicts and how they can be resolved, the operations, efficacy and 
challenges of its preventive diplomacy mechanisms as an intergovernmental regional organisation. 
 
7.3.2 Limitations of the Case Study Approach 
However, there are limitations associated with case study research designs. Many quantitative scholars contend that 
the case study research approach and its subsequent findings are less scientific and lack validity, reliability, 
generalisability, representativeness and replicability (Bryman 2001, Babbie and Morton 2006). Case study results 
have also been criticised as lacking valid basis for objective, accurate and authentic generalisations and 
transferability to other settings, therefore devoid of external validity. The difficulties in generalisations of the findings 
arise from the fact that different organisations may be shaped and influenced by different contextual socio-economic 
and political forces. For example, the challenges faced by SADC as a regional organisation may differ from those 
faced by ASEAN because they exist in different contexts. Lincoln and Guba (1985) suggest that generalisability of 
qualitative research findings can be attained as the design provides thick and descriptive explanations on the 
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research domain. Information from other similar settings can also be obtained through documentary studies on 
different organisations. 
 
Rejecting the criticism, qualitative researchers argue that the focus in the case study is not the transferability or the 
ability to generalise the findings, but deep understanding of the meanings and realities of the phenomenon under 
study in its natural context. As Cresswell aptly puts it: ―the intent of qualitative research is not to generalise findings, 
but to form a unique interpretation of events‖ (1994: 158-159). In the view of qualitative researchers, research 
findings can never be a final and accurate representation of what transpires in the research domain at different times. 
There will always be a multiplicity of voices, insights, experiences and perspectives as the world is not static but 
dynamic (Guba and Lincoln 1985, Denzin 1994). Therefore what counts as data and how it is used as evidence will in 
each case differ radically depending on who conducts the research, his or her epistemological orientations and the 
general prevailing socio-economic and political climate within which the research is conducted (Scholstak and 
Scholstak 2008: 25). Considerable effort was made by the researcher in this study to follow the guiding principles and 
frameworks for qualitative case study research designs in the collection and analysis of data. 
 
7.4 Study Population and Selection Procedure 
A "sample" refers to the population from which evidence and data for the study is obtained, interpreted, analysed and 
the findings presented. Bryman (2001: 495-496) outlines 3 essential questions to guide researchers in the  sampling 
process. The guidelines are as follows: 
 Who do you need to study in order to investigate your research questions? 
 How easily can you gain access to a sampling frame? 
 What kind of sampling strategy will you employ (for instance probability sampling, theoretical sampling, 
convenience sampling)? 
 
The purposive/purposeful selection procedure is employed in this qualitative research study. This is whereby ―a 
selection of those to be surveyed is made according to a known characteristic (such as being a politician or union 
eader)‖ (May 1999: 88). The argument for the selection method is that the researcher identifies those who are ―fit for 
the purpose‖ (May 1999); that is, those who are in a position to provide informative data and answers to the research 
questions and problem, due to their professional training or occupational advantage and experience (Patton 1990).  
 
According to Merriam (1998) the purposive non-probability sampling procedure is logical as long as the researcher 
needs the data to solve qualitative problems such as discovering what occurs, the implications and relationships of 
the occurrences rather than to answer questions such as how much or how many. This is because ―qualitative 
research seeks to maximise the range of specific information that can be obtained from and about that context, by 
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purposely selecting locations and informants that differ from one another. Therefore sampling in the interpretive 
paradigm is often purposeful and directed at certain inclusive criteria rather than random‖ (Babbie and Mouton 2006: 
177 and 288). The merit of purposeful sampling is that it provides expert answers to what one wants to discover, 
understand and gain insight into. It also accords the researcher the opportunity to select the respondents on the 
basis of his/her knowledge of the population, its elements, the aims and rationale of the study and the researcher‘s 
judgement of the purpose of the study (Babbie and Mouton 2006). 
 
 For this study, therefore, the research population was selected from the SADC Headquarters in Gaborone 
(Botswana). Representatives from relevant units such as the Secretariat, the SADC Directorate on Politics, Defence, 
and Security Affairs, Conflict Resolution Unit and professionals, and experts on security, academics, conflict 
mediators and representatives from non-governmental organisations. The Directorate on Politics, Defence and 
Security is targeted since it directly handles security matters in the SADC and is expected to provide an insider's 
expert view. Respondents were also selected from the different Lesotho political organisations, the monarchy and 
non-governmental organisations as they, in their different capacities played a role during the conflict and peace-
building efforts during the 1994, 1998 and 2007 SADC interventions in Lesotho.  One former President of Botswana 
was also interviewed as he was involved as one of the Troika member during the diplomatic preventive mission of 
1994 and as the SADC mandated facilitator of dialogue between the Lesotho political players after the 2007 
elections. Representatives from the Lesotho Council of Churches (LCC) and the Lesotho Council of Non-
Governmental Organisations (LCNGO) which have been involved in peace mediation during the SADC interventions 
were interviewed to give the views of civil society on the issue. The purpose is to get views and insights from different 
sources for an informed interpretation of the data. As Babbie and Mouton (2006) advise: ―the best way to elicit the 
various and divergent constructions of reality that exist within the context of a study is to collect information about 
…events and relationships from different points of view. This means asking different questions, seeking different 
sources and using different methods.‖ A total number of 24 respondents were interviewed. 
  
To gain access to the research and archival sites, the researcher had to obtain the approval of the "‗gate keepers" 
(relevant authorities) and maintain a productive relationship with the respondents.  As Schotstak and Schostak put it, 
―the negotiating process involves inscribing the reasons for being with people and [at] places relevant to the research 
into the agendas that prevail in the given social circumstances.‖ In other words ―[h]ow does the reason for the 
researcher to be around make sense to those encountered?" (2008: 237). Letters requesting permission to conduct 
studies through interviews were posted and/or submitted by the researcher to the selected institutions and individual 
respondents. The letters explained how the studies were to be conducted, that is, the data collection instruments, the 
proposed respondents, the time frame and how the data would be used and shared with the respective institutions 
and respondents. This is in line with Miles and Huberman‘s (1984) parameters for conducting qualitative research 
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studies. Specifically, the researcher has to establish the setting (where the research will take place), the actors (who 
will be observed or interviewed), the events (what the actors will be observed doing or interviewed about) and the 
process (the evolving nature of events undertaken by actors within the setting) (in Cresswell 1994: 149). This 
provided the framework for conducting the study. However, as is the norm in every study, the researcher did not get 
responses from some of the intended respondents‘ institutions such as the Ministries of Defence in Botswana and 
South Africa, the Institute of Security Studies (ISS) and the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA). 
 
7.5 Data Collection Instruments 
Data collection instruments are pivotal in any research since they determine how and where the data is to be 
obtained, the trustworthiness and authenticity of the data to be collected and the findings of the study. Therefore, as 
Wiersma (2000: 3) asserts, ―the process of data collection requires proper organisation and control so that the data 
will enable valid decisions to be made about the research problem at hand.‖ 
 
The study employed in-depth interviews and document analysis for data collection. It was decided to use these two 
instruments as they would complement each other by providing insights and answers to the research problem from 
different angles. In other words, it was presumed that the study would benefit from the process of triangulation which 
entails the use of 2 or more methods of data collection procedures within a single study (Leedy 1993, Cohen and 
Manion 1994, Babbie and Mouton 2006). Triangulation has numerous merits in research. Leedy (1993, 143) opines 
that it ―enables one to use several frames of reference or perspectives in the analysis of the same set of data. Data 
triangulation attempts to gather observations through the use of a variety of sampling strategies to ensure that a 
theory is tested in more than one way…‖ This study benefited from triangulating data from the respondents and 
documentary analysis and diverse literature on regional SADC, its prospects, challenges and the efficacy of its 
preventive diplomacy interventions in the Kingdom of Lesotho as the case study. 
 
 7.5.1 Interviews 
One of the methods of data generation in this study was the interview research instrument. An interview (face-to-face 
or interactive) as a research technique is a conversation between the interviewer and the interviewee for the purpose 
of eliciting information from the respondents. It is an interpersonal role situation in which the interviewer asks 
respondents questions designed to elicit answers pertinent to the research problem (Kvale 1996, Naoum 2006). The 
interview is focused on the respondents‘ experiences, views and opinions regarding the institution or situation under 
study. It thus constitutes an ―ideal speech situation characterised by a process free from domination where the 
parties involved in construction of meaning exchange arguments without coercion‖ (Stringer 1999: 36). 
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A semi-structured interview was employed because of its adaptability and flexibility. The flexibility in the semi-
structured interview guide allows the researcher to formulate other questions on the basis of information emerging 
from the responses of the interviewees. Qualitative interviews give the interviewer the opportunity to sift data from the 
respondents‘ attitudes, feelings, interests, concerns, gestures, facial expressions and tone (Cresswell 1994, Rubin 
and Rubin 1995, Kvale 1996, Bogdan and Bikini 1998, Krathwohl 1998, Gay and Airasian 2000, Bryman 2001, 
Babbie and Mouton 2006, Naoum 2006). Such invaluable data cannot be obtained through other research methods 
such as the quantitative questionnaire surveys. The other advantage as indicated in the definition is that it can be 
administered in person, therefore the researcher is an active participant, has control over the line of questioning, the 
response rate is relatively high and the researcher is fully assured that the respondents are the ones for which the 
interviews were intended.  
 
However, the interview research instrument has its challenges and shortcomings such as the presence of the 
interviewer and the manner in which he or she asks the questions influencing the interviewee. Babbie and Mouton 
(2006: 289) note: ―all too often, the way we ask questions subtly biases the answers we get.‖ Put differently, ―the 
researcher‘s assumptions and values shape the inquiry and become part of the argument…there can be no 
disinterested research…the researcher is both a participant in the action and inquirer into that same action‖ (Stringer 
1999: 15). In view of this, Linklater (2001: 145) asserts that ―[s]ocial inquiry is never objective and value –free but 
supports, however indirectly, particular conceptions of society which favour identifiable sectional interests.‖ The 
interview instrument can be obtrusive and disruptive to the respondents‘ daily schedule, performance and production 
targets. Some respondents may be too busy for interview sessions, thereby affecting the progress of the research 
process. In some instances, the respondents may be biased and selective with the information they give to the 
researcher in accordance with the rules and regulations of the organisation. In this case, the researcher can be 
denied access to vital information which could ensure fertile research findings. In this study, the researcher 
anticipated difficulties in extracting some of the sensitive information pertaining to the internal politics of the SADC 
organisation. Interviews with different political parties in Lesotho elicited partisan positions regarding the SADC 
interventions in Lesotho. The researcher had to contend with the challenges of guiding some of the respondents to 
focus on the questions for more focused discussions without stifling the perspectives and insights which they wanted 
to advance. 
 
A detailed interview schedule (guide) comprising open-ended semi-structured questions on the SADC preventive 
diplomacy missions in Lesotho, its efficacy and challenges (of conflict prevention, management and resolution and 
peace-building) was drawn. Open-ended questions are regarded as highly relevant in this qualitative study as an 
instrument to extract more information from the respondents. Each interview session was expected to last for 45 
minutes to an hour depending on circumstances emerging from each particular session and setting. With the 
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permission of the respondents, the interviews were tape-recorded and later transcribed by the researcher for 
appropriate data coding, categorisation and analysis.  
 
The researcher also took extensive field notes during the interview sessions on respondents‘ answers and other 
emerging issues including his observations and interpretations of the respondents‘ gestures and expressions during 
the interview sessions. From these notes, the researcher later reconstructed the dialogue and accounts of particular 
events, speculations, impressions, ideas and problems as emerging during the interview sessions. It is important to 
record as much as possible from the interviews. The field notes and data from the audio tapes complemented each 
other for thick and credible data for the research findings. Continuous reference to the field notes and the transcribed 
data ensured the development of the study as an emergent design which is one of the essential features of the 
qualitative research approach (Guba and Lincoln 1989, Bryman 2001, Patton 2002, Babbie and Mouton 2006). 
 
7.5.2 Document Studies 
The term "documents" embraces a heterogeneous set of sources such as personal documents (letters, diaries, 
autobiographies, photographs), official documents from the state, organisations and other private sources (policy 
documents, annual reports, communiqués, memos, minutes of meetings, newspapers, magazines, journals) (Cohen 
and Manion 1994, Bryman 2001, Babbie and Mouton, 2006). Documentary studies are an invaluable source of data 
in research as they provide vital information in all the stages of research from the formulation of the topic, research 
questions, literature review, field work, analysis and presentation of the research findings. It is the duty of the 
researcher to sample the relevant documents during the course of the research proceedings. Scott (1990: 6) 
provides the criteria for assessing the quality and relevance of documents by researchers in relation to the topic 
under consideration. The guidelines comprise 4 aspects as follows;  
 Authenticity - is the evidence genuine and of unquestionable origin? 
 Credibility - is the evidence free from error and distortion? 
 Representativeness - is the evidence typical of its kind, or if a-typical, is its extent known? 
 Meaning - is the evidence clear and comprehensive? 
 
It is the responsibility of the researcher to deeply interrogate the different sources to screen and identify those 
relevant to his or her research topic, and to validate the authenticity and accuracy of the documents. This is because 
no document ―must…be taken at its face value when used as a research source; it is also necessary to have 
considerable additional knowledge of the social context to probe beneath the surface‖ (Scott 1990: 195). Documents 
cannot always be regarded ―as providing objective accounts of a state of affairs. [As] they have to be interrogated 
and examined in the context of other sources of data‖ (Bryman 2001: 377). The different stances, dimensions, views 
and perspectives reflected by different documents can be used as ―a platform for developing insights into the 
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processes and factors that lie behind the divergence‖ (Bryman 2001: 377), and as pointers to other sources of 
information. Documentary sources are classified as primary or secondary materials. Primary sources are ―those 
which came into existence in the period under research‖ while secondary sources are ―interpretations of events of 
that period based on primary sources‖ (Bell 1999: 108). Both sources were vital and complementary in the provision 
of the required data in this study.  
 
Relevant documentation on SADC and its preventive diplomacy mechanism‘s activities in the Lesotho missions were 
obtained and analysed to augment data from the reviewed literature and interviews. Documentation comprised 
information on the SADC summit meetings and conferences, policy documents, communiqués on the activities of the 
organisation, and other scholarly research on regional integration and security from different setups. Information was 
also obtained from journal contributions from researchers and websites on research institutions on conflict 
prevention, management and resolution. For instance, policy and other operational documents on SADC were 
accessed through its website: www.sadc.int. An in-depth study of the related documentation helped delineate the 
study problem and provide topics and sub-topics to be covered in the investigation and highlights for the interview 
questions.  
 
The merits of document studies are that most are a primary source of information and enable the researcher to 
obtain the data in the language of the respondents. Compared to other data collection instruments such as the 
interview, it is less obtrusive. Moreover, ―the nature of the document is not affected by the fact that you are using it for 
the enquiry‖ (Robson 1993b: 272). Robson (1993b) further observes that documentary sources possess several 
advantages: ―data is permanent, can be re-analysed, and allows reliability checks and replication‖ (paraphrased in 
Ketlhoilwe 2007: 104). The sources may be ―used by the researcher for some purpose other than that for which they 
were originally intended‖ (Bell 1999: 109-110). For example, in this study the researcher used some of the 
information on the SADC policy documents to answer the research questions on the organisation‘s preventive 
interventions in Lesotho.  
 
Demerits of document studies can be that some information may be protected and unavailable for public access and 
consumption and thus difficult for the researcher to obtain (Cresswell 1994, Bryman 2001). Such a problem could be 
expected with some information regarded by the inter-governmental organisation (SADC) as highly sensitive and 
classified especially on security matters. The information in documents could also be flawed, such as documents 
which paint only a positive image of the organisation and its activities, thus denying the researcher comprehensive 
evidence from which to embark on objective analysis and presentation of the findings. 
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The triangulation of data collection instruments is regarded as one of the best ways of overcoming the deficiencies 
that may emanate from one investigator or method, neutralise personal bias, ensure complementarity of data and 
ultimately the validity, credibility, trustworthiness, comfirmability, dependability, generalisability and transferability of 
the research findings in the interpretive research study (Lincon and Guba 1985, Denzin 1989, Leedy 1993, Cresswell 
1994, Bryman 2001, Babbie and Mouton 2006). In this study, triangulation was effected through the use of in-depth 
interviews, purposeful selection of respondents from the SADC and other expert institutions, representatives of the 
Lesotho political organisations, the monarchy, non-governmental organisations and individual respondents such as 
the former President of Botswana, Sir Ketumile Masire, who facilitated peace efforts in Lesotho in 1994 and 2007. 
This together with extensive literature reviews and documentation analysis and the diverse qualitative data analysis 
modes ensured a detailed description and presentation of the research findings. 
 
7.6 Validation of Research Instruments 
Cresswell argues that qualitative researchers ―have no single stance or consensus on addressing the traditional 
topics of validity and reliability‖ (1994: 157). Their argument is that the main intent of the qualitative research is not to 
quantify and generalise the findings but to build meanings based on interpretations of what is prevailing within the 
research context. It is an investigative and interpretive process through which the researcher constructs an 
understanding and meanings from the study phenomenon by contrasting, comparing and classifying the emerging 
issues and themes of the study object. Therefore, instead of relying on the traditional validity and reliability measures, 
the qualitative researcher seeks trustworthiness, authenticity, credibility and believability based on the coherence of 
interpretations, analysis and presentations through the process of verification (Guba and Lincoln 1985, Eisner 1991, 
Erlandson etal. 1993). ―If one assumes there are multiple realities (as is the case with qualitative studies) the notion 
of reliability is no longer as relevant‖ (Krefting in Poggenpoel 1988: 350) as the ―…knowledge is no longer the mere 
reflection of an active objective reality, but the construction of social reality…‖ (Kvale 2002: 309).  
 
Babbie and Mouton acknowledge the difficulties encountered by researchers in their bid to ensure validity and 
reliability of the research findings. They posit that ―[a]lthough we should strive with everything in our power to do truly 
valid, reliable and objective studies, the reality is that we are never able to attain this complexity. Rather it remains a 
goal, something to be striven towards although never fully obtained‖ (2006: 276). Achieving reliability, validity and 
objectivity is more difficult in qualitative research as the researcher is largely instrumental in the entire research 
process, making it impossible to eradicate his or her biases in the inquiry product. 
 
Authenticity and reliability of the research product were ascertained by piloting the interview questions with the 
Bachelor of Education 4th-year student teachers at the University of Botswana. The point of the exercise was to 
check the consistency and accuracy of the data collection instruments items for appropriate adjustments. The 
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accuracy and reliability of the data was also established through triangulation of data collection instruments. Data for 
the research was solicited through in-depth interactive interviews from purposively sampled respondents, extensive 
literature survey and study of relevant documentation. Gall etal. (1996), Bogdan etal. (1998), Tsayang (1995) point 
out that in case study research, it is vital to authenticate findings through corroborative evidence drawn from multiple 
data collection instruments and sources.  
 
This study employed interviews and document studies to generate data. . The advantage of triangulation is that the 
methods complement each other.  Shortcomings and deficiencies inherent in each method and source are 
neutralised when they are used in conjunction with others (Leedy 1993, Cresswell 1994, Babbie and Mouton 2006). 
The data was interpreted and presented in detail synchronising the research findings, data interpretation and 
theoretical positions within the study area in order to present a holistic and accurate picture of the SADC preventive 
diplomacy security mechanism. According to Babbie and Mouton (2006) triangulation is generally considered to be 
one of the best ways of enhancing authenticity and trustworthiness in qualitative research.  
 
7.7 Ethical Considerations 
Ethical measures are very important in ensuring that the researcher complies with the ethical standards, codes and 
procedures for conducting credible research and obtaining accurate, objective, trustworthy, valid and reliable 
research findings. The norms for conducting research include adhering to the principles of voluntary participation and 
informed consent by the respondents, protection of the privacy, rights and safety of the research subjects, 
guaranteeing anonymity and confidentiality of respondents and the information they provide, and accountability and 
professionalism in the presentation of the findings (Leedy 1993, Cresswell 1994, Bryman 2001, Bak 2005, Denzin 
2005, Christian 2005, Babbie and Mouton 2006). Ethical considerations revolve around ―how threats to the security of 
the researcher and the researched are to be ensured during the research process? What is at stake for each 
individual involved? How does the reason for the researcher to be around make sense to those encountered? 
(Sholstak and Scholstak 2008: 238 and 237 respectively). ―How should we treat the people on whom we conduct 
research? Are there activities in which we should or should not engage in our relations with them? (Bryman 2001: 
476). The general rule and expectation is that ―ethically, people should not be exploited, their dignity diminished, their 
safety compromised‖ (Schostak and Schostak 2008: 238) or deceived to perform reprehensive acts as this would be 
a transgression of the research code of conduct. 
 
Therefore, it is the responsibility of the researcher during all stages of the research process to ensure that the dignity 
of the participants is safeguarded. As De Vos etal (1998: 23) correctly observes, ―[t]he final responsibility for ethical 
conduct rests squarely with the researcher concerned.‖ This suggests that any research study should be ―built on 
trust between the researcher and the participants, and the researchers have a responsibility to behave in a 
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trustworthy manner, just as they expect participants to behave in the same manner‖ (Gray, Mills and Airasian, 2006: 
19).  
 
The researcher adhered as much as possible to the agreed norms and standards (as stipulated in the Nelson 
Mandela Metropolitan University Ethics Code of Conduct) by explaining the purpose of the study to the participants, 
the methods to be used in data collection and how the findings will be disseminated. Participants were briefed about 
the purpose of the study and their rights as participants in the research before they consented. The aim of such 
briefings was to ensure informed consent, responsibility and accountability by participants regarding the responses 
they provide during the interviews. This information was clearly stated in the letters of request for permission to 
conduct the research in the selected institutions and individual respondents. The research respondents were also 
informed of the commitment by the researcher to adhere to the ethical principles of confidentiality, in that no names 
would be reflected in the final research presentation unless with the consent of the respondent.  
 
7.8 Data Analysis and Presentation  
Data analysis entails the critical and reflective descriptions, explanations, interpretations, synthesis, evaluation, 
inferences and verifications of data collected for a comprehensive and coherent presentation of the research findings. 
The information gathered is analysed, corroborated, compared and contrasted with data from available literature, 
theoretical paradigms and the researcher‘s interpretations, insights and views. According to Tesch (1990), the 
process of data analysis is multifaceted. There is no single "right way.‖  Data analysis also involves segmenting the 
data, generating and developing categories, themes and patterns and matching them for a coherent and 
comprehensive presentation. Lofland (1971), Lofland and Lofland (1995: 164) warn researchers against what they 
refer to respectively as ―analytic interruptus‖ (in Bryman 2001: 388) and "descriptive excess," which would stifle the 
analytic interpretations and arguments in the presentation of the findings as a result of the excessive data collected. 
 
The researcher synthesised and analysed information from the research inquiry, literature review and theoretical 
surveys through the processes of data reduction, de-contextualisation and re-contextualisation of the interpretation 
schema to form the basis for the emerging research story. The processes of data coding, categorisation, 
interpretation, pattern-matching, explanation-building and generalisation were based on the evidence provided by the 
respondents, literature reviews and theoretical frameworks. According to Bryman (2001: 398) ―coding is the starting 
point for most forms of qualitative data analysis.‖  The researcher classified data into component parts and labelling it 
according to themes, concepts, theoretical positions and research questions to be addressed in the study. As 
Charmaz (1983: 186) puts it, ―codes…serve as shorthand devices to label, separate, compile and organise data.‖ 
Data analysis and processesing were simultaneously carried out during data collection in line with requirements of 
the qualitative research paradigm On-going data analysis and processing is also in line with the qualitative studies 
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reliance on inductive grounded theory from data. Thus the approach is ―iterative or recursive… [in] that data 
collection and analysis proceed in tandem repeatedly referring back to each other‖ (Bryman 2001: 390). 
 
The interpretation and analysis of responses from the different participants resulted in detailed descriptions of the 
findings. As Tesch notes, ―[w]hile much work in the analysis process consists of ‗taking apart‘ (for instance, into 
smaller pieces), the final goal is the emergence of a larger consolidated picture‖ (1990: 97). The qualitative research 
paradigm is an interpretive approach as its results have often been in the form of thick, descriptive narratives rather 
than quantified scientific reports common in quantitative studies (Miles and Huberman 1984, Cresswell 1994, Mason 
1994, Cohen and Manion 1994, Rossman and Rallis 1998, Holliday 2001, Bryman 2001, Babbie and Mouton 2006). 
This approach describes the data holistically, taking into account the complexity of social systems rather than 
concentranting on discrete variables as in quantitative research. In the process of data analysis and presentation, the 
researcher strove to balance subjective and objective interpretations, engagement and disengagement for credible 
and objective research findings. That is, the researcher was conscious of the effects of his beliefs, feelings and world 
view on the research process, data interpretation and presentation. Care was taken to present the findings in an 
objective manner. 
  
The researcher made a concerted effort to code, categorise, interpret and analyse the research data on the basis of 
identified and emerging themes from the findings. Some relevant features fitting within the context of the study were 
adopted and adapted while some features which were deemed unfitting were left out. In analysing data, the 
researcher coded the core themes such as motivations and justifications for the interventions, the legitimacy of the 
missions, challenges faced during the preventive diplomacy missions, successes of the missions and the lessons 
drawn from the SADC interventions in the Kingdom of Lesotho in 1994, 1998 and 2007. The central themes and 
categories were deduced from the main research questions, the literature review and the subsequent responses from 
the interviews. To enhance the authenticity and credibility of the research findings, the researcher quoted the 
participants' interviews verbatim. 
 
 7.9 Conclusion 
This chapter dealt with research design, respondents‘ selection procedures, interview and document analysis data 
collection instruments and the merits and demerits of each. The chapter also outlined the ethical aspects considered 
in the study and how data was validated during the analysis and presentation of the findings. It also briefly described 
how the data would be analysed and presented. The next chapter focuses on discussions of the research findings. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
 Discussions and Presentation of Findings  
8.1 Introduction 
Data was analysed and presented through the descriptive and explanatory qualitative approaches. Data from the 
interviews and document studies were coded and classified into themes according to the research questions and 
objectives and emerging themes. The categories include the SADC security organ‘s preventive diplomacy 
mechanism, conflict prevention, management and prevention strategies, and the views of respondents from the 
SADC, Lesotho political organisations, the monarchy, Lesotho non-governmental organisations, Lesotho dialogue 
facilitator, academics and military officers some of whom participated in SADC interventions in Lesotho. Data from 
the research inquiry was also matched, categorised, compared and contrasted for a holistic picture, full and 
systematic analysis and understanding of the research unit - the SADC - and its preventive missions of 1994, 1998 
and 2007 in Lesotho. Inductive reasoning strategies were employed in the matching, patterning, and categorisation of 
data and evidence to facilitate a systematic interpretation of data from the interviews, literature review and document 
studies (Poggenpoel 1998, Strauss 1998, Bryman 2001, Mason 1994, Snodgrass 2005). The quantitative approach 
was only used to reflect the number of respondents. Confidentiality and anonymity of data and responses was 
maintained in accordance with the ethical norms, codes and standards of research during data interpretations and 
presentations. 
 
This chapter presents an analysis of data from interviews on SADC preventive diplomacy missions of 1994, 1998 and 
2007 in the Kingdom of Lesotho. It is an analysis of the participants' understanding, experiences, views and 
reflections on the SADC preventive diplomacy interventions in Lesotho. Data was obtained through detailed 
interviews with the SADC officials, representatives of different political parties in Lesotho, retired soldiers (from 
Botswana) who participated in the 1998 mission, representatives of non-governmental organisations in Lesotho, 
academics from the Political Science Departments from the National University of Lesotho (NUL) and University of 
Botswana, (UB) and the facilitator during the 1994 and 2007 SADC missions in Lesotho who is an ex-President of 
Botswana. The thrust of the analysis is to determine, examine and reflect on the efficacy of the SADC preventive 
diplomacy in Lesotho based on the reasons (motivations), justifications, challenges success, lessons learnt and 
remedial measures to the identified shortfalls in its conflict prevention, management and resolution architecture.  
 
The findings of this empirical study are analysed with the view to search for patterns, relationships, differences, 
inconsistencies and any relevant information which provides answers to the overarching research questions which 
guided the study. The findings are also discussed in relation to the literature review and theoretical framework which 
provided the scope for the study. As a qualitative study, the presentation employs detailed excerpts from the 
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interview responses to reflect the views of the respondents and buttress or dispute their positions, insights and 
conclusions.  
 
8.2 Justifications and motives for the interventions 
As indicated in Chapter 6, SADC‘s intervention was to defuse post-1994, 1998 and 2007 elections disputes. In 1994, 
the SADC employed non-coercive preventive diplomacy led by the Troika of Masire (Botswana), Mandela (South 
Africa) and Mugabe (Zimbabwe); while in 2007 the SADC mediation was led by Masire in respect of the SADC 
overtures to eminent persons' roles in regional peace initiatives. The 1998 intervention was a military mission 
launched by South Africa and Botswana, arguably on behalf of the SADC. Respondents were asked to indicate 
whether they felt the missions were justified and/or necessary. As expected, a wide range of responses were 
received from the different participants in line with the positions of their different institutions, organisations, political 
inclinations and affiliations.  
 
8.2.1 Interventions; A response to Threats to Democracy 
Several reasons were advanced by participants who viewed the interventions as justified, legal and procedural. 
Those who felt that all the interventions were necessary and justified were from the SADC OPDS Unit, the party 
which was in government when the respective missions were launched, and some of the respondents were from 
opposition parties. Those who argued that the interventions were justified, reasoned that SADC is a regional 
organisation, legally tasked and mandated to assist a member state when there are threats to democracy and 
security which could destabilise regional peace and stability. The proponents argued that the SADC is mandated to 
restore order and peace in its member states and nip in the bud any unconstitutional means of gaining power or 
threats to democratically elected governments. According to Southall (2001:162) during the 1998 mission, the Troika 
of South Africa, Zimbabwe and Botswana (the parties mandated as the guarantors of the Lesotho democracy in 
1994), ―were particularly alarmed by the junior officers‘ rebellion and convinced that it was a precursor to a military 
intervention...All the three governments had good reasons for wanting explicit commitment by SADC states to the 
norms of civil rule and democracy; they were not prepared to stand back and see that commitment breached by the 
weakest member state within the regional organisation.‖ Given this context therefore, the SADC was operating within 
its mandate as stipulated in its founding treaty, the OPDS and MDP protocols, which govern the organisation‘s 
intervention and security operations and the assessment by the Troika guarantors. They stated that in all the 
interventions, the governments of the day in the Kingdom were faced with threats of coups and destabilisations from 
the opposition protesting the outcomes of the 1993, 1998 and 2007 elections. Most of them felt that Lesotho is a 
member of the SADC and had ratified the SADC treaties and protocols, and that; therefore, nothing was amiss with 
the SADC assisting its member.  One of the respondents from the OPDS Unit stated: “...It is relevant and acceptable 
in our treaty..., and protocols that the member states can support each member in the event that a member state 
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feels threatened and that exactly what we did” (Interview with R 2; 28 June 2010). In the same vein, the opposition 
Marematlou Freedom Party interviewee also noted that the interventions were justified because when SADC “... was 
build up and given the arms which they could use...,  in intervening, we were all involved; all countries of SADC were 
involved; nothing was... forced by any one group of SADC members. So there was justification in the interventions...” 
(Interview with R 15, 07 July 2011)   Respondent 2 echoed this position when he said that the protocol which 
established the SADC security mechanism in 1996 was acceded and ratified by all SADC member states. He noted: 
“... that all of the member states accepted to enter into this protocol clearly saved as a stepping stone to have an 
assistance to be provided to other member states” (Interview with R 2, 28 June 2010). 
 
 A former President of Botswana who was involved in the 1994 and 2007 SADC preventive missions in Lesotho 
argued that all the interventions in their different forms were justified because if swift action was not taken, the 
discord was bound to spread to other member states in the region. As he puts it: “[y]es, yes indeed both of them were 
justified because what goes wrong with the other member state of SADC concern all other members of SADC, not 
only politically and emotionally but even economically. It does affect and there is also loss of life that we should all try 
to prevent” (Interview with R 10, 23 May 2011). The position that SADC member states should assist when there are 
civil commotions in another member, is in agreement with the SADC protocols and treaty. For example, Article 11 of 
the Protocol and structure of the Organ clearly stipulates that the SADC is duty bound to intervene in both inter- and 
intra-state conflicts. Articles 11(b) (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv) on the jurisdiction of the OPDS state that the SADC will 
intervene in significant intra-state conflicts as manifested by large scale violence between sections of the population 
and/or between the state and its people, amounting to genocide, ethnic cleansing and gross violation of human 
rights, in instances of military coups against a legitimately elected government and any large threats to regional 
peace and stability. SADC used these clauses to justify its interventions in the DRC and Lesotho. The above 
scenarios prevailed in the case of Lesotho following protests spearheaded by the opposition against the outcomes of 
the 1993, 1998 and 2007 elections. The protests against the 1993 and 1998 elections which were won by the BCP 
and LCD respectively were followed by coups led by the military and the monarchy and there was general threat to 
internal and regional peace which moved the regional bloc to intervene and restore normalcy. The post-2007 election 
Masire-led dialogue facilitation was also geared towards deterring a deterioration of Lesotho into political chaos 
reminiscent of the 1994 and 1998 cases. In view of the above it can logically be argued that the interventions were 
necessary and justified. 
 
8.2.2 SADC as Guarantor of Lesotho Democracy 
It emerged from most of the interview responses that what justified the SADC interventions in Lesotho, (mainly the 
1998 and 2007 missions) was the fact that after the 1994 SADC Troika mission, the SADC was mandated to be the 
guarantor of the Lesotho democracy, peace and stability. In the words of Respondent 15: “[a]fter 1994, SADC was 
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charged with looking after the affairs of Lesotho literally. The Troika in particular was to keep an eye on what was 
happening in Lesotho” (Interview with R 15, 07 July 2011). In line with this mandate, the SADC was put on guard and 
committed to ensuring that democracy was maintained and sustained in Lesotho. Any indications to the contrary 
would invite SADC‘s intervention. When the democratically elected government faced the post-1998 and 2007 
election violence and threats of coups, SADC undertook its mandate as accorded by the regional organisation. 
Confirming this commitment regarding the 1998 military intervention, Respondent 10 posited: “[t]hat is why South 
Africa and Botswana went in because we should have been three there, we should have been Botswana, South 
Africa and Zimbabwe. But we thought we would alert the Basotho and create a lot of commotion if the army came all 
the way from Bulawayo and Harare....” (Interview with R 10, 23 May 2011). According to one former Commander of 
the Botswana Defence Force (BDF), the military intervention was a continuation of diplomatic initiatives by the 
Presidents of South Africa, Botswana and Zimbabwe that were duly declared by SADC as guarantors of the Lesotho 
peace and democracy (Interview with R 12, 14 June 2011). In keeping with this mandate, “...SADC... promised to 
remain seized with the events and affairs of Lesotho....So Lesotho formally became a mountain that was constantly 
under the guidance of SADC” (Interview with Respondent 16, 07 July 2011) To this end, since 1994, the SADC has 
been involved in monitoring the Lesotho political situations particularly the conduct of its national elections to date. 
Hence, when the 2007 elections sparked opposition protests, SADC swiftly delegated Sir Ketumile Masire to defuse 
the situation through dialogue. 
 
8.2.3 Interventions to Restore Law and Order 
Most respondents argued that the levels of violence and insecurity which followed national elections in Lesotho were 
major reasons why SADC interventions should be credited as valid and justified because they restored law and order 
in the country and also protected democracy and a democratically elected government. A representative of the party 
which was in government during the intervention felt that all the SADC missions were justified and necessary to 
restore democracy, law and order.  An interviewee from the ruling LCD party indicated that both the 1993 and 1998 
elections which saw landslide victory by the BCP and the LCD respectively, were credible, fair and free and they 
ushered in democratically elected governments. In his view, the problem was that the military and the monarchy were 
hostile to the BCP and did not want to accept the will of the people and the advent of the democratic dispensation 
which was emerging in Lesotho following the 1993 and 1998 elections. The 1994 and 1998 post-election coups led 
by the monarchy in collaboration with the military and the opposition were a travesty to democracy in Lesotho and 
had to be thwarted by the regional organisation. He stated that they “... were very happy in the manner in which 
SADC handled it (the intervention). There was not any other way. That was the government elected by the people. 
So other people were not accepting the outcome of the elections” (Interview with R 6, 19 August 2010).  A participant 
from the the opposition ABC concurred with the views of Respondent 6 that somebody had to come in to defend 
democracy and the democratically elected governments (1994 and 1998). He hailed the interventions as “good in 
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terms of restoring the democratically elected government(s) and also encouraging debate to see where the problem 
is” (Interview with R 8, 10 August 2010).  Another respondent from the opposition LPC also noted that the justification 
of the SADC interventions emanated from the fact that the 1993 and 1998 general elections were legal and there was 
nothing unprocedural with the general elections. In light of this, the elections resulted in democratically elected 
governments which had to be respected and defended which the SADC accordingly did in 1994 and 1998. He further 
highlighted that what was flawed was the FPTP electoral model which promotes the winner-takes-all route. If any 
issue had to be raised, it should have been that of reforming the electoral model, not questioning the outcomes of the 
elections and legitimacy of the government. In light of this he posited: “[s]o in my view the intervention was legitimate 
but there were also legitimate concerns by the opposition. That is why I support the present electoral model-the 
Mixed Member Proportion (MMP) model (Interview with R 4, 04 August 2010)  
 
8.2.4 Interventions to thwart Violence 
Similarly, some of the respondents observed that the interventions were justified considering the intensity of violence 
which accompanied the post 1993, 1998 and 2007 general elections in the Kingdom. The palace coups of 1994 and 
1998 were characterised by loss of lives (for example the killing of the Deputy Prime Minister), destruction of 
property, looting and total collapse of the government, all of which bred unbridled lawlessness that in turn rendered 
the country ungovernable. In his letter requesting assistance during the 1998 dispute the Prime Minister of Lesotho, 
Phakalitha Mosisili, noted that ―[s]ince returning from the SADC meeting in Mauritius, I have come back to a city and 
a government held at ransom by the demonstrators of the BCP, BNP and the MFP with their leaders urging them on‖ 
(cited in Molapo, 1999: 1). The post-2007 elections were also followed by opposition riots which culminated in the 
bombing of the residences of the government officials and the attempted assassination of the Prime Minister, 
Phakalitha Mosisili. What aggravated the chaos and insecurity especially in the cases of 1994 and 1998 was the 
involvement of the military which, for some of the respondents, had reneged on its national duty of maintaining 
peace, security and order in the country. According to the Prime Minister: ―[t]he most serious tragedy is that the 
police, and in particular the army, are best spectators‖ (cited in Molapo, 1999: 1). The security forces had been a 
partisan entity since the era of the Basotho National Party under Leabua Jonathan and later after 1986 when it 
launched a coup and ruled until 1993 when democracy was restored. In view of this, the Lesotho Defence Force was 
tempted to destabilise the democratic dispensation and retain political power. This is how Matlosa (1995: 138) 
recounts the situation: ―[h]aving tested power, the military proved extremely reluctant to make way for the democratic 
the government to render itself subject to democratic control mechanisms, and to concede its corporate material 
interests to civil supervision.‖ The military is therefore accused of taking advantage of the opposition protests to 
paralyse the government and hijack the democratic trajectory in Lesotho. The ABC respondent described the 
situation as follows: “[b]ecause Maseru was under the control of the opposition and the main government offices 
were under threat, nobody was safe and somehow people were saying our security, that is our defence force was 
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being classified as if they are part of the opposition support base, not owing allegiance to the government” (Interview 
with R 8, 10 August 2010). The military was no longer taking orders from central command or the government. Both 
the military command and the government in the cases of 1994 and 1998 were paralysed by the military mutiny and 
the concomitant opposition uprisings and palace coups. The country had become virtually ungovernable (Interviews 
with R 3, 03 August 2010; R2, 28 June 2010; R 12, 14 June 2011; R 11 and 13, 04 May 2011 and 16 June 2011 
respectively).  
 
This volatile scenario was better described by a former Botswana Defence Force retired Brigadier who was involved 
during Operation Boleas. He stated that “...military intervention was necessary because the military in Lesotho itself 
had gone out of hand. It was no longer following the constitution or its reason for existence in whatever they did in 
Lesotho because they were politicised and unfortunately they were the opposition was in control of the military and 
the military deterred the police from taking on their duties....In other words the military was encouraging lawlessness” 
(Interview with Respondent 12, 04 May 2011). One of the respondents from the SADC OPDS also stated that the 
SADC interventions were justified because “[s]uch acts were, you know; undertaken by the powers, by the institutions 
that are employed to ensure that peace and security in the country” (Interview with R 2, 28 June 2010). The mandate 
of the SADC particularly during the 1998 mission was to disarm and contain the LDF, restore the democratically 
elected government and return the country to political normalcy. As a result of these ugly scenes, the SADC 
interventions came as a welcome overture. According to a retired academic at NUL “...it was a frightening situation; 
yah. Any force that could restore order and stability was definitely justified....the government had collapsed. The only 
force which could restore the government to power and thereby ensure... order was the SADC” (Interview with R 16, 
07 July 2011).  
 
 If the views expressed above are anything to go by, the SADC interventions were motivated by justifiable and noble 
reasons, and were therefore necessary. The SADC had pledged to defend democracy and denounce 
unconstitutional means of attaining power in the region. In its treaty, the OPDS and MDP protocols, the SADC has 
pledged collective resolve and commitment to promote and defend democracy, peace and security. Chapter 3, Article 
4 on principles of the SADC treaty commits the organisation ―to defend human rights, democracy and the rule of law, 
solidarity, peace and security‖ within its member states and the region at large (SADC Treaty 1992). To the extent 
that there is evidence that Lesotho‘s democracy and security were in jeopardy, the intervention was logical and the 
SADC as the regional body was operating within its regional mandate of maintain regional peace. 
 
8.2.5 Government-requested SADC interventions 
The other perspective which emerged from the interviews to justify the SADC preventive diplomacy missions in 
Lesotho was that in all the missions the SADC did not take unilateral decisions. On the contrary, the SADC was 
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accordingly requested by the legitimate government of Lesotho for assistance to quench the turmoil which was 
unfolding in the Kingdom. The SADC persistently pointed out that the organisation came at the invitation of the 
legitimate government in Lesotho. If indeed the interventions were responses to requests by the government of the 
day, then SADC was in line with Article 7 of the MDP which reads: ―no action shall be taken to assist any State in 
terms of this Pact, save at the State Party‘s own request or with the consent...‖ (SADC Mutual Defence Pact 2004). In 
fact, the governments at the times of the SADC interventions have it on record that they invited the SADC in face of 
coups and insurmountable civil turmoil which threatened full-scale civil war. For instance, in his briefing to the South 
African Parliament on why South Africa deployed troops in the Kingdom, Mangosotho Buthelezi who was the acting 
President read the letter written by Prime Minister Mosisili to the South African government requesting assistance. In 
the letter, the Prime Minister said ―[i]n my capacity as the Prime Minister and Head of Government of the Kingdom of 
Lesotho; I wish to urgently request your Excellencies Heads of States of Botswana, Mozambique, South Africa and 
Zimbabwe to come to the rescue of my government and the people of Lesotho. The only intervention I can and do 
request is of a military nature... It is against this background that I submit a formal and urgent request... in 
accordance with the SADC Agreements to put together, quickly a strong military intervention to help Lesotho to return 
to normalcy‖ (cited in Molapo 1999: 1). Similarly, during the 1994 conflict, the then Prime Minister, Ntsu Mokhehle of 
the BCP, had written a letter to the South African government stating that due to the rapidly deteriorating situation in 
the Royal Lesotho Defence Force, the government of Lesotho was urgently requesting the South African 
Government to assist by dispatching a peace-keeping force to Maseru to defuse a bloodbath which might flow from 
the disastrous situation.  
 
A sizeable number of the respondents held this perspective as an indication that the interventions were at the behest 
of the government of the day.  Respondent 2 argued that in all instances of SADC‘s interventions, “Lesotho had a 
legitimate government... it was the one that requested assistance from the regional body and that government had 
the right to ensure the security of the nation and protection of the entire citizens” (Interview with R 2, 28 June 2010).  
Another respondent, an officer in the SADC security unit, also stated: “[y]ou must also realise that SADC did not take 
the unilateral decision; there was an intervention from the government of Lesotho particularly from the Prime Minister 
that a coup has occurred...and the government was in a state of paralysis....so the Prime Minister himself said the 
assistance we request is of military nature” (Interview with R 1, 25 May 2010). The request for military intervention 
was mainly because ―the Lesotho army has become a player in the unrest and so cannot be seen to be a neutral 
force able to create a safe environment for the solution of the problems of the country" (ANC Parliamentarian Fatima 
Hajaij, 1998 cited in Molapo 1999: 2). Supporting this fact, regarding the 1998 military intervention, Respondent 13, a 
retired Brigadier who participated in both the 1994 and 1998 missions provided a quotation of a public statement by 
the Prime Minister Phakalitha Mosisili to parliament that: “[t]he armed forces of Botswana and South Africa are in 
Lesotho at the express invitation of the government of Lesotho. That they are not an invasion but an intervention 
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force” (Interview with R 13, 16 June 2011). This view is shared by another interviewee (Respondent 14), a Brigadier 
General attached to the SADC Headquarters. He maintained that “it was the decision of the government that there 
should be an intervention. So the government in its wisdom found that it was necessary for the intervention to be 
carried out‖ (Interview with R 14, 20 June 2011). 
 
With such evidence, the SADC ―cannot be faulted for coming to the help of a legitimate government, recently elected, 
which requested assistance‖ (Southall, 2001: 166). Despite the dissenting views, there is evidence that in both the 
1994 and 1998 interventions, the SADC was invited by the governments of the day which the regional body 
recognised as legitimate. Therefore, it was to some extent within its operational mandate as stipulated in its 
protocols. However, the shortcoming was that the SADC did not ―obtain the consent of all the disputing parties to its 
peacemaking efforts‖ as stipulated in Article 11 on the procedures of the OPDS protocol. In both the 1994 and 1998 
interventions, the SADC did not make any efforts to determine whether their intervention would be acceptable to the 
opposition. This might be, perhaps understandably, because they were invited by the legitimate authority in Lesotho 
and the urgency of the need to defuse the volatile political situation in the country.  
 
However, some of the interviewees maintained that according to the Constitution of Lesotho, the invitation for 
intervention ought to have come from the King who was the head of State, and not from the Prime Minister. The 
Prime Minister, in accordance with the Lesotho constitution should have invited intervention with the approval of the 
King, which was not the case during the 1998 intervention (Interviews with R 16; Coordinator of the Lesotho 
Transitional Resource Centre (TRC) Development for Peace, R 21, 13 July 2010 and 09 August 2010 respectively). 
In questioning the legality of the South African-led intervention, the New National Party (NNP) parliamentarian 
Geldenhuys emphasised the issue thus: ―[t]he argument that the government of Lesotho requested SADC to 
intervene does not hold water. In terms of the Lesotho Constitution, the King must be consulted on all issues of 
government business. The King of Lesotho was not consulted on this issue and therefore there is no question of a 
legitimate request by any government‖ (cited in Molapo, 1999: 2). But, that was not the case because of the political 
rivalry which had existed between the Lesotho government and the monarchy. In both the 1994 and 1998 
disturbances in the Kingdom, the King was at the centre of the attempted coups and the Prime Ministers did not 
consult the King because they regarded him as part of the problem rather than the solution. As other respondents 
portrayed, the historical animosity and power struggle between the Prime Minister and the monarchy dated back to 
1965 when the Constitution of Lesotho was drawn.  
 
The core of the strife was that the monarchy wanted the constitution to accord it executive powers instead of the 
ceremonial powers which it currently holds in the Lesotho government. As the LPC interviewee puts it “[a]t 
independence there was a dispute between the position of the King versus that of the Prime Minister and there was 
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some opinion which said that the King should have executive powers and the Prime Minister should just be 
subordinate to the King...Then at independence it was finally said that the Prime Minister must have executive 
powers. Now that was never accepted by the monarchy” (Interview with R 4, 04 August 2010). This political tug-of-
war between the government and the monarchy was cited as one of the source of friction in the Lesotho political 
arena. The NIP respondent described the relationship in the following words: “[s]o...we have a Prime Minister who 
has been elected and we have a King who is there by virtue [of birth]. So these two heads...we honestly really have a 
problem all the time because there are some people who believe in their King [and] there are others who believe in 
their Prime Minister. So we have two bulls in the kraal” (Interview with R 3, 03 August 2010). It is this animosity and 
the involvement of the monarchy in the 1994 and 1998 disputes, supposedly on the side of the opposition parties, 
which the participant from the ruling LCD relied on to say there was no way the government could have consulted the 
King because he was spearheading the conflict and the Prime Minister had no alternative but to use his executive 
powers to invite the SADC to restore law and order in the country. Disputing this view, a University of Botswana 
academic noted: “[y]ou need to realise that he King was not an innocent bystander in the whole thing; you recall the 
vigil at the King‟s Palace and I believe he sympathised with the people. So he was an interested party in some way. 
So I think it was...something prudent that the Head of state (Prime Minister) intervened in that manner. Had the Prime 
Minister not intervened in that particular manner, I am sure we would be talking a different story about the stability of 
that Southern African country” (Interview with R 7, 13 July 2010). In fact, the Prime Minister in his letter emphasised 
the urgency of the request: ―I will appreciate your Excellencies' timely intervention before it is too late‖ (cited in 
Molapo, 1999: 2). 
 
In any case, if indeed all the interventions were at the invitation of the government of the day, then they could fit in 
well as legitimate in international law. One of the requirements for intervention is that it ―should be specifically 
requested of the potential intervener by the government of the country under attack; the requesting government 
should have the clear support of the majority of its population; the requesting government should itself act with 
intelligence and humanity and be demonstrably more responsive to the needs of the people...‖ (Millar; cited in du 
Plessis 2000: 45). 
 
These reasons for the justification of the SADC interventions in member states are an acknowledgement to the 
pledge by the SADC to champion democracy, political stability, peace, human rights and democratic governance in 
its member states and the region as a whole for it to realise its core goals of regional integration and economic 
development. Chapter 3 Articles 4 and 5 of the SADC Treaty on the principles and objectives of the organisation 
outlines its core duty as defence of human rights, democracy and rule of law, evolve common political values, 
systems and institutions, promote and defend peace and security (SADC Treaty 1992). That the SADC successfully 
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restored the democratically elected government, peace, stability and thwarted the outbreak of full-scale civil war in 
Lesotho is a commendable effort by the regional organisation. It fulfilled Article 2 (a, b and g) in which it pledged to: 
 Protect the people of and safeguard the development of the Region against instability arising from the breakdown 
of law and order, intra-state conflict and aggression; 
 Promote political cooperation among State Parties and the evolution of common political values and institutions; 
 Promote the development of democratic institutions and practices within the territories of State Parties and 
encourage the observance of universal human rights as provided in the Charters and Conventions of the African 
Union and the United Nations respectively (Protocol and Structure of the Organ 2001). 
 
Article 11 of the Organ Protocol states the central task of the SADC as prevention of large-scale violence and coups 
which may jeopardise regional peace and stability. Sub section b (i), (ii), 111) and (iv) define significant intra-state 
conflict within the territory of a state party as: 
 Large-scale violence between sections of the population or between the state and sections of the population, 
including genocide, ethnic cleansing and gross violation of human rights; 
 A military coup or other threats to the legitimate authority of a State; 
 A condition of civil war or insurgency;  
 A conflict which threatens peace and security in the Region or in the territory of another State party (Protocol and 
Structure of the Organ; 2001). 
 
A close assessment of the disturbances which erupted in Lesotho in 1994, 1998 and 2007 shows that they fit into the 
above description. Hence, SADC was within its legitimate regional mandate as stipulated in its treaty and security 
protocols. 
 
As if in anticipation that some of the respondents would denounce the SADC missions as unjustified, Respondenst 2 
and 4 raised a critical point regarding the question of the justification of the intervention as the response would be 
determined by one‘s political inclinations.  Respondent 4 stated: “[i]n my view the interventions were justified but to 
convince the opponents of the regime is not easy” (Interview with R 4, 04 August 2010). Put differently, as noted by 
Respondent 2, there is normally no justified intervention. This is because to those people who might feel that the 
disturbances would have benefitted them, the intervention would always be unjustified. Nevertheless, to those who 
felt threatened by the disruptions to peace and security, the intervention was justified (paraphrase from an interview 
with R 2, 28 June 2010). For example, for the government, the SADC interventions were the only available solution 
as the country was rendered ungovernable and the government paralysed by the opposition protests. The retired 
NUL academic concluded: “[i]t was justified...definitely intervening in that kind of situation and under those 
circumstances, it was justified; to the extent that Lesotho was in crisis” (Interview with R 16, 07 July 2011). The 
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justification is also boosted by the official requests made by the government to the SADC Heads of States for 
assistance as stated earlier. 
 
8.3 Opposing Views on the Motives and Justifications of the Interventions 
Conversely, while some of the respondents from the opposition parties had similar views on the justifications of the 
1994 and 2007 non-coercive interventions, they held a different view regarding the 1998 military intervention. Most of 
them hailed the 1994 and 2007 peaceful settlement of the dispute through dialogue and negotiations as the best tool 
the SADC should employ in resolving regional conflicts. Such feelings emanate from the pledge by the SADC in its 
treaty and protocols that it would strive to ―prevent, contain and resolve inter- and intra-state conflicts by peaceful 
means (mediation, negotiation, arbitration and conciliation‖ (The SADC Treaty 1992; Article 11 (b) and (c) on 
objectives). 
 
In this regard, even the Basotho National Party interviewee who was virulent throughout against the SADC missions 
in Lesotho, calmed down when he noted that the 1994 and 2007 missions “...were partly justified; you know; as sister 
countries to come in for talks; to make sure that they bring both sides to a peaceful understanding” (Interview with R 
18, 07 July 2011). Regarding the 1998 military intervention, it became clear that most of the opposition parties‘ 
respondents were bitterly against the SADC. The mentioning of the 1998 military intervention invited such comments 
as "military invasion incursion", "violation of the Basotho sovereignty", "territorial integrity and nationhood" and 
―interference in the domestic affairs of Lesotho‖. Some even argued that the intervention was not a SADC project but 
was the South African military against Lesotho, and therefore unjustified. The interviewee from the Lesotho Royalty 
(Respondent 19) summed up the anger of the Basotho nation against the military intervention of 1998 when he said: 
“1994 was quite amicable, was‟nt it? Now because there were talks that were offered, 1998 you know, the military 
might will always hurt some one. And we are saying we felt we have been raped as men when a man comes into 
your country and bombards your army places, your whatever, even entering the palace and pointing guns at the 
King”s house. That was the biggest humiliation we have ever suffered as a nation” (Interview with R 19, 07 July 
2011). 
 
8.3.1 SADC Interventions: An intrusion in the Domestic Affairs of Lesotho 
Numerous reasons were advanced by those who view the SADC interventions as unjustified encroachments in their 
domestic affairs. The views that the SADC intruded in the domestic affairs of Lesotho may have been motivated by 
the SADC pledge in its treaty, the OPDS and MDP protocols that the organisation will respect the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of member states. In its OPDS Principles, section (a), the SADC pledges to ―respect the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of each state and its inalienable right to independent existence.‖ In the preamble of 
the Protocol and Structure of the Organ, the SADC unequivocally stated its commitment to the principle of strict 
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respect for sovereignty, sovereign equality, territorial integrity, political independence, good neighbourliness, non-
aggression and non-interference in internal affairs of other States‖ (Protocol and Structure of the Organ; 2001). 
Article 7 of the MDP also emphasises that the organisation will observe the principles of non-interference in the 
internal affairs of each other. Thus the BNP respondent contended that “[i]t is not [an] intervention; I call it an 
interference in our domestic affairs. It was a purely political matter between the ruling party LCD and opposition 
parties over how the LCD was running the country” (Interview with R 18: 07 July 2011). Another respondent argued 
that to the extent that Lesotho lost its sovereignty during the 1998 SADC intervention, then its justification was 
questionable. This is how he articulately put it: “[y]es we were definitely sacrificed. There is no way in which it was not 
going to be sacrificed if you have an external force intervention, with that kind of superior military might and totally 
subordinating the country, that country is not sovereign at least during the temporary occupation...That is any 
intervening force, if superior to the force that is being occupied, will definitely deprive the latter of the sovereignty. 
Although temporarily, Lesotho lost its sovereignty during the entire SADC military presence in the country....They 
determined and directed the course of things and processes; how people behaved and so on...which of course was 
unconstitutional” (Interview with R 16, 07 July 2011). 
 
The above sentiments are echoed by the Basotho Congress Party interviewee (Respondent 17). In his view, "[t]he 
interventions were not justified to the extent that...they went to encroach on the sovereignty of the country” (Interview 
with R 17, 08 July 2011). According to the BNP Secretary General, the 1998 military intervention was a “violation of 
international law. It was total interference, unwarranted and not supported by any legal instrument” (Interview with R 
17, 07 July 2011). It is such views which bred animosity between South Africans and some Basotho mainly from the 
opposition who felt that South Africa was acting like a regional bully and had intentions of usurping Lesotho to be part 
of South Africa.  Respondent 18 had this to say on this issue: “[s]o to them we are not an independent country; we 
are not a sovereign country. They think we are just a small boy on which they can do anything they like in our 
country. And we feel so sad about that” (Interview with R 18, 07 July 2011).  These views were shared by almost all 
respondents from the opposition parties. They indicated that the SADC had violated one of its principles of not 
interfering in the domestic affairs of member states and respecting the territorial integrity and sovereignty of member 
states. In fact Southall and Petlane, 1995: xvi) argue that although the 1994 SADC mission is credited for restoring 
democracy; Lesotho‘s independence was enormously compromised when the SADC Troika was put on alert as the 
guarantors of Lesotho democracy and peace. They maintain that, ―Lesotho‘s continuing independence is in very 
large measure dependent upon its adherence to newly regionally endorsed democratic norms.‖ The SADC 
interventions of 1998 and 2007 under the auspices of the SADC Guarantors of the Lesotho democracy are evidence 
of how Lesotho independence is controlled by the regional body.  
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The insinuations that South Africa had the intention of incorporating Lesotho as one of its provinces has a long 
history. In fact, the Kingdom was saved from being part of the apartheid Union of South Africa by the British who 
declared the country a British Protectorate together with Botswana and Swaziland. The apartheid regime had wanted 
to have the Kingdom as part of the Union. The inclination was also spurred by the surrounded geographical position 
of Lesotho and its economic dependence on the Republic of South Africa This has been an invidious issue to 
Basotho who had all along vowed to defend their nation. Questioning the deployment of South African troops in 
Lesotho, some opposition members of parliament viewed the military intervention as intended to annex the Kingdom 
to be part of South Africa. Geldenhuys of the New National Party (NNP) interrogated: ―[w]hy [if that was not the 
intention] was the South African flag hoisted on the premises of the Palace? Was this to demonstrate a deed of 
annexation because this is how it is interpreted in Lesotho?‖ In his view the 1998 military mission was a shortsighted 
act of aggression which would sour the future relations between South Africa and Lesotho (cited in Molapo, 1999: 2-
3). 
 
However, Southall (2000) contends that there was no way that a democratic South Africa which was still in the 
embryonic phase of consolidating its democracy, could have moved to incorporate a tumultuous and perennially 
conflict-ridden impoverished Kingdom. In his view, it would have been a gross political miscalculation and politically 
suicidal. Southall posits that even though South Africa had lucrative investments in the Lesotho Highlands Water 
Project, she would not contemplate integrating the Kingdom. Instead, ―[t]he real challenge will be to find an internal 
solution to Lesotho‘s political problems that can be combined with a closer functional relationship which respects the 
Kingdom‘s political sovereignty, yet acknowledges the necessity for it to work with South Africa economically‖ 
(Southall, 2000: 7). 
 
8.3.2 SADC Inconsistency in its Preventive Diplomacy Missions 
The other reason advanced by those who question the justification of the SADC military mission of 1998 is that the 
SADC is not consistent in its applications of interventions. They accuse the regional body of double standards. The 
respondents who hold this view felt that while the SADC swiftly moved in Lesotho, they have not done the same in 
the DRC, Zimbabwe and Madagascar which they feel have been embraced by similar political turmoil. The BNP 
respondent angrily questioned, “[w]hy they don‟t go sending an army into Zimbabwe...Why don‟t they do it in 
Madagascar now? Why don‟t they do it in the DRC? Why did they do it in Lesotho only?” (Interview with R18, 07 July 
2011). Reverend Meshoe of the African Christian Democratic Party in South Africa commended the position taken by 
South Africa on the DRC conflict as a wise and logical one. However, he recorded his misgivings about the South 
African military intervention in Lesotho. This is what he said on this issue: ―[w]e fail to understand why our executive 
did not use the same caution and wisdom before deciding to invade the tiny Kingdom of Lesotho‖ (cited in Molapo, 
1999: 3). The perceptions that the SADC is selective in its coercive interventions inevitably triggered views that the 
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SADC only targets the weaker member states to intervene militarily. Respondent 19, who is a member of the 
monarchy, argued: “[t]o me SADC looks like a double standard type of body. It all depends on who you are. Look at 
what is happening in Zimbabwe, they did nothing with them. Look at what is happening in Madagascar, they didn‟t do 
anything; except what has happened in Lesotho. The cases of Madagascar and Zimbabwe shows you that they are 
double standards people, or they were able to only attack the weaker...They cannot do that in Zimbabwe” (Interview 
with R 19, 07 July 2011). The validity of such questions was also raised by respondent 7 - an academic with the 
University of Botswana - that indeed there was a coup in Madagascar and human rights abuses in Zimbabwe which 
did not meet the same coercive response as was the case with Lesotho (Interview with R 7,  13 July 2010). The 
above responses confirm perceptions that the coercive intervention was only possible because of the dimunitive 
status of Lesotho in the region and that the same cannot be reproduced in other conflict-ridden regional member 
states such as Zimbabwe (Sejanamane, 1996). Makoa (1998: 21) lambasted South Africa for being fork-tongued in 
its foreign policy. While South Africa advocated dialogue in the DRC conflict, it swiftly engaged militarily in the case of 
Lesotho. He expressed shock at the about-turn in South Africa‘s approach to conflict resolution in the Lesotho 
instance: from a blanket insistence on negotiated settlements to military intervention. The fact that the SADC 
intervened militarily in Lesotho shows that the organisation is not a security community, since members of such a 
community do not resort to coercion in resolving regional disputes. 
 
However, on the issue of double standards, respondents from the SADC Organ unit and an academic from the 
University of Botswana argued that the SADC interventions in different conflict situations are determined by the 
contextual factors such as the nature of the conflict, the sources, the level of violence involved and the stakeholders 
in the conflict. The University of Botswana academic stated, “[i]t depends on the situation; it‟s contextual. I mean 
when people protest peacefully then you sit down and talk to them. But when people are burning the commercial 
district, then you have to come in force” (Interview with R 7, 13 July 2010). In its founding treaty and security 
protocols, the SADC has pledged to resolve regional conflicts through non-coercive diplomatic means. But it goes on 
to say that where there is grave and gross human rights violation, massive loss of life, genocide and other 
abrogations to normal human existence, it will use any means necessary, including force, to normalise the situation. 
The SADC also pledged to resort to coercion as a last resort option after the diplomatic non-coercive measures have 
failed. Article (g) of the Objectives of the Organ states that ―only where diplomatic means fail, would the Organ 
recommend that the Summit should consider punitive measures‖ (SADC Organ Protocol 2001). In fact the SADC 
raised issues to the effect that the military intervention was preceded by peaceful measures through the Langa 
Commission and numerous delegations by the then-South African Minister of Defence, Joe Modise, and Deputy 
President Thabo Mbeki, which did not bear fruits as far as diffusing the situation was concerned. In the view of the 
SADC and other interviewees the situation which prevailed in Lesotho in 1998 was drifting towards total warfare. As 
Southall (1998: 2) portrays the situation: ―the internal dynamics of the situation had been transformed by the army 
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revolt...‖ The government ―...was steadily losing any last remaining grip on power as the BNP and BCP soldiery and 
the police were working together to paralyse the functioning of the government.‖  A former commander of the 
Botswana Defence Force (Respondent 12) described the scenario thus: “[w]hat was happening is that it had reached 
a point where it was difficult for government [and] people to conduct normal life. I mean going to work. The soldiers 
were stopping people, commandeering government vehicles; people, ministers could not go to their offices. The there 
was destruction of normal life in Maseru. So government was paralysed.... So this was a deteriorating situation” 
(Interview with R 12, 14 June 2010). In his letter requesting assistance, the Prime Minister gave graphic details of the 
political chaos in the Kingdom. He portrayed a situation of ―...rampaging demonstrators congregating at various 
offices, government vehicles taken by force from civil servants, civil servants being stopped from going to work, 
abduction of ministers, and senior military officers, and the killing of the Deputy Prime Minister". This, no doubt 
reflected the intensity of the political anarchy unfolding in Lesotho which should have moved the regional 
organisation to intervene militarily, more so because the armed forces were part of the destabilisation.  
 
The organisation cannot be accused of double standards and selective use of coercion regarding its 1998 military 
mission in Lesotho. The issue of high intensity violence as one of the factors which the SADC depended on to 
determine the use of coercion, was contested by the BCP respondent who said that before the arrival of the SADC 
forces, the demonstrations were peaceful. In his words: “[t]hey came in on the 22nd of September; before then there 
was no looting, there was no torching or destruction; there was nothing. But everything went astray from the moment 
the forces of South Africa entered Lesotho” (Interview with R 17, 08 July 2011). These sentiments are in consonance 
with Southall‘s (1998: 1) assertion that ―South Africa‘s...armed incursion into Lesotho has provoked a massive 
controversy...it is widely blamed for precipitating an orgy of looting, arson, and violence which left the main street of 
Maseru, the capital, a burnt out shell. It has also raised questions concerning the necessity of intervention, the 
international legality of such actions, the credibility and consistency of South African foreign policy, the effectiveness 
of South Africa‘ armed forces and the appropriate role for SADC.‖ In the view of one opposition Member of 
Parliament in South Africa, ―sending troops into Lesotho clearly contravened previous commitments to peaceful 
solutions to conflict situations on the continent‖ (cited in Molapo, 1999: 2). In fact, the SADC official interviewed 
indicated that the SADC intervened militarily in the DRC. However, it is on record that South Africa had insisted on 
diplomatic solutions of the DRC conflict. She only deployed her troops as a post-conflict peacebuilding effort with the 
United Nations Peace Mission in the DRC (MONUC).  
 
8.3.3 SADC Intervention: A Violation of Lesotho Sovereignty 
Whatever the case, some of the Basotho, mainly from the opposition parties, persistently projected the SADC military 
intervention of 1998 as an incursion which violated their sovereignty and statehood. It emerged abundantly from the 
responses of the opposition participants in this study that the Basotho were reeled by the South African troops 
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hoisting the South African flag, as if they were a victorious invading force over the Kingdom. The alleged violent 
approach by the South African troops and the affront bred by the hoisting of the South African flag was accordingly 
interpreted as an invasion and violation of the Lesotho sovereignty. The citizens were emboldened by the spirit of 
patriotism to defend their country. To add insult to injury, they advanced to the royal palace and this was viewed as 
an unpardonable affront as the monarchy in Lesotho is regarded as an embodiment of the Basotho nation and 
statehood. This, to a large extent, triggered the historical animosity between the Basotho and/or Lesotho Defence 
Force and the then-apartheid South African troops which invaded Lesotho on several occasions in pursuit of the 
liberation activists. Consequently, apart from the fact that South African troops entered Lesotho first when the 
situation was still volatile, the historical animosity between the two neighbours was fully revived. It ultimately 
manifested itself with a high level of resistance which the South African troops met from the Basotho, compared to 
the hospitable and less hostile reception of the Botswana Defence Force (BDF). It has also been established that, 
compared to the BDF which is credited as having been professional in its operations and which hoisted a white flag 
symbolic of a peace-making force upon entering Lesotho, the South African troops were very confrontational and 
unprofessional in their approach and this sparked hostilities and a collective spirit of resistance. One respondent 
indicated that “[t]here was an understanding that no, no, South Africa was now invading and taking over the country. 
And all, by and large, that was the information that was being spread over that South Africa is taking over the 
country. And again when the South Africans got to the Palace, they raised their flag and that was very offensive...; it 
was assumed that these people are now raising up their flag at the highest seat of government in Lesotho. Basically, 
it meant South Africa has taken over. That is how it was interpreted and that is one of those things that led to the 
mass uprising by the people who said we would rather burn down everything else” (Interview with R 14, 20 June 
2011). The differences in the operational approaches of the South African and Botswana contingents are clearly 
articulated by the leader of the Basotho African Congress (Respondent 5). He argued that the “Botswana army was 
very, very professional because when they came into the border, they just pushed up a white flag calling for peace 
and every body you know gave that gentle approach back to them and they were very friendly with the people. That 
is why they were able to build their mission successfully because people listened to them whilst the other military 
units (South African) had it very difficult because people were fighting with them” (Interview with R 5, 04 August 
2010)  
 
The volatile situation was worsened by poor communication from the paralysed government to the public that the 
South African and later Botswana contingents were carrying out a legitimate SADC mission and mandate as 
requested by the government. This may have persuaded some Basotho not to interpret the mission as a South 
African attack. However, the media fuelled the view that the operation was a South African invasion to the detriment 
of the perception of the whole mission. This lack of transparency and clarity, coupled with flawed communication by 
the Lesotho government and the SADC regarding the mandate and legitimacy of the mission gave ammunition to the 
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opposition parties to present the entire operation as a South African incursion, much to the chagrin of the SADC 
which wanted it to be viewed as a regional peace-keeping operation (De Coning 1998; Basupi 2007). Questions still 
hang over the Lesotho political space on the legality of the 1998 military mission. In view of this, the New National 
Party member of parliament wondered who in fact instructed him [the Acting President of South Africa, Buthelezi] to 
intervene militarily in Lesotho and for what reasons? (cited in Molapo, 1999). Although both sides raised compelling 
arguments on the issue of the justification and motivation for the interventions, the bottom line is that the SADC did 
not follow its stipulated rules and procedures in launching the 1998 mission which the majority of the participants in 
this study contested and resented. With such perceptions against military intervention, SADC‘s ―involvement may be 
judged according to whether it has laid the basis for non-violent resolution of political conflict within Lesotho‖ 
(Southall, 2001: 168). 
 
8.3.4 Questions on the Legitimacy of the SADC 1998 Military Intervention 
Chapters 52, 53 and 54 of the UN Charter mandated regional organisations to intervene in regional conflicts upon 
being granted permission by the United Nations Security Council. The SADC has also stipulated in its founding treaty 
and security protocols that it will always consult the UN and the AU in cases where the organisation has to intervene 
in member states disputes. Furthermore, SADC has pledged to comply with rules of interventions as stipulated in the 
UN and AU Charter and international law conventions. The Organ Protocol Article 11 on methods, item (d), states 
that ―[t]he Summit shall resort to enforcement action only as a matter of last resort and, in accordance with Article 53 
of the United Nations Charter, only with the authorisation of the United Nations Security Council‖ (Protocol and 
Structure of the Organ, 2001). However, in the cases of the SADC military interventions in the DRC and Lesotho in 
1998, the SADC had not sought the approval of the AU or the UN. The missions were conducted and retroactively 
referred to the UN and AU relevant organs. This has raised questions regarding whether the SADC missions in the 
DRC and Lesotho were even mandated by the SADC. Sceptics argued that the two missions were launched by 
Zimbabwe, Namibia, Angola and South Africa and Botswana as individual nations representing their own national 
interests.  
 
According to those who hold this view, there was no SADC summit of head of states as required by the SADC treaty 
to deliberate on the Lesotho crisis, and subsequently mandating the SADC to intervene. Worse still, the OPDS 
Protocol and MDP (the legal instruments through which military intervention could be undertaken and coordinated in 
a member state) had not been ratified by all the SADC members during the 1998 military mission (Southall 1998). 
They were only ratified in 2001 and 2004 respectively. That in 1998, both the Organ and Mutual Defence Pact 
protocols had not yet been ratified and no recorded summit meeting to determine what action to take in the Lesotho 
crisis, it is not surprising that there are so many questions about who really authorised and coordinated the operation. 
Explaining this situation, one of the respondents noted, “I would say that perhaps, at the material time that we are 
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talking about, SADC has not as it were put its house together in terms of, you know rolling out the legal instruments 
to facilitate the process” (Interview with R 7, 13 July 2010). Molomo (1998: 8) therefore posits that ―the question of 
paramount importance in Lesotho intervention is whether or not it was legitimate? [And] this begs a further question, 
legitimate for whom?‖ These perceptions increasingly gave credence to the beliefs that the 1998 military intervention 
was a South African incursion rather than a SADC peace-keeping mission.  
 
To add insult to injury, there seemed to have been no SADC flag and logo to symbolise and designate the operation 
as a SADC peace-keeping operation. The fact that the two intervening forces - Botswana and South Africa - hoisted 
different flags on entering the Kingdom raised more questions than answers on the mandate and legitimacy of the 
operation (Makoa 1998, Basupi 2007). Makoa (1998: 10) points out that ―South Africa and Botswana claimed that 
their intervention in Lesotho is a SADC initiative. But, initially, they differed radically in terms of their perceived role... 
For example; on entering Lesotho the BDF hoisted a white flag, indicating that it saw itself as a peace-keeping force. 
This contrasts sharply with the behaviour of the SANDF which entered the country as an invasion force, attacking the 
royal palace, the two main army barracks in Maseru, and the rural LDF garrison at Ha katse. South Africa flaunted 
the SADC as a source of its authority. But Botswana explained that the SANDF and the BDF were in Lesotho at the 
behest of the Troika countries (South Africa, Botswana and Zimbabwe) which became guarantors of political stability 
in Lesotho following their mediation of the crisis engineered by the 1994 short-lived palace coup.‖  With the South 
African flag flown by the South African troops, the Basotho felt insulted and deprived of their nationhood and 
sovereignty. The prevalence of such perceptions were also aggravated by the fact that it was the South African 
forces which came into Lesotho first and conducted the bulk of the intervention task before the arrival of the 
Botswana Defence Force contingent (Mashishi 2003, Ngoma 2005, Hwang 2005, Likoti 2008). According to Mashishi 
(2003: 84), ―[i]t was the South African government that received a request from Lesotho. It was South Africa that 
initiated the possibility of mounting peace intervention in Lesotho. It was South African troops that... intervened first 
without a proper mandate from SADC.‖ The mission command structure was headquartered in Bloemfontein (South 
Africa). In view of this situation one of the respondents argued that the involvement of Botswana “...was to improve 
the image that it must be SADC, not South Africa, conducting the intervention” (Interview with R 4, 08 August 2010). 
This has raised questions on the legitimacy of the SADC mission and gave ammunition to those who viewed it as 
unjustified. 
 
These perceptions are used by those who deem the SADC intervention, mainly the 1998 coercive measure, as 
unjustified and in contravention of international law which it has pledged to comply with in its founding treaty and 
operational protocols. Worse still, the letter which the Prime Minister wrote requesting assistance was not addressed 
to the SADC but to the South African government. This has raised criticisms that the South African-led military 
intervention was not a SADC mission but a South African incursion. Difficulties experienced by the South African 
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government in convincingly locating the intervention within the realms of international law, therefore led to political 
antics of referring to the intervention as justified by ―customary international law‖ - whatever that means (Seiler, cited 
in Southall, 2001: 167). According to the BCP respondent the mission was conducted pursuant to an agreement 
signed by the acting President of South Africa, Mangosotho Buthelezi, and the Prime Minister of Lesotho, Phakalitha 
Mosisili, and not with the SADC as a regional body which should have been the case. South African, rather than 
SADC forces, intervened on the basis of the agreement between the two parties. Based on this view, the BCP 
respondent said, “[t]hat is where it loses the meaning of being a SADC intervention because if it was a SADC 
intervention, one would have thought that the agreement would have been between the government of Lesotho and 
the SADC machinery or the SADC head office‖ (Interview with R 17, 08 July 2011). Within this context and 
considering the letter from the Prime Minister to the South African government, it becomes very difficult to convince 
sceptics that the mission was authorised and mandated by the SADC. Respondent 17 further maintained that “[t]his 
was just a matter between two states and when it was done, there was no prior authorisation by the SADC. There 
was no SADC seating and authorising that oh no let South Africa act on our behalf. It was not like that. It was just an 
agreement between South Africa and Lesotho.‖ The participant went on to illustrate why his party thinks it was not a 
SADC mission. He stated, “[t]hat is exactly what we are saying that this was never a SADC mission because even 
prior to the signing of the agreement between Lesotho and South Africa, there was never a meeting of SADC to 
discuss the Lesotho situation. Even before that could be done South Africa was already in the country protecting its 
interests...There was never a SADC sanction; there was never an African Union sanction [and] there was never an 
United Nations sanction in respect of that intervention” (Interview with R 17, 08 July 2011). 
 
These sentiments were echoed by the BNP interviewee who posited that “...there was not even any law nor any 
agreement of SADC to send its troops into the country. [This is more] especially because, this regional agreement or 
arrangements are only done after they have been requested to do so by the United Nations Security Council. But 
nothing like that happened; they just came in” (Interview with R18, 07 July 2011). The above sentiments were echoed 
by Basupi (2007) in his thesis on the SADC 1998 military operations in Lesotho. He notes that the Status of Forces 
Agreement, (SOFA) that is, the agreement on the entrance of foreign troops in Lesotho, was not signed between the 
SADC and Lesotho but between the individual intervening countries (South Africa and Botswana) and Lesotho. The 
situation is that ―there was no SOFA with SADC, as SADC does not yet have a body which has the authority to enter 
into such an agreement, nor has it developed the necessary policies and procedures in this regard‖ (Republic of 
South Africa, Department of Defence: 1998: 6). Basupi (2007) further observes that there were also mixed feelings 
regarding the code name of the operation (Operation Boleas) as it did not reflect the regional image and symbolic 
meaning and purpose of the mission as per international practice. For example, different missions have been code-
named to carry the banner of the authorising body like the AU Mission in Darfur and Somalia and the UN missions in 
the DRC (MONUC), UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) to mention but a few. However, in the case of Lesotho, ―at no 
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point was there any symbolism that the intervention force was under the authority of SADC, or of a civilian head that 
can be identified with SADC...‖ (Basupi, 2007: 42). As if the damage was not enough, it is alleged that the 
commander of the South African contingent reported to the  the South African Defence Force Chief of Staff and the 
South African Minister of Defence as opposed to the SADC Security Unit Troika and/ or the SADC Chairperson if at 
all it was truly a SADC-mandated operation (Basupi, 2007). 
 
8.3.5 Questions on Payment of the 1998 Mission‟s Costs 
Several questions were raised on how the costs of Operation Boleas were paid. The BCP leader observed that after 
the intervention, the South African government required Lesotho to pay for services rendered and compensate for the 
destruction which ensued during the mission. Article 13 of the agreement between the Government of the Republic of 
South Africa and the Kingdom of Lesotho (1998: 6) stated that on settlement of debts for the 1998 mission, ―[t]he 
Parties agree that the Receiving Party shall be liable to the Sending Party for all real expenses and costs incurred by 
the Sending Party, with regard to the provision of military assistance to the Receiving Party. Upon receipt of an 
account from the Sending Party, the Receiving party shall pay the expenses and costs within a period of 30 (thirty) 
days. Interim accounts may be lodged by the Sending party and upon conclusion of the military assistance a final 
account shall be lodged.‖ A consideration which brings more questions than answers and complicates the 
controversy surrounding the legitimacy of the mission is why, if any payments were to be made, were they not 
directed to the SADC? In fact, if it was truly a SADC mission, SADC should bear the costs of the operation and an 
agreement should have been signed between the government of Lesotho and the SADC as a regional body rather 
than with an individual member state. The fact that the payments were to be made to South Africa, made some 
people logically conclude that it was a South African mission.. In view of this, the BCP interviewee noted: “[t]hen we 
are saying payments were made to South Africa. Lesotho paid South Africa...If it was a SADC exercise; the expense 
would have been that of SADC isn‟t it? And the question is, would SADC have charged Lesotho for intervening in a 
political conflict? We don‟t think so” (interview with R 17, 08 June 2011). The respondent further argued that people 
should not be hoodwinked by the retroactive statement by the SADC headquarters that the mission was sanctioned 
by the organisation because, “[i]n our humble view it was just an after thought... A cover- up of something that had 
been done already. It was not initiated by them. That is why we are saying, in so far as we are concerned, the so 
called SADC intervention in Lesotho was in no way a SADC intervention but a South African intervention” (Interview 
with R 17, 08 July 2011). In fact Du Plessis (2000) had denounced this tendency by the SADC to retroactively 
legitimise operations taken by individual member states as SADC missions, as an indication that the SADC lacked 
concrete intervention guidelines and operation principles. In the same vein, it appears that the intervening powers 
(Botswana and South Africa) used their own financial and material resources. The question to ask is, why, if it was a 
SADC mission, was it not funded by SADC? For example, the two countries used their own transport facilities and 
troops as the SADC Standby Force was still in its formative stages. Reflecting on this issue, respondent 7, an 
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academic with the University of Botswana remarked that “[m]uch as we are talking about SADC, these countries 
(South Africa and Botswana) were using their own resources. The SADC Brigade as we speak has not been fully 
established” (Interview with R 7, 13 July 2010). Consequently one of the retired Brigadiers from the BDF, who was 
involved in both the 1994 and 1998 operations lamented that “...the BDF was stretched to the limit by this operation 
which ate into their coffers for that financial year” (interview with R 13; 16 June 2011). It has also been established 
that while the South African government required Lesotho to refund it for the intervention, Botswana pledged to cover 
for the expenses of its operations in the Kingdom. With such evidence in place, one is compelled to agree with those 
who felt that the operation was labelled a SADC operation for political expedience, to save the image of the regional 
body and protect the integrity of South Africa from being labeled a regional bully. 
 
8.3.6 SADC Interventions Motivated by National Interests 
Further evidence is given by those who question the "SADC-ness" of the 1998 mission. To them it was a realist 
mission led by South Africa to defend its economic interests in the Kingdom. Several opposition participants in this 
research raised the issue that South Africa, under the pretext of a SADC operation, invaded the country to protect its 
economic interests, mainly concerning the Highlands Water Project at Katse Dam which is essential for supply of 
power to industries in the Gauteng Province. In their theses on the SADC operations in the DRC and Lesotho, 
Hwang (2005) and Likoti (2006) compellingly argue that the interventions were resource-driven to protect the national 
interests of the individual member states. This perspective consistently emerged mainly from the opposition 
participants who maintained that South Africa did not intervene in Lesotho for protection of peace, democracy and 
security as she claims but for national benefits. This confirms the Realists‘ position that in international politics, 
nations will more often than not intervene where their national interests be they political, strategic and or economic 
are in jeopardy (du Plessis 2000, Terrif etal. 2004). In line with this perspective, one of the interviewees held that 
indeed the trend of the South African 1998 intervention was shaped by their economic interests and that was the 
main reason why they extended their operations to the Lesotho Highlands Water Project rather than limiting it to 
Maseru where the uprisings were concentrated. He concluded that “[m]ember states, no matter what framework we 
put into place, they will always go where they have those interests. So national interests at the end of the day call the 
final shots. We may agree as a region that we need to intervene in a particular area, but eh, as to where we will go, 
[laughs], individual member states will determine that on the basis of their interests” (interview with R 14, 20 June 
2011). The participant surmised that this was the reason why South Africa and Botswana, and Zimbabwe, Angola 
and Namibia went into Lesotho and the DRC respectively in 1998. 
 
This perspective did not escape the diagnosis of the opposition participants during the interview sessions. They felt 
that the intervention had nothing much to do with the SADC and defence of regional peace and security. On the 
contrary, the opposition viewed the 1998 mission as a resource-motivated hegemonic invasion of Lesotho. The BCP 
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respondent made it abundantly clear that “[w]hen SADC intervenes, it should be with a view to protect the interests of 
that nation; the member state. Then they can say the interests of this nation are at stake as a member state. We 
intervened to safeguard, to protect those interests and the well-being of that member state. But with this intervention, 
it was no so. It was merely a dictation of South Africa as a stronger neighbour. And purely for economic interests” 
(Interview R 17, 08 July 2011). What made the opposition parties in Lesotho and almost all the opposition 
respondents conclude that the mission was a South African economic venture, was that when the South African 
troops entered Lesotho, they first headed to the Highland Water Project at Katse Dam and killed all the soldiers who 
guarded the dam. The question which persisted within the responses of the opposition participants is: since the 
protests were concentrated in Maseru, why did the South African troops capture the dam? The respondent from the 
BCP provided the answer to the question when he stated: “[t]he first moment they came in, once their armoured 
vehicles entered the border they were already at Katse, right inside the country...In the early hours of that morning, 
they did not only occupy the Highlands Water area, they actually massacred, the Lesotho soldiers who were on 
guard. They killed all of them. Remember that there were no protests at Katse. The protests were in Maseru the 
capital city. But instead they went to their only interest; water to purely safeguard their national interest-the Highland 
Water Scheme” (Interview with R 17, 08 July 2011). 
 
Sessay (2000: 239) has also dubbed the South African-led intervention into Lesotho as ―proof that regional 
hegemons are ready to take risks, and will move into neighbouring states if their interests are threatened.‖ Mashishi 
(2003) notes that South Africa had invested immensely in the Lesotho Highlands Project to supply its industries with 
water. Therefore no wonder that its intervention under the auspices of SADC is associated with efforts to protect its 
national interests. That the South African military intervention was spurred by national interests is evidenced by the 
fact that the country violated its foreign policy principles underpinning intervention in other nations. In its foreign 
policy position on peace operations, it stated that the South African Defence force would only be deployed outside 
South Africa if there was: 
 a peace settlement that is in place and agreed to by all belligerent parties; 
 an established time frame for the operation; 
 clarified aims and objectives; 
 approval of South African participation in the peace forces by all parties to the conflict; 
 sustainable and feasible deployment and acceptable command and control arrangements (Cilliers, 1995: 11). 
 
Makoa argues that during the South African-led military intervention, none of the above principles were observed. He 
notes that ―[i]ndeed until 22 September, 1998 this was a popular myth in South Africa. The country‘s media in 
particular, believed that these represented an unambiguous foreign policy orientation‖ (Makoa1998: 21). 
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Against this backdrop, the 1998 military intervention has been mirrored by mainly the opposition political parties as a 
South African invasion in defence of its national economic and political interests. The BNP respondent went further to 
indicate that South Africa had an agenda beyond simple defence of its economic interests. He argued that Lesotho is 
strategically a very important area in South Africa and is well-endowed with numerous minerals such as water and 
diamonds; hence, South Africa has always entertained an idea of absorbing Lesotho. In his words: “[w]e have all the 
water; we control all the water here; we have diamonds. We have a lot of things which South Africa is eyeing and that 
is why...South Africa has always been wishing Lesotho becomes part of South Africa so that we can share these 
resources” (Interview with R 18, 07 July 2011). He lamented the fact that South Africa unfairly benefits from the 
Lesotho water, hence their motivation to intervene militarily to defend their economic life veins which they felt were in 
danger. However, the point of Lesotho being a strategically important country which motivated the South African 
military intervention is contested by one respondent. The respondent also expressed doubts that South Africa could 
only have moved to protect the water project. In his view, "Lesotho strategically is not very important. It doesn't have 
well-known deposits of natural resources in abundance. I am not saying we have nothing. We have water which we 
supply to South Africa and I don‟t think it is an overriding motivation. It could have been one of the motives but it 
could not be overriding” (Interview with R 16, 07 July 2011).  
 
The NUL academic still concurred to some extent with those who felt the intervention was motivated by protection of 
South African interests. The fact that South African troops took control of the Katse Dam, and the official statements 
by the South Africa military commanders and the government that they were protecting their interests, provide 
answers to the question of the motivation for the intervention. Consequently, this exacerbated the suspicions that 
SADC was not involved (Interview with R 16, 07 July 2011). The BAC respondent also acknowledged that the driving 
motivation for South Africa was to protect its economic interests and that the capture of the Dam and the concomitant 
brutal killing of the soldiers on guard were triggered by information from the Lesotho government to South Africa that 
the opposition intended to destroy the dam to hijack the supply of water to its industries. According to the BAC 
respondent, “...they were actually trying to protect their interests in the Highlands Water Project because they were 
given false information that the opposition was going to bomb the dam” (Interview with R 5, 04 August 2010). This 
position is shared by a respondent from the ABC  that South Africa came in to protect its businesses because there 
was a strong allegation by the government that the people wanted to demolish the dam‖ (Interview with R 5, 10 
August 2010). 
 
8.3.7 Interventions to Defend the LCD Government 
Respondents from the opposition maintain that the South African government intervened to defend its counterpart, 
the LCD government, which had virtually crumbled owing to opposition mass protests. Mashishi, (2003: 80) argues 
that South Africa as a new entrant to the world of democracy, was poised to protect its newly attained democracy by 
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showing unflinching support for what they considered a democratically elected government. This was also ―to avoid 
small election irregularities becoming a route for ambitious elements in the military forces in the sub-region to pursue 
their political aspiration...‖ against democratic trends unfolding in the region. Most of the opposition participants 
expressed bitterness against the South Africa for hiding behind the SADC in defence of a government which had 
come to power through flawed and fraudulent elections. This, they said, was confirmed by the Langa commission, 
although its report, perhaps for political expedience, deviated from its original findings to say that the electoral flaws 
of the 1998 did not warrant annulment of the election outcomes. The fact the the Commission was instituted by South 
Africa, not SADC, and was led by a South African High Court Judge, Pius Langa, and the fact that the release of the 
report was delayed gave credit to the suspicions that it was being doctored by the South African government to help 
the LCD government reamain in power despite the irregularities of the elections which brought them to power. As the 
Reverend Stanley Magoba of the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) stated in parliament: ―[t]he manner in which we 
(South Africa) handled the Langa Commission report was very clumsy. We took so long and tensions in Lesotho 
complicated the situation instead of simplifying them... The added problem is the legitimacy of the present 
government in the light of the Langa Report and... it is an embarrassment to us. The question of law and order in 
Southern Africa and does affect us...But the critical point is that if we do intervene in Lesotho, it should be for the 
sake of defending the Basotho... rather than the present government‖ (cited in Molapo, 1999: 3). The BCP 
respondent indicated in his submissions that Judge Pius Langa “...was referring to some irregularities that may have 
happened and we were of the view that may be from that report... measures would be taken put in place to rectify 
what was done wrong. But that is not what came to be... the report was never published to the nation. In fact when 
we thought that it would be given to the stakeholders, it was taken to Mauritius and there after everything was 
stalled...” (Interview with R 17, 08 July 2011). The above stated view is also expressed by the then fiery Democtaric 
Alliance leader, Tony Leon, when he said: ―[t]he Langa Report, sponsored by SADC accepted as a way-through by 
all parties in Lesotho as to why the publication of that Report was delayed for so long, because the suspicion which 
arouse in the interim period...is that there was tempering; there was doctoring and that tensions were inflamed to a 
combustible point‖ (cited in Molapo, 1999: 3). 
 
The controversy surrounding the Langa Commission and its delayed report even dragged the SADC into what most 
Basotho felt was a South African scheme to assist the LCD government to stay in power. The opposition in Lesotho 
lambasted the SADC as nothing but a group of dictators who were just poised to defend each other from the people 
no matter how genuine the peoples‘ demands were. One respondent felt that “SADC was intervening on behalf, or 
was reacting in that way...sort of saving the face of a fellow SADC member state” (Interview with R 7, 13 July 2010). 
To bolster the above perspective, the BCP leader had this to say: “You see, „ntate‟ there is no good will in the running 
of SADC. Why, because SADC is run by people who are not very democratic themselves. It‟s not an entity or an 
establishment that is for people. In fact, it is an entity that is for rulers; for the power holders; those who are in power. 
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That is the problem with SADC. It cannot be effective in that sense because as we say it now becomes an entity 
whose function is but to protect those in power. It is a club for the rulers. They protect each other; they make favours 
for each other” (Interview with R 17, 08 July 2011). 
 
According to a respondent from the BAC, SADC is “losing face in the territories of operation because the decisions 
that it takes are the decisions of the government of the day” (Interview with R 5, 04 August 2010). Respondent 19 
also indicated that the SADC has lost integrity as a regional body because “its always South Africa‟s hand that really 
translates everything into action rather than the body itself” (Interview with R 19, 07July 2011). Implicit in this 
response is that the 1998 intervention, even if it was dubbed a SADC mission, was pushed by South Africa. To this 
end ―[m]ost Basotho say it was not the SADC which was planning. It was just between the countries interested to 
assist the Lesotho government” (Interview with R 8, 10 August 2010). On this note the latter called upon the SADC to 
address real issues instead of protecting their political allies. Similarly Molomo (1998: 9) suggests that ―the moot 
question that the SADC has to address is whether it was intervening on behalf of the people of Lesotho or the 
government of Lesotho.‖ Furthermore, if indeed it was a South African invasion, questions would inevitably be raised 
as to ―whether the region with South Africa taking the lead, is sliding back into the era of destabilisation.‖ 
 
Opposition parties felt that by restoring the LCD to power, South Africa (SADC) had virtually imposed an 
undemocratic government on the people of Lesotho. The MFP respondent lashed out that the SADC “...came into our 
area....and they leave their pet: the Head of government; leave him to act like a clown” (Interview with R 15: 07 July 
2011). The respond from the BNP alleged that because the Prime Minister is assured of support from South Africa he 
“even boasted openly that if you (the opposition parties) do any nonsense, I will call them in again” (Interview with R 
18, 07 July 2011). For them, the LCD was in government through a fraudulent election and when it was on the verge 
of being toppled by the discontented masses, it was fraudulently saved and restored by South Africa under the 
auspices of the SADC. Sessay (2000: 194) argues that the South African-led military intervention in Lesotho was 
reminiscent of the ECOWAS (ECOMOG) interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone to restore the governments of 
Samuel Doe and Tejan Kabbar respectively. He asserts that West Africa presented the first example of a subregional 
organisations‘ military intervention in the domestic affairs of member states in the 1990s. And, to him, this ―seemed to 
have opened up a Pandora‘s Box. For in December 1998, South Africa under the democratically elected government 
of Nelson Mandela, sent troops to neighbouring Lesotho to prop up the government of that country which was coming 
under increasing pressure from the army and the opposition.‖  
 
The opposition participants further claim that during the Masire-led intervention post-2007 election disputes, the LCD 
government has displayed unparalleled intransigence and resisted any peace initiatives suggested by the facilitator. 
Illuminating this problem, the LPC respondent noted that ―[t]he regime is becoming autocratic and even now we are 
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engaged in some political dialogue concerning the outcome of the general elections of 2007. It is clear that the 
election was fraudulent. Yet the government is just intransigent” (Interview with R 4, 04 August 2010). This 
uncompromising stance by the government during the dialogue facilitation was also raised by the SADC OPDS 
Director, the Coordinator of the Christian Council of Lesotho (CCL), and all the opposition political parties‘ 
participants in this research. The Coordinator of the CCL (Respondent 9) stated that “[t]hey are negotiating in bad 
faith, especially the government did not want to give any offer no matter how valid are the reasons presented by the 
opposition. In fact, the government wanted to maintain the status quo...I am saying this because among all the 
contentious issues, none of them has been resolved. The situation is as it is because it is the government and 
nobody can move the government from its original position” (Interview with R 9, 20 August 2010). The BAC 
participant depicted the government‘s uncooperative stance in a more diplomatic way when he said, “[o]ne would 
think the government of the country has to take a lead to harmonise the situation. But if the government is not taking 
the lead and is negative on every aspect, arrogant, then you are dealing with a very complex situation” (Interview with 
R5, 04 August 2010). 
 
The facilitator during the post-2007 election disputes also alluded to the uncompromising and uncooperative attitude 
of the government as the main reason for terminating the mission. The government did not accord attention to the 
facilitator‘s observation that the alliances formed by the LCD and NIP, the ABC and LWP respectively, contravened 
the electoral procedures of the Mixed Member Proportionality (MMP) electoral model; hence a distorted allocation of 
parliamentary seats which the opposition were vehemently contesting as it granted unfair advantages to the parties 
which formed coalitions. The government also snubbed the facilitator‘s suggestion to invite the MMP expert Professor 
Eklirk to assist in breaking the impasse by granting his expert views and opinion on the operational modalities of the 
model. The Lesotho dialogue facilitator demonstrated at length how the government frustrated his mediation efforts. 
He held that “[t]hings went very well for a period but then... as the discussion developed people felt more and more 
sure that the government had cheated and was not prepared (1) to own up that they had cheated and (2) to do 
something to ameliorate the situation and (3) the more vocal the opposition became, the more government wanted to 
show they are not going to give in‖ (interview with R 10, 23 May 2011). A suggestion by the facilitator  to invite the 
MMP expert, and appealing to the negotiating parties to then sign a Memorandum of Agreement on what the expert 
would have determined, unleashed a governmental negative response to the effect that the election results should 
not be altered irrespective of the determination by the expert. No doubt the opposition also rejected this suggestion 
by the government as disingenuous and against the spirit of fair negotiations. When the facilitator contested that such 
an undertaking would be tantamount to pre-judging the expert‘s findings, the government refused to sign the 
proposed Memorandum of Agreement. “So at that point I felt my purpose in Lesotho had come to an end because 
why should I be continuing to claim this is Lesotho I know when these people are not prepared to go ahead with the 
negotiations” (Interview with R 10, 23 May 211). In view of the consistently mentioned government uncooperative 
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stance, the BNP official observed that this confirms their position that “the government doesn't want peace because 
they think that they will be supported by SADC through its armed forces” in case of any threats against it (Interview 
with R 18, 07 July 2011). 
 
The SADC is constantly accused by most of the participants from the opposition and the academics interviewed in 
this study for failure to support the dialogue facilitation process to pressure the government to concede to some of 
the peace initiatives as they would have gone a long way to resolve the political impasse in the Kingdom. The ABC 
Youth leader lamented the fact that the SADC has “engaged Ntate Masire; he has recommended, but the SADC 
does not back up the ideas of Ntate Masire....Nothing so far that deal with the recommendations. So I don‟t see 
SADC backing up those recommendations. ...So I wonder why they have commissioned him to intervene, unless 
they were just trying to buy time or engaging themselves as a regional organisation” (Interview with R 8, 10 August 
2011). According to one participant from the royalty in Lesotho, if the SADC and the government of Lesotho had 
supported, resourced and implemented the Masire recommendations and suggestions, this would have made a 
positive impact on the political landscape of the Kingdom (Interview with R 19, 07 July 2011).  
 
To those who hold this view, the failure and/or reluctance by the SADC to reinforce the dialogue recommendations 
goes to show how determined SADC was to keep one of theirs in power no matter how detrimental that was to 
regional stability and security. It can be logically argued that the intransigent resilience by the LCD government to 
peace initiatives might have been born by the knowledge that “...this body (SADC) cannot arm twist them or make 
them do anything... for a better change” (Interview with R 19, 07 July 2011). The MFP official lashed out that SADC 
should “...keep a fair hand in dealing with the personalities involved. It is no use in coming to intervene, if you go and 
talk to the guilty man privately [and] when he defies you, you say well, the man is the Prime Minister; after all we 
have to give him an opportunity. I mean this is just nonsensical” (Interview with R 15 07 July 2011). On the basis of 
this seemingly unsupportive posture by the SADC, the BNP leader said, “[s]o we have no faith in SADC whatsoever 
and we don‟t even know what SADC is all about. It‟s just you know a paper tiger that is making a lot of noise but you 
don‟t see it doing anything to try and protect the ordinary civilians against abuse by the governments” (Interview with 
R 18,  07 July 2011). 
 
It was within this context that the BNP and the MFP interviewees vowed never to allow any SADC military 
intervention in the country since it had made the government more autocratic against its people as it was assured of 
SADC assistance. Reflecting his determination to oppose any future SADC military interventions in Lesotho, the BNP 
respondent posited that “[w]e have had enough of that. I don‟t think we will allow any SADC army to come into our 
country again. Never. It won‟t be the same. I can make you believe we shall fight; we shall fight” (Interview with R 18, 
07 July 2011). The MFP respondent clearly stated that “[i]f there was to be anything that comes, I think I would resist 
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their coming in. If they feel they are forced to come in they must come by force; I would resist it. They have acted so 
poorly that I would resist it” (Interview with R 15, 07 July 2011). In this sense the SADC, if indeed it was a SADC 
mission, ―should be more towards listening to the people; doing what is in the best interest of the people; not what is 
in the best interest of a ruler or a person in power. In other words SADC can only be successful if it tends to be more 
of a people centred entity rather than ruler-centred entity” (Interview with R 17, 08 July 2011). The Coordinator of the 
Transitional Resource Centre Development for Peace, a non-governmental organisation for promotion of peace and 
democracy in Lesotho, felt that while the SADC successfully restored the government in 1998, it did that at the 
expense of democracy and detriment of its integrity and image especially among the opposition in Lesotho (Interview 
field notes with R 21, 09 August 2010). 
 
8.4 Views that the 1998 intervention was mandated by the UN 
Several questions, as indicated above, were raised as to whether the 1998 intervention was mandated by the SADC. 
Many respondents felt that it was not authorised by the UN therefore it was illegal, a violation of the Lesotho 
sovereignty and international law on intervention as stipulated in the UN Charter, Chapter 53. Some of the 
respondents held the view that the SADC, as the regional body of which Lesotho is a member and has ratified its 
treaty and protocols, was within its mandate when it launched all 3 missions in Lesotho (1994, 1998 and 2007). 
Concentrating on the 1998 military mission -as it was the one almost all the opposition participants denounced as 
illegitimate - they had issues in defence of the SADC action.These are detailed below. 
 
8.4.1 SADC has the Mandate to Intervene in Regional Conflicts 
Firstly, some ofthe participants maintained that the SADC as the regional bloc has an obligation in its own right to 
maintain regional peace, security and stability. This responsibility, according to those who hold this view, is enshrined 
in its founding treaty (1992) and security protocols establishing the SADC OPDS (2001) and the MDP (2003). 
Through these instruments, the SADC has pledged to engage in collective efforts against any threats to regional 
security be they internal, intra- or inter-state conflicts. The UN Charter, Chapter VII, articles 52, 53 and 54 recognises 
the significant roles of regional organisations, solely or in partnership with the UN Security Council or the AU Peace 
and Security Council. They argued that the SADC as the regional body was duty bound to act when one of its 
signatory members was in political turmoil which jeopardised internal and regional peace, security and democracy. 
They are also of the view that the SADC countries, as observed by Basupi (2007: vi) are first ―the most likely to feel 
the negative effects of the conflict and are consequently interested in its resolution; secondly, they understand the 
issues at the centre of the conflict as well as the actors involved better than ‗outsiders‘; and thirdly, they command 
moral authority and legitimacy both from within the international community as well as the member countries in their 
attempts to mediate in local conflicts.‖ In other words, it is assumed in international relations, that states in a 
particular geographical region would be in a relatively advantageous position and better acquainted with the conflict 
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causal problems, the nature and complexities of the regional conflicts, the contextual particularities of the conflicts; 
characteristics and motives of the belligerent parties and therefore could devise well-informed strategies of resolving 
or managing regional conflicts. As Burton and Dukes (1990: 19) correctly observe, ―[b]y understanding conflict we 
may learn about the probable characteristics of war under different conditions and the methods most suitable for 
regulating, preventing and winning wars.‖  
 
It is this understanding which informed the United Nations‘ Security Council particularly during the post-Cold War era 
that partnerships with regional blocs were essential if global peace and stability were to be achieved and sustained. 
This motivation also emanated from the fact that the major powers which control the Security Council had become 
unwilling to commit their material and military resources in the Third World as the ideological conflict had subsided 
and their individual economic, political and strategic interests were no longer endangered by each other. Simply put, 
―major powers are increasingly reluctant to become embroiled in military intervention(s) beyond the confines of their 
geopolitical and national interests‖ (Du Plessis 2000: 19). Within this new political climate, the United Nations and the 
big powers devised policies such as empowering the regional organisations with the responsibility to resolve conflicts 
in their respective regional zones. In light of this, Odunuga (1999: 51) advises that ―African leaders will have to 
summon the political will to pull the continent out of the present morass in which it has been bogged down for too 
long. Thereafter, the international community will itself be obliged to be a partner in progress.‖ 
 
It was in this context that resolutions like ―African solutions to African problems‖ were brought up. In the case of 
Africa, the end of the Cold War and the resultant withdrawal and reluctance of the UN and developed world to be 
involved in Africa was followed by a plethora of conflicts which threatened the little gains of independence. This also 
motivated African leaders to strengthen their regional blocs to deal with regional conflicts. Evidently, different regional 
organisations such as the ECOWAS and SADC formed security wings of their regional groupings. The ECOWAS 
formed the ECOMOG which subsequently intervened to quell conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone; the SADC formed 
its OPDS and the MDP which facilitated the interventions in the DRC and Lesotho and currently Zimbabwe and 
Madagascar. The respondents therefore used these political scenarios to justify the SADC intervention in Lesotho as 
legitimate and within the framework of the post-Cold War international relations arena. The Director of the Security 
Organ argued that although the UN Charter requires regional bodies to request permission before intervening, it also 
allows them to intervene in emergency crisis situations and report to the UN thereafter. He explained that the 1998 
Lesotho situation was an unfolding coup against a legitimately elected government which the Geneva Convention, 
the UN, the AU and regional organisations in their diverse manifestations are opposed to, and have pledged 
collectively to nip in the bud whereever and whenever it emerge. He said: “I want to mention again [that] in 1998 and 
even all other interventions are also in line with the Geneva Convention which clearly says that no way that the AU 
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can accept coups. The SADC treaty and protocols are also taking...the cue from that convention” (Interview with R 2, 
28 June 2010). 
 
 According to the Organ Director, the SADC abided by the UN and AU Charters, the SADC treaty and protocols. 
Reinforcing this point, he stated that “The UN and the AU Charters say if there is a need, a region can take collective 
response and report to the UN later. The UN and AU are now concerned with what happened in Rwanda in 1994 and 
no leader would like to see that happening again. So there are certain tough times and the scenario is that you are 
allowed intervention in a member state” (Interview with R 2, 28 June 2010). In the same vein, Sessay (2000) argues 
that the ECOWAS military interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone were carried out without prior authorisation of the 
United Nations‘ Security Council but were retroactively endorsed by the UN and the AU. This ―endorsement of the 
ECOWAS initiative in Liberia can be seen as a tacit devolution of responsibility for the maintenance of global peace 
and security by the UN, one of its primary missions‖ (Sessay, 2000: 235). In fact, according to one official from the 
SADC security organ interviewed in this study, in an ideal situation, the regional organisations should not be 
subordinate to the UN and the AU in case of needing to make a decision on whether to intervene or not and on what 
methods to use when faced by crisis in their respective regional zones. He elaborated that “[t]he relationship between 
the AU and SADC ...is not the other way round. SADC composes of sovereign regional states. SADC proposes to the 
UN and AU. The AU does not have the power to direct regional organisations on what to do. That goes for both of 
them” (Interview with R 1: 28 May 2010). However, according to the UN and AU Charters, regional organisations are 
required to consult the two bodies before intervening especially in cases where coercive measures are to be 
employed. This is important because with the authority of the UN, the mandate of the regional organisation would 
carry weight as testimony of the collaboration and partnership of the two in promoting global peace. It was for that 
reason that in Article 11 of the Organ protocol on methods, item (d), the SADC stated that the summit shall resort to 
enforcement action as a last resort and in accordance with the UN Charter. That the SADC did not procure the 
authorisation of the UN Security Council before the intervention in Lesotho indicates how the organisation 
contravened the clauses to that effect. 
 
The view that the UN permits regional organisations to intervene in emergency situations and report later, was 
shared by several respondents in this study.  One such respondent pointed out that “[t]he UN in one of its clauses 
gives the subregional bodies [mandate] to deal with an emergency [and] subsequently to seek UN Security Council 
approval later....The logic is that sometimes the situation on the ground is such that, you have to prevent loss of life. 
You cannot run to New York when people are dying. So as a contingent measure regional bodies like SADC are 
allowed to do whatever they can do to save lives. But then seek the sanctions of the UN. ...We didn‟t want a 
holocaust to happen. After Rwanda I don‟t think anybody would like to see a similar situation unfold” (Interview with R 
12, 14 June 2011). The UB academic noted that although it appeared to contravene the UN Charter, it had to be 
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carried out because there was threat to human lives, law and order in the Kingdom. He said “[y]ah, so it was ratified 
in retrospect; so clearly it was untidy but you know war or instability is something that has to do with peoples‟ lives; 
you cannot just sit back... when people are engaged in violent deaths, arson and other illegal acts...you have no 
other way but to use force...as a means to an end...to restore law and order...You cannot wait for a summit of the 
Head of states to convene first, by then people are gone” (Interview with R 7, 13 July 2010). According to the NUL 
academic, the 1994 and 1998 protests naturally kept the SADC worried because “...they involved a lot of nasty 
political episodes... As you remember the killing of the former Deputy Prime Minister among others...and the 
government had collapsed” (Interview with 16, 07 July 2011). 
 
As such, it was in accordance for the SADC as the regional body of which Lesotho is a member and has ratified all its 
treaties and protocols, to intervene to restore order. For the NUL and UB academics, the fact that the SADC, albeit 
retroactively, officially took the responsibility and acknowledged that the Lesotho and the DRC missions were 
sanctioned by the SADC, should be reason and evidence enough that it was a SADC mission. The NUL retired 
academic argued that although the operation created suspicions and gave the impression that it was not a SADC but 
South African hegemonic invasion, “...people learnt later that SADC was accountable; ... and actually accepted its 
role” (Interview with R 7: 07 July 2011). The issue of retroactive approval of regional intervention is contended by Du 
Plessis (2000) as a travesty of international law as it can easily be abused by stronger member states against weaker 
states with the assurance that if supposedly convincing reasons couched with the right vocabulary such as 
humanitarian peace operations, defence of democracy and so forth are raised, the operation would be endorsed by 
the regional body, the AU and or the UN. 
 
8.4.2 Intervention was Mandated by the SADC 
Secondly, on the question of whether indeed the 1998 mission was mandated by the SADC and therefore a SADC 
operation, the aforementioned participants emphasised that it was nothing else but a SADC-mandated intervention. 
Responding to the question, one of the interviewees, who led the BDF contingent in Lesotho during operation Boleas 
opined that “I believe that such commentators, there is a motivation for them to say whatever they are saying. And 
you know politicians will normally differ especially coming from different camps and you will find that those who say 
that are politicians who are probably the adversaries to the ruling parties in their countries” (that is Lesotho, South 
Africa and Botswana) (Interview R 11, 04 May 2011). Unsurprisingly, that was the case as most of the criticism 
regarding the military intervention came from the opposition entities in the countries which were directly involved. The 
respondent further revealed that he recalled a meeting held at a South African staff college at which the SADC 
sanctioned the military intervention to restore order in Lesotho in 1998. According to another participant the 
September 1998 Mauritius SADC summit of heads of states authorised the SADC intervention through the Troika of 
Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe as per the 1994 Memorandum of Agreement which entrusted them as the 
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guarantors of peace, democracy and stability in Lesotho (Interview with Respondent 12, 16 June 2011). This 
perspective is also corroborated by de Coning albeit with a slight variation on the countries delegated to undertake 
the intervention. He points out that ―[s]ome commentators believe that the Lesotho Prime Minister requested SADC 
military assistance at the SADC Summit in Mauritius. Some suggest that a decision was taken at the Mauritius 
Summit authorising South Africa, Botswana, Zimbabwe and Mozambique to deal with the matter on behalf SADC...‖ 
(de Coning 1998: 3).  
 
In the same vein, another interviewee who is the Secretary General and a Minister in the LCD government said the 
question of whether the 1998 operation was a SADC mission or not is unfounded and misleading, as the SADC 
member states never differed on the Lesotho mission. He asserted: “SADC has never said that...even at 
once...SADC has never complained...as the organ... you know, if there was any quarrel within SADC that we are not 
happy.” He further established that, unlike Zimbabwe and the DRC where it is on record that member states differed 
on the approach to mediating the conflict, on Lesotho “[w]e did not have any country saying what this one did was 
wrong...If somebody was saying no there was a dissenting view from SADC that this would not have happened; but I 
don‟t remember any [SADC] country saying that...It is certain people [who] have the audacity to say things like that; 
they don‟t indicate that it is their view” (Interview with R 6, 19 August 2010). The respondents, who hold the view that 
the 1998 mission was mandated by the SADC, argue that the mission was in line with the Memorandum of 
Agreement signed between the SADC Troika of Mugabe, Mandela and Masire who brokered the 1994 political 
impasse. As one of the respondents explains it, “[m]ilitary intervention was necessitated by a deterioration of the 
security situation in Lesotho. There has been a diplomatic process that has been going on since 1994; and this 
diplomatic initiative was by Presidents Masire, Mugabe and Mandela who were declared as guarantors of the 
diplomatic process in the country” (Interview with R 12, 14 June 2011). One of the respondents, who was part of the 
SADC Troika and also facilitator of the post-2007 dispute dialogue confirmed that, “[t]his is where the Memorandum 
of Understanding came in. We had to give an undertaking that we shall be eh umpires; we shall look at the play and 
adjudicate where we feel anyone of the two parties had gone against the agreement‖ (Interview with R 10, 20 May 
2011). 
 
According to these participants, the fact that Botswana and South Africa led the SADC military mission in Lesotho is 
evidence enough of how the two countries were committed to carrying out the SADC 1994 mandate. A retired BDF 
Brigadier who was involved during both the 1994 and 1998 missions noted: “[t]here was a memorandum of 
understanding which was signed by His Majesty King Letsie III, the then Rightful Honourable Ntsu Mokhehle, the 
Presidents of Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe who acted as guarantors and they remained seized with efforts 
to secure peace and stability in Lesotho‖ (Interview with R13, 16 June 2011). Therefore according to proponents of 
this perspective, South Africa and Botswana carried out the operation on behalf of, and on the authority of, the 
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regional body. According to Snyder (1999), "[t]he Troika was determined not to allow a military coup in Southern 
Africa‖ and they also justified their intervention by appealing to the Harare Declaration of 1991 which called upon all 
SADC member states to collectively and jealously guard against any threats to democracy, democratic processes 
and institutions, rule of law and democratic governance (cited in Ngoma, 2005: 165).  
 
8.4.3 SADC Intervention for Humanitarian Reasons  
Thirdly, the arguments that the intervention violated the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lesotho, is also 
contested by this group of participants. In the first place, they argue that in its founding treaty and security protocols, 
the SADC had clearly stipulated that it would intervene by any means necessary, coercive measures included, in 
cases of grave human rights violations, genocide and large-scale violent eruptions within and/or between any of its 
member states. Since Lesotho was on the verge of civil war during both the post-1993 and 1998 election disputes, 
the SADC had to intervene to thwart the deterioration of the situation which could have imperilled regional security 
and development. Such operations are covered by the UN Charter under the umbrella of humanitarian support or 
peace operations. This is in congruence with the assertion by Lyons and Mastanduno (1995: 3) that, ―we are 
currently witnessing the emergence and recognition of a legitimate ‗right‘ to intervene in the domestic affairs of [other] 
states in the name of [international] community norms, values or interests. Instead of the view that intervention in 
international conflicts must be pre-emptively illegitimate, the prevailing trend today is to take seriously the claim that 
the international community ought to intercede to prevent bloodshed by whatever means available.‖  
 
In the views of Pukesh (1995) and Sessay (2000), under circumstances of bloodshed, genocide, exploitation and 
persecution of minorities by the state or any group, massive refugee outflows and other forms of humanitarian 
emergencies, the international community and or the relevant regional organisation should intervene. The concerned 
―state‘s claim to sovereignty can be set aside... [as] its sovereignty is no longer sacrosanct... Other countries should 
feel free to take any actions necessary to restore law and order in the affected state or states‖ (Sessay, 2000: 198). 
Humanitarian intervention should also be justified ―...when the state has virtually ceased to exist [and] when there is 
no effective civil authority... Since there is no state, the question of respecting its autonomy simply did not arise. Its 
subjects are rendered political orphans and need a period of time to sort out their collective affairs...‖ (Parekh, 1995: 
23). The retired NUL academic concurred and commented that the situation in Lesotho was so ghastly that the SADC 
had to intervene, even if it was to trigger criticisms of violating the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lesotho. He 
maintained that “[i]t is now generally accepted in some extreme cases, sometimes for humanitarian reasons, 
countries can intervene and violate that sovereignty if they were to restore order and protect human life” (Interview 
with R 16, 07 July 2011). The retired academic further cited the humanitarian interventions of the ECOWAS in Liberia 
and Sierra Leone which did not have to await authorisation by the UN because there was an emergency situation 
and the governments in the particular countries had collapsed as cases in point. Illustrating this point, Sessay (2000: 
 377 
 
215) observes that ―[t]he two operations were not directly sanctioned by the world body, but they both not only 
received retroactive approval from New York, the UN even played second fiddle to both ECOWAS and ECOMOG in 
the two countries.‖ In this regard, the President of Uganda defended the ECOMOG interventions by saying, ―[w]hen 
we talk of non-interference in the internal affairs of another country, we mean one state which is functioning not 
interfering in another functioning state...we are not interfering in the internal affairs of Liberia because there was no 
longer any central authority in that country‖ (cited in ECOWAS Secretariat, 1998: 8). 
 
The SADC has also consistently used the reasons of state collapse, defence of democracy, threats to human life, 
violations of human rights and general threats to regional peace as their motivation for the 1994, 1998 and 2007 
interventions in the Kingdom of Lesotho. The LCD respondent hailed the SADC interventions as timely and having 
achieved their objective of restoring democracy, peace and stability in Lesotho. As he puts it: “[I]f SADC is a 
democracy; [and] one of its tenets is to ensure that there is, we democratise the region; and because that is one form 
of government which the world seem to be believing in all the systems we have...where democracy is at stake, they 
can be no other justifications more than that. Here, rule of law, democracy itself was at stake; so it was justified‖ 
(Interview with R 6, 19 August 2010). This broad task of the SADC is covered under the jurisdiction of the Organ 
where the regional bloc pledged to intervene where there are coups or threats of unconstitutional means of attaining 
power as happened in Lesotho in 1994 and 1998. Therefore, since the SADC viewed the government as legitimately 
constituted, and they had been requested by such a government, the SADC was fulfilling its stated regional mandate. 
 
8.4.4 Intervention Requested by the Government of Lesotho 
Fourthly, the mission should be recognised as a SADC operation on the basis that in both cases, the SADC came 
into Lesotho at the request of the government of the day. In the cases of 1994 and 1998, the government had written 
official letters inviting the SADC to intervene. Most of the participants referring to the fact that the Prime Minister 
wrote official letters detailing the deteriorating security situation and the impending coups in Lesotho in 1994 and 
1998, suggest that the mission was conducted by the SADC at the invitation of the legitimate government of the day. 
For instance, during the 1994 intervention, the then Prime Minister, Ntsu Mokhehle of the BCP, wrote a letter to De 
Klerk dated 14 January 1994 in which he stated: ―[a]s a result of a rapidly deteriorating situation in the Royal Lesotho 
Defence Force...[we] urgently request the South African Government to help us by dispatching a peace-keeping force 
Maseru...Our Army Commanders have been overpowered by the rapidly deteriorating situation...The situation is so 
grim as to warrant your government‘s urgent...response...‖ (Government of Lesotho Letter to the Government of 
South Africa; 14 January 1994: 1 -2). The issue of SADC invasion and violation of the sovereignty of Lesotho should 
not arise. One of the retired BDF Brigadiers quoted a paragraph from the High Court judgement against the 
opposition protests in 1998 which states that the SADC military in Lesotho was in contravention of international law. 
“The law provided that if government does anything to assert authority in its mandate, it is not the legality of the 
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action, but rather the political authority that should be considered to prevail within the constitutionality of international 
law” (Interview with R 13, 16 June 2011). The retired NUL academic reiterated the fact that the intervention “occurred 
at the behest of the complainant...there was an official letter written by the Prime Minister of the country requesting 
South Africa to intervene; and by implication ofcourse the SADC...So it was requested by the Prime Minister although 
paralysed...It was not a unilateral discretional decision of South Africa” (Interview with R 16: 07 July 2011). In fact, on 
briefing the South African parliament on the 1998 mission, Buthelezi, who was the Acting President, stated that the 
letter from the Prime Minister of Lesotho was addressed to Presidents Mandela (South Africa), Mugabe (Zimbabwe), 
Mogae (Botswana) and Chissano (Mozambique (cited in Molapo 1999). 
 
The respondent from the LCD maintains that there was nothing amiss with the letter being addressed to South Africa 
because she held the SADC chairmanship at that time. For a speedy response to mitigate the deteriorating security 
situation, the letter had to be directly addressed to the chairman for him to consult other members and the relevant 
organs of the SADC. On these grounds, the Lesotho sovereign government has the right to call for assistance 
because the “government was elected, whether people were questioning it or not; whether people question its 
legitimacy or not, they were a government; they were entitled to call for intervention. In their own view, and they 
would account to the populace whether it was right or wrong to do so or not. So it does not, in my opinion matter 
whether SADC did meet or decide, whether the UN did meet or decide and all this kind of things. A sovereign state 
can determine issues of sovereignty in its own jurisdiction” (Interview with R 14, 20 June 2011). Similarly, one of the 
officials at the SADC Organ unit argued that the accusations of a South African invasion of Lesotho do not hold 
water. In his view, “SADC member states within the region have bilateral agreements among others, of which you 
know, entail assistance in times of crisis. Therefore any time, I think any member state is free to appeal to SADC or 
any of the member states... in assisting to alleviate whatever challenges are there. As such in the case of Lesotho 
the coup was eminent, lives were under threat, the government was under siege [and] South Africa and Botswana 
helped SADC. They had the advantage in terms of their own protocols‖ (Interview with R 1, 28 May 2010). 
 
8.4.5 Intervention for Defence of National Interests in International Relations 
Fifthly, on the issue of South Africa having conducted the military intervention to defend its national interests, the 
participants in this group did not contest the situation that South Africa had both economic and political national 
interests to defend in Lesotho. In fact, in its national defence and intervention policy document, the South African 
government has made it abundantly clear that it will mainly commit its defence resources where its interests are at 
risk. This is an established trend in international politics and is the core of the realists‘ theory that nations will often 
intervene where their interests are in danger or where they intend to establish some economic, security, strategic and 
political links to boost their national influence. Therefore, like any other nation in the world South Africa had the 
legitimate right to protect its interests in the Kingdom and if its economic hub was the Highlands Water Project, which 
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the South African military is accused of having swiftly captured upon entering Lesotho, so let it be. One of the 
respondents pointed out that with the Lesotho High land Water project “being their source of revenue, selling water 
from Lesotho, it needs not be a surprise that when an issue of this nature arises, then the immediate first port of call 
would be South Africa” which is the beneficiary from the scheme (interview with R14, 10 June 2011). Therefore, it 
should not be surprising that one of the motivating factors for the South African military intervention was to protect its 
economic and political interests in Lesotho. The participants further maintain that with Lesotho in crisis, the economic 
and political status of South Africa would no doubt be endangered considering the fact that Lesotho is geographically 
and economically in the belly of South Africa. The participants argued that there was no way South Africa could not 
be adversely affected by turmoil in Lesotho. As such, it was politically prudent for South Africa to intervene to restore 
order before the disorder permeated into its own boundaries with calamitous consequences. It would have been 
politically suicidal for South Africa to remain passive when there were fermentations which would no doubt boil 
across its borders. In the words of the LPC participant: “[h]ere was a political hotspot which was hanging in the 
bowels of South Africa; so to speak; so it was only South Africa which could be expected to keep order within the 
geographical area. No other power” (Interview with R 4, 04 August 2010).  
 
According to Respondent 11 this was because South Africa was going to be a victim of the outflow of refugees from 
Lesotho subsequently jeopardising its own security and political stability. He stated:  “South Africa was going to have 
its own toll of casualties in the sense that the life in Lesotho if it depreciated because of a state of anarchy, South 
Africa was going to be adversely affected” (Interview with R 11, 04 May 2010).  One respondent aptly captures this 
complex economic and geographical relationship thus: “Lesotho is placed in the heart of South Africa with a lot of 
economic problems; the lack of capacity of the state to support the population. So...South Africa faces the ever 
present challenge possibility of Basotho crossing into South Africa because of economic problems. These are 
economic considerations but in a very negative sense. South Africa will always be worried by what is happening here 
[in Lesotho] because what happens here will force people to cross the border into South Africa and of course be a 
drain on South Africa‟s resources” (interview with R 16, 07  July 2011). It is in this sense that the NUL academic 
contended the insinuations that South Africa may have been principally driven by economic self-interest in Lesotho. 
With these arguments and the established historical fact that South Africa has been, and remains the economic 
fountain of Lesotho in terms of provision of employment through migrant labour, and the fact that inevitably when 
there is a crisis in either of the countries people would flee to seek refuge in the other, South Africa should have 
considerable interest in the stability of Lesotho. Sharing the same view that economic motives could not have been 
the major driver of the South African-led intervention is Southall (2001) who argues that South African commerce has 
not been jeopardised by the political upheavals which had rocked Lesotho since the 1970s. He also doubts if the 
government which could have emerged from the coup would have interfered with the Highlands Water Project which 
is a major source of revenue for the landlocked and impoverished mountainous Kingdom.  
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The intervention of South Africa and Botswana is viewed as an act of good neighbourliness, a spirit of brotherhood 
and an indication of commitment to historical and cultural ties. For example, during the political turbulences in both 
South Africa and Lesotho, refugee flow from and to each neighbour was a common trend. Lesotho harboured South 
liberation activists while the apartheid South African regime gave refuge to the BCP‘s Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA) 
which fought the Leabua Jonathan autocratic regime from the 1970s to the 1980s. In the same vein, activists and 
refugees from both South Africa and Lesotho flocked into Botswana. In a way Botswana had an interest in the 
stability of Lesotho to prevent a refugee crisis in its territory. The UB academic illustrated the point this way: “South 
Africa especially was fighting or acting in its own national interests because if Lesotho burns, where will Basotho go? 
We in Botswana also had historic ties with Basotho. You would know that when Leabua Jonathan declared a state of 
emergency, where did Basotho refugees go to? They were here in Tlokweng. And we know how difficult it is to carry 
out national development when you have refugees in your midst...” (Interview with R 7, 13 July 2010). The historical 
and cultural affinity between Botswana and Lesotho as one of the factors which motivated Botswana to send its 
contingent, reverberated in the responses of the NUL and UB academics, the retired soldiers from Botswana and the 
LDF soldier at the SADC headquarters. They noted that Lesotho and Botswana are linked in culture, languages 
(Setswana-Sesotho) and the fact that historically the two countries formed the British High Commission Territories 
with Swaziland during colonial rule. The respondents went further to establish that, apart from the cordial and 
professional approach displayed by the BDF, these cultural affinities partly contributed to the warm and hospitable 
welcome the BDF received from the Basotho during the 1998 operation.  One of the respondents extrapolated, on 
this basis that, “[h]ad the intervention been led by Batswana, there probably would‟nt have even been that resistance 
that was there...This is because they were culturally acceptable...less belligerent...and offensive” (Interview with R 
14, 20 June 2010).  The participation of Botswana has been used as a rebuttal tool for those who want to only view 
the 1998 mission as a South African invasion for economic reasons. They argue that Botswana does not have any 
recorded economic ties and interests in Lesotho but were involved in the peace operation. This, they say, goes to 
show that the operation was a regional mission and the two nations were carrying out a SADC mandate in the 
Kingdom. It is logical to assume that these sentiments indicate that although Botswana had no recorded economic 
interests in Lesotho, it had cultural ties and was interested in seeing a politically stable Lesotho. 
 
8.4.6 South Africa Played its Role as a Regional Hegemon 
Finally, the participants who argue that the 1998 operation was a legal SADC peace operation maintain that there is 
no doubt that South Africa is the hegemon in the SADC region. After freeing itself from the octopus grip of apartheid 
bondage and attaining democracy and majority rule and joining the regional body (SADC), South Africa had, without 
any doubt, the legitimate responsibility to promote and defend sustainable democracy, peace and stability within the 
regional member states and the region at large. As an economically, politically and militarily powerful nation in the 
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region, South Africa has the responsibility to provide leadership in the integration and peacebuilding project. It was 
therefore the duty of South Africa to respond to the calls by the Lesotho government for assistance against the 
violent threats to democracy and peace. . According to the LPC official, “[i]n 1998 the democratic government was 
established [in South Africa], so it was easy for that country to intervene because it considered itself now legitimate to 
do that. The image of apartheid was no longer there. Even we ourselves here as the authorities of the country, we 
were comfortable except that it must still not be a South African intervention but it should be a SADC intervention‖ 
(Interview with R 4, 04 August 2010). This was because Lesotho is in the bowels of South Africa geographically (and 
economically) and the disruptions in Lesotho would be precarious to its newly attained democracy, peace and 
security. Added to this was the regional pledge through the SADC treaty and protocols that the regional bloc would 
not at any time condone unconstitutional attainment of power and would use whatever means at their disposal to 
thwart such undemocratic tendencies. Apart from the proximity of Lesotho within South Africa, the latter was the 
country mainly poised to exercise regional leadership as the regional hegemon. History has shown that in all regional 
groupings, regional hegemons have inalienable responsibilities of maintaining regional stability. This was evidenced 
by Nigeria during the ECOWAS peace-keeping operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone. 
 
As previously discussed, after the 1994 intervention, South Africa, Botswana and Zimbabwe were designated by the 
SADC as the guarantors of the Lesotho democracy. Hence, in 1998 Botswana and South Africa continued their task 
of defending democracy in Lesotho on behalf of the SADC. In the words of the UB intellectual, “they have already 
been committed to be guarantors of democracy in Lesotho [and] they were already involved in the process‖ 
(Interview with R 7, 13 July 2011). Therefore it should be noted that to the extent that South Africa contributed the 
bulk of the resources and was largely engaged during the 1998 crisis in Lesotho, South Africa is the regional 
hegemon and has the responsibility to provide leadership in regional affairs. This is what regional hegemons do the 
world over, be it the USA in NATO or Nigeria in ECOWAS/ECOMOG. The South African-led intervention should 
therefore be viewed as a constructive benevolent hegemonic action to build and consolidate democracy and 
development in the region. That the South African-led intervention was actually invited by the democratically elected 
government to repulse an impending unconstitutional acquisition of power is testimony that South Africa was a 
maturing democracy engaged in a democratic mission for the benefit of Lesotho and the region at large. The SADC 
efforts through the establishment of the Troika of Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe (1994), formation of the IPA 
and reforms of the FPTP electoral model to an inclusive MMP model, the retraining of the Lesotho army, and the 
intervention by the Masire-led dialogue facilitation may give credence to the perspective that neither the SADC, nor 
South Africa has any ill intentions in Lesotho. In fact the benefit of peace and stability in the sub-region would be of 
advantage to all regional members but mainly to South Africa as the regional economic and political power house 
(Mashishi, 2003). 
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8.5 Perceptions that the Interventions were motivated by Lesotho‟s Weak Politico-Economic position 
There are prevalent perceptions in international relations that interventions are usually uni-directional. History has it 
on record that military interventions, be they between states, regional or inter-regional, will always be carried out by 
powerful nation-states politically, economically and militarily against their weak counterparts. Conversely, ―[s]mall 
states are susceptible to risks and threats, both internal and external sources. Such states have a relatively lower 
threshold than larger states, given the interaction between size and vulnerability‖ (Santho, 2000: 1). It is also a truism 
of history that each and every regional organisation has its own regional hegemon which drives the integration 
project in terms of resources, political influence, and policy direction and implementation capacity. The same regional 
powerhouse always provides leadership whenever there are regional challenges which require measures such as 
military intervention, sanctions or execution of any major mediation for regional peace efforts. In the ECOWAS, 
Nigeria is such a power while in the SADC, it is South Africa. Such powers will always provide the bulk of the 
contribution be it financial, military or any other resource to assist the operation. The perception is that whenever 
there are political disturbances in comparatively weaker regional members, the regional hegemons will be quick to 
resort to coercive measures to pressure the weaker member; while the same cannot be done where relatively 
powerful members are concerned. For instance it is believed that the SADC could not contemplate military 
intervention in Zimbabwe because it is a relative power to contend with. Hence the SADC has continued to pursue 
quiet diplomacy in spite of its apparent failures in resolving the political impasse which has besieged the country for 
more than a decade. Expressing this perspective, one of the respondents posited that “[i]t begs the same question as 
to why when we saw that human rights were being violated in Zimbabwe whether there was any [military] 
intervention. And it also begs the question as to whether, if there were problems in South Africa SADC would be in a 
position to intervene...” (Interview with R 7, 13 July 2010). Another diplomatic response depicting the reality of the 
smaller countries being victims of regional organisations‘ coercive measures was presented by Respondent 10. . He 
pointed out: “[n]o I don‟t think we took advantage of the smallness of Lesotho but I think at the same time, it could 
have been difficult if Lesotho were South Africa. We would have wished to go in but would have found eh, the game 
was not worth the gamble. [As] we would not achieve the intended objectives...Certainly we thought Lesotho 
was...not as powerful as South Africa...” (Interview with R 10, 23 May 2011). This answers Molomo‘s (1998: 8) 
poignant question: ―if there was an abrogation of democracy in any Southern African country, would the SADC forces 
intervene? Put more directly, ―if the governments of Zimbabwe or South Africa faced similar problems, would SADC 
forces intervene?‖ Molomo goes on to state: ―in the case of Lesotho one is hard pressed to dispel the thinking that it 
was the case of the strong prevailing over the weak!‖  
 
It follows therefore, as the LPC official observed, that “[w]hen it comes to the powerful members of SADC, no similar 
interventions can be conducted; whether it is South Africa or Zimbabwe. No. So Lesotho was an easy target because 
of its small size‖ (Interview with R 4, 04 August 2010). This position fits well with Molomo‘s (1998: 8-9) assertion that 
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―Lesotho finds itself in an unenviable geo-political situation of being totally surrounded and economically dependent 
on South Africa. In order to assert its independence and sovereignty, it has to find the right balance to co-exist with 
its powerful neighbour on mutually beneficial terms. The maintenance of that balance has not been easy for the 
Kingdom.‖ In the same vein, Matlosa (1993: 127) portrays Lesotho as an extraordinary case of economic captivity 
and political pliability almost unparalled in the sub-region which in turn casts doubts on the country‘s integrity and 
independence. 
 
This perspective was vociferously and forcefully portrayed by the opposition MFP, BNP and BCP political parties‘ 
participants during the interviews. The contending voices suggest that maybe South Africa wanted to flex its muscle 
as a hegemon within the SADC region. The proponents of this perspective argue that South Africa had attained 
multiparty majority rule and democracy and would tend to exert its power in the region by testing its military might on 
smaller regional powers. To this end, the Lesotho political turmoil provided an opportune moment for such an act 
where the regional hegemon would flex its political muscle through the regional body. As Mashishi (2003: 83) 
observes, ―a sub-regional organisation is only effective when a hegemon wants to utilise it for its own purposes.‖ 
There have always been fears and suspicions mainly among the many and less developed SADC members that 
South Africa might use its economic and political might ―to dominate the region and that these imperial intentions are 
bound to occur under the guise of humanitarian intervention or other similar peacekeeping ventures‖ (Basupi, 2007: 
40). Matlosa 1993, 127) described the Lesotho political-economic dependency on South Africa as 
"hyperdependency‖ on which Lesotho ―survives, feeds and grows‖ on, hence her deformed economic growth.  
 
The painful reality is that the apartheid South African regime adroitly used the labour migration issue strategically in 
congruence with its regional "carrots and sticks" policy to pressurise its economically weak neighbours to toe its 
defined political line. For example, in 1984, South Africa threatened to cut down the number of migrant labour from 
Lesotho if the country did not sign a non-aggression pact with it (Matlosa, 1993). The central question was whether a 
black majority-led government would completely shed the apartheid aggressive posture of exporting violence to live 
in harmony with other regional members, promote peace, stability, regional integration and development (Ngoma 
2005; 1999). Worse still, Lesotho has adverse historical memories of the apartheid South African forces which used 
to launch their murderous raids in the Kingdom at will. The South African apartheid government had also used its 
powerful economic position to suffocate the economically dependent Lesotho to force her in line with its inhuman 
political policies. Most cited was the time when the apartheid regime assisted a military coup against Leabua 
Jonathan‘s government in 1986 for allegedly harbouring the African National Congress (ANC) guerrillas.  
 
Given such a sour historical relationship, the Basotho should be forgiven for not thinking that even the black majority 
South African government may also fall to the same political posture against the Kingdom. As Matlosa and Sello 
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(2005: 51) put it, ―the Lesotho situation is further complicated by its unique geographical position as a tiny state 
surrounded by a country whose internal and external policies have always been [the] object of profound distrust and 
therefore a contentious and perennial issue in its domestic policies.‖  In this sense Lesotho has, historically and to 
date, been a victim and prisoner of her geographical position, weak political status, fragile institutions of governance, 
a highly politicised military, lack of resources and a dependent economy (Matlosa 1993,, 1995, Molomo 1998, 
Santho, 2000). One respondent from the royalty in Lesotho summarised Lesotho‘s gloomy position thus: “[w]e are 
completely surrounded by South Africa. We get everything from them. So they have all this upper hand. And the real 
politik, of course. If you say no to South Africa, remember what happened in 1986; the military coup; they were 
helped by the South African government because two of our borders were closed and poor Jonathan could do 
nothing about the problem. And then his government had to go on its knees. He had nothing. There was no paraffin, 
no candle, no petrol; nothing...” (Interview with R19, 07 July 2011).  
 
The BNP official also highlighted how Lesotho is at the mercy of South Africa because of its geographical situation 
and weak economic position. He posited that “[b]ecause of our small size and our geographical position of being 
surrounded by them...they know that whether we go east or west, we are at their mercy. So they are strangling us; 
this is what they are doing” (Interview with; R 18, 07 July 2011). It is such historically entrenched experiences which 
moved the opposition political parties to view the SADC military intervention of 1998 as a South African military 
incursion on a small, economically and geographically vulnerable Lesotho. For example, historically, Lesotho has 
been a perennial supplier of migrant labour to the South African mines and South Africa has used the issue as a 
weapon to manipulate Lesotho politically. The apartheid regime sponsored the 1986 military coup against the BNP 
government because it had refused to sign the non-aggression pact through which Lesotho was expected to commit 
itself not to harbour South African liberation activists. In a similar vein the MFP interviewee saw the South African-led 
military intervention as a hegemonic stunt by a regional bully (South Africa) against its weaker counterpart (Lesotho). 
In his view, “...it was like the big boy threshing the small boy...They played that game” (Interview with R 15, 07 July 
2011). The feeling that the SADC and/or South Africa launched a military incursion owing to the weak position of 
Lesotho was advanced by one opposition leader, Molapo Qhobela during the 1998 operation that SADC seems to be 
taking Lesotho for a SADC colony rather than a sovereign state. His passionate calls to the Basotho to resist the 
SADC invasion were reiterated by the BNP and the MFP respondents who staunchly vowed during the interviews to 
gallantly resist any future SADC interventions in the Kingdom. 
 
However, other interviewees including some from the opposition, hold a different view on this issue. They argue that 
there is no way that the newly democratic South Africa would have wanted to endanger and tarnish its image 
regionally and internationally by invading a small and vulnerable member state for purposes of hegemonic 
entrenchment in the region. South Africa would have been more cautious since the ghost of the apartheid regime‘s 
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invasions against the neighbouring states was still lingering in both the regional and international political arena. 
Instead, South Africa immediately after attaining majority rule, has established itself as a champion of democratic 
dispensation in the region and the continent via its political vanguard policy of African renaissance. As Mashishi, 
(2003) surmised, South Africa would not do anything that could jeopardise its newly attained democratic image. 
There is no shadow of doubt that a South African orchestrated annexation of a small and vulnerable neighbour would 
adversely affect South Africa‘s political prospects both regionally and internationally. Entertaining such intentions 
would therefore have been contradictory to South Africa‘s larger goals of providing political leadership in the 
continent through the SADC, the AU and NEPAD. Hence in response to the question, the LPC respondent said, “I 
don‟t agree with the view that South Africa was mainly arrogant... It was also the new democratic government which 
was sensitive to African aspirations. It was building an image of itself internationally. I don‟t think they would let this 
tarnish their image as the democratic government to come and act arrogantly over a small country‖ (Interview with R 
4, 04 August 2010). Another participant stated that he did not "see any hegemonious threats from the so called 
superpower in the SADC which is South Africa‖ (Interview with R 13, 16 June 2011). This is because “SADC treats all 
its members as equals and...any intervention is guided by legal instruments and also the UN Charter which clearly 
states the rights of the relevant parties” (Interview with R 2,  28 June 2010). The ABC respondent did not entertain 
the perception that the SADC intervened in Lesotho because of its weak economic and political status. He clearly 
stated that “[w]e believe that they came here just because there was a problem. We don‟t think of may be because 
we are a small country they can do whatever they want to do because all the time they don‟t come here but they only 
come when we have problems. So it means that they were here to prevent that problem. Well... we are a small 
country; we don‟t have many forces...but I think they respect that... our country...It is us who always create 
problems...and they would be coming because we are a member of SADC‖ (Interview with R 8, 03 August 2010).  
Another respondent was brief and to the point. He asserted: “[e]ven in small countries, called weak, life is also very 
important. We cannot just sit down and say a country is weak when their soldiers are killing the leaders. So I don‟t 
agree with that assessment‖ (interview with R 12, 14 June 2011). In other words, SADC could not and should not use 
the fear of being accused of invading a small country as an excuse for not going into a country bedevilled by crisis to 
restore order and save lives. In fact, the SADC has clearly stated in its security protocols that it would intervene in 
member states whenever gross violation of human rights, genocide and threats to democratic governments are 
perpetrated. 
 
8.5.1 Why did South Africa and Botswana Oppose Military Intervention in the DRC 
The participants were asked why South Africa and Botswana, the two nation-states which intervened militarily in 
Lesotho, were the same nations which vehemently opposed the Zimbabwean-led military intervention in the DRC. A 
variety of reasons were advanced by different participants. One of the respondents advised that in responding to the 
question, it is important to scrutinise the dynamics of the politics within the SADC region at the time. He reflected: “[i]t 
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may have been primarily influenced by the relationships amongst the Head of States within the SADC at the time... 
[For example] Zimbabwe was somewhat aligned to a number of countries that could see eye to eye whereas South 
Africa on the other hand and Botswana, may not have necessarily eh, acknowledged that position‖ (Interview with R 
13,  16 June 2010). This was in reference to the intense differences which ensued in the 1990s between Zimbabwe 
(Mugabe) and South Africa (Mandela) as the respective OPDS and SADC chairpersons. The differences between the 
two leaders emanated from the struggle for control of the regional body. Their differences which coalesced around 
the operations of the SADC Security Organ visa-a-vis the mother body, divided the organisations into two camps. 
The Mugabe-led camp (Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Angola) advocated for a security organ autonomous from the 
SADC mother body when it came to making decisions to respond to conflict situations. On the other hand South 
Africa, Botswana and Tanzania held that the Organ should be subordinate to the SADC chair in its operations as per 
the SADC treaty. This is the scenario which led to ruptured SADC responses in both the DRC and Lesotho cases. 
The participants acknowledged that each of the SADC camps had immediate national interests to safeguard when 
they intervened in the two countries. As previously indicated, Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola had their economic, 
political, strategic and ideological interests to protect in the DRC. Similarly, Botswana and South Africa felt compelled 
to quench the fires in their immediate vicinity because their interests would be immensely jeopardised by a collapsed 
Lesotho. 
Also worth noting, according to one of the respondents, is that “the case of the DRC really was very fluid. It was not 
as clear cut as that of Lesotho...In the DRC, eh, in that vast country, there was no clear defined force that was in 
power. And in Lesotho, it was simply for Botswana and South Africa to intervene on behalf of one warring faction. In 
my view, I think it was the government” (Interview with R 17, 07 July 2011). Put differently, “Lesotho was much easier 
to safe than a larger problem which was never saved by the countries which militarily intervened in the DRC. If you 
comparatively look into the two cases, you find that in the DRC, almost fifty percent of African states intervened. But 
the desired results were never achieved and warring factions in Africa whoever had differences would want to have 
their playing ground in the DRC” (Interview with R 11, 04 May 2011). Resolving the DRC conflict was further 
compounded by the fact that there was no clearly spelled out mandate; no common desired result for the conflict 
among the warring factions, and the intervening countries had diverse and conflicting interests which hampered 
efforts to find a lasting solution to the conflict. That is the reason why the DRC conflict was dubbed by some 
commentators "Africa‘s First World War" and "Africa‘s scramble for Africa." On the contrary, in Lesotho (apart from 
the fact that it is a small country and the conflict was strictly limited to the capital city Maseru), from the military 
perspective one of the issues to consider is the geographical area of operation and the logical question to ask during 
the planning of the operation would be, "[w]hat are the available chances of successfully executing the operation 
given the existing geographical area of operation?" In the two scenarios under consideration, “the DRC is a complex 
country, the terrain is very difficult, the country is huge, there were a lot of forces that were involved. But in Lesotho, it 
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was a very confined simple issue, it was easier, the operation was more feasible” (Interview with R 14, 20 June 
2011). Among other things in the view of the latter participant the South African and Botswana military contingents 
would probably be more familiar with the terrain of Lesotho than with that of the DRC.  
 
On the basis of these perspectives the NUL academic hailed the decisions of South Africa and Botswana as 
reflective of maturity in their foreign relations and strategic in their posture. To him, military intervention in the DRC 
could have made political sense only if it was in defence of a democratically elected government as was the case in 
Lesotho. But at the time the Kabila senior government had come to power through the toppling of the Mobuto regime 
which was also dictatorial (Field notes from Interview with R 16, 7 July 2011). The Johannesburg‘s Sunday Times 
newspaper dated 6 September 1998 (cited in Makoa, 1998: 21) also commended the South African government 
position on the DRC conflict. It posited: ―[b]ut having been slow out of the starting blocks, South Africa since led with 
maturity, insisting on a dialogue and cease-fire and taking a principled decision not to send troops to that country. 
This stance does not arise out of an assessment of the tactical and strategic odds of losing soldiers in a foreign war. 
It comes out of the very hard lesson of the futility of conflict that South Africans have learned from the experience of 
their country.‖ The position of South Africa and Botswana that the DRC conflict should be addressed through 
diplomatic, non-coercive measures was vindicated as that was the measure which ultimately led to the resolution of 
the conflict instead of the military intervention as pursued by the Zimbabwe-led SADC camp. 
 
However, Makoa also held the view that the decision by South Africa for coercive intervention in Lesotho and non-
coercive means in the DRC was reflective of the vacillating nature of its foreign policy still haunted by the apartheid 
ghost. He posits that ―unable to break out of the apartheid mould, the ‗new‘ South Africa has maintained what can be 
described as a dichotomous, but rather ‗polarised‘ Africa policy-an indifferent and hesitant, and an aggressive and 
bullish. The former is mirrored by the response to the DRC crisis, while the latter is exemplified by the intervention in 
Lesotho‖ (Makoa, 1998: 19). According to Southall (2001: 167-168), it revealed that South Africa‘s foreign policy was 
in disarray. This is because ―[t]he handling of the intervention was taken as evidence of inconsistency in South 
Africa‘s post-apartheid policy...The shift from an insistence upon the need for a negotiated settlement in the case of 
the DRC, and the...imposition of a political solution in Lesotho, inevitably aroused concern.‖ In the view of Van 
Nieuwkerk (1998: 15), South Africa‘s intervention suggested that it was based upon 'ad hoccery' and that it had not 
yet attained the right blend of strategies and practices to implement its proclaimed role as regional leader, mediator 
and peacemaker.‖ 
 
8.6 Role Played by Civil Society Organisations during the SADC Missions in Lesotho 
One aspect of critical significance in conflict prevention, management and resolution which regional organisations or 
any conflict-mediating body should embrace is the civil society organisations (CSOs). "Civil society organisation" is 
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an encompassing term which brings together labour movements, trade unions, religious and church organisations, 
intellectual and professional associations, NGOs, business community, private sector and pressure groups in their 
diverse formations. History and experience show that these groupings have influenced socio-economic, cultural and 
political policy formulation and implementation globally albeit with different impacts, successes and challenges. Their 
role in preventive missions is of paramount importance because they are highly representative of the different 
sections of the population and also command considerable support and influence among their members and from the 
societies in which they operate. In the words of Minear and Weiss, (cited in Jentleson, 2000; 12) ―the hallmark of 
NGOs is their activity at the grass roots level...working on the frontlines...‖ It follows that they are deeply embedded in 
the socio-economic and political fabric of society. Their involvement would ensure the people own the intervention 
process, its outcomes and commitment to implementation of its resolutions to their logical conclusion. 
 
Since they operate mainly at grass roots level, they are in a better position than the political elite to comprehend the 
day-to-day existential challenges affecting the ordinary masses. Based on this it is assumed that they can add 
incredible value to peace-keeping, peacemaking, humanitarian peace support and post-conflict peace building 
undertakings. In addition, it is assumed CSOs can bring new reflections, experiences, perspectives and insights to 
the preventive diplomacy processes. This is so because their strategies and approaches may not be so tainted by 
subjective political connotations as those of the warring parties. Moreover, although in some cases NGOs and CSOs 
may be partisan in their ideology and affiliations, they have a significant role to play in peacemaking and peace 
operation missions globally. For instance while the UN and any regional organisations are engaged in track 1 
diplomacy (formal negotiations between representatives of the warring parties), CSOs can embark on track 2 
diplomacy (non-official diplomatic overtures with the warring parties to ease tensions and open other channels for 
negotiations). At the end of the day, the two efforts would complement each other for peace to be realised. As Fisher 
(2011: 8) correctly observes, ―[a] peace process is largely a matter of cooperation between different actors, parties 
and other peace mediators, governments, civil society and international organisations.‖ In other words, CSOs and 
NGOs will help to consolidate and develop the UN and regional organisation‘s capacity to engage more effectively in 
conflict prevention, management and resolution. Lund (2002: 173) also observes that effective implementation of 
preventive engagements requires the collective efforts of governmental and non-governmental actors ―...so as to 
provide the range of needed instruments (mediation, deterrence, institution building, etc) and resources to address 
the leading sources of the conflict. In the process, these actors form a ‗critical mass‘ that visibly symbolises a 
significant international commitment to non-violent change. Rarely can any single actor or action prevent serious 
violent interstate conflicts.‖ 
 
It should also be noted that CSOs are well-positioned to promote the new security thinking into the conflict 
prevention, management and resolution processes. The new security perspective expands the definition of security 
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to embrace the eradication of social ills such as poverty, discrimination and marginalisation (on the basis of gender, 
race, religion, and ethnicity), disease, environmental degradation, human rights violations, persecutions, oppression 
and exploitation as anathema to peace, security, healthy living, justice, democracy and freedom. The agenda of 
different CSOs is to promote the infusion of non-military interpretations of insecurity in the conflict prevention, 
management and resolution arena. Preventive diplomacy measures which take into consideration the needs, rights, 
freedoms and living standards of people are in a better position to identify and address the deep underlying sources 
of conflicts in society compared to the classic militaristic view of security and insecurity, hence coercive remedial 
measures. In fact, CSOs bring the civilian version, expertise and insights into the preventive diplomacy missions, and 
regional organisations should include them in their security mechanisms. For an example, the TRC Coordinator 
(Respondent 21) concurred that the SADC‘s interpretation of peace and security is predominantly limited to the 
conventional realm of security for the defence of the state rather than human security. In this regard, CSOs are 
pivotal in infusing the human security aspects into its preventive diplomacy mechanism operational modalities and 
missions. 
 
This section dwells on the role CSOs and NGOs played during the SADC preventive diplomacy missions of 1994, 
1998 and 2007 in the Kingdom of Lesotho. The aim is to investigate the extent to which the SADC involved civil 
society during the peace operations and post-conflict peace-building period. It is also to examine the contribution of 
the CSOs in the promotion and building of peace in Lesotho. This is because it is envisaged that inclusion of civil 
society would ―enhance the SADC‘s capacity for, and expertise in mediation and preventive diplomacy and thereby 
heighten the prospect of success in regional efforts and resolve inter and intra-state conflict(s)‖ (Machakaire; 2011: 
3). During the turmoil in Lesotho (1994, 1998 and 2007) civil society organisations such as the Christian Council of 
Lesotho (CCL), the Lesotho Council of Non-Governmental Organisations (LCNGO) and the Transitional Resource 
Centre for Peace and Development (TRC) had tremendous input in trying to broker peace between the opposition 
parties and the government. The Coordinator of the TRC (Respondent 21) mentioned that in 1991, the TRC 
organised a national conference to provide a forum for all political parties to discuss and share experiences before 
the 1993 elections. The Coordinator stated that this was motivated by the volatile political climate which then existed, 
especially between the BNP and the BCP as evidenced during the campaigns. The purpose of the national 
conference was therefore to educate the politicians on the importance of peace and prepare them for a common 
understanding of the democratic dispensation in the Kingdom. He noted how both the BCP and the BNP viewed the 
national conference with suspicion and the two rival parties were reluctant to participate. (Field notes from interview 
with R 21, 10 August 2010) In the same vein, the LCNGO Coordinator (Respondent 22) also indicated how they 
facilitated mediation between the government and the opposition to inculcate values and ideals for peace and 
peaceful resolution of the political impasse. The three CSOs (CCL, TRC and LCNGO) also attempted to broker talks 
with different opposition political parties and the government after the 2007 elections but in vain (Field notes from 
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interviews with R 9, R 21 and R 22, August 2010). All these efforts were carried out by the CSOs on their own, as 
local groups with vested interests in the defence of peace, democracy and stability in Lesotho. 
 
8.6.1 Perceptions that SADC did not officially involve CSOs 
Evidence from interviews with four participants from the TRC, LCNGO and the CCL revealed that during the 1994 
and 1998 SADC preventive missions, the regional body did not officially involve the CSOs in finding the solution to 
the conflicts. In the words of the TRC Coordinator, they “became intruders...SADC came in to force parties to 
dialogue” (Interview with R 21, 09 August 2010). The LCD respondent acknowledged that the CSOs were not 
formally involved but were only consulted about the process. He stated that regarding the 1994 and 1998 SADC 
missions, “I don‟t know to what extent but I think there had been consultations with civil society” (Interview with  R 6, 
19 August 2010). The LCNGO Coordinator noted that while they were invited during the 2007 Masire-led dialogue 
facilitation, they did not play an active role in the talks. Instead they were just ―observers; point of reference with no 
formal engagement in the process” (Interview with R 22, 11 August 2010). On the other hand, the CCL Coordinator 
noted that he was not in a position to give testimony on the extent to which the CCL was involved during the 1994 
and 1998 SADC missions because he was not part of the CCL administration by then. However, he confirmed the 
central role played by the CCL during and after the SADC dialogue facilitation. He indicated that in the 2007 mission 
the CCL was involved from the embryonic stages of the process. He said: “[w]hen Sir Ketumile Masire was given an 
assignment to look into the Lesotho post-electoral dispute, CCL was one of the NGOs that was involved right from 
the onset... we attended all the meetings in which he was the mediator” (Interview with R 9, 20 August 2010). After 
Masire retired his mission due to the collapse of the talks opposition parties wrote an official letter to the CCL 
requesting the organisation to take over the dialogue facilitation. Upon taking over the process, the CCL embraced 
the LCNGO and the TRC for a combined effort in driving the process of breaking the political quagmire and restoring 
peace and stability. In the view of the MFP participant, this was the only time the CSOs played a prominent and 
substantive role in mediating a peaceful resolution of the conflicts in Lesotho (field notes from the interview with R 15, 
07 July 2011). 
 
Some of the participants noted that the SADC never officially involved the CSOs in its regional preventive diplomacy 
scheme. In response to the question regarding the extent to which the SADC involved the CSOs, the NUL academic 
markedly stated: “[n]ot really; not officially; they have made contacts with them...In other words they were missing 
from the official state sponsored specific resolution.” It was only after the CCL's relatively successful mediation that 
the SADC appeared to have realised that “these guys have their own citizen resolution mechanism, hence the official 
support of the CCL initiatives” (Interview with R 16, 07 July 2011). That may have indicated that “the role of the civil 
society in the SADC is not yet projected to its legitimate levels” (Interview with R 14, 20 June 2011). The view that 
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CSOs were only informally consulted is echoed by the ABC and LCD respondents during the interviews for this 
study.  
 
The BCP respondent clearly stated that the SADC did not substantially involve the CSOs during its missions in 1994, 
1998 and 2007. Perhaps, in the case of the 1994 and 1998 missions, the volatility of the conflict situation could have 
thwarted any meaningful involvement of the CSOs. He responded to the question with: “[n]ot very much...I wouldn‟t 
say the civil society was involved in a meaningful way...So much that when Masire left, not having completed the 
assignment...the churches took over and that is when now SADC endorsed them, which is an indication that they 
were never meaningfully involved in the first place before Masire failed‖ (Interview with R 17, 08 July 2011). The BNP 
respondent was irascibly combative in his response. He confined himself to the 1998 military intervention and 
described the mission as an invasion of the Kingdom led by South Africa under the pretext of a SADC peace mission. 
There was no way Basotho civil society could cooperate with the invading forces. In his assessment, “[n]one of the 
CSOs ever supported SADC; they condemned SADC; so they would never mix with scum. This South African army 
was just a scum as far as we are concerned. It was not a professional army. It was just a group of hired assassins; a 
mercenary army” (interview with R 18, 07 July 2011). Viewed on the basis of the above responses, the SADC had a 
flawed mission as it did not officially involve the most representative organisations in the country in finding a 
resolution to the country‘s problems. 
 
8.6.2 Perceptions that SADC involved CSOs 
However, there are research participants who felt that the SADC did its best within the conflictual context to consult 
and involve different CSOs in the search for the resolution of the 1994, 1998 and 2007 disputes in Lesotho. A retired 
Brigadier from the BDF who participated in the 1994 SADC mission in Lesotho made reference to the SADC 
conducting “a number of seminars and workshops where upon we had NGOs views represented....so that they 
should also appreciate the need for a shift from the pre-1993 elections” and embrace the evolving democratic 
dispensation. He further indicated that “the churches were very influential in that as we had a number of churches 
represented at different fora” (interview with R 13, 16 June 2011). That the CSOs participated during the 1994 SADC 
mission is also confirmed by a participant from the monarchy who noted that their involvement “was very satisfactory 
in 1994...They really did their best to involve the NGOs and stakeholders into the dialogue...And even marked other 
things to be looked after by the civil society itself...So they did really have a forum and we applaud that, we really 
want to salute the SADC for that” (interview with R 19, 07 July 2011). That the 1994 SADC mission involved CSOs is 
also confirmed by Weisfelder (1997: 35). He states that the Troika of Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe 
facilitated ―a national dialogue on reconciliation which would include all political parties and interested non-
governmental organisations‖ during the 1994 intervention. Matlosa and Sello (2005) also indicate that the Lesotho 
Council of Non-Governmental Organisations (LCNGO) played an important role in Lesotho‘s historic return to 
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multiparty democracy in 1993 after more than two decades of one party dictatorship. In addition, Matlosa (1995: 127) 
noted how the LCNGO organised a march on the 26 January 1994 in opposition to external military intervention in 
the Kingdom (as per invitation by Prime Minister Ntsu Mokhehle). It advocated a domestic solution through: 
 amnesty to all warring soldiers; 
 special parliamentary session on instability in the LDF; 
 national dialogue forum to address the crisis. 
Matlosa also indicated the role played by the LCNGO in staging a 2-day stay away from work (22nd to 24th August 
1994) to pressure King Letsie III into restoring democratic rule in the country. It also joined combined protests by NUL 
Lecturers and Researchers‘ Union, the Lesotho Law Society, Trade Unions and students to prevail on the King to call 
a national conference to ―seek a solution as well as examine ways to prevent similar incidents from recurring in the 
future‖ (Matlosa, 1995: 127). 
 
Although there is no concrete evidence that the King relented due to this pressure in conjunction with that from the 
SADC Troika; the pivotal role played by the LCNGO in striving to find a lasting solution cannot be discounted or ruled 
out. 
 
Santho also noted the prominent role played by the Lesotho Network for Conflict Management (LNCM) in the 
formation and operationalisation of the Interim Political Authority during the 1998 SADC mission. It is on record that 
there were vicious debates and differences between the opposition and the government on how the IPA should 
operate. The LNCM vehemently appealed to all political stakeholders to cooperate and engage in fruitful and 
constructive debates within the IPA forum for the sake of the country. They noted that ―[i]t is our considered opinion 
that the spirit and letter of this agreement will inspire all political actors in Lesotho to strive to deepen the country‘s 
democracy and political stability. Our politicians must strive to accept each other. They must recognise that their main 
vocation is to lead the country and assure prosperity in the new millennium; not to compete in trading deadly political 
blows at the expense of the country...‖ They went on to indicate how the government and the opposition would 
complement each other in the growth of democracy in the Kingdom; ―[i]n all democracies a strong ruling party needs 
a strong opposition. Without a strong opposition democracy is undermined and ruling parties are easily tempted to 
drift towards veiled authoritarianism‖ (in Santho, 2000: 3).  
 
Among other things, the NGO initiated a post-conflict National Peace Accord (Building national peace accord) in 
partnership with other CSOs. The National Peace Accord Proposal marked the genesis of CSOs‘ unified input to the 
process of national peace building in Lesotho. Its core provisions required the promotion of a non-violent political 
climate in Lesotho, an inclusive multi-party democracy, political tolerance, freedom of speech and association and 
establishment of a non-partisan security sector all of which would enhance national unity, peace-building, democracy, 
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and social and economic reconstruction and development (Santho; 2000). Southall (2000) also noted how the CSOs, 
in Lesotho with the financial assistance of the United Nations‘ Development Programme (UNDP) initiated the 
National Consultative Forum (NCF) which comprised a broad spectrum of society to enhance tthe functions of the 
IPA. The forum gathering, which was initially opposed by the government (LCD) ultimately, progressed as planned on 
the 21 and 23 February 1999. Chaired by the LNCM, it was attended by 350 delegates from parliament, the judiciary, 
political parties, chiefs, civil society and the diplomatic community. The forum resolved to reform Lesotho‘s electoral 
model and laws and embrace a culture of democracy, tolerance and peaceful resolution of conflicts (Southall 2000). 
Southall (2000) also noted the role of the NCF in the organisation and facilitation of a two weeks workshop with the 
IPA to discourse on electoral alternatives, consensus and consensus building.  
 
Ostensibly, the above evidence is indicative of the reality that CSOs organisations did not remain passive; instead 
they made commendable efforts in deciding the way forward for the country, with or without the partnership of the 
regional body. 
 
To the extent that the opposition and the government ultimately cooperated in operationalising the IPA; engaging in 
electoral reforms and organising the ever peaceful 2002 elections, it can be argued that the CSOs had a positive 
input in the process. 
 
Arguably, the bulk of the evidence from the interviews show that it was only after the withdrawal of the Masire-led 
SADC mission that the CSOs became officially active participants with the CCL in mediating the political impasse 
between the government and the opposition parties. Interviews with the two SADC officials from the SADC Organ did 
not yield any substantive responses on the extent to which, and how the CSOs were involved during the 1994 and 
1998 missions. Their responses focused on the post-Masire CCL mediation as reflected by such statements as “[a]s 
we speak, the CCL is engaged with the mediation process” (Interview with R 2, 28 June 2010). One of the officers 
emphasised the partnership between the SADC and the CCL as a commendable move. He reflected that “[c]urrently 
the Organ Troika is collaborating with the CCL to facilitate the dialogue between the parties. Of course they are 
making headways in that some of the processes which contributed to the conflict such as the review of the 
constitution are being addressed. Therefore, these are the matters that SADC is facilitating on‖ (Interview with R 1, 
28 May 2010).  Implicit and explicit in the evidence from the interviews is that upon realising the significance of CSOs 
in preventive diplomacy, the SADC accordingly endorsed their (CCL) peace initiatives and have deployed a team 
from the Diplomacy Unit and the SADC Troika to work with them. In a way, the endorsement was a commendable 
move by the SADC as it to some extent gave the process political weight and clout (Field notes from interviews with 
R 9 and R 22, August 2010). Although the process is still on-going, most of the participants hailed the CSOs for 
stabilising the situation and steering dialogue towards a peaceful resolution of the conflict among the political 
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stakeholders in Lesotho (field notes from interviews; August 2010; July 2011). As the CCL Coordinator expresses it, 
“SADC with its political authority was unable to decrease the political tensions among the political stakeholders but 
the church managed. Though no substantial benefits, the opposition have received, but the political stability in this 
country is now normal. In other words the church managed to normalise the political stability in this country” 
(Interview with R 9, 20 August August 2010).  He also acknowledged the recognition by the political parties in 
Lesotho that the CCL was the most appropriate CSO which wields the moral authority to mediate among the 
conflicting political parties. That regional organisations should tap in the expertise of CSOs and other internal experts 
is also alluded to by Azar (1990a: 37) that ―[t]he possibility of resolving protracted social conflicts is enhanced by 
improved knowledge of the history of the dispute, of the needs and interests at stake, and an appreciation of the 
participants‘ emotional investment in the outcome.‖ 
 
On the basis of the above the respondents from the CSOs called upon the SADC to always integrally tap and utilise 
the local CSOs (internal structures‘) skills and experiences whenever they are engaged in mediating regional 
conflicts. This is vitally important because they are in a better position and context to understand the origins, nature, 
emotions and dynamics of the particular conflict more than external actors. As Jentleson (2000: 12) puts it ―...by both 
location and activity, NGOs often are the first...actors to become aware of conflicts in their early stages.‖ Therefore 
CSOs are better placed for effective preventive diplomacy as it ―requires the ability to sniff trouble in its early stages 
and then take steps to avoid it‖ (Jentleson, 2000: 11). Among other things, a combined force by the regional 
organisation and CSO would present a strong multi-sectoral multi-functional and multi-faceted engagement for 
positive results in the attainment of sustainable peace. This collaboration in preventive diplomacy is vividly captured 
by Lund (2002: 177) that ―[o]ne of the lessons is that multiple actors and their respective policy instruments and 
political influence are needed to steer any given unstable country towards peaceful progressive change...What is 
ideally needed is for many actors to join others in collaborative assessments and country-specific conflict prevention 
strategy development...This is one practical step that could help to spread a culture of prevention.‖ 
 
In the post-Cold War era NGOs have become increasingly and actively involved in both direct and indirect 
peacemaking and peacebuildng initiatives. The United States Institute for Peace has acknowledged that NGOs have 
helped fill the void through private diplomacy when regional organisations are still constrained by bureaucratic 
intricacies and processes (Menkhaus and Ortmayer, 2000). Lund (1996: 7) acknowledges ―the low profile but 
increasing contributions to conflicts prevention and management... and track two diplomacy‖ by  NonGovernmental 
Organisations such as development organisations; humanitarian relief and refugees organisations; private 
foundations watchdog groups advocating human rights, intellectuals and institutions engaged in research on 
democracy building, research and training on conflict prevention, management and resolution. Their role is, among 
other things, to ―...facilitate political and social interaction by mobilising groups to participate in political, social and 
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economic activities. [Their] role also includes providing checks and balances on government power, monitoring 
human rights abuses‖ and advocating on human rights issues in their diverse manifestations and effects (Barclay 
1999: 32).  
 
In view of the above, regional organisations should empower CSOs in their respective member states in terms of 
institutional building, training in conflict mediation and resolution skills and provision of technical, human and financial 
resources and support. This would go a long way in ensuring successful collective conflict prevention, management 
resolution regionally and globally. Illustrating this point Barclay (1999: 314-315) notes that the reconstruction, 
recovery and development of any nation emerging from conflict ―...need closer collaboration between regional 
organisations, the international community and national authorities in government, private sector and civil society. It 
is essential that representatives of these organizations who work within the country towards ultimately achieving the 
same objectives cooperate in sharing information...These would facilitate the mutual reinforcement of efforts by the 
state, the region and the larger global community.‖ That being the case, one of the research participants gave 
thumbs up to the SADC-CSOs partnership in conflict mediation and resolution if their collaboration in addressing the 
post-2007 election dispute is anything to go by. He opines that “[m]ay be we are beginning to see, this kind of 
relationship between SADC and the CSOs evolving. And I hope it does, because...after the withdrawal of Masire, 
they [SADC] actually officially accepted the CCL as an important factor” to the extent that they were invited at the 
SADC Summit of Head of States in Windhoek (Namibia) in August 2010 (Interview with R 16, 07 July 2011). The 
government of Lesotho has also expressed optimism on the CCL facilitation of dialogue between political parties in 
Lesotho. They report that the CCL is currently supervising dialogue by Lesotho political parties and promoting a 
culture of peaceful resolution of conflicts without sacrificing basic principles of good governance and respect for the 
rule of law in the process (Lesotho Government Response to the Eminent Person 2010). Commenting on the pivotal 
role which NGOs play in conflict prevention, management and resolution, Lund (1996: 8) concludes that they are 
―able to play many roles that governments are unable or unwilling to perform, NGOs are becoming (explicitly or 
tacitly) more significant partners for governments and international organisations in preventing conflict.‖  This is 
essential because there is no single entity with the monopoly of knowledge on how best to resolve conflicts as they 
come in diverse forms and can therefore never be ―straight jacketed‖ (Machakaire, 2011). 
 
On the basis of the above perspectives, there is no shadow of doubt that civil society is crucial in regional peace 
operations. Therefore, regional organisations such as SADC should strive more to incorporate civilian elements such 
as human rights, religious, humanitarian, refugee, electoral units and labour organisations in their mission structures 
so that they are in a better position to influence a broader spectrum of society in the conflict context in which they 
operate. Such inclusive missions would help coordinate the partnership and efforts between regional organisations, 
CSOs, the UN agencies, donor agencies, the conflicting parties and the host government. This collaboration of local 
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and international non-governmental organisations and donor agencies would clearly enhance the peacebuilding 
capacity of regional organisations (Deconing 2004). 
 
8.7 Challenges Faced by the SADC during the Lesotho interventions 
One critical topic which was touched on in the conduct of this research study was to examine the challenges, 
problems and difficulties encountered during the SADC missions of 1994, 1998 and 2007. Studies on conflict have 
shown that conflicts are quick to emerge while it is a mammoth and intricate task to mitigate their effects and resolve 
them once they have erupted. In the view of Nathan (2010: 1), conflict mediation ―like the conduct of warfare is 
complicated, volatile, unpredictable and risky.‖  Several factors are responsible for the complexities of transforming a 
conflict- ridden nation to peace and stability. The following are some of the factors: the harm and damage incurred by 
warring parties; hardened attitudes and resolve by parties to defeat the opponent; entrenched win-lose dichotomy 
between the belligerents; negative labelling of each other and incompatibility of the warring parties‘ conflict goals, the 
warring parties understanding and interpretation of the conflict; the context and content of the conflict; the number of 
parties involved in the conflict; identification of an acceptable venue to all the parties; their willingness or 
unwillingness to negotiate the resolution of the conflict and generally the extent to which the mediating body is 
acceptable and considered neutral by all the warring parties. The mediating entity has to contend with all these 
challenges in addition to studying the conflict situation to master both its surface and deep, underlying causes in 
order to devise the appropriate measures to resolve it. 
 
Furthermore, the mediating body is faced with the problem of whether they have identified the real sources of the 
conflict, the appropriate remedial measures and whether the warring parties would embrace their approach and 
strategies for addressing the root causes of the conflict. The UN and different regional organisations such as 
ECOWAS, OAS, ASEAN and NATO to mention but a few have had their share of the challenges posed by efforts to 
mediate intra- and inter-state conflicts in their respective regional zones. Restoring peace and stability in conflict-
ridden countries especially in Africa has been elusive and dauntingly challenging (Adedeji 1999). Owing to this, Africa 
has been engulfed by numerous civil wars, some of which have become frozen wars. The case of Somalia is a living 
example. Since the withdrawal of the UN peace-keeping force, the conflict is raging on and Somalia is virtually a 
collapsed state. The poorly resourced African Union peace-keeping force has miserably failed to transform the 
conflict in any substantive way. In some cases, different regional member states would support different warring 
factions, further complicating the conflict and making it difficult for the regional body to function as a neutral actor in 
the conflict. 
 
The task of mediating conflicts is challenging because regional cooperation through intervention in member countries 
for conflict resolution is replete with problems of distrust, intra-regional divisions, sovereignty issues and paucity of 
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resources to sponsor the peace-keeping and post-conflict peace building initiatives which are geared towards 
preventing the recurrence of conflict in the particular country (Adedeji 1999). 
 
Against the foregoing background, respondents were asked to reflect on the challenges which the SADC 
encountered during the three preventive diplomacy missions in the Kingdom. The challenges faced by the SADC as 
expounded by the different participants range from operational, institutional, policy and economic, political and 
implementation constraints.  
 
8.7.1 The Challenge of Quenching Violence and Restoring of Order 
Firstly, the SADC had to deal with volatile conflicts to restore order for peaceful resolutions of the disputes. In 1994 
and 1998 Lesotho was on the verge of plunging into full-scale civil war as the opposition, in collaboration with the 
military and the monarchy had paralysed the government of the day. The post-2007 elections were also 
characterised by violent attacks on the LCD government officials, an attempted assassination of Prime Minister 
Phakalitha Mosisili and heated disagreements over the allocation of parliamentary seats within the mixed member 
proportion electoral system. The SADC had the mammoth challenge of restoring the government, disarming the 
mutinous soldiers and appealing to the opposition parties and their supporters and the monarchy to calm down for a 
negotiated settlement of the conflict. The SADC was enmeshed between hostile camps to bring the rival political 
stakeholders together for a mutually beneficial settlement of the conflicts. The SADC suffered accusations and 
counter-accusations by the different rival camps. For example during the 1994 and 1998 missions the SADC was 
accused by the opposition of favouring the government of the day against the opposition. A large number of 
opposition participants in this study accused the SADC of giving an unfair advantage to the government during its 
intervention operations. According to one respondent “...the latitude given to the opposition in terms of negotiations 
on the way forward was a little bit wanting” (Interview with R 11, 16 June 2011). As the BAC respondent puts it 
“[w]hen we complain about the government and then the government is the player and the judge, it becomes difficult” 
(Interview with R 5, 04 August 2010). Said differently during the SADC interventions, “the government negotiated as 
the government not on the same par as the opposition parties. And that type of attitude makes it impossible for 
mediators to come up with reasonable solutions and recommendations. In other words, there should have been 
something which should have been done to neutralise the political power of the government” (Interview with R 9, 20 
August 2010).  
 
In both cases the SADC had the dilemma of recognising the government of the day which the opposition were 
struggling to topple. As the BCP official pointed out “[t]he intervention was merely to install a government that the 
opposition was saying no, this was improperly in place. So SADC was not able to map out a way forward that would 
satisfy the opposition” (Interview with R 17, 08 July 2011). This put them in a situation of being accused as pro-
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government and anti-opposition. For instance, the MFP interviewee accused the SADC for talking “to the guilty man 
privately” and when he defies them, they justify by saying “well the man is the Prime Minister. After all we have to 
give him an opportunity” (Interview with R 15, 07 July 2011). What further embittered the opposition parties was that 
the report of the Langa Commission, whose release the SADC delayed had alleged to fraudulent practices which 
marred the credibility of the results and the resultant government. The Mail and Guardian; 9-15 October, 1998; (cited 
in Makoa 1998: 18) observed that the report, in its original form (before being doctored) ―questioned the legitimacy of 
the LCD government and called for re-elections under an interim government of national unity. But when South Africa 
and Botswana troops were sent into Lesotho, their stated aim was to reinstate the supposedly legitimate and elected 
LCD government.‖ In light of that, ―it would certainly be wrong to hail the intervention as a positive development for it 
was meant to protect the staus quo-that is to nourish and perpetuate this political morbidity‖ (Matlosa, 1998: 22). This 
is more so because ―it is not completely clear at the time the decision to launch the intervention was made, SADC 
was wholly convinced that the LCD had not rigged the elections‖ (Southall, 2001: 161). 
 
The Coordinator of the CCL advised that on the basis of such perceptions, the opposition felt the SADC was an 
organisation which interfered in the domestic affairs of Lesotho to reinstate the government without necessarily 
addressing the real issues and interests of the discontented masses. The view that the SADC was for the defence of 
the status quo was largely projected by the MFP, BCP, the BAC and the BNP respondents. The latter reasoned that 
the SADC ―is a clique which is there to protect each other among the rulers.” He went on to illustrate that when 
people rise against the government of the day in the SADC region that is when the SADC comes in. But when it is 
the government massacring its people, as was the case in Zimbabwe, the SADC remain indifferent and passive. He 
therefore argued that “[i]n Lesotho it‟s the same thing that happened. All these things that the LCD government has 
been doing against us, even ignoring agreements that have been signed; we tried to speak to SADC; we wrote to 
SADC, we sent emissaries to SADC. They just kept a blind eye as if nothing has happened...But once we start to rise 
against Mosisili, then you see them coming in rushing into the country” (Interview with R 18, 07 July 2011). The 
opposition respondents maintained that the government‘s intransigence in spite of the commendable effort which the 
Masire-led peace facilitation had made in resolving the post-2007 election dispute emanate from the government‘s 
firm knowledge that the SADC would not engage against one of theirs. According to the Coordinator of the CCL, the 
problem “...is the reluctance to exact political pressure on the government to make sure that now the political 
impasse is resolved. In other words, SADC is now very diplomatic on this issue..”. Faced with such a situation, 
Masire‘s “problem was that he was begging the government...Simply, he was nursing the feelings of the government 
by having to meet the Prime Minister alone begging him to cooperate‖ (Interview with R 9, 20 August 2010). 
However, the government viewed Masire as pro-opposition in his findings as he constantly accused the government 
of non-cooperation and frustration of the mission. 
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8.7.2 Failure to invite Opposition Parties during its Summits 
The SADC also had to contend with the accusations that during its Summits of Heads of state, in which reports were 
given on the status of the crises in Lesotho, the opposition were never invited in spite of the fact that they were an 
integral aspect of finding a lasting solution to the problem. The opposition maintained that the fact that they only 
invited the government is evident enough that the SADC was biased in favour of the government as a stakeholder. 
The BAC official recommended that “[i]f there is a conflict, the conflicting parties must be treated equally [and] fairly, 
that is when you are going to satisfy conflicting parties. And whenever, there is a SADC summit, they don‟t have to 
call only the government which is in conflict with opposition parties. They must call the opposition parties so that they 
hear two sides of the story...You cannot take one side ...and be able to make...a fair judgement or decision. They 
must always have the conflicting parties together... They should be objective in their approach; [Then] they can easily 
be in a position to draw consensus” (Interview with R 5, 04 August 2010). In light of the above, the BAC leader 
suggested that the SADC should form the opposition forum through which it could engage the opposition parties as 
stakeholders in the search for a durable solution to the Lesotho political impasse. 
 
8.7.3 Government accusation of SADC as Pro-opposition 
On the other hand, the SADC also faced the challenge of being accused by the government of siding with the 
opposition during its operations. For instance, during the 1994 intervention the SADC decision that the King should 
reverse the palace coup on condition that the government should reinstate King Moshoeshoe II, and disband the 
commission of enquiry set up to investigate Moshoeshoe II‘s relations with previous governments was reluctantly 
accepted by the BCP government. The SADC Troika facilitated the signing of the Memorandum of Agreement 
between the monarchy and the Mokhehle government. In line with the Memorandum of Agreement signed between 
the BCP government and the monarchy Act no 10 of 1994 on the reinstatement of the former King was enacted and 
the King was reinstated on the 25 January 1995. Section 2 (1) of the act provided that ―[u]pon the abdication of His 
Majesty King Letsie III from the office of King of Lesotho, His Majesty Moshoeshoe II shall assume the office of King 
of Lesotho‖ (Lesotho Government Gazette; in Makoa 2002: 11). It was the conviction of the SADC Troika that 
addressing the friction between the government and the monarchy would provide a panacea to the incessant political 
unrest in the country. As such they held that ―[t]he question of the monarchy appears to be a very important 
traditional question and one that goes to the very heart of the Basotho society and underlies its present problems... 
hence the need to address it‖ (Report on Presidential Visit to the Kingdom of Lesortho; 1994: 13).  
 
While it might have been undertaken by the SADC Troika in the spirit of give and take to find an integrative solution, it 
bred bitter feelings within the ranks of the BCP government which felt that the SADC was sympathetic to the 
monarchy. The feelings of the government were forcefully asserted by the BCP respondent that “[t]he question here 
would be how did we view that move by that intervention? ...it was just a SADC thing or it was just a thing of 
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neighbours who may be sympathetic to the Palace. I would say it that way eh because in their negotiations, they 
never said it was wrong in the first place for the King to have staged a coup in order to twist the arm of the the 
government...Infact they worked towards putting in place exactly what the King wanted; the reinstatement of his 
father...a law was passed for the restoration of Moshoeshoe II to the throne...But some of us who already were 
witnessing that at the time felt that no, surely this is just eh an exercise of friends doing favours for each other‖ 
(Interview with R 17,  08 July 2011). Southall and Petlane (1995: xii) expressed the compromise thus: ―[d]ismayed by 
the implications of the overthrow of democracy in even so small a state as Lesotho, the governments of Botswana, 
Zimbabwe and-most importantly post-apartheid South Africa compelled a re-instatement of the duly elected BCP, 
albeit with instructions to the latter to address itself to outstanding constitutional issues particularly the question of the 
monarchy as well as to matters concerning the military.‖ 
 
Another respondent felt that while a solution had to be found, the SADC should not have made the restoration of King 
Moshoeshoe II to the throne a condition upon which King Letsie had to give power to the democratically elected BCP 
government in 1994. He argued that King Moshoeshoe was not dethroned by the BCP government and therefore 
they were not obliged to reinstate him. He stated that “I agree that that was an issue to be discussed but not the 
condition...That is where really even though for the sake of peace, I accept what the SADC did, but truely speaking 
the government was supposed to be returned unconditionally...I think we swallowed a very bitter pill...There was no 
fairness in that...But unfortunately politics is also about power. So if somebody who has power demands something, 
you just settle for a compromise not because eh there is truth in what is being done‖ (Interview with R 6, 19 August 
2010). 
 
Similarly, the LCD government found fault with the recommendations made by the SADC post-2007 election disputes 
mediation team. In the view of the government, Masire was fronting for the opposition. In response to Masire‘s report 
to the SADC that he was retiring the mission because the government was uncooperative, the government of 
Lesotho noted that while the Eminent Person initially conducted the task with diplomatic commitment ―[a]s the 
process unfolded, serious difficulties began to show; and there was a perception, rightly or wrongly, that the Eminent 
Person‘s Mission was not conducting its business in an open and transparent manner, which induced a sense of bias 
and partiality on the part of the mission. A simple, but significant example is the way information flowed regarding the 
Mission‘s visits to Lesotho. In many a case, the Government would learn through the grapevine of the opposition 
circles that the Eminent Person was planning a visit to the country; and in most cases this would later turn out to be 
true, with the Government ‗honoured‘ with a very short and belated notice of such a visit. At times the ruling party 
(LCD) would not be invited to or notified of meetings.‖  
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The acrimonious contention between facilitator and the government emerged from Masire‘s suggestion that the 
formation of alliances by the LCD and NIP and the ABC and LWP contravened the mixed member proportion (MMP) 
electoral model leading to the distorted allocation of proportional representation seats in parliament. The allocation of 
seats unfairly benefited the parties which formed alliances to the detriment of the parties which went into elections as 
individual entities. This actually violated the intentions and purposes which proportional representation aims to 
achieve. The BNP participant commended Masire that, “...at least [he] did say openly, no, I know where the problem 
is; and that thing hurt the government so much, but it was the truth” (Interview with R 18,  07 July 2011). In the words 
of the dialogue facilitator “[t]he core issues were really that the ruling party (LCD) and the ABC had not obeyed the 
rules the same MMP was established for. That the parallel candidates were set with the view that the party that did 
not do well in the constituency elections would get something from proportional representation...Both of them linked 
with parties that they knew would not win elections and therefore could only come up in the proportional 
representation....they were joined and voted in the constituencies as one party instead of two different parties. And 
when it came to proportionality, the LCD helped their smaller party, the NIP and then ABC also helped their smaller 
party, LWP. And therefore the bigger parties won because the smaller parties helped them in the constituencies and 
the smaller parties won disproportionate number of seats because their votes were swelled by the votes of the bigger 
parties...Other smaller parties which had not joined the two coalitions did badly” (Interview with R 10,  23 May 2011).  
 
The Lesotho dialogue facilitator had also suggested that the expert who recommended the MMP electoral model in 
Lesotho be invited to give an informed view on what went wrong so as to break the impasse but the government 
objected to all of Masire‘s suggestions on the grounds that the High Court in Lesotho had ruled that there was 
nothing unlawful in the formation of alliances during the 2007 elections. On the response letter referred to above, the 
government of Lesotho vehemently opposed Masire‘s recommendations. It categorically stated that ―[t]he correct 
position is that Government had to act responsibly as the custodian of constitutionality in the Kingdom. The 
perspective of the Government was premised on a fundamental principle, viz. Respect for judgments and decisions 
of the courts of law, and Lesotho‘s institutions of democracy, such as the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), 
and its integrity and competence...The courts have spoken on the matter of the validity or otherwise of allocation of 
the proportional representation seats, having held that there was nothing unlawful with party alliances which had 
been formed for purposes of contesting the general elections of February, 2007...Thus for the Government, there 
could not, conceivably, be another ‗court of experts‘ to come to Lesotho and give another ‗judgment‘ over and above 
that of a court of law in Lesotho‖ (Lesotho Government Response to SADC Eminent Person; 2010: 3 and 4).  
 
 One of the interviewees lamented the LCD government‘s refusal to allow the facilitator to invite the MMP expert who 
would have brought in expert insights towards the resolution of the post- 2007 election dispute. He observed that “Sir 
Ketumile Masire more than anything else was hindered by some authorities in Lesotho. They did not allow him to 
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bring the experts to clearly advise whether or not the application of the model was properly done. And without the 
answer on that one, we cannot up to now say the allocation of seats was right. One would expect that all political 
parties would have accepted that the experts were brought in to tell us exactly what has transpired so that any 
decision that is taken is informed by experts. But in the absence of that, up to now we still have gaps and I don‟t see 
any possibility of going forward‖ (Interview with R 2, 28 June 2010). The rift between the Eminent Person mission and 
the Lesotho government hampered any progress resulting in Masire terminating the mission mid way in 2010. 
Accusations and counter-accusations flew between the Lesotho government and the facilitator. While Masire blamed 
the government‘s uncooperative behaviour, the government felt that ―[t]he Eminent Person, who essentially was to 
facilitate the dialogue, [had] decided to descend into the arena of technical disputes between the contesting parties, 
and to make findings over and above as well as against those of the court of law. It is strongly contended that this is 
not the role of a facilitator, but that of an arbitrator and/or adjudicator...The Government of Lesotho views this attitude 
in a very serious light indeed, as it is clearly yet another instance where the Eminent Person joins opposition parties 
in their complete disregard, and indeed disrespect, of the institutions of State that buttress the rule of law and 
democracy in Lesotho (such as the judiciary, the legislature, and the IEC)‖ (Lesotho Government‘s Response to 
Eminent Person 2010: 6 and 10). 
 
Consequently, the SADC was faced with the challenge of dealing with an uncooperative government in trying to find 
a lasting solution in the Kingdom. According to one respondent who participated in both the 1994 and 1998 missions 
“[t]here had to be a number of interventions from external organisations to try and motivate the government of 
Lesotho to sit at a round table with all the concerned parties” (interview with R 12, 16 June 2011). Worse still, the 
SADC seemed powerless to pressure the government to bend to some of the recommendations which would have 
gone a long way in resolving the political impasse. In light of this, one of the interviewees argued that “[t]his body 
[SADC] is made up of all the countries in the SADC and then if one SADC member, just because it doesn‟t want to 
relent, or give in, and then choose to be nasty when SADC advises, it means SADC has to be stronger” (Interview 
with R 19, 07 July 2011). For example during the post-2007 mission the SADC had to contend with an increasingly 
widening rift between the opposition and the government of Lesotho. Each blamed the other for the collapse of the 
mission. The Lesotho government felt Masire was overriding the ruling of its High Court and the Independent 
Electoral Commission regarding the outcomes of the 2007 elections mainly to placate the opposition parties. These 
perceptions were triggered by the facilitator‘s comment during the mission that the High Court had ―decided not to 
decide‖ on the petition placed before them by the MFP. The SADC remained passive when the Lesotho government 
frustrated the SADC mission arguing that ―instead of facilitating dialogue and agreement on the Memorandum of 
Understanding, the Eminent Person found it easier and expedient to apportion blame exclusively to the Government 
and the ruling party.‖ To show the deepening rivalry which was unfolding between Masire and the government, when 
the CCL took over the process, the government of Lesotho gleefully reported that ―...the Christian Council of Lesotho 
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(CCL) has picked up the baton of dialogue which fell from Sir Ketumile Masire‘s hand. They are currently supervising 
dialogue by Lesotho‘s political parties and promoting a culture of peaceful resolution of conflicts without sacrificing 
basic principles of good governance and respect for the rule of law in the process‖ (Lesotho Government Response 
to the Eminent Person; 2010: 5). The point here is that the SADC remained indifferent and powerless when their 
delegated mediator was subjected to such humiliation by one of their member states. 
 
8.7. 4 Perceptions that the 1998 Intervention was Illegal 
Secondly, while none of the participants questioned the legitimacy of the 1994 and 2007, the SADC had to contend 
with excruciating questions over the legality of the 1998 mission as discussed earlier in this chapter. Controversy 
abounds as to whether it was authorised by the SADC or was a South African invasion. According to de Coning the 
most significant challenge faced by the SADC during the 1998 military intervention was the lack of transparency and 
clarity around the decision to authorise the mission. Numerous critics intimate that the intervention was not legal in 
terms of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter which specifically states that regional blocs such as the SADC should only 
undertake peace operations with the prior authorisation of the Security Council. According to Southall (2001: 167) 
―[t]here is little doubt that peace-keeping is essentially a UN responsibility, that it should be endorsed by the world 
body, and conducted in accordance with the international ethos of the UN Charter.‖ Since SADC had not sought such 
authorisation, it could not claim the UN‘s endorsement (Southall, 2001). Therefore the intervention in Lesotho has 
always been ―portrayed by its critics as illegitimate and partial to the LCD‖ (de Coning, cited in Southall, 2001: 167). 
No doubt then that the opposition parties were opposed to the military mission as a South African invasion to 
safeguard the LCD government which attained power through fraudulent elections. The SADC had to contend with 
the prevailing perceptions that the intervention was not a SADC mission but a South African incursion which blatantly 
contravened international law, encroached and violated the sovereignty of Lesotho. Justifying the legality of the 
mission was a mammoth challenge to the SADC, more so because it was, from the onset not sanctioned by the UN 
Security Council as prescribed in the UN Charter. In such a situation the SADC faced stiff resistance from Basotho 
opposition and the LDF especially in 1998 as evidenced by the high casualties and the massive destruction of 
property in Maseru. The SADC grounds that the intervention was in accordance with the guarantee of Lesotho‘s 
stability assigned to South Africa, Botswana and Zimbabwe in 1994 and that they were invited by the legitimately 
elected government were not accepted by the opposition because in all the instances (1994, 1998 and 2007), the 
opposition was questioning the legality of the government due to the flawed elections/electoral process which brought 
it to power. Effectively, the SADC had to contend with protecting its tainted image among the opposition parties in 
Lesotho.  
 
Given the prevalence of such perceptions, the opposition fiercely contested the legality of the mission as mandated 
by the regional body. Southall (2001: 167) argues that ―even if the intervention followed from noble motivations, its 
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imperfect legality was always likely to undermine its success by providing a moral basis to the LDF and the 
opposition for resistance.‖ The view widely held by the opposition respondents was that the 1998 mission was a 
South African incursion driven by economic motives. This view is aptly captured by Makoa (1998: 23) that ―South 
Africa was spurred into this action more by its own interests than the reasons that it has provided...the intervention is 
more akin to conspiracy than to what it purports. Clearly a South African project, the military intervention is a 
contrived affair meant to intimidate government opponents and to defend investment projects such as the Lesotho 
Highland Water project...The SADC that is being touted by South Africa and Botswana is a smokescreen meant to 
win legitimacy for an essentially indefensible act.‖  What sparked more piercing questions on the legality of the 
mission as stated earlier was that the intervening forces from Botswana and South Africa hoisted two different flags 
on entering the Kingdom. Worse still, the agreement which permitted the intervention was signed between South 
Africa and the government of Lesotho rather that the SADC which is purported to be the authorising body. It was in 
view of this situation that De Conning, (1998: 2) concludes that ―...it was unclear who took the decision? When the 
decision was taken? Where it was taken? And, what that decision was. It was unclear if there was any formal SADC 
decision that authorised the Lesotho intervention. If such a decision was taken by SADC, it is unclear if it was 
authorised by the SADC Summit in Mauritius, at the Ministerial meeting, or at a meeting of Chiefs of Staff. Assuming 
for a moment that SADC did approve the intervention, what was the mandate approved by the SADC for the 
mission? It was not clear therefore as to where the decision to intervene was taken.‖  In light of the above, de Coning 
(1998: 4) concluded that ―what the confusion over authorisation does point to...is lack of clarity over what the correct 
authorisation procedure for SADC missions are? It emphasises the need for a clear and transparent authorisation 
process in SADC that will make it easier for all involved to immediately infer credibility on a decision taken after a pre-
designed authorisation process has been followed. As the Lesotho intervention proved once more, clarity around how 
decisions of this nature are taken is crucial to the credibility of multinational missions.‖ What further exacerbated 
questions on the legality of the SADC military mission is that the OPDS and MDP) protocols, the instruments on 
which the intervention was purportedly premised, had not been formally ratified by the member states (Molomo 1999, 
Southall 2001). 
 
On the other hand the SADC had to contend with the government of the day whenever compromises which seem to 
accommodate the opposition had to be made. For example, during the 1994 intervention, the BCP government had 
hard feelings regarding the SADC compromise calling on the government to reinstate King Moshoeshoe II. They felt 
the SADC was unfairly sympathising with the monarchy against them as a democratically elected government. 
During the 1998 mission, the ruling LCD had serious misgivings about the Interim Political Authority (IPA) in which 
the opposition and the government were collectively involved in governing the country prior to the holding of fresh 
elections. In the view of the government, the IPA was an imposition by the regional body which forced the LCD to 
share power with the opposition that did not want to accede to defeat in fair and free elections. Hence, the 
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government is said to have consistently frustrated the operations of the IPA (Santho 2000, Southall 1998, 2000, 
2001).  
 
Similarly during the 2007 Masire- led dialogue facilitation, the LCD government felt Masire‘s recommendations were 
geared towards assisting the opposition into toppling a democratically elected government.  On that premise the 
government frustrated all of the facilitator‘‘s recommendations much to the chagrin of the SADC. In the words of the 
MFP respondent, the Prime Minister “snubbed the whole process...He did not bother to attend meetings” (interview 
with R 15, 07 July 2011).  The dialogue facilitator “did his level best but he could not move an inch because the 
government was so arrogant and you know they even insulted him” (Interview with R 18, 07 July 2011). In view of 
this bickering between the government and the opposition parties, Petlane and Southall, (1995: xvi) noted that the 
sticking challenge to SADC ―will be the development of a culture of political tolerance in Lesotho; a recognition by all 
major political actors that their opponents cannot be eliminated and a movement beyond the view of politics which 
sees the winner as taking all.‖ 
 
8.7.5 SADC Operational Flaws 
Thirdly, the SADC intervening troops confronted numerous operational challenges. The issue of lack of sufficient 
intelligence on the status of the dispute and the level of resistance which the intervening forces should be prepared 
for have been raised by several commentators on the Lesotho SADC interventions especially the 1998 military 
mission. Basupi (2007: VI) indicates that the SADC intervention forces were ill-prepared and unable to anticipate the 
magnitude of resistance they encountered in Lesotho ―due to poor information gathering capabilities.‖ Consequently, 
SADC forces, especially the South African troops met formidable resistance from the LDF and opposition supporters 
who deemed them as invaders. According to one participant the intervening troops operated in a polarised, volatile 
and highly charged atmosphere and Basotho from different political parties were highly agitated against each other 
and they were equipped with lethal weapons (paraphrase from interview with R 12, 14; June 2011 and R 10, 23 May 
2011). Another respondent based at the SADC Headquarter pointed out that “[t]here was resistance, massive 
resistance. As a result of the resistance, a lot of weapons were taken out of the armouries...arms just went all over 
and got into the hands of people who were not soldiers. So we had more than just armament of the mutineers and 
everybody else including the civilians themselves...” [Consequently] “the intervention force found it very difficult to 
carry out its mandate of disarmament.” On account of the chaotic situation as described, “it became very difficult to 
account for all the weapons; hence it took many years to fully disarm the whole society; it took efforts beyond 
Operation Boleas itself...There may be some weapons that may not have been recovered as a result of this process”  
(Interview with R 14,  20 June 2011). If this is true, this is a haunting challenge for the SADC in view of the fact that 
Lesotho is consistently prone to post-election violence. As such the SADC should brace itself for violent post-2012 
elections as Basotho may employ some of the uncovered weapons and cause havoc in the country once more. In 
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view of the above poor operations by the SADC Sejanamane, (1996: 82) argues that ―[f]rom a peace and security 
perspective, the Lesotho crisis, has shown that there is no satisfactory formal conflict resolution and peace-keeping 
mechanism in Southern Africa.‖ 
 
8.7.6 Lack of Sufficient Intelligence Information 
To add insult to injury, according to Basupi the intervening troops were not combat-ready as there was no proper 
planning and rehearsal by the intervening forces before deployment. For example ―there were complaints that the 
army had been sent into Lesotho ‗blindfolded‘... and the ‗wrong people‘ had been dispatched to Lesotho on the basis 
of inadequate planning, preparation and information‖ (The Star; November 1998, cited in Southall, 2001: 166). There 
was also lack of coordination between the BDF and the SANDF during the operation. Consequently, the BDF arrived 
a day after the SANDF had been solely engaged in street battles with the LDF and opposition supporters. This hiccup 
resulted from inadequate aerial photographs and intelligence liaison between the BDF and the SANDF (Southall, 
2001). Heitman (1998: 5) also observed that the flawed performance of the SADC troops emanated from faulty 
intelligence reports on the Lesotho crisis as the ―assessment was somewhat over-optimistic and resulted in a force 
too weak to handle the operational requirements especially the level of resistance on the part of the LDF elements.‖ 
This resulted in the deployement of a small contingent comprising 600 SANDF and 200 BDF soldiers to confront a 
2000- strong LDF bolstered by agitated opposition protestors (Southall 2001, Basupi 2007). 
 
8.7.7 Poor Co-ordination of Intervening Troops 
Worse still, there was failure to coordinate a simultaneous entry of both the SANDF and BDF into Lesotho. One 
participant noted that the operation was not properly planned as the assumption was that it was just going to be a 
brief encounter and the SADC troops would then move out. He took issue with the fact that there was no other 
personnel mechanism in place such as the police and humanitarian officers to maintain law and order. The 
participant posited that “[i]t was not even foreseen that as they engaged the military then some parts of the populace 
would start going into issues of looting. There was nobody who made sure that Maseru was not burnt down” 
(Interview with R 14, 20 June 2011). Southall (2001: 165) holds the view that ―Maseru need not have been left so 
dismally unprotected from the rioting‖ had adequate planning been done. In the view of Southall (1998: 4) ―[t]he burnt 
out shell of Maseru‘s main street says it all‖ regarding the flawed planning and execution of the mission. The 
participant even insinuated that the delayed arrival of the BDF might have been due to irreconcilable differences 
between the two forces on how best to carry out the operation. He stated that “[t]here were major differences 
between the BDF and SANDF regarding the intervention and operations in Lesotho. Even the delayed arrival of the 
BDF had nothing to do with logistical issues. It was due to the differences on how the operation was to be conducted” 
(Interview with R 14, 20 June 2011). One BDF retired officer also indicated that lack of coordination was also present 
in the disparity of benefits to the participating troops. He noted that Botswana and South Africa had different 
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remuneration pegs for their troops. This situation is a blow to the credibility of the mission as a SADC operation 
because if it was so, the regional organisation should have determined a standard remuneration for the intervening 
forces. 
 
This participant also raised the issue that if the SADC had efficiently planned the intervention they should have been 
very cautious about sending South African troops into Lesotho considering their history of rivalry and animosity. He 
posited that “[h]ad proper planning been done, there would even have been understanding that the mere presence of 
the South African military force in Lesotho will cause an uprising from...the populace...” (Interview with R 14, 20 June 
2011). Southall maintains a similar perspective that it was not wise that the South African National Defence Force 
(SANDF) was led by an Afrikaner (Colonel Hartslief) because ―it was always likely to be construed as an invasion 
force.‖  He further pointed out that ―had the SANDF awaited the BDF, the operation would have appeared more like a 
SADC operation, rather than a South African one with a SADC fig-leaf‖ (Southall, 2001: 165).  
 
In light of the above, the SADC, as a regional body tasked with maintenance of regional peace and security faced 
stinging criticisms as being ill-prepared and incapacitated for regional military interventions to restore order. Southall 
(2001: 166) maintains that ―it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that those who approved the military logistics for this 
operation gifted their critics with sufficient ammunition to query their competence.‖  The MFP participant posited that 
“SADC has poorly performed. It needs to improve its art of intervention. Or if not, it has to decide whether they would 
intervene militarily straight away or if they want to negotiate a settlement. Then they better sharpen their skills” 
(Interview with R 15, 7 July 2011). On the basis of assumptions that the SADC operation was based on inadequate 
information, one participant suggested that the SADC should always send fact-finding missions before intervening 
rather than just dash in militarily (paraphrased interview excerpt with respondent  R 5, 04 August 2010). Southall 
(1998: 4) is also of the view that ―[a]n efficient operation could have provided the framework for a long term solution 
to Lesotho‘s perpetual political crises. While there would have been numerous objections concerning the international 
legality of such an intervention, its evident military success would have muted criticism. Perhaps SADC would have 
even earned plaudits for defending democracy.‖ 
 
However, on the contrary, the Commander of the South African contingent, Colonel Hartslief contended that the 
difficulties and the concomitant flaws in launching the operation emanated from ―the ‗fog of war‘ rather than 
inadequate intelligence or strategic planning...‖ (in Southall, 2001: 165). Despite this feeble defence mechanism, 
many questions remained as to whether the South African military was ready for international and regional peace-
keeping missions. 
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8.7.8 Challenges of Dealing with a Politicised Lesotho Security 
Fourthly, during the 1994 and 1998 interventions, the volatile political atmosphere was further fermented by the 
highly politicised and partisan security apparatus in Lesotho. Since the 1970‘s the security apparatus became deeply 
embedded in the Leabua Jonathan BNP government to the extent that they resisted the BCP (Mokhehle) and LCD 
(Mosisili) democratically elected regimes in Lesotho. Molomo (1998: 5) posited that ―[t]he Lesotho military, having 
successfully intervened in politics at least twice, cannot be said to be firmly under civilian control...The BNP, in its 
twenty-seven years of rule had entrenched itself especially in the military such that successive governments had a 
legitimacy crises.‖ The political situation was aggravated by the Leabua Jonathan regime which, in its bid to 
consolidate its hold on power ―armed the Basotho National Party‘s Youth League...an action which virtually turned 
the youth League into some kind of a parallel military force‖ (Molomo, 1998: 5). Hence, in 1994 and 1998, they 
colluded with the military to launch coups against the said governments.  
 
The SADC missions had to contend with military resistance especially during the military encounters of 1998 when 
the military-cum-monarchy coup paralysed the government. Thus without backing from the security establishments 
and under threat from the establishments which are supposed to defend the state, the BCP and LCD governments of 
1994 and 1998 crumbled. King Letsie III was able to dissolve the governments in the two instances due to the ―tacit 
support of the military, an active encouragement of the opposition BNP and royalist forces‖ (Weisfelder, 1997: 35). 
The scenario above depicts a volatile situation akin to full-scale warfare. That is, the SADC troops had to confront the 
LDF an institution that was established to ensure peace and security in the country but was now the source of 
instability in the country. According to Petlane and Southall (1995) this shows how the politicised military was 
determined to hijack democratisation in Lesotho. In both the 1994 and 1998 missions the SADC faced serious 
challenges of restoring trust between the government and the security establishment. In all the instances, the security 
forces were suspicious of the BCP and LCD governments and the opposition parties exploited the volatile situation to 
their advantage. 
 
The confrontation between the SADC and mainly the South African National Defence Force culminated in huge 
casualties, looting and destruction of property in Maseru. The scenario is better captured by Furley and Roymay, 
cited in Basupi (2007: 36) that ―[t]he SADC troops were seriously under-strength, most likely because of poor 
intelligence about the level of resistance anticipated, and entered the country prepared for a best case rather than a 
worst case scenario. Instead of securing the capital and preserving peace and stability, as were the mission‘s 
intention, SADC troops became tied up in a protracted battle with mutineers giving opposition supporters the 
opportunity to plunder, loot and burn the city centre.‖ Furthermore; there was evidently no coherent coordination of 
the operations of the BDF and South African national Defence Force (SANDF) troops. 
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The SADC also faced the challenge of retraining the highly politicised military to be a professional army to defend 
democracy, law and order and it was a mammoth task. During the Leabua Jonathan regime, the system that used to 
operate in the security apparatus was membership to the party (BNP). A majority of the participants pointed out that 
the security establishment in Lesotho had for a long time been a highly a politicised force right from the Leabua 
Jonathan BNP government to the Lekhanya military junta permeating to the BCP and LCD governments in 1994 and 
1998 respectively. This created a problem to the SADC training team from Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe 
which was tasked with retraining and re-orientating the LDF from a partisan security establishment to a professional 
army which would defend democracy. One retired BDF officer who was involved in the process stated that “...it was a 
very big challenge to try and show them that for a proper military institution; they have to divorce themselves from the 
political alliances‖ (Interview with R 12, 16 June 2011). The challenge for SADC was to try to remodel the Lesotho 
Defence Force into a neutral, apolitical and professionalised army (Field notes from interview with R 12, 14 June 
2011). It was a very challenging task for the SADC to retrain an army which had been entrenched into partisan 
politics and had at some stage tested power after a military coup in 1986. It goes without saying that there was some 
form of resistance to the democratisation process in Lesotho and the military still cherished wielding political power 
over the civilians. In fact it is on record that the LDF was evidently reluctant to relinquish power unconditionally to 
give way to democracy and civilian rule in 1993. The military attempted to manage the transition by setting rules 
which would protect their political space in the new democratic dispensation. In the view of Matlosa (1995: 120), ―it 
seems as if their withdrawal from political office (not from politics) was rather a face saving strategy against internal 
and external pressure than commitment to multiparty democracy.‖ 
 
8.7.9 Poor Communications about the Missions 
Fifthly, the SADC faced the challenge of lack of proper information on the intervention. The SADC failed to 
communicate the intention and mandate of the mission as a SADC operation. The source of information to the 
agitated Basotho became the media which projected the operation as a South African invasion. The SADC therefore 
had to deal with the damaging misinformation as projected by the media to the wide Basotho populace. The media 
was awash with headlines such as ‗South African intervention in Lesotho;‟ „the incursion that went wrong‟ and „a city 
ruined by a bungled intervention‟ all of which created a negative image for the regional body. Commenting on this 
lack of clear communication by the SADC and the government of Lesotho, Basupi (2007 and de Conning (1998) 
observe that failure to communicate to the public about the mandate of the mission led to the intervention forces 
suffering the painful dilemma of being perceived as a South African invading force as opposed to the way it perceived 
itself as a SADC peacemaking force. Such damaging perceptions no doubt impacted directly and adversely on the 
ability of the combined task force to convincingly communicate the reasons for their presence in Lesotho to the 
people. According to Basupi (2007: 40) the SADC intervening force suffered from three critical challenges regarding 
its relations with the media. In his observation ―there was lack of a clear strategic guidelines; there was no cohesive 
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corporate communication strategy; and external communication tended to be reactive rather than proactive.‖ The 
media also questioned the hastiness with which the military intervention was launched. This gave weight to 
accusations that the SADC has failed to lay foundations for non-violent resolution of political conflicts in Lesotho 
(Southall, 2001). Debating this issue in parliament, the then leader of the Freedom Front Constandt Viljon pointed out 
that the military action should have been launched after ―a specific pre-warning that in case this...will not be met by 
the internal people in Lesotho, force would be used. The use of force without notice is bad‖ (cited in Molapo, 1999: 
3). These further raised questions as to whether ―the intervention was undertaken as a neutral third party force, or 
whether it was undertaken on behalf of the Lesotho Congress for Democracy government.‖ 
 
With such unanswered questions hanging around the intervention, Basotho got more agitated and infuriated by the 
presence of the South African troops. The misunderstanding led to the people burning “everything else rather than 
being taken over by South Africa...the information that was being spread was that South Africa was taking over the 
country” (Interview with R 14, 20 June 2011). Worse still, for the integrity of the SADC, the South African troops 
blundered by hoisting their national flag upon entering the Kingdom inadvertently giving credence to the 
misinformation that South Africa was invading the country. Southall (2001: 167) noted that the perceptions of a South 
African invasion were further fuelled by the ―...already growing resentment throughout the region at what was 
increasingly perceived to be South Africa‘s new hegemony. [And] ―[t]he dubious legality of the intervention and 
Lesotho‘s de facto status as an encircled and powerless dependency inevitably encouraged perceptions of South 
Africa as a bully.‖ 
 
8.7.10 SADC Failure to Enforce Intervention Resolutions 
Sixth is the conspicuous failure by the SADC to enforce compliance and execution of its recommendations and 
resolutions mainly by the LCD government. This lack ofenforceability of its resolution prescriptions has damaged the 
efficacy of SADC as a regional peace-making organisation. It was experienced in the DRC, Zimbabwe, and 
Madagascar and in Lesotho which is the main case in this study. The NUL academic indicated that “[t]here is 
evidence, in the case of Lesotho; some of the directives that were provided were not implemented. The other cases 
in point are Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe has definitely resisted all the SADC initiatives to a democratic regime. 
Ravalomanana is still facing Rajoilina in Madagascar. So there is the authority problem‖ (Interview with R 16, 07 July 
2011). In the case of Zimbabwe the ZANU-PF regime ignored the SADC recommendations on the agreed operation 
procedures of the Government of National Unity with the MDC formations as prescribed in the Global Political 
Agreement in 2009. Similarly, Rajoilina also resisted calls by the SADC to open the political space for an inclusive 
democratic dispensation which would accommodate all opposition political entities in the country. 
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Numerous participants in this study raised this issue as one of the major shortcomings of the SADC as evidenced in 
its missions of 1994, 1998 and 2007. During the interviews, several participants accused the SADC of failing to exert 
political pressure on the government to implement or comply with some of the recommendations that would ensure 
attainment of sustainable peace and security in the Kingdom. In all the three missions, the government has been 
labelled as the spoiler as it either negotiated in bad faith or ignored the recommendations of the negotiation process. 
One of the frequently mentioned shortcomings in the SADC mediations was that the government negotiated as the 
government not at par with the opposition. The SADC failed to neutralise the power of the government to be 
accommodative of the opposition as a way of resolving the incessant political turmoil in Lesotho. For example, after 
the 1998 mediation, the SADC put up an inclusive IPA as a governing authority in which all the political parties were 
involved. But, as evidenced, the government consistently frustrated its operations, (for example by failing to avail 
adequate resources) and dragging its feet in making the constitutional amendments to expedite the holding of the 
2002 elections in a fair and peaceful political space. The NIP respondent observed that the IPA operated at a snail 
pace in as far as implementing the resolutions was concerned. He stated that “in the IPA, they spent very long time 
disagreeing” (Interview with R 3, 03 August 2010). The LPC respondent indicated that the IPA operations were 
resisted because the LCD government was opposed to the IPA through which it had to share governance with the 
opposition parties when they believed they had been duly elected in a free and fair election.  He added that “it was 
not easy because the LCD was opposed to the imposition of something which in its view was unjustified” (interview 
with R 6: 08 August 2010).  
 
The LCD was reluctant to fully participate in the deliberations of a body which they deemed competitive to parliament 
in which they were a majority. ―For the LCD, the IPA is an unwelcome imposition. The LCD claims-with considerable 
justification-to have won the 1998 election fairly and squarely, just as the BCP (from which it emerged) swept to its 
unambiguous victory in 1993. Consequently, it view(ed) the challenge of the Opposition Alliance to its popular 
legitimacy as emanating from undemocratic elements (in its view, covertly backed by the monarch and sections of 
the army) which because they have lost power are mounting a vigorous rearguard action to secure undeserved 
privileged and continuing influence‖ (Southall, 2000: 5). For example, the failure of the IPA to amicably agree to the 
new electoral system (MMP) was essentially because they deemed it an imposition by the SADC arbitration. On the 
other hand, the LCD viewed the SADC intervention as providing fertile grounds for the marginalisation and 
eradication of the monarchy and the army as competing political factors for power in Lesotho (Southall, 2000). 
Therefore it was ―almost inevitable that the terms of the settlement will be hotly debated by the LCD and its 
opponents‖ (Southall; 2001: 168). For example, the opposition parties also strove to project their own political agenda 
within the IPA.  They saw the IPA as a forum through which they would participate in governance and enhance the 
political standing of their respective parties in the Lesotho political space (Southall 2000).  
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Consequently, the SADC had immense difficulties to reconcile the two political camps and exert pressure, especially 
on the government to negotiate in good faith. There are allegations that the LCD was more often than not absent 
from the IPA gatherings presumably to hamper its functioning. The political bickering between the government and 
the opposition on the mandate of the IPA and electoral reforms delayed the holding of the elections which were 
scheduled for 2000. They were ultimately held two years later in 2002 (Southall; 2000, 2001; Santho 2000). Based on 
this situation one participant from the Royalty urged the SADC to always stand firm in backing its mediation teams 
and pressure the recalcitrant party to tow the line for the sake of peace and stability in the region. For instance, in the 
case of the 2007 mission, the SADC delegated Eminent Person clearly indicated that the 2007 elections were 
fraudulent as a result of the LCD and ABC alliance coalitions with the NIP and LWP respectively. The facilitator 
further suggested that the MMP expert be invited to clarify whether the electoral model was procedurally 
implemented, all of which was resisted by the LCD government with SADC watching passively and dismally failing to 
back Masire‘s recommendations on their merit. The participant from the Royalty observed that while the SADC 
facilitated dialogue between the different political parties, “...when it comes to implementation and arm-twisting the 
government, it has been a very insurmountable task for the SADC to do” (Interview with R 19, 07 July 2011).  
 
The BAC participant also noted that “[w]e have had a mission sent by SADC. They agreed that the model was 
defrauded; but SADC is failing to make a decision that is against the government...Masire did a very wonderful job 
but he was frustrated by the government” (interview with R 5: 04 August 2010). The ABC Youth League official also 
joined the chorus when he stated that “the intervention by SADC to address the Basotho crisis, it seems SADC has 
failed to use its strong position. [And] Now it means many people especially the opposition may not view SADC as an 
important body...SADC is not doing its job” (Interview with R 8, 10 August 2010). As such, without the SADC backing 
the 2007 SADC mediation crumbled while the political fermentation brewed on until the CCL took over the process. 
With the SADC as a regional body having failed to put the political weight and muscle on the negotiating parties (the 
government) to oblige, the BAC respondent painted a bleak picture for the CCL mediation effort as it did not have the 
legal authority to exert pressure. He maintained that “if the Chief Executive of the SADC is not able to decide; what 
about ordinary people that have got their mandate as individuals; It‟s tough” (Interview with R 5, 04 August 2010). 
This bleak situation for the CCL mediation process is also envisaged by Respondent 2. He states that “[a]s we speak 
the same CCL is also having the same stalemate. It looks like it will go up to 2012 elections without that being 
resolved” (Interview with R 2, 28 June 2010). 
 
Worse still, while the SADC has endorsed the CCL mediation and pledged to collaborate with it in breaking the 
political impasse, the regional body has not provided sufficient personnel, material and financial support to the 
mission. The Director of the SADC OPDS conceded to the reality that the SADC faces immense paucity of resources 
to back its peace-keeping efforts. In his words “...the challenge is financial resources to sustain our mediation 
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process. We depend on international cooperation partners which is not very good” (Interview with R 2, 28 June 
2010). The respondent also illustrated that although they have the human resource in the form of Eminent Persons 
and Panel of former Heads of State for the mediation in regional conflicts they still lack the capacity to swiftly place 
them on the ground in conflict situations. He explained that “the disadvantages are [that] we don‟t have eh structured 
systems where we can activate immediately when things happen to get them there” (Interview with R 2, 28 June 
2010).  
 
8.7.11 SADC Lack of Expert Mediators 
In the same vein, there is the challenge that the SADC has no pool of expert conflict mediators who are trained in the 
art of conflict prevention, management and resolution. It has therefore relied heavily on former presidents and 
Eminent Person under the assumption that they have the diplomatic skills of managing and resolving conflicts which 
not all of them posses. In a paper presented at a Seminar on International Mediation at the University of Botswana, 
September 2011) Nathan asserted: ―[i]nternational mediation has suffered from an acute lack of professionalism, 
expertise and rigour... The field of international mediation has placed no emphasis on training and education, on 
developing doctrines, strategies, and operating procedures, on setting and maintaining standards on appointments 
based on clear criteria and proven ability, and on learning from past experience in order to improve performance and 
avoid mistakes in the future. In short, international mediation has been regarded as synonymous with diplomacy 
rather than as a specialised activity.‖ As the LCD respondent puts it “[t]he tendency is that because you have been a 
former President or Prime Minister, you are being seen as enough that you can drive the process while the process 
might be even more complicated than that‖ (Interview with R 6, 19 August 2010). This position, in this case was 
indirectly directed to the post-2007 SADC peace mission whom the government staunchly resisted as pro-opposition. 
The CCL Co-ordinator also noted that the Lesotho political impasse might have been more complicated for Masire. 
He surmised that “...this means that he did not [fully] understand our political culture and complexity of our politics‖ 
(Interview with R 9, 20 August 2010). It was in light of this that the participarnt from the Royalty suggested that the 
SADC “has to rebuild its personnel in their Eminent Persons who could really take care of the modus operandi when 
it comes to negotiations... It has to make better Eminent Persons who can come and...capacitate its negotiators; 
make them stronger, more learned and more diplomatic...They can be more serious if one party does not adhere” 
(Interview with R 19, 07 July 2011).  
 
The LCD offcial is also of the opinion that while it is necessary to delegate reputable former presidents, “at the same 
time you need to back them up with a very strong team of experts; the people who know more about issues like 
conflict management, peace-building processes and staff like that‖ (Interview with R6, 19 August 2010). In their study 
of protracted social conflicts in Lebanon and Israel, Burton (1990a, 1990b, 1990c and Azar 1990a, 1990b 
emphasised the need to engage a panel of experts selected from scholars and practitioners who are specialised in 
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conflict analysis to facilitate conflict resolution through track two diplomacy. According to Azar (1990a: 35) an 
appropriate panel of facilitators should be ―a group of interdisciplinary colleagues who have been involved in tracking 
and studying conflict situations...; schooled in conflict analysis, management techniques, or human behaviour... Most 
important is the knowledge about protracted conflicts (especially the social-psychological factors involved) and cross-
cultural experience and sensitivity.‖ The Panel of mediators would then mediate and hold mediation workshops with 
the warring parties with the aim of transforming the conflictual perceptions to attitudes of willingness to cooperate, 
compromise and collectively resolve their common problems. 
 
One of the participants recommended that the SADC should not only sharpen the skills of the mediators but “must 
[also] improve the skills that goes in negotiations of and the SADC population itself. The people who are being 
affected by these negotiations must be prepared to take heed of what will be said they should do‖ (Interview with R 
10, 23 May 2011). This is very important considering the fact that for any mediation resolutions and 
recommendations to be successfully implemented the consumers of their contents and outcomes should be party to 
their decisions and design. These perceptions are based on the fact that in Lesotho the SADC mediation process 
was impeded by striking differences by the political parties to the extent that one of the research participants 
recommended that SADC should educate its political leaders on the rigours of politics. He observed that “[i]t looks 
like our politicians (here I am looking at the government and opposition) lack civic education on politics...They need 
to be capacitated in politics because they are leaders, but now really, they are as good as they are followers...SADC 
should ensure that atleast people who are political leaders should be empowered in terms of political knowledge...to 
understand their responsibilities and accountabilities as political leaders.[This is] because in most cases one will 
realise that the leaders are part of the problem instead of being part of the solution ... due to their political ignorance” 
(Interview with R 9,  20 August 2010). Respondent 19 noted that the hostile political space in Lesotho dates back 
from the 1970s and the political parties have failed to embrace politics of cooperation. He also noted that this might 
indicate that Lesotho was not adequately prepared for the democratisation process which took root in the 1990s. In 
other words political leaders should also be assisted and strive as leaders to embody politics of tolerance, 
cooperation, compromise, consensus and respect of majority decisions as expressed in elections and other 
structures of governance. As the LPC respondent observed “it is important to have a culture of politics of 
consensus...and the leadership of SADC should do well to encourage that” (Interview with R 4, 04 August 2010). 
 
However, during the interview, the facilitator of the Lesotho dialogue who also participated in the 1994 and 2007 
missions in Lesotho indicated that they engaged the different Basotho political stakeholders with the goal of 
promoting and enhancing politics of consensus among them for the benefit of peace and tranquillity in the Kingdom. 
For example during the Troika, they appealed to both sides to recognise each other through a compromise in which 
the King was to restore the BCP government while the latter was to reinstate King Moshoeshoe II to the throne. The 
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Troika also advised the government to mend its sour relationship with the military sector. The facilitator posited that 
“[w]e talked to the various stakeholders individually and later we called them together and the conclusion was eh, 
they should take the responsibility for peace in Lesotho and therefore learn to live together in peace. And that could 
only be strengthened by every party; to ensure that whatever, they do is according to the law...rather than take arms” 
(Interview with R 10, 23 May 2011). Therefore, the fact that the Basotho political entities have not yet embraced the 
politics of cooperation may be a result of protracted hostile and conflictual interaction between the political parties. As 
respondent 19 observed “...it is not easy to really remake politics after a long time of conflict...There has been serious 
conflict that has not been able to heal the hearts of our political personnel and landscape...Along the way, there has 
been a lot of damage to our politics of give and take... (Interview with R 19, 07 July 2011). 
 
The clarion call therefore is for the SADC to build capacity to back conflict mediation entities. In light of this the CCL 
Coordinator appealed to the SADC “to provide technical and financial support to the mediation [process] 
because...the CCL has no financial resources as the mediation was not budgeted for. Secondly, it has no expertise, 
that is why a request was made to SADC that now since you have been handling this issue, you might be in a 
position to give your support team to assist us” (Interview with R 9,  20 August 2010). 
 
Therefore, to many opposition political parties and other participants in this research, in spite of its political authority, 
the SADC has failed to resolve the political tensions among the political stakeholders in Lesotho. Makoa (1998b) 
argues that while the interventions managed to remove the immediate threat to the government, they yielded few, if 
any, prospects for political stability and democracy in Lesotho. During the interviews the NUL academic indicated that 
SADC faced formidable political problems after the interventions as “...they left the nation deeply divided; people did 
not trust them. And equally the government did not trust them. So they were facing the problem of confidence 
building” (Interview with R 16, 07 July 2011). Similarly, the BAC participant and another participant from the Royalty 
noted that based on the Lesotho missions, the SADC has lost integrity. It is on the basis of this loss of trust that the 
BNP and the MFP respondents staunchly vowed that under no circumstances would they ever allow any future 
SADC interventions in their country. The fact that all interventions of 1994, 1998 and 2007 failed to gain the 
confidence of all the warring parties does not augur well for the prospects of the regional organisation as a neutral 
body. In all three instances, the SADC was accused of being biased, either towards the government or towards the 
opposition parties. Given this situation, it may be concluded that the SADC has failed the test of third-party conflict 
facilitation. According to Azar (1990a: 36) ―an important characteristic of facilitators is that they must be able to 
remain fair and neutral during the process and resist getting drawn into the dispute itself. Facilitators must afford 
recognition to both parties and act so to increase the level of trust between them and the participants.‖ Evidence from 
this study has revealed that SADC is still lacking on this score. 
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Because of the failure to address the political animosity between the different political parties some of the participants 
anticipated violent eruptions during the on coming elections in 2012. As Southall (1998: 5) puts it ―Lesotho must now 
live the consequences of the failure of its political institutions and of South Africa/SADC‘s bungled interventions.‖ In 
its 1994 Report, the SADC Tripartite Task Force of Masire, Mugabe and Mandela recommended thorough dialogue 
between political stakeholders, mainly political parties, the monarchy and the military to avert future disputes. They 
stated that ―[i]t is clear that until or unless the broader underlying political issues are addressed, there can be no 
guarantee that such confrontations will not erupt again‖ (Report of the SADC Tripartite Task Force 1994: 13). The 
BAC, the BNP and the LCD respondents were not very optimistic that the coming 2012 elections would bring peace 
and stability in the Kingdom. Reflecting the volatile political atmosphere in Lesotho, the BNP participant lamented that 
“[t]he state is very volatile...I don‟t even know what will happen in the 2012 elections. But I can tell you with the 
situation as it is now, I doubt if we are going to have a peaceful election until such time that the LCD government is 
out. Everybody wants it out and we shall make sure that it goes out hook or crook; it will go out. This time, we are 
prepared for anything” (Interview with R 18, 07 July 2011). They therefore dismiss the regional body as a ‗talk shop‟ a 
‗tea club‟ a ‗paper tiger‟ and a ‗closed book‘ which has dismally failed in tackling and finding a lasting solution to the 
Lesotho political crisis. The BCP leader compared the SADC to the continental body (AU) as a total failure in 
addressing regional/continental conflicts. He indicated that “SADC has been non-effective...May be that is why 
even...continentally the AU is the same thing. Surely we only have to look at what is happening in North Africa to 
know that even the AU is as toothless and useless as SADC...I don‟t want to mention the case of Zimbabwe. It is 
deplorable what is happening in Zimbabwe. SADC was never able to do a thing” (Interview R 17: 08 July 2011). 
 
However, to the contrary some of the participants were optimistic that the SADC–CCL collective efforts would deliver 
a peaceful election in 2012. For example respondent 19, noted that “[i]ts a process, a political healing, it really takes 
time”.we are really confident that in our next elections there could be a balance of power...that would may be pay 
dividends for a better Lesotho and better relations with all sister countries within the SADC” (Interview with R 19,  07 
July 2011). 
 
8.7.12 Failure to Address Lesotho‟s Structural Economic Problems 
Finally the other major challenge faced by the SADC during and after the Lesotho interventions was that it appeared 
that the regional organisation concentrated its analysis of the conflicts solely on the political arena thereby ignoring 
one of the root causes of the Lesotho crises. As indicated in the previous chapter Lesotho is very underdeveloped 
and economically dependent on South Africa for its economic survival. Thus the deep underlying source of friction in 
the country which inevitably permeates the political realm and explodes is the underdeveloped economic status of 
the Kingdom. Azar (1986) observes that there is a correlation between violent conflicts, underdevelopment and 
uneven distribution of wealth. Several experts on conflict prevention, management and resolution are unanimous on 
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the reality that any attempts to resolve a conflict without addressing the root causes of the conflict are doomed to fail 
and the conflict is bound to recur. This is because inappropriate strategies would be directed to the symptoms rather 
than the real causes of the conflict. Burton and other basic human needs theorists have argued that any resolution 
strategies which address the surface issues of the conflict will definitely fail to find a lasting solution to the conflict or 
transform the conflict zone. In the view of Mitchell (1990: 162) ―[f]or a conflict to be genuinely resolved, the underlying 
issues must be brought to light, analysed and then dealt with in a mutually satisfactory way that involves the fulfilment 
of basic needs to achieve a win-win outcome. Otherwise the solution is likely to be merely temporary.‖  In light of this 
Azar (1990a: 18) notes that ―[a]ttempts at settlement or control of a crisis that do not tackle the deeper dynamics 
underlying the crisis will be temporarily successful at best. Moreover, the intractable and entangled nature of issues 
in protracted social conflicts involving the struggle over communal needs reduces the efficacy of third-party 
assistance.‖ According to Azar (1990a: 2) this is because ―...unmet psycho-political and socio-economic needs lead 
to dysfunctional cognitive and behavioural patterns that are not easily remedied by ordinary methods of diplomacy or 
the use of force.‖ 
 
It has emerged from this study that the SADC missions missed the dire economic situation of Lesotho as the root 
source of the recurrent conflicts in the Kingdom. ‖ In one of the papers on the recurrent instability in Lesotho Makoa 
(2002) advises that debates and research on the endemic conflict in Lesotho need to focus on the economic 
characteristics of the Basotho nation-state ―and its capacity to mediate or manage conflict and, and to perform 
distributive functions expected of the state.‖ It appears its weak economy lacks the ability and institutional capacity to 
sustain a coherent political structure in the Kingdom. It lacks the ―capacity to generate the national consensus 
essential for political stability and social harmony‖ (Makoa 2002: 5). 
 
Makoa further holds that most of the Basotho earn a living as migrant labour in the South African mines and 
industries since the country cannot provide employment opportunities to its citizens. Therefore, ―[t]his suggests that 
for the majority population in Lesotho the state is neither a facilitator of accumulation nor a factor in economic life. If it 
cannot influence the economic activity of the bulk of its population or maintain itself, can the state be a force for 
unity? In other words, it cannot rally its citizens around a particular political course or programme. As a result, it can 
only become the focus of political power contestations‖ (Makoa 2002: 16). The state becomes a step ladder for 
control and/or access to the available meagre economic resources. This has resulted in ugly and sometimes bloody 
contestations of election results as experienced in all the Basotho elections since 1970. Southall and Petlane (1995) 
depict the bitter contest between the BNP and the BCP during and after the 1993 elections as falling within the ambit 
of this struggle. In other words, in the view of the BNP, the BCP‘s capture of political power would seem to herald 
their (BCP) drive to use the state as a vehicle for accumulation. The BNP felt displaced from state power hence 
wealth control and accumulation‖ (Southall and Petlane 1995: xiii). 
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Given this scenario, one of the interviewees posited that one of the daunting challenges facing Lesotho “is the state 
of the economy. So we are likely to see more disturbances because of the state of the economy. And the 
government, the ruling party is not seriously addressing that problem of the economy. So there is a lot of 
discontentment within the country. Unemployment is a great problem in this country” (Interview with R 4, 04 August 
2010). In the view of other participants, one of the major shortcomings of the SADC intervention strategies in Lesotho 
was the failure to consider the adverse effects of the country‘s underdevelopment on the Basotho populace and the 
body politic. Makoa (2002: 14) maintains that ―one of the most glaring features of the Basotho nation-state is its 
inability to accumulate and redistribute wealth among its people.‖ Therefore, in his view “the problem really was not 
simply a political conflict. To solve the problem of Lesotho, SADC ought to address the economic problems” 
(Interview with R 16,, 07 July 2011). Inspite of the fact that the regional body‘s original goal was economic integration 
and economic growth and that in its founding treaty and protocols, it acknowledged the significance of economic 
growth as a catalyst for political stability, peace and security, the organisation has failed to infuse an economic 
assistance package to conflict-ridden member states. One respondent posited that “[n]owhere does it entail plans to 
enhance the individual [member] countries‟ capacity to deal with the economic problems; to support their own 
population” (Interview with R 16, 07 July 2011). That being the case, the LPC participant concluded that “the 
development of the economy in Lesotho is very critical. So SADC, I think has a role to play in that” (Interview with R 
4, 04 August 2010). 
 
In view of this serious shortcoming of the SADC in the case of its Lesotho interventions, Santho advises that ―[i]t is 
important to give serious attention to the multi-faceted aspects of addressing the challenges of poverty, youth 
employment and development that Lesotho faces in the short, medium and long term period. The bedrock of 
sustaining democracy is a national development strategy that provides sustainable livelihood for all Basotho.‖ It is a 
fact that Lesotho‘s economy remains constrained in terms of resource endowment, trade, job creation and 
employment opportunities and income generation and requires both micro and macro economic re-orientation fully 
backed by the regional bloc (Matlosa, 1993). In other words, the SADC should strive to assist Lesotho to address its 
debilitating economic challenges, if it is serious about finding a lasting solution to the political crises in the Kingdom. 
An economically viable Lesotho would ensure reduced dependence on South Africa and a fair distribution of 
resources and wealth to its populace and thereby minimise political agitation and disturbances in the small land 
locked country (Matlosa 1993). 
 
The point is that while the SADC succeeded in identifying and addressing other structural sources of the Lesotho 
conflicts in the form of reforming its FPTP electoral system to a Mixed Member Proportionality (MMP) and retraining 
and depoliticising its security forces, the regional body failed to address its structurally defective economy into a 
 419 
 
vibrant economy that could carter for the survival and existential needs of its people. In fact, instead of economic 
assistance, the South African government is said to have required the Lesotho government to pay for the services 
rendered and the damages caused during the 1998 turmoil. No doubt, this further worsened the already dwindling 
Lesotho economic woes. The recurrence of the Lesotho conflict after the 2007 elections may be indicative of the 
SADC failure to address the Lesotho economic troubles as the root cause of conflicts. As Lund (1996: 35) correctly 
notes ―defining preventive diplomacy as the amelioration of poverty might indeed increase the material welfare of the 
areas targeted for preventive action, and this might in turn reduce their chances of violence in the relatively remote 
future.‖ 
 
To avoid overlooking the deep-rooted sources of conflicts (as the SADC did with the Lesotho economic case), 
Barclay (1999) provides informative and searching questions which regional organisations should always consider in 
addressing regional conflicts and determining post-conflict peacebuilding measures to prevent reversion to conflicts. 
Regional organisations, according to Barclay (1999: 298) should strive to get answers to some of the following 
questions: 
 What are the major underlying factors which led to the crisis and consequent collapse of governance? 
 What are some of the critical problems and prospects in restoring peace to the crisis countries through regional 
cooperation?  
 Which policies and institutional factors could deter or avoid a repetition of similar civil conflicts? What are the 
lessons and implications for countries in transition from crisis to recovery in terms of governance and regional 
cooperation? 
 
Obtaining answers to all these questions may give the intervening entity an opportunity to find a holistic, all-
embracing strategy to resolve the conflict at hand and attain lasting and durable peace.  
 
8.8 Successes of the SADC Missions 
In spite of the well-articulated challenges of the SADC during its three preventive missions in Lesotho, the 
organisation made commendable strides in the right direction as stipulated in its founding treaty and protocols. 
 
Of heightened importance is the reality that the SADC interventions of 1994, 1998 and 2007 defused the violence 
between the government and the opposition and reversed the coups which followed the national elections of 1994, 
1998 and 2007. As indicated in chapter six, in 1994 and 1998 Lesotho suffered coups orchestrated by the opposition, 
the military and the monarchy collective. In 2007 there were assassination attempts against the Prime Minister and 
his government official. Therefore, in spite of its shortcomings, the organisation should be credited for having 
successfully halted the violence and prevailed on all the political stakeholders to find negotiated settlement of their 
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differences for the sake of peace and stability in Lesotho.  One interviewee from the OPDS indicated that the SADC 
missions were a success because they managed to stop the escalation of conflict beyond the acceptable limit as it 
happened in other countries (field notes from an interview with R 2, 28 June 2010). For instance, in 1994, the SADC, 
through its Troika of Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe, managed to diplomatically reconcile the warring parties 
through negotiations, reverse the coup, restore the BCP government and facilitated the reinstatement of King 
Moshoeshoe II, all of which brought about some period of tranquillity in the Kingdom. Similarly in 1998, although 
through coercive measures, the SADC successfully halted the coup and the concomitant violence and plunder, 
restored the government, formed the Interim Political Authority (IPA) in which all political stakeholders were 
represented and monitored the reform of the FPTP electoral system to a model which was more inclusive and 
representative-the mixed member proportionality (MMP). In 2007, the SADC mandated Masire to mediate the post-
election dispute and despite his failure to find a lasting solution to the problem, he successfully brought the 
belligerent parties to the negotiation table after diffusing the prevailing tensions in the country. In light of this ―there 
are some reasonable grounds for hoping that the interventions may have paved the way towards a less fractious 
politics‖ in Lesotho as she heads towards the 2012 elections (Southall, 2001: 168). 
 
8.8.1 Restoration of Democracy in Lesotho 
Several participants attested to the successes of the SADC in reducing the tensions, restoring the supposedly 
democratically elected governments and promoting a climate of peaceful dialogue between the political rivalries. The 
LCD Official argued that all the three SADC interventions were a success in that they brought back democracy which 
was under serious threat. He asserted that “[t]hey were a success; to me I see them as a success. Because one just 
think what would be Lesotho...had it not been through the intervention of SADC...There would be no democracy 
enjoyed in the country” (Interview with R 6, 19 August 2010). Even the staunchest critics of the SADC credited the 
SADC for diplomatically handling the 1994 and 2007 disputes. One such a participant was the BNP respondent who 
indicated that the 1994 diplomatic mission was commendable because the sister countries came in to bring the 
stakeholders for talks whose outcomes were a peaceful understanding and resolution of the conflict (field notes from 
an interview with R 18, 07 July 2011). The ABC respondent posited that the 1994 mission was conducted “amicably, 
professionally as well as politically” (Interview with R 8, 10 August 2010). The NUL academic agreed that the SADC 
Troika secured a compromise between the government, the monarchy and the opposition which saved Lesotho from 
descending into bloodbath.  
 
Inter-alia, as reflected in the 2007 mission the SADC promoted a culture of “dialogue between different parties and 
the norm that whenever there are problems, there must be negotiations. It‟s something to be appreciated” (Interview 
with R 16, 07 July 2011). Evidence abound that the Masire-led dialogue facilitation team managed to bring calm in a 
politically volatile climate and the rival parties saw reason to participate in a negotiated peace settlement. Although 
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the SADC facilitation team did not conclude and achieve its mandate, the baton was picked by the CCL which is 
continuing with the negotiations. The dialogue facilitator himself conceded that “[b]y the time we got to Lesotho, 
people were equipped with lethal weapons. But our coming in sort of imposed a sort of moratorium but still Basotho 
were agitated against the other. That was a problem which we fortunately managed to put down” (Interview with R 
10, 23 May 2011). The SADC has endorsed the CCL facilitation and collaborate with it in bringing an amicable 
solution to the political impasse. The collective efforts of the CCL and SADC are still on going and there are positive 
overtures to breaking the impasse according to some of the optimistic participants in this research. One participant 
observed that the collaboration between the SADC Troika and the CCL in facilitating dialogue between the parties is 
making headways in addressing some of the factors which bred friction between them. As such, in all the SADC 
missions, the organisation succeeded in preventing coups, halting the escalation of violence and restoring 
democratically governments, an achievement for which it should be commended.  
 
8.8.2 Interventions Saved Lesotho from Full-scale Civil War 
In addition, participants observed that although the SADC intervened militarily in 1998, the mission was timely, and it 
successfully saved the country from falling into a political abyss. The participants who held this perspective maintain 
that the SADC restored a democratically elected government which was on the brink of collapse due to opposition 
parties, the monarchy and the military strangling of the democratic dispensation which was unfolding in Lesotho. The 
LCD respondent asserted that “[w]e were here [in government] for two weeks and everybody wanted to topple us. 
They don‟t want to give democracy a chance...The people don‟t want to accept the outcome of elections...We won 
square and fair” (Interview with R 6, 19 August 2010). Given this precarious situation to Lesotho‘s young democracy 
“the intervention was good in terms of restoring the democratically elected government and also encouraging 
debates to see where the problem is” (Interview with R 8, 10 August 2010). All in all the SADC “participated in the 
political process to direct and show the adversaries...the common ground to take for Lesotho to become a peaceful 
country in the future” (Interview with R 11, 04 May 2011). In other words, the SADC through its interventions saved 
democracy in the Kingdom, and its image as a regional bloc composed of democratic governments in which there is 
a peaceful climate for both internal and external investment. As Matlosa (1995: 135) explains; ―regional countries did 
not want to see the reputation of the new SADC, now inclusive of South Africa-besmirched by its inclusion of 
unelected governments as it sought to re-fig its appeal to investors and international donor countries in the 
increasingly competitive post-Cold War era.‖ 
 
8.8.3 Disarmament of Protestors and Mutineer Soldiers 
The participants from the military establishment also commended the SADC for successfully fulfilling its primary 
mandate of disarming and containing the Lesotho Defence Force and restoring law and order in the country. One of 
the participants stated that the SADC managed to secure most of the weapons which were seized by the civilian and 
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LDF mutineers during the political chaos and they were kept in Blomfontein (South Africa) to be formally returned to 
the Lesotho government at some later stage (Interview with R 11, 04 May 2011).  The same participant summed it up 
as: “[i]n Lesotho the results, I believe were achieved. We pulled out in less than twelve months and we could see the 
developments. There was troop reduction and the mission changed from military intervention to retraining of the 
Lesotho Defence Force. And ultimately in less than two years the intervening forces of SADC withdrew to their 
respective countries after the desired objectives were achieved” (Interview with R 11, 04 May 2011). The successful 
disarmament of the LDF helped to restore law and order and saved the country from descending into political 
anarchy. Sejanamane (1996) argues that although during the interventions Lesotho‘s sovereignty was compromised, 
the circle of violence which has characterised the country‘s post- elections period was halted for a while. 
 
8.8.4 Retraining of the Lesotho Defence Force 
Among the areas that the SADC is credited to have been successful is the retraining of the historically politicised and 
partisan security establishment into a more efficient, professional and less politicised army. As indicated in chapter 
six, the Lesotho military has been deeply entrenched in the Lesotho political quagmire since the 1970s when Leabua 
Jonathan consolidated his hold on power by involving the military as BNP card-carrying members. This turned the 
military into a political instrument for the defence of the government rather than an apolitical instrument for the 
preservation of national peace and security in Lesotho. This politicisation of the military culminated in the military 
coup of 1986 and the short-lived coups of 1994 and 1998 against democratically elected governments. This was an 
indication of their opposition to democratic civilian rule in which they were expected to be apolitical. Two decades of 
constitutional crisis and politicisation of the military systematically eroded the BCP and the LCD governments‘ ability 
to reign in the highly politicised security sector. ―To the extent that the military has a monopoly, the capacity of a 
democratic government to exercise effective control and command over the management of force within the state 
apparatus is extremely limited. It became more compromised in the highly politicised Lesotho military which had also 
tested power from 1986 to 1993‖ (Matlosa 1995: 119).  
 
As a way of finding a lasting solution to the political crisis, the SADC Troika strongly recommended concerted efforts 
to mend the ever-widening rift between the government and the military. The Troika Task Force noted that ―[a]lthough 
discontent within the military establishment was the immediate cause of the...crisis in Maseru (1994), it is widely 
agreed that the discontent is but symptomatic of a much broader, more deeply rooted malaise within Lesotho; a 
malaise which is essentially political in nature‖ (Tripartite Report 1994: 13). Then as a post-conflict peace-building 
measure, the SADC embarked on a coordinated retraining of the Lesotho Defence Force into an apolitical 
professional apparatus oriented to defence of democracy and constitutional governance. As Southall (2001: 169) 
puts it ―[a] more civilianised politics in Lesotho could only have been made possible by a breaking of the intimate link 
between the LDF and the BNP, and by attempting to render a reformed army subject to civilian authority.‖ In line with 
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this plan, the 1998 SADC mission was divided into two phases: Operation Boleas whose task was restoring law and 
order and Operation Maluti which focused on the retraining of the LDF.  
 
A SADC Training Team comprising Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe as guarantors of the Lesotho democracy 
was tasked with undertaking the mission. The purpose of the retraining process was “to assist them to understand 
their participation and involvement in nation building, democracy and provision of national security” (Interview with R 
2, 28 June 2010). Another participant noted that the primary reason for the retraining was to “ensure that the Lesotho 
Defence Force was a well trained army which would not in future get politicised. And to ensure that the operations of 
the LDF were directed at peace enhancement, peace-keeping and conflict prevention during, before and after the 
elections” (Interview with R 11, 04 May 2011). As such the retraining was aimed at reconciling the often tumultuous 
government-military relations as evidenced by the friction between the two in 1994 and 1998. For example, in 1994 
the BCP government accused the military of being a BNP instrument while the military was hostile and suspicious of 
its (BCP) intentions. For example, the LDF feared that they were going to lose their jobs with the impending 
integration of the Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA) into the national army. The military was suspicious of the intended 
commission of inquiry against its activities in the Lesotho political arena as an attack on its integrity and a BCP 
government orchestrated ploy to victimise it (Matlosa 1995). With such animosity, friction festered on leading to the 
military-cum-monarchy coup of 1994. As Matlosa (1995: 138) puts it ―...the BCP government found itself 
[subsequently the LCD government in 1998] in contradiction with both a civil service and an army that has been 
recruited and trained to serve the BNP government.‖ 
 
Therefore, the retraining was focused on instilling cordial civil-military relations and enhancing their responsibilities in 
a democracy. In the words of Matlosa (1995: 127) the challenge of the BCP and the SADC was ―to seek to resolve 
the continuing crisis in the civil-military relations by negotiating a lasting domestic solution with its rebellious army.‖ 
One other important aspect of the retraining programme was the establishment of a Counter Crime Unit comprising 
of the military and police officers. The aim was to bridge the gap between the two security apparatuses in terms of 
their operations as was experienced during the political turmoil in Lesotho (field notes from interviews with R 13, 
16June 2011 and R 14,  20 June 2011). In all these endeavours, the SADC is said to have been successful. For 
instance, the unit was involved in the disarmament programme to recover weapons from civilians and the rebellious 
military as a post-conflict peace-building measure.  One of the respondents explained how as a result of the 
retraining programme Lesotho managed to build a new highly professional army that has taken its place in the region 
along side its regional counterparts. This is indicated by its participation in regional peace-keeping exercises. Another 
respondent indicated that “[f]rom the military perspective I would also say that it was a very big success in that we 
then began to see the high ranking officers interacting more in an international scene by sending some of their 
officers to train outside Lesotho which gives them exposure” (Interview with R 13, 16 June 2011). 
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That the Lesotho security sector was depoliticised by the SADC retraining programme was reflected by its neutrality 
during the 2002 elections and the disputes which followed the 2007 elections. The security sector left the 
contestations to the political establishments to discourse on and resolve. This is an indication of the successfully 
implemented post-conflict peace-building measures in that the military which was historically notorious for stifling 
democracy in the Kingdom remained in the barracks. This, as noted by Southall (2001: 169) indicates ―in particular 
the extent to which SADC‘s involvement [led] to the civilianisation of politics in Lesotho...‖  Although ―only time will 
reveal the extent to which this restructuring will have been successful-but of necessity weaning the army away from 
political involvement there can be no doubt‖ Southall (2000) also points out that before they left, the SADC training 
team conveyed an ominous warning to the LDF that any future political involvement by the military will not be 
condoned or tolerated by the regional body. This shows how the regional body was determined to neutralise the 
security sector as a factor in Lesotho‘s politics. This was vitally important because the experiences of many African 
states with regard to the involvement of the military in politics has been catastrophic. They have on many occasions 
―stifled democracy with their interventions, purportedly in the attempt to rectify the mistakes of the ruling class which 
had failed to adhere to the principles of democracy through various violations of the constitution‖ (Odunuga 1999: 
44). The politicisation of the armed forces in many African states has deprived the continent of democratisation 
process, political stability and economic development. In most cases, development is arrested because the 
inefficiency of military rule creates an uncongenial investment climate and contributes to virtually institutionalised 
corruption (Odunuga 1999, Barclay 1999). Ajulu describes the Lesotho military as a ―kleptocratic class-conscious that 
they lacked political legitimacy, they devoted themselves to systematic looting of state resources‖ (cited in Southall 
and Petlane 1995: xiii). As such, aware of the way in which the Lesotho security has been politicised, and in 
cognisance of how it has arrested the democratic dispensation in Lesotho since the 1970s, the SADC took the 
necessary concerted resolve to depoliticise it to be a security sector for the defence of national security, democracy 
and constitutional rule that the regional body has pledged to promote, sustain and defend. Thus history will judge the 
SADC intervention as having marked a turning point in Lesotho‘s political space if it successfully weaned the Lesotho 
military from partisan involvement in politics (Southall 1998). 
 
8.8.5 Establishment of an Inclusive Interim Government in 1998 
The SADC is also accorded some measure of success for, after successfully restoring law and order in 1998; it 
facilitating the establishment of the Interim Political Authority (IPA), an inclusive body in which all the political parties 
were represented for collective governance and debating on how best to resolve Lesotho‘s political problems. On the 
3rd of December 1999 with the SADC facilitation, and after protracted debates between the government and the 
opposition parties, the IPA agreement was signed. The historic agreement paved the way for ―greater inclusivity and 
representation within the political system...and...consolidation of ―the country‘s young democracy‖ (Santho, 2000: 3). 
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That is, the IPA signified a successful compromise in reconciling the government and the opposition parties to work 
together for the sake of peace and stability in the Kingdom. Southall (2001: 163) summarises the integrative SADC 
facilitated compromise thus: ―SADC had brought the different parties to a genuine compromise which embodied 
second-best solutions for both sides to the conflict. The LCD government remained in power, but was forced to 
concede an early election and the establishment of the IPA as a forum for mediation about long-term electoral and 
political solution; and the Opposition were compelled to concede their demands for a government of national unity in 
favour of guarantees of an early election and the establishment of the IPA.‖ The Lesotho Network for Conflict 
Management (LNCM) also hailed the IPA agreement as ―a harbinger of constructive management of conflict in 
Lesotho and essentially heralds a new dawn in Lesotho politics; an era of political stability and tolerance of diverse 
political views and options‖ (cited in Santho, 2000: 3). In this sense the IPA was a sort of an inclusive interim 
government as the opposition parties had protested election results from the flawed FPTP electoral system in which 
the winner takes all and the opposition, in spite of the sizeable percentage of votes did not get any substantive 
representation in parliament. 
 
8.8.6 Electoral Reforms in Lesotho 
Transferred wholly from the British system, the FPTP had throughout Lesotho‘s history delivered a single party 
landslide victory and virtually a parliament dominated by one party as experienced by the BCP and the LCD in 1994 
and 1998 respectively. Odunuga (1999: 44) vividly articulates how the phenomenon of winner takes all has 
fermented disturbances especially in Africa. He asserted that ―[m]any African countries are in ferment because 
political power has been taken to mean ‗winner-takes all‘ affair with respect not only to patronage and the 
prerogatives of office but also to the nation‘s wealth and resources. The concentration of power in the hands of a 
particular group can in that sense serve only as a source of discontent in that the resulting economic deprivation 
alienates the government from the majority of the people.‖ For example, during the 1998 elections, on the basis of 
receiving 61% of the votes, the LCD had managed to win a majority of the 99 parliamentary constituencies. In 
contrast, opposition parties won 39% of the votes but obtained only one seat in parliament. ―This scenario highlighted 
the inadequacies of the FPTP system and exacerbated political tensions among opposition supporters‖ (Rule and 
Mapetla, 2001: 114). In the view of Matlosa and Sello (2005: 12) it is the contention of the opposition that the 
electoral model has created a defacto one party rule in the country and ―heralded the beginning of various types of 
violent conflicts that became the hallmark of Lesotho‘s instability.‖  
 
Several participants in this research delved into the shortcomings of the FPTP electoral model. The LPC respondent 
stated that “[w]hat was wrong was the electoral model-the First Past the Post. That was what was wrong because a 
huge section of the population of voters had elected the opposition but was not represented in parliament due to that 
electoral model” (Interview with R 4,  04 August 2010). The participants who held this view noted that because the 
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opposition representation was not proportional to the percentage of votes, they cried foul that the elections were 
rigged. According to one participant the FPTP nature of winner- takes all gives “an impression that elections were 
rigged when in actual fact they were not... This is because there is a mismatch between the popular vote and 
electoral outcomes” (interview with R 7, 13 July, 2010). The landslide victories of the BCP and LCD in 1994 and 1998 
respectively through the FPTP model triggered violent protests from the opposition on the grounds that the elections 
were fraudulent. But the real problem was that ―[t]he plurality electoral system deny appropriate representation for 
minority interests...The peculiarly inadequate outcome of the election [within the FPTP system] indicated the urgent 
need for a reform of the electoral system towards proportional representation‖ (Southall, 2001: 161). On the other 
hand the LCD official questions why the same electoral model is functioning in Britain and Botswana and has yielded 
democracy while it is problematic in Lesotho. This respondent traced the problem to Basotho opposition tendency of 
failure to accept defeat. He argued that if the problem is the electoral system “why are you not addressing that 
instead of disputing the outcome of the elections” (Interview with R 6, 19 August 2010). One is compelled to concur 
with the above sentiments that the friction in the Lesotho body politic was misdirected in that they did not identify the 
source of the problem in order to apply the appropriate remedial measures. The participant viewed the problem as 
the opposition which always failing to accept defeat in democratic elections. In view of these perceptions, Southall 
and Petlane (1995: xvi), suggest that ―...whatever the change to the electoral system may eventuate, we must return 
to the simplicity that institutions do not make democracy but people do. For democracy to take root in Lesotho there 
must of course be a guarantee that future elections will held and assurance that they will continue to be fairly 
administered and that their results will be respected by those who lose and not misused by those who win.‖ 
 
Be that as it may, it was on the basis of this defective nature of the FPTP electoral system that the IPA was tasked 
with the mammoth task of reviewing the constitution, establishing an independent electoral commission, amending 
the electoral law and organising fair, free and credible elections in a period of eighteen months. It facilitated a 
constitutional review which culminated in the amendment of the Lesotho electoral law. One of the participants 
summarised the IPA‘s task thus; “[t]he main mandate of the IPA was to work for the levelling of the playing field, 
preparing for the holding of smooth elections thereafter; preparing for some machinery that would be more inclusive 
in the sense that the state of having the winner takes all situation; the state of having only the FPTP electoral model, 
there should be put in place something that would be more inclusive of the divergent views of the stakeholders” 
(Interview with R 6,  08 July 2011). The protracted consultations and debates by different political parties culminated 
in the replacement of the FPTP electoral system with a new model: the Mixed Member Proportionality (MMP) which 
was supposed to provide a remedy for the defects experienced in the former electoral model. The hybrid model was 
expected to combine the best aspects of both the FPTP and proportional representation electoral models. That is, it 
retained some elements of the FPTP and introduced elements of proportionality. Respondents 7, 8, and 19 hailed the 
introduction of the MMP model as a panacea to the Lesotho electoral disputes. The UB academic indicated that 
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“addressing the electoral system was perhaps one of the biggest issues that were done to resolve problem” 
(Interview with R 7, 13 July 2010). The ABC participant dubbed it “one of the best models in the world” (Interview with 
R 8, 10 August 2010). The MMP guaranteed broader participation by political parties as those small parties which did 
not win the majority of votes would be compensated through parliamentary representation within the proportional 
representation framework. The model stipulated that allocation of seats would be 80% for constituencies and 40% for 
proportional representation. The MMP worked towards achieving political stability because ―there was some stretch 
of apparent appeasement; apparent security [and] peace when the parties had their representatives in parliament 
however small (Interview with R 17, 08 July 2011). To the effect that through the new MMP model, general elections 
would produce a fairly broad based representation of parties in the legislative, different political parties seemed to be 
satisfied with it (Matlosa and Sello, 2005). 
 
Subsequently the 2002 elections were held through the new electoral model and an inclusive and representative 
parliament emerged from the elections. As Matlosa and Sello, 2005: 14) put it, ―[t]he new system was put to the test 
during the 2002 general elections and keen observers of Lesotho‘s political scene are agreed it has delivered a 
desirable outcome for Lesotho‘s democracy, judging for instance by the broadly representative nature of the new 
parliament.‖ Lesotho entered a new era of a stable democracy even though the legacy of political bickering among 
the political parties persisted both in and outside parliament (Matlosa 1993, 1995, Southall 2001, Matlosa and Sello 
2005). Commenting on the 2002 parliament the BCP leader said “[w]e had the first parliament in 2002 that sort of had 
the different shades of political views in the country instead of the one strong political party manning parliament” 
(Interview with R 17, 08 July 2011). The elections were characterised by relative tranquility as opposed to all other 
elections in the country. Hailing the success of the MMP electoral model during the 2002 elections, the Prime 
Minister Mosisili said: ―Lesotho has made tremendous and remarkable progress in democratic 
governance...Governance has been strengthened by the...adopted Mixed Member proportional system that has 
allowed a representation of at least ten political parties in the National Assembly. As a result, the country has for the 
first time in her political history enjoyed post-election peace and stability...‖ (cited in Matlosa and Sello, 2005: 1).  
 
For this reason it would only be fair that the SADC should be commended for having successfully implemented the 
new electoral model that seemed to promote democracy and inclusivity in governance which had been lacking in the 
history of electoral processes in the Kingdom. In view of the above, it would also be fair to commend SADC for 
successfully implementing post-conflict building measures through the retraining of Lesotho security apparatus, 
prevailing over the monarchy to be above partisan politics and be a unifying unit, reforming the Lesotho electoral 
system and establishing a political structure - the IPA - to facilitate dialogue. More often than not, the success of post-
conflict building measures determine whether the root causes of the conflict have been eradicated or not. With this in 
mind, Lund (1996: 94) states that ―...depending on the resources available...a variety of other services which might 
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include hands on assistance in building institutions, alleviating distrust, promoting reconciliation, establishing 
channels through which to pursue negotiations, and formulating settlements‖ should be put in place as post-conflict 
peace-building measures. ―In other words, one of the measures of the adequacy of preventive interventions is their 
richness or breath.‖ Kofi Annan (1998, 2000, and Boutrous Ghali (1992, 1995) were unequivocal on the significance 
of post-conflict peace-building measures as determinants of future peace and security in countries emerging from 
conflicts. Failure to put in place appropriate post-conflict peace-building initiatives means failed peacemaking 
missions and the country is more likely to revert to war. 
 
However, during the 2007 elections, the LCD and the ABC formed electoral alliances with the NIP and the LWP in 
contravention of the MMP model. This blatant violation of the model reversed the political gains which were achieved 
through the 2002 elections when the model‘s rules and procedures were followed by all political entities. The 
opposition parties, mainly the BNP, BCP and the MFP contested the allocation of seats which were distorted in 
favour of those parties which formed coalitions and against the smaller parties. The smaller parties lost their 
expected share of proportional representation to the coalition partners. The BCP particpant articulated how the ruling 
party defrauded the new model when he said: “[t]he problem came in the elections of 2007 when the MMP was 
circumvented by the ruling party in that it made an alliance with a smaller party... and that sort of undermined the 
model because most of the 40 seats reserved for the opposition parties were taken by the same LCD, the ruling party 
which has taken about 60 constituencies through the FPTP model. And also some 20 or so, about half of the PR 
seats were also taken through the party that was nothing but the other face of the coin; of the ruling party” (Interview 
with R 17, 08 July 2011). The SADC post-2007 dialogue facilitator also clearly established that the post-2007 
electoral disputes over allocation of proportional representation seats emanated, not from any defaults of the MMP 
model, but from the way the ruling party manipulated the model to its advantage through formation of electoral 
coalitions. In view of this, one participant noted that SADC should not be faulted for nefarious political machinations 
of the Lesotho political parties which led to the distortion of the model. He held that “this cannot be blamed on the 
SADC. SADC is not a participating party” in the Lesotho political arena (Interview with R 1, 28 May 2010).  
 
However, there is optimism for peaceful elections in 2012. This is because the CCL, in collaboration with SADC is 
still engaged with the different political parties to prevent a repeat of the 2007 political uproar. They are engaging the 
political parties and the Independent Electoral Commission for electoral reforms and constitutional amendments to 
minimise the existence of any loopholes which the political parties can selfishly manoeuvre in the coming 2012 
elections. The CCL Coordinator noted that when the LCD, ABC, NIP and the LWP formed electoral coalitions, they 
adroitly exploited ambiguity of the Lesotho electoral law, for example on the formation of alliances, the resultant 
allocation of alliances and the position of the leader of the opposition in parliament. Through the CCL dialogue forum, 
political parties are provided with the opportunity to address their concerns, debate the alliance system within the 
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MMP model and its implications for peace, security and democracy in the Kingdom. With this in mind, the ABC 
respondent asserted that “[w]e need to look at the electoral model and also the change of the constitution. That 
means to say that even though we have these seats allocation in parliament, but that seem to be conflicting with our 
constitution. And again we need to also amend the electoral law so that these kind of matters can be dealt within the 
law...It is a matter of political debate” (Interview with R 8, 10 August 2010). 
 
Hopefully, with such a collective consultative effort, the elusive peace and security will be realised in Lesotho. What 
should remain a reality, and which should be recorded in books on the history of Lesotho, is how the SADC shaped 
the Lesotho political content and context through the introduction of the hybrid electoral model. It is up to the Basotho 
political stakeholders to show commitment and resilient resolve on implementing it for the betterment of the country 
and the region at large. If properly implemented, the model may provide a lasting political panacea to the turbulence 
which follows almost every election in the SADC region and the African continent at large. 
 
However, Sejanamane (1996) dismisses what is considered as the successes of the SADC in the Kingdom of 
Lesotho. He argues that the level of success was due to the dimunitive status of Lesotho in the region. Among other 
things, the peacemaking strategies which were applied in Lesotho cannot be reproduced in other relatively powerful 
regional states such as Zimbabwe.  
 
8.9 Lessons from the Lesotho Missions 
One critical question directed to the research participants was what lessons did the SADC learn from the SADC 
missions? Or better still what lessons should the SADC have learnt from the Lesotho interventions? The question is 
of utmost importance because while the regional bloc was involved in the DRC, Zimbabwe and Madagascar, it was 
only in Lesotho that the SADC intervened through both non-coercive and coercive measures (1994 and 1998 
respectively) and mediation by an Eminent Person (2007). The question is also vital in the sense that the SADC 
preventive diplomacy mechanism is in its embryonic stages. As such the regional body is on a learning trajectory to 
be an efficient vanguard for regional peace and security. As the saying goes; ―experience is the best teacher‖ SADC 
has to tap lessons from its regional engagements for the betterment of its preventive diplomacy architecture. The 
1998 SADC intervention was viewed by several analysts as ―a case of trial and error in the operationalisation of 
peacemaking, peace enforcement and peace-keeping strategies in the SADC region‖ (Santho, 2000: 2). It is 
therefore envisaged that the experience in Lesotho should have provided informative insights, lessons and 
experience on where they went wrong, how they would have better embarked on the missions and what  their their 
strengths and shortcomings were. Such pointed question would help the regional body in shaping, sharpening and 
redefining its future regional peace operation strategies. As Southall (2001: 169) observes ―if the current post-
intervention negotiation process fails to forge a more stable and formally democratic order, a repeat performance is 
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more than likely...SADC‘s imprint...would provide an unambiguous legal framework and procedures under which any 
further intervention might be launched‖ if at all they critically evaluated their performance in the missions. 
 
8.9.1 Need for Early Warning Systems and Proactive Responses 
Several issues were raised by different respondents on what the SADC learnt or should have learnt from the Lesotho 
expeditions. Many respondents noted that the SADC was reactive rather than proactive in all of its peace 
interventions including Lesotho. They observed that the root cause of such a flawed response was the conspicuous 
absence of functional early warning and risk assessment systems which would detect crisis in member states before 
they erupt into manifest conflict. Such observations bred the suggestions that SADC should have learnt the 
significance of well-established and operational early warning systems which would help the regional bloc to nip 
conflicts in the bud. Experience has shown that once a conflict has erupted, it is very difficult and costly to resolve or 
manage. This is because ―the longer that crises are allowed to fester, the harder they are to resolve. As the spiral of 
violence and destruction intensifies, polarisation deepens, the number of divisive issues increases, societal 
institutions crumble, the prospects for settling conflicts decreases, and the risks of conflict spreading increase. As the 
dangers, difficulties, and costs of intervention then mount, nations are more inclined to stay out or pull out of apparent 
quagmire‖ (Lund, 1996: 14). Azar (1990a: 15) observes that once a conflict has been entrenched ―...the space for 
compromise and accommodation shrinks...and proposals for political solutions...tend to be perceived on all sides as 
mechanisms for gaining relative power and control.‖ 
 
Established early warning systems would permit rapid preventive deployments that would defuse the conflicts before 
they escalate into sustained violent confrontations between the warring parties. It would justify the significance of the 
assumption that proaction is better than reaction and that crises can be better addressed as they emerge rather than 
when they have already deepened and widened (Azar 1990a, Lund 1996). The SADC, like all other regional blocs 
world wide took cognisance of the pivotal role that early warning systems could play in the task of maintaining 
regional peace and security. Hence in Article 11 of its Organ Protocol section on methods, item (b), it clearly states 
that ―[t]he Organ shall establish an early warning system in order to facilitate timely action to prevent the outbreak 
and escalation of conflict‖. In the objectives of the Organ, item (f), the SADC pledged to ―use preventive diplomacy to 
pre-empt conflict in the region, both within and between states, through an early warning system‖ (Principles and 
Objectives of the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security, 1996). While the SADC acknowledges the significance of 
early warning as stipulated in its founding treaty and security protocols, the organisation has not yet established an 
operational early warning structure to detect potential conflicts before they erupt. The lack of operational early 
warning systems saw the SADC reactive interventions of 1994 and 1998 when Lesotho was on the brink of total civil 
war. The level of resistance which the SADC forces met from Basotho during Operation Boleas is indicative of how 
the conflict has deepend and intensified and therefore was difficult to manage. Because of the calamitous effects of 
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reactive interventions Barclay (1999:313) has this invaluable advice for regional organisations: ―considering the long 
and costly process of restoring peace, it would seem more prudent and beneficial if regional organisations should 
specifically expand their mandate to include crisis prevention in member states.‖ That is to say regional organisations 
should develop their capabilities with the intent and purpose of understanding and identifying potential crises and 
direct their intervention programmes to addressing the causes before it explodes into systematic violence and armed 
conflict (Lund 1996, Barclay 1999). 
 
One of the lessons the SADC learnt therefore was the need to establish early warning systems to identify potential 
and emerging political hotspots and countries prone to conflicts in order to launch well-planned and well ordinated 
rapid response preventive missions before the outbreak of confrontations. The OPDS respondent was the first to 
acknowledge the significance of the lessons they obtained from their involvement, not only in Lesotho, but also in the 
DRC, Zimbabwe and Madagascar. In response to the question he stated; “[v]ery much so... there is much that we 
learnt in Lesotho...We are now working on the lessons on Lesotho and we are trying to create a data base where we 
will use these lessons on Lesotho for future mediation processes...for us to develop some kind of technical models 
on how we can do better and what is it that we have not done in Lesotho” (Interview with R 2, 28 June 2010). One of 
the participants from the SADC Security Organ put it on record during the interview that the SADC security unit is 
currently establishing a regional early warning network structure which will “on continuous basis provide early 
warning information on what potential dangers exist in the region. It will work together in close consultation with other 
mediation support structures...” (Interview with R 2, 28 June 2010). The establishment of the early warning system 
should be accompanied by development of appropriate preventive diplomacy structures such as the Panel of Elders, 
Eminent Persons, fact-finding mission teams, mediation units, intelligence networks and standing regional peace-
keeping force all of which should be fully resourced for rapid preventive deployments in the conflict zones.  
 
A SADC regional intervention based on a thorough prior assessment of the conflict situation would go a long way to 
ensuring successful preventive diplomacy missions. An analysis of the fact-finding data would guide the regional 
body on how best to intervene, what intervention strategy to employ and when to get involved. Decisions on whether 
to intervene or not would be based on gathered and analysed information which would determine the nature of the 
intervention. For example, because of insufficient information on the intensity of the Lesotho 1998 crisis, the SADC 
only deployed soldiers who while engaged in vicious battles with the LDF and opposition protestors could not 
address the pertinent aspect of maintaining law and order to prevent the plunder, looting and burning of Maseru 
commercial centre. The operation should have involved police units to guard the streets. As one of the respondents 
observed “[t]here were serious problems of planning in that operation in Lesotho. It was a purely military intervention. 
And we know that peace support operations cannot be an exclusively military affair. It is a matter that also involves 
the civilians. So that is the big lesson that we learnt. That there were limitations in terms of planning as to who should 
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intervene in Lesotho” (Interview with R 14, 20 June 2011). An established early warning system, working in tandem 
with other regional security instruments would eliminate the blunders which the SADC troops are said to have 
committed in Lesotho on account of inadequate information on the nature and status of the crisis. 
 
8.9.2 Establishment of a Standing Regional Peace-keeping Force 
Another respondent indicated that the preventive missions in Lesotho, Zimbabwe and the DRC were wake-up calls 
for the regional body - the SADC to put its security architecture and operational tools in order. It emerged from the 
interviews that as a result of the Lesotho and DRC experiences, the SADC members states have recognised the 
significance of establishing the SADC Brigade a SADC standing peace-keeping force which is always readily 
available for deployment should the need arise. One participant stated that “[i]ts work in progress. SADC is busy; 
seized with that process of establishing the SADC Brigade” (Interview with R 7, 13 July 2010). Another participant 
pointed out that “...member states have pledged the resources so that as and when they are required for an 
operation; we can always call them and deploy them” (Interview with R 14, 20 June 2011). If fully established and its 
objectives realised, such an entity would ensure standard training procedures, principles, values and operational 
commonalities during regional peace-keeping engagements. Trained under the same codes, norms and standard 
peacemaking operational ethics, the embarrassingly conflicting postures displayed by the BDF and the SANDF 
during the 1998 military intervention may become a thing of the past. Rather than having individual member states 
contributing to an adhoc peace-keeping force (as experienced in the cases of the DRC and Lesotho), they would be 
obliged to contribute to a standing regional force which would be legally constituted and mandated to undertake 
SADC peace operations. Therefore, to some extent ―the crisis in Lesotho has pointed to the dangers of continuing an 
adhoc approach‖ to interventions in regional disputes (Southall, 1998: 5). One participant observed that in the 
previous interventions “even when we have agreed as a region that we intervene in a particular country, member 
states still retain the right to determine whether they can go into that operation. And it is their sovereign right to do so” 
(Interview with R 14, 20 June 2011). Worse still, according to Santho (2000: 3) there was ―lack of clarity about when 
SADC states are acting in concert and when one or two SADC member states act unilaterally, or claim to be acting 
on behalf of SADC.‖ 
 
It is envisaged that, such a regional security structure would to some extent minimise controversies around legality 
which often surround individual armies‘ interventions in other member states. Lesotho and the DRC are cases in 
point where the South African and Zimbabwean-led forces suffered intractable criticism of having launched the 
missions, not with the SADC mandate but for their selfish national interests. Interventions by a regional standby force 
would also reduce the costs incurred by the operation as it would no longer be shouldered by individual intervening 
countries but by the regional body. It would also save SADC the embarrassment of retroactive accountability on 
operations, some of which it was clear were clouded with controversies about their legitimacy as regional missions as 
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was the case of the DRC and Lesotho. One participant acknowledged the centrality of an established regional 
standby force and hoped member states would exert both financial, material and political will for its success. He 
posited that “[i]t is encouraging that at least we know there is a SADC standby force in existence... missions. It only 
need to be nurtured and one would hope that the respective governments would contribute fairly well to such a 
standby force so that we must be seen as an entity that can take up such missions when called upon” (Interview with 
R 13,  16 June 2011). 
 
It can be surmised from the responses that some of the operational blunders as experienced during the Lesotho 
operation such as uncoordinated entrance into the country, the two intervening forces hoisting two different flags and 
other operational flaws emanated from lack of a central command of the intervening forces. The supposition is that 
such a force would be commanded from one centre and its mandate would be that delegated by the regional body. In 
its operational documents and protocols, the SADC has noted that as it continues to grow, the regional body will form 
a single regional security entity to collectively respond to both internal and external threats to peace and security. 
Article 9 of the SADC Mutual Defence Pact states that through the Pact state parties shall cooperate in all defence 
matters and facilitate a well coordinated interaction among the the members‘ defence forces through the training of 
military personnel in any field of military endeavour; hold joint military exercises in each other‘s territory; exchange 
military intelligence and information on relevant matters and conduct joint research on how to harmonise their military 
and defence policies; defence industries and equipments; and on issues of national and regional security (Protocol 
on the SADC Mutual Defence Pact; 2004). 
 
 In view of this, the intent to form a SADC Brigade, accelerated by the experiences and lessons from the DRC and 
Lesotho, was long-term development projects of the SADC agenda in its bid for a peaceful and conflict free region. 
What remains to be seen is the commitment of SADC member states in terms of political will, financial resources and 
contribution of troops for institutional development and operationalisation of the regional stand-by brigade. As de 
Coning (2005: 17) notes ―[t]he high performance scenario will only materialise if the development of the SADC stand-
by system is a very high priority for most of the SADC member states. It is only if most of the member states choose 
to give this initiative its full support, including the financial and in-kind resources it would require, that this scenario 
can be achieved.‖ 
 
8.9.3 Need to Focus on Non-coercive Measures 
The other lesson the SADC learnt was that it is advisable to resolve regional conflicts through peaceful, non-coercive 
mediation with the belligerent parties to reach a mutually amicable solution. The lesson emanated from the fact that 
the SADC launched diplomatic and negotiated missions in 1994 and 2007 and the strategies did not trigger the 
animosity which the regional body encountered when they launched the military operation in 1998. In fact, in its 
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founding treaty and security protocols, the SADC pledged to engage in peaceful diplomatic, non-coercive 
interventions only to embark on coercive measures as a last resort. Regional organisations in their diverse formations 
pledge peaceful engagements in their treaties. It is important to emphasise the need for dialogue in conflict 
resolution. As historically evidenced most conflicts of the world have been resolved through dialogue (Odunuga 
1999). It emerged from the responses of many participants that they were enraged by the 1998 SADC military 
intervention. Several interviewees acknowledged the 1994 and 2007 diplomatic missions and denounced the 1998 
military mission. Thus ―[t]he lesson here is that it is only through peaceful means that societal problems can be 
solved...‖ (Odunuga, 1999: 50).  As Albert Einstein correctly observed ―peace cannot be kept by force. It can only be 
achieved by understanding.‖  
 
Participants from the SADC OPDS indicated that the SADC is developing its mediation structures like the mediation 
unit, the diplomacy unit and the Eminent Person Panel to handle the mediation process so that the stakeholders to 
the conflict are involved and are party to the negotiation outcomes. One of the participants concluded that “[o]ne of 
the lessons that was learnt through the experience was that whatever we have put in place as SADC is a result of our 
own historical experiences and the 1998 situation in Lesotho being one of those... It was only as a result of the 
lessons from Lesotho and the DRC that we started to put in place other measures...The system has improved much 
better now over the years...Now we have even taken to issues of mediation...Really by then the SADC had a very 
shaky mediation mechanism in place; very shaky‖ (Interview with R 14, 20 June 2011). The participant indicated that 
attempts at mediation were carried out by South Africa (not SADC) through the Langa Commission and the Thabo 
Mbeki-led mediation but all were futile. The 1998 bitter experience, as demonstrated by numerous participants was a 
watershed moment in shaping the main route for the SADC in resolving regional disputes. The following excerpts 
from the interviews are reflective of the SADC emphasis on dialogue; “I recommend dialogue; not like in 1998 when 
the forces came in,” “dialogue; that is the only means of solving problems,” “don‟t impose a solution...mediation can 
help people to find home grown solutions to their own problems,” “dialogue is the corner stone of resolving crisis,” 
“dialogue prevails, where all the parties sit down around a table and finally agree” “in dialogue we have seen that the 
SADC works very good,” “SADC should develop the capacity...in promoting dialogue” and that “SADC should learn 
that it is not proper...to engage military means to address political problems...SADC should make sure that political 
leaders are engaged in extensive talks” (Excerpts from interviews with different participants; June, July and August 
2010 and 2011). 
 
One of the participants indicated that the decision by the SADC to pursue a negotiated settlement of the crisis in 
Madagascar was influenced by the Lesotho experience. He stated that “[w]hen the coup was effected in Madagascar, 
there was an issue as to whether we should intervene militarily. The rationale decision that was taken then was no, 
let us give mediation a chance. So use of force is the last resort. So adherence to the founding documents of SADC 
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structures have been given effect to” (Interview with R 14, 20 June 2011). With the experiences of Lesotho, the 
SADC delegated the former President of Mozambique, Joachim Chissano to mediate a political settlement between 
the political formations in the country. Despite the numerous hurdles he encountered, a roadmap to resolve the 
island‘s crisis is unfolding with the political parties having agreed to dialogue over the political situation in the country. 
The parties have formed an interim political governing structure to prepare for democratic and inclusive elections in 
2012 (Chissano; 2010). 
 
8.9.4 Involvement of all Stakeholders in Peace Missions 
The SADC also learnt that peace-keeping interventions should be multifaceted and involve different societal bodies in 
order to be more representative and holistically address the challenges emerging during and after the intervention. 
Non-governmental organisations (CSOs) in their diverse formations play a vital role in unofficial track 2 diplomacy 
which if properly coordinated with the official track 1 diplomacy can lead to peaceful resolution of conflicts. In several 
international conflicts, non-governmental organisations such as the Carter Centre for Democracy; the Oslo Channel, 
the Community of Saint Egidio, have acted as primary intermediaries between conflicting parties to assist them to 
arrive at negotiated settlements to their conflicts. For instance the Community of Egidio (a Catholic organisation 
linked to the Vatican) played a central role in bringing the Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO) and 
Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) parties to a negotiated settlement culminating to a lasting solution in the 
devastating two-decade conflict in Mozambique. The efforts of the NGO were fruitfully complemented by the United 
Nations mission in the 1990s. Non-governmental organisations have important roles to play in areas of development, 
reconstruction of war-torn societies, humanitarian assistance, disarmament and rehabilitation programmes, 
protection of human rights, and promotion of democracy during post-conflict peacebuilding phases of conflicts.  
 
Basic human needs theorists in a way recommend the input of CSOs through holding problem-solving workshops 
facilitated by social Scientists with expertise in group processes and human behaviour. The workshops are mainly 
(Peck 1998) designed to provide an analytical, problem solving framework for assessing the conflict and exploring a 
wide range of potential solutions by all the warring parties. The workshops can be helpful in transforming the 
conflictual attitude and perceptions of the warring parties to cooperation and commitment to finding a lasting solution 
to the conflict. According to Kelman (1990 the workshops can ―help produce a more differentiated image of the 
enemy and help the participants discover potential negotiating partners on the other side... They contribute to the 
development of shared vision of a desired future which helps reduce the parties‘ fears of negotiations as a step into 
the unknown, dangerous realm. They may generate ideas about the shape of a positive-sum solution that meets the 
basic needs of both parties...Ultimately problem solving workshops contribute to a process of transformation of the 
enemy relationship between the parties‖ (in Peck 1998: 189). Several participants indicated that the 1998 military 
intervention was flawed in that it only involved the military sector. The police and civilian sections were not fully 
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engaged to address the challenges unfolding as the military quell the violent eruptions. One of the participants stated 
that the 1998 Lesotho intervention was “just the military that went into Lesotho. And at the end of the day, (laughs), 
there were other constructions that were not done. That is one lesson” (Interview with R 14, 20 June 2011). Several 
participants also reflected that the SADC has not initially formally involved the civil society organisations in the search 
for a peaceful resolution of the Lesotho conflicts. As reflected earlier, CSOs are pivotal in determining the realisation 
of sustainable peace and security in a conflict-ridden society. That the SADC endorsed the role of the CCL in 
facilitating dialogue among the different political entities in Lesotho after the withdrawal of the Masire-led mission is a 
clear indication that the SADC has learnt the significance of embracing NGOs in its peace operations. In light of this 
the CCL Co-ordinator has advised that the SADC ―should establish conflict resolution institutions in SADC countries; 
local conflict management institutions comprising Non-Governmental Organisations such as the Christian Council of 
Lesotho‖ (Interview with R 9, 20 08 2010). In fact Article 23 (1 and 2) of the SADC Treaty on Non-Governmental 
Organisations states that ―SADC shall seek to involve fully, the peoples of the Region and non-governmental 
organisations in the process of regional integration.‖ The regional body also committed itself to ―cooperate with, and 
support the initiatives of the people of the Region and non-governmental organisations, contributing to the objectives 
of this treaty in areas of cooperation in order to foster closer relations among the communities, associations and 
peoples of the region‖ (SADC Treaty 1992). If the SADC could optimally utilise its experience in Lesotho to 
implement the tapping of the skills of CSOs in preventive diplomacy it may go a long way in resolving regional 
conflicts through embracing and inclusive measures. This is because in the view of Peck (1998: 185), CSOs ―have 
the potential for tapping into a broader base of ideas and approaches...ability to bring serious problems to public 
awareness and exert pressure on governments to respond...‖ 
 
Therefore, although the SADC was faced with a barrage of challenges in its Lesotho missions, it gained some 
insights and experiences on how to better traverse the route to successful preventive diplomacy and there is no 
doubt that, with the political will to learn and correct their mistakes, the SADC will make more organised and efficient 
future regional peace interventions. As the Eminent Person in the Lesotho dialogue facilitation rightly observed “[t]he 
preventive measures will improve with time and therefore SADC should not just give up and say because they tried 
somewhere, then it didn‟t work, or they tried in Lesotho and it didn‟t work. They should fashion their tools to be equal 
to the task of fulfilling the job and resulting in a situation with measures that will quell the situation” (Interview with R 
10, 23 May 2011). And indeed, as another participant observed, since its preventive missions more than a decade 
ago “SADC has evolved a lot and it has put in place a number of measures and it is continuing to do so” (Interview 
with R 14,  20 June 2011). One participant concluded by saying “[i]t remains to be seen how effective the security 
sector is, given the new mandate of having a SADC standby force which hasn‟t been put to test as yet” (Interview 
with R 13,  16 June 2011). The good thing is that the SADC is willing to learn from its shortcomings and put some 
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remedial measures in place as reflected in the above interviews. Hopefully, the organisation will improve its 
performance in future operations as a result of the lessons they obtained from their previous engagements.  
 
However, Sejanamane (1996: 83) disagrees that the Lesotho case has provided a model for the regional body‘s 
future regional peace interventions. He states that ―[t]hat there is a need for some form of stability in the region is not 
in doubt, but how to ensure that has up to now eluded everybody.‖  
 
8.10 Conclusion 
Diverse arguments and perceptions about the SADC interventions in Lesotho were raised by different participants in 
this study. It emerged that the SADC had both successes and challenges in diffusing the Lesotho conflicts. The study 
also revealed that the SADC preventive diplomacy mechanism has numerous shortcomings in terms of its 
operations. For example, in the case of the 1998 military mission, it remains unclear whether it was really authorised 
by the SADC.  It also emerged from the study that the SADC preventive missions failed to address the structural 
economic challenges in the Kingdom of Lesotho which appear to be the major sources of conflicts. The study also 
revealed that the SADC has learnt a lot from the Lesotho experience on how they can model their preventive 
diplomacy architecture for future regional operations. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
Conclusion and Recommendations 
9.1 Introduction 
The aim of this study was to examine the efficacy of the SADC preventive diplomacy mechanism in view of its 
missions in the Kingdom of Lesotho in 1994, 1998 and 2007 respectively. This chapter presents a summary and 
conclusions from the findings in relation to the literature reviewed and theoretical frameworks which guided the study. 
It also provides recommendations on how the SADC should improve the structures and operations of its preventive 
diplomacy architecture on the basis of its experiences in Lesotho. In addition, the chapter outlines some fertile areas 
for future research in light of the scope and limitation of this study. 
 
9.2 Summary of the findings 
The study examined the SADC preventive diplomacy missions in Lesotho as a case study to determine the efficacy 
of the regional bloc in conflict prevention, management and resolution as stipulated in its treaty and security 
protocols. The empirical data for the study was obtained through in-depth interviews from key stakeholders such as 
officials from the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS), representatives of different political parties, 
representatives of different Non-Governmental Organisations in Lesotho, former soldiers who were involved during 
the missions and the Eminent Person who was involved during the 1994 and 2007 missions in the Kingdom. 
 
Data analysis drew extensively from the in-depth interviews and the literature and theories on regional integration, 
conflict prevention, management and resolution. The analysis hinged on the questions about the motivations, 
justifications, mandate, legitimacy, challenges, successes and lessons drawn from the SADC missions in Lesotho. 
The research findings presented the different views and perspectives from the different research participants on the 
above themes about the SADC missions in Lesotho. It emerged that while the SADC intervened in Lesotho in 1994 
and 2007 through non-coercive and coercive measures in1998, peace and stability remains elusive in the Kingdom. 
The research findings also revealed that while the ruling party regarded the SADC interventions as legitimate and 
within its regional mandate, opposition parties deemed the missions, especially the 1998 military intervention to be an 
illegal interference in the domestic affairs of the Kingdom. The opposition felt that South Africa intervened in the 
Kingdom to safeguard its national interest as opposed to the proclaimed motives for the defence of democracy and 
regional peace. Compelling arguments from different interviewees were presented and supported by literature from 
the study. 
 
Evidence from the study revealed that the SADC preventive diplomacy in the Kingdom of Lesotho especially the 
1998 military intervention were surrounded by questions of who authorised the mission and its exact mandate. Such 
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perceptions raised questions on the legality of the mission. For instance, there was no evidence of the SADC Summit 
mandating South Africa and Botswana to undertake the military mission on behalf of the regional body. There was 
also no evidence that the SADC contacted the UN Security prior to its interventions as stated in Chapter 53 of the UN 
Charter. This raises questions as to whether the mission was really a regional project or an adventure by the 
individual countries for their own national interests. 
 
The findings also revealed that most of the interviewees advocated non-coercive diplomacy measures for regional 
peace-keeping efforts. It emerged that while they hailed the 1999 and 2007 SADC missions, they denounced the 
military intervention of 1998 as an invasion and violation of Lesotho sovereignty and territorial integrity. The 
participants also reflected on how the SADC failed to enforce its peace resolutions during the 1994, 1998 and 2007 
missions. For instance, it emerged that during the Masire-led dialogue facilitation, the LCD government remained 
consistently intransigent leading to the collapse of the talks and the SADC as the mandating regional body could not 
prevail on the government to comply with the resolution. This led to some participants viewing SADC as a useless 
body whose role is to defend their regional counterparts rather than the regional citizenry. 
 
The data also revealed that while the SADC experienced operational hurdles, it managed through the three missions 
to bring the warring political entities to dialogue, restored law and order, democracy and peace in the Kingdom. The 
participants indicated how the SADC managed to establish the Interim Political Authority which co-ordinated electoral 
reforms, re-training of the highly politicise Lesotho security establishment after the 1998 mission. To date, the SADC 
is in partnership with the Council of Churches in Lesotho and other non-governmental organisations in negotiating a 
peaceful settlement of the post-2007 electoral disputes and preparations for fair, free and credible election in 2012. 
 
9.3 Recommendations for improvement of the SADC Preventive Diplomacy Mechanism 
It also emerged from the research findings that the SADC drew some lessons from its preventive diplomacy missions 
in Lesotho. Several participants noted that the SADC needed to developed early warning systems to establish 
potential crisis spots for proactive responses. Evidence from the three missions in Lesotho and in other cases such 
as the DRC, Zimbabwe and Madagascar revealed that the SADC was reactive in its response to regional conflicts 
and this resulted in thorny challenges as reflected in the previous chapters. Participants indicated that the SADC 
should have established early warning and risk assessment systems to co-ordinate when and how to respond. 
 
It was also evident from the data that the SADC does not have a clearly established standard intervention policy to 
coordinate its preventive missions. It emerged that individual member states can intervene even when there is no 
clear mandate from the regional body as was experienced in Lesotho and the DRC. That the SADC also lacks a clear 
intervention policy was reflected by its retroactive legitimisation of the DRC mission while it was surrounded by 
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controversy. It is from such shortcomings that the SADC needs a clearly constituted and operationalised intervention 
policy code which binds the organisation and all member states. Such a policy would ensure a smooth operation of 
the envisaged SADC stand-by force. 
 
Among other things, the SADC should expedite the establishment of its regional stand-by force to avoid the adhoc 
operations by individual member states in regional peace-keeping missions as experienced in the DRC and Lesotho. 
The SADC Brigade would see a force trained on standard military ethics and codes to defend regional peace and 
stability. The situation as it is now is that individual member states have different security and defence policies and 
this creates numerous challenges when the troops are hastily deployed for peace-keeping missions. The differences 
experienced during the operations of the South African and Botswana troops in Lesotho are a case in point. An ever-
ready and well-prepared regional force would go a long way to achieve durable regional peace and stability. Such a 
force should be supported by political will and material resources from member states for it to have any substantive 
impact in the region. 
 
The research findings also indicated that the SADC need expert mediators in its preventive diplomacy interventions. 
It emerged that the SADC depends on former Heads of state as mediators. The issue is that while the former 
presidents can rely on their stature to prevail over the mediation, they need expert support from people trained in 
conflict mediation and negotiations as well as psychologists who understand how the human mind works. During the 
interviews, several participants revealed necessity of such experts within the SADC security organ to provide expert 
guidance to mediation processes. The expert team would also assist in identifying the structural sources of conflicts 
which if accordingly addressed would eliminate chances for the recurrence of conflicts. For instance, it emerged that 
one of the root causes of conflicts in Lesotho was economic underdevelopment and failure by the successive 
governments to equitably distribute wealth to the people. However, in its post-conflict peacebuilding measures SADC 
did not assist in the economic realm. Instead, they focused on the political sphere hence peace and stability will 
remain elusive in the Kingdom. Experts on conflicts converge on the fact that for any intervention to bear fruits, it 
should be informed by identification of the underlying sources of the conflict at hand.  
 
The SADC security mechanism also needs to embrace the post-Cold War definition of security which is not restricted 
to the defence of the state but is inclusive of human security. In its missions in Lesotho the SADC seemed to be 
locked in their classical militaristic definition of security. In light of this, the SADC failed to detect that the root causes 
of the conflicts in Lesotho was not political but a defective economy which is heavily dependent on South Africa. A 
definition of security which pledges to advance the needs of the people, promote democracy and democratic 
governance, human security, human rights, freedoms and justice, equitable distribution of national wealth, economic 
growth and food security and human welfare would be a lasting mitigating factor to regional conflicts. In view of this, 
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SADC needs established and well-resourced structures to fight social ills such as poverty, underdevelopment, 
undemocratic governance, corruption, illiteracy and disease. It is clear that most of the countries in the region are 
candidates for such ills which no doubt breed incessant conflict. Basic human needs theorists and the Marxists 
maintain that a situation where the people are deprived of their existential needs will never enjoy peace and stability. 
 
9.4 Recommendations for Future Research 
As indicated in Chapter One, this study had limitations in terms of scope and methodology. For instance, it was a 
case study of the SADC preventive diplomacy in the case of Lesotho. Data was only collected through in-depth 
interviews and literature on regional organisations and conflict management. As such, there is no doubt that its 
findings cannot be exhaustive of the broad range of regional organisations and their experiences in regional conflict 
prevention, management and resolution. It is important to note that the SADC was also involved in the DRC, 
Zimbabwe and Madagascar. In view of this it would be necessary for empirical research on the SADC preventive 
missions in these countries. This is more so because each conflict situation has its own peculiarities which should be 
considered in determining the efficacy of the regional bloc on consideration. What we are saying is that the 
challenges which the SADC encountered in Lesotho would not be similar to the ones it encountered in Zimbabwe, 
the DRC or Madagascar. 
 
It would also be necessary for future research to embark on comparative studies, for example of the SADC and other 
regional organisations in regional preventive diplomacy missions. Such studies would broaden the scope by bringing 
experiences from other regions and provide rich data from which a holistic understanding of the operations of 
regional organisations could be drawn. The failures and successes of SADC in fulfilling its regional mandate would 
be benchmarked through such studies. 
 
Another fertile area for future research would be the role of the SADC Panel of Eminent Persons in regional conflict 
prevention, management and resolution. The SADC has relied on former Presidents, for instance Sir Ketumile Masire 
(Botswana) in Lesotho and Joaquim Chissano (Mozambique) in Madagascar. Research on their operational 
mandates, challenges and how best they can be empowered and supported would go a long in enhancing regional 
peace and stability. Data from this study revealed that the Masire-led Commission in the Kingdom of Lesotho was not 
only under-resourced but it was not sufficiently supported by the regional organisation in terms of enforcing its 
resolutions. 
 
Finally, studies need to be conducted on the role of civil society organisations in conflict prevention, management 
and resolution. It emerged from the literature that non-governmental organisations have played a prominent role in 
different conflict set-ups, and regional organisations should tap into such potentials during their preventive missions. 
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Some participants in this study revealed that the SADC did not formally involve the civil society organisations during 
its missions in Lesotho. As such a study focused on the extent to which the SADC involve the civil society 
organisation in its structures and operations is imperative. 
 
9.5 Conclusion 
This chapter presented a summary of the research findings and recommendations on how the SADC should improve 
the operations of its preventive diplomacy mechanism. The study revealed that while the SADC had made 
commendable strides in the development of its security mechanism, it still has a long way to go as revealed by its 
operations in Lesotho. It also suggested other areas for future research on the SADC security architecture. Such 
studies would add to the existing literature on the SADC preventive diplomacy mechanism and how best it could be 
improved for a peaceful SADC region. 
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Appendix C 
 
Objectives of the Organ on Politics Defence and Security (OPDS) 
1. The general objective of the Organ shall be to promote peace and security in the region 
2. The specific objectives of the organ are to; 
a) protect the people and safeguard the development of the region against instability arising from the 
breakdown of law and order, intra-state conflict and an aggression; 
b) promote political cooperation among State Parties and the evolution of common political values and 
institutions; 
c) develop common foreign policy approaches on issues of mutual concern and advance policy collectively in 
international fora; 
d) promote regional coordination and cooperation on matters related to security and defence and establish 
appropriate mechanisms to this end 
e) prevent, contain and resolve inter- and intra-state conflict by peaceful means; 
f) consider enforcement action in accordance with international law and as a matter of last resort where 
peaceful means have failed; 
g) promote the development of democratic institutions and practices within the territories of State Parties and 
encourage the observance of universal human rights as provided for in the Charters and Conventions of the 
African Union and the United Nations respectively 
h) consider the development of a collective security capacity and conclude a Mutual Defence Pact to respond 
to external military threats; 
i) develop close cooperation between the police and state security services of State Parties in order to 
address‘ (i) cross border crime and promote community based approach to domestic security 
j) observe, and encourage State parties to implement United Nations, African Union and other international 
conventions and treaties on arms control, disarmament and peaceful relations between states; 
k) develop peacekeeping capacity of national defence forces and coordinate the participation of State Parties 
in international and regional peacekeeping operations and 
l) enhance regional capacity in respect of disaster management and coordination of international humanitarian 
assistance.  
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Appendix D 
Interview Schedule  
(What is your perception of your government/organisation/ political party role regarding the SADC interventions in 
Lesotho?  In your view (or the view of your government/political party/organisation) were the SADC preventive 
missions of 1994 and 1998 in Lesotho justified? Please give reasons for your answer.  
 
1. What role did your government/political party/ organisation etc play during and after the interventions? 
 
2. Some critics have argued that the 1998 SADC military intervention in Lesotho was motivated by the small size, 
weak politico-economic and unique geographical position of the country in the SADC region. What is your view (the 
view of your government/political party/organisation) on these perceptions? (Some political commentators hold that 
the (SADC) South African-led military intervention in Lesotho cast doubts (raise questions) on the sovereignty of the 
Kingdom in relation to South Africa. What is your comment?).  
 
3. What challenges were faced by the SADC during and after the preventive missions of 1994 and 1998 in Lesotho?  
 
4. What post -conflict-intervention measures were put in place after the Lesotho interventions (How effective were the 
post-conflict peace-building measures?)  
 
5. Would you say the Lesotho preventive missions (1994 and 1998) were a success or failure? Please give reasons 
foryour answer.  
 
6. The SADC was involved in both the 1994 and 1998 preventive missions in the Kingdom of Lesotho and the 
organisation employed non-coercive and coercive measures respectively. Which of the two intervention mechanism 
would you recommend for future SADC preventive measures? Please give reasons for your answer.  
7. Has the SADC preventive mission in Lesotho provided any valuable lessons for future regional preventive 
measures in the region? (What lessons were learnt (should the SADC have learnt) from the Lesotho 
preventive missions?  
 
8. What recommendations/suggestions would you make on the structural/institutional/policies and 
operational modalities of the SADC preventive mechanism in view of the Lesotho intervention of 1994 and 
1998?  
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9. Anything else you would want to say about the SADC preventive mechanism in Lesotho or the region in 
general? (What would be your last word/input on the SADC preventive machinery?  
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APPENDIX E 
Interview Schedule: Lesotho Dialogue Facilitator 
 
 
1.  As a member of the SADC Troika during the 1994 SADC intervention in the Kingdom of Lesotho,. Could 
you please take me through the sequence of events which motivated the SADC intervention? 
2. In your view were the SADC preventive missions of 1994 and 1998 justified? Please give reasons for your 
answer. 
3. Would you say the 1994 and 1998 SADC preventive missions in Lesotho were a success or a failure? 
Please give reasons for your answer. 
4.  What is your opinion on the perception that the eruption of violent conflict in 1998 and 2007 might be a 
reflection of a failed non-coercive preventive diplomacy in Lesotho? 
5. 5 What is your view regarding the 1998 SADC military intervention in Lesotho? 6 What peace building 
measures were put in place after the 1994 and then the 1998 preventive missions? Would you say these 
measures were effective in preventing the recurrence of conflicts in the Kingdom? 
6. 7 The 2007 elections in Lesotho were followed by violent protests by the opposition parties and you were 
appointed the SADC peace facilitator. In your view what are the core issues which give rise to violent 
conflict which hasve followed almost all elections in the country? 
7. 8 What challenges did you encounter as the facilitator of the Lesotho peace process? 
8. 9 On the basis of the Lesotho experience would you say the SADC has a coherent and efficient preventive 
diplomacy mechanism? 
 
10 What recommendations/suggestions would you make for future preventive missions on the basis of the 
Lesotho experience? Is there anything else you would like to say generally about the SADC preventive 
mechanism and operations in the region in general? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 537 
 
Appendix F 
 
Interview Schedule:  Former soldiers (Retired) 
 
1. In 1998, the SADC (SA and Botswana) intervened militarily in the Kingdom of Lesotho (Operation Boleas). What 
do you motivated the military intervention? 
 
2. In your view was the SADC military intervention necessary/justified? Please give reasons for your answer. 
 
3. Some political commentators have argued that the 1998 military intervention in Lesotho was not mandated by the 
UN, the AU or the SADC. What is your opinion of these arguments?  
4. South Africa and Botswana as SADC members were opposed to military intervention in the DRC in 1998.  Why do 
you think they opted for military action in Lesotho? 
 
5. There are perceptions that the military intervention in Lesotho in 1998 was motivated by the small size, weak 
economic-political and unique geographical position of Lesotho in the region. What is your view on these 
perceptions? 
 
6. The Botswana intervention force (contingent) did not meet much resistance orconfrontation in Lesotho in 1998 as 
compared to the South African force. What do you think was the reason for such a difference? 
 
7. What was the mandate of the SADC intervention force in Lesotho? 
 
8. What challenges/difficulties did the SADC intervention force face during the preventive mission? 
 
9. What peace-building measures did the SADC put in place after the Lesotho mission of 1998? 
 
10. How effective were the post-conflict peace initiatives in preventing the recurrence of conflicts in Lesotho? 
 
11. In what ways did the SADC involve the Lesotho Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) during and after the 
intervention to resolve the conflict? 
 
12. In your view was the SADC military preventive mission a success or failure? Please give reasons for your 
answer. 
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13. What lessons were learnt by the SADC security mechanism from the Lesotho preventive mission of 1998? 
 
14. What recommendations/ suggestions would you make on the structural/institutional/policies and operational 
modalities of the SADC preventive mechanism in view of the Lesotho military intervention of 1998? 
 
 15.  Is there anything else you would want to say about the SADC preventive mission in Lesotho or the region in 
general? 
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Appendix G 
Interview Schedule: SADC OPDS officials, Independent Experts (Academics; Political 
Scientists/Commentators 
 
1. SADC intervened in the Kingdom of Lesotho in 1994, 2007 and 2007. In your view were the SADC preventive 
missions in Lesotho justified? Please give reasons for your answer. 
 
2.Article 11(a), (b) and (c) of the Protocol on the Politics Defence and Security (OPDs) pledge to use peaceful means 
in resolving both intra-state and inter-state conflicts. Article 11 (a) of the Protocol also pledges to respect the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the SADC members states. Why did the SADC opt for military intervention in the 
1998 Lesotho? 
 
3. Some political commentators maintain that the military intervention (1998) was not authorised or mandated by 
SADC neither by the African Union nor the UN as expected. What is your comment to such views? 
 
4. Critics have also argued that the SADC military intervention in Lesotho raised questions regarding the sovereignty 
of Lesotho in relation to South Africa. What is your opinion?  
 
5. It is on record that South Africa and Botswana were opposed to military intervention in the DRC. What factors do 
you think motivated their decision for military action in the case of Lesotho? 
 
6. Some critics hold that the 1998 SADC military intervention in Lesotho was motivated by the small size, weak 
politico-economic and unique geographical position of the country in the SADC region. What is your stance to such 
perceptions? 
 
7. In what ways did the SADC involve the Civil Society Organisations during and after the 1994, 1998 and 2007 
missions? 
 
8. What challenges were faced by the SADC during and after the preventive missions of 1994, 1998 and 2007? 
 
9. What peace-building measures did the SADC put in place after the preventive missions to prevent the recurrence 
of conflicts? How effectiove were these post-conflict-peace-building measures? 
 
10 What would you say were the successes and failures of the SADC preventive missions in Lesotho? 
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11. The Lesotho elections of 2007 were followed by protests by opposition parties over the electoral procedures and 
allocation of proportional representation seats in Parliament. Can this be an indication that the SADC peace-building 
measures were not effective in curbing the recurrence of conflicts in the Kingdom? 
 
12. Following the 2007 post-election disputes the SADC mandated Sir Ketumile Masire to facilitate dialogue between 
the government and the opposition parties. What challenges were encountered by the mission? 
 
13. Has the SADC preventive missions in Lesotho provided any lessons for future preventive measures in the 
region?  What lessons did SADC learn from the Lesotho experience? 
 
14. What recommendations/suggestions would you make on the structural and operational strategies of the SADC 
preventive diplomacy mechanism in view of the Lesothomissions? 
 
15. What are your final thoughts on the SADC preventive diplomacy machinery? 
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Appendix H 
Interview Schedule: Representatives of Non-Governmental Organisations in Lesotho 
 
1. SADC intervened in Lesotho following the post-1993, 1998 and 2007 electoral disputes. Were the interventions 
justified/ necessary? 
2. In what ways did the SADC involve the Civil Society Organisations during andafter the missions? 
3. What role did your organisation play in bringing peace and stability in Lesotho? 
4. What challenges were faced by the SADC during and after the preventive missions?  
5. Were the SADC preventive missions a success or failure? Please give reasons for your answer? 
6. On the basis of the Lesotho intervention would you say the SADC has an effective preventive diplomacy 
mechanism? 
7. The Christian Council of Lesotho took over the mediation after the collapse of the Masire-led mediation. What 
support do you get from SADC? 
8. How effective was your partnership with SADC towards resolving the political impasse in the Kingdom? 
9. What challenges did your organisation face in trying to find a solution to the disputes in Lesotho? 
10. What do you think should be done in order to find a lasting solution to the Kingdom‘s conflicts? 
11 What recommendations/suggestions would you make on the structural and operational modalities of the SADC 
preventive diplomacy mechanism? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
